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M. J. VERMASEREN

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EDITED BY

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PREFACE

During the last few years my colleagues Dr B. Hartmann, Dr M. S. H. G. Heerma van Voss, deans of the Theological faculties of the Leyden and Amsterdam Universities respectively, and myself have met several times to look into the possibility of bringing into closer contact scholars of the various faculties in which the religions of Classical Antiquity are studied. For the most part these scholars are associated with the Netherlands section of the IAHR since they are mainly concerned with the study of Greek and Roman religion. However, there is a large group interested in the classical religions who are not professionals in the same way as the theologians under whose responsibility these studies are placed.

With the complete agreement of various other colleagues and of the Council of the Dutch section of IAHR we decided to devote the autumn meeting of the national section for the study of religions to the theme of Hellenistic religion. The response to this initiative was so great that a large number of younger and older students and scholars of all Universities were present on 1 October 1977. The meeting was held in the Allard Pierson Museum at Amsterdam by kind permission of its Director Prof. Dr J. Hemelrijk; this had the advantage of bringing everybody into direct contact with the hellenistic archaeological documents and Dr R. A. Lunsingh Scheurleer, Keeper of the Museum, had even organized a small special exhibition of religious monuments of the Hellenistic age. Only a few of the lectures could in fact be delivered; the complete rich harvest of this succesful day is published in this book. We can only hope that this experience will inspire other similar meetings in the Netherlands and elsewhere.

M. J. VERMASEREN

THE HELLENISTIC CONCEPT OF THE ENVIOUSNESS OF FATE

G. J. D. AALDERS H.Wzn.
(Amsterdam, Free University)

At the end of his Histories, Polybius,[1] having come back to Greece, asks all the gods to let the existing situation continue for the rest of his life, remembering 'that fate is powerful in conceiving envy against men and displays its power especially in those spheres in which man thinks that he is most successful and prosperous in his life'.

It is clear from this that Polybius was convinced that fate, Τύχη, was capricious and incalculable and that he was apprehensive that the situation might change, as it so often did after success and good luck. This can, of course, in itself be regarded as a universally human attitude and this is certainly so in the case of pessimistic authors, but what is striking is that an (all too) human feeling, envy, is ascribed to blind fate. One is involuntarily reminded in this context of the well-known early Greek concept of the envy of the gods or the deity. This inevitably gives rise to the question as to whether — or to what extent — the concept of the enviousness of Tyche, which Polybius was certainly not the only author in the Hellenistic world to mention, was a later transformation of the early Greek idea of the envy of the deity. A further question that arises is to what extent Polybius, in the passage quoted above, was expressing his own personal conviction or whether he was using the idea of Tyche's envy, in accordance with a well-known traditional concept, simply as a rhetorical embellishment.

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[1] 39.8.2.

I

The early Greek concept of the envy of the deity,[2] who pitilessly struck down mortals whose prosperity or good fortune exceeded the measure, was apparently only marginally important during the last decades of the fifth century B.C.[3] The concept certainly occurs here and there in the literature of the later centuries and even until late in the imperial period, but it is only found as the echo of an early tradition. As such, it was also taken over by the Romans[4] as a literary theme.[5]

The statements about Tyche's envious nature can be interpreted as a transformation of the earlier idea, resulting from the predominating importance given to Tyche during the Hellenistic period. The matter could be allowed to rest there,[6] were it not for the fact that a concept that is essentially different from the one with which we are familiar from the writings of the earlier Greek authors is at the basis of a number of Hellenistic and later statements about the enviousness of fate. It is therefore valuable to examine these later statements a little more closely.

Tradition has attributed to two well-known historical figures, Camillus[7] and Aemilius Paullus,[8] the idea that human happiness is never unadulterated and that adversity occurs at the climax of prosperity and good fortune through the action of an envious higher power. No doubt as a kind of edifying political thought, the desire that this inevitable adversity would take place in their private lives and that the state would not be affected[9] is also attributed to these two men, although this did happen only to Paullus.

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[2] For the most recent information about this, see Aalders, *De oud-Griekse voorstelling van de afgunst der godheid*, Mededelingen KNAW, afdeling Letterkunde, N.R. 38.2, Amsterdam and Oxford (1975).

[3] See Aalders, *op. cit.*, p. 10ff.

[4] See B. Lier, "Topica carminum sepulcralium Latinorum", *Philologus* 62 (1903), p. 473: "A Graecis autem Romanos has opiniones mutuatos esse, ex titulis graecis cum latinis comparatis apparebit".

[5] See, for example, Dion. Halic., *A.R.*, 3.21.1; Verg., *Aen.* 6.64f.; 870f.; Lucan., 9.65f.; Plut., *Consol. ad Apoll.* 105ab; *Pomp.* 42.12; *Ant.* 44.5; W. Peek, *Griechische Versinschriften* I (= *GV*), Berlin (1955), 1732 = *Griechische Grabgedichte* (= *GG*), Berlin (1960) 360; Festus, *Epitome* 24. See also Aalders, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[6] The present author did this fairly recently (*op. cit.*, p. 12).

[7] Dion. Halic., *A.R.*, 12.14 (20); Liv. 5.21.15; Val. Max. 1.5.2; Plut., *Cam.* 5.8.

[8] Diod. 31.11.2-3; Liv. 45.41.7; Vell. Pat. 1.10.4; Sen., *Cons. ad Marciam*, 13.3; Plut., *Aem. Paullus* 36 (cp. *Reg. et Imp. Apophth.* 198cd); App., *Mac.* 19. Subject to a Greek influence, Paullus may possibly have expressed himself in this way because of his own inner conviction; see Plut., *Aem. Paullus*, 37.1. See also N. K. Petrochilos, *Roman Attitude to the Greeks*, Athens (1974), p. 115f. The tradition in question may, however, go back to Polybius, on whose writings both Livy and Diodorus drew.

What is particularly striking in this tradition about Camillus and Paullus as well as in an anecdote about Philip II of Macedon which probably also dates back to the Hellenistic period[10] is the idea of compensation contained in it, an idea that is known to us from the early concept of the envy of the deity. Philip did not try himself to bring about a set-back which would have been relatively easy for him to bear at the climax of his successes, as Polycrates did in the well-known story in Herodotus[11] by throwing a precious ring into the sea, but, like Camillus and Paullus, prayed for this to happen. It should also be noted that, like Polybius in his epilogue, Philip and Camillus were apprehensive about the enviousness of fate, but directed their prayer to the gods or the deity.[12]

The idea of compensation is not always so clearly present, however, in statements about divine envy in the Hellenistic literature and in the literature of the imperial period which built up on that of the Hellenistic period. Envy was aroused, it was thought, by any great piece of good fortune, remarkable success, great talent or high expectations. Philostratus, for example, said of a very gifted orator who died young that he was a victim of envy[13] and Libanius said, in his funeral oration on the emperor Julian, that the envious *daimon* was more powerful than reasonable expectations.[14] There are many such ideas to be found in metrical epitaphs, both in Greek and Latin, and especially during the imperial period. In these epitaphs, the person's death is ascribed to the envy of a divine power or to that of fate.[15] Sometimes the only reason for speaking of such envy is the early or premature moment of death.[16]

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[9] According to Plutarch, Antony also asked the gods for this for the sake of his army (*Ant.* 44.5).

[10] Plut., *Cons. ad Apoll.* 105ab; *Reg. et Imp. Apophth.* 177c.

[11] 3.41. For this passage, see also H. S. Versnel, "Polycrates and his Ring. Two Neglected Aspects", *Studi Storico Religiosi* (1977), p. 17ff.

[12] The δαιμόνιον invoked by Paullus in Diod. 31.11.2 is, according to the context, the (personified) Tyche.

[13] φθόνῳ ἁλούς, *V.S.* 2.612. See also Quint., *Inst. or.* 6, Prooem. 10, for the early death of gifted young men: ...ut prorsus posset hinc esse tanti fulminis metus quod observatum fere est celerius occidere festinatam maturitatem, et esse nescioquam quae spes tantas decerpat invidiam, ne videlicet ultra quam homini datum est nostra provehantur.

[14] ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζον μὲν ἴσχυσεν ὁ φθονερὸς δαίμων εὐλόγων ἐλπίδων (18.2).

Even in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. this divine envy was not attributed to particular, individual gods.[17] Later there was even less question of individuality in the case of envy on the part of the gods.[18] Quite often envy is mentioned without any further qualification.[19] Phthonos was also often personified.[20] In most cases, however, apart from the obvious personifications of death and the underworld (such as Hades or Moira[21]), only the indefinite term δαίμων was used[22] or Tyche was named,[23] when reference was made to an envious divine or supernatural power.

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[15] See Lier, *Philol.* (1903), p. 473ff.; see also Aalders, *op. cit.*, p. 12, note 30.

[16] See, for example, *GV* 591 (= *GG* 297); *IG* VII, 1882.

[17] See M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* I, Munich (1955^2), p. 735, note 1; Aalders, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[18] *GV* 1732 (= *GG* 360), according to which the gods might have done better to put Envy to death.

[19] See, for example, *A.P.* 9.149 (Augustan); Quint., *Inst. or.* 6, Prooem. 10 (n. 13); Plut., *Non posse* 1090c; G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca ex lapidibus collecta* (= EG), Berlin (1878), 560; 583.3: φθόνος ἄδικος τις; 692.3; Kaibel, 'Supplementum epigrammatum Graecorum', *Rhein. Museum*, New Series 34, p. 690 ad n. 611; *A.P.* 7.361; 9.153 (Agathias).

[20] See, for example, *A.P.* 9.256 (the early imperial period); Apul., *Met.* 4.14; *GV* 591; 719; 833; 1732; 1809 (= *GG* 297; 288; 256; 360; 364); *A.P.* 8.85b; 90; 100; 121; 126; 128 (all by Gregory Nazianzen). For the personification of Phthonos, see O. Höfer in W.H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* III, 2, Leipzig (1902-1909), col. 2473ff., and E. Bernert, *RE* 39 (1941), col. 961ff.

[21] See, for example, *A.P.* 7.387 (Augustan); *GV* 1114; 1594 (= *GG* 338; 350); *EG* 144; 474; 596a; 618a, 10. For Latin parallels, see Lier, *Philologus* (1903), p. 475.

[22] See, for example, Dion. Halic., *A.R.* 3.21.1; Plut., *Cons. ad Apoll.* 105b; *Pomp.* 42.12; App., *Mac.* 19; *IG* VII, 1882; *EG* 345; 348; 497a; 536.3-4; 574.8; 596a; 579.1 (without any qualification, but clearly belonging to the same group of ideas). δαίμων or δαιμόνιον can also often mean fate (see above, note 12), but the indefinite nature of the expression should not be overlooked.

[23] See, for example, Diod. 31.11.2-3; Laberius in Macr., *Sat.* 2.7.3 v. 16ff.; Plut., *Cons. ad Apoll.* 105b; *Mul. virt.* 254e; *Aem. Paullus* 36.5-8; *EG* 489; 664.5. See also the association of Fortuna with Invidia in Statius, *Silv.* 2.1.120ff. and 5.1.137.

The following data can be established when the Hellenistic and later statements about the envy of the deity or fate are compared with the earlier Greek concept of the envy of the deity:

a. The personal, individual character of the envious deity is thrust further into the background, to the extent of making envy an independent reality or personifying it.

b. The idea of compensation is not entirely absent, but envy is not aroused by a transgression of the limits imposed on mortal man or by a disturbance of the equilibrium of the cosmos. It is also not aroused by moral guilt. It is quite arbitrarily directed against anything that is beautiful, happy, successful, gifted, promising or young. Its victims do not always lose their lives, as often is said in the epitaphs that have been preserved. They may also lose their personal good fortune or their children, as Aemilius Paullus did. Sometimes a successful career is brought to an end, as happened in the case of an athlete who suffered a physical disability.[24]

c. This envy is not a *de facto* envy in the strict sense of the word, since the deity does not begrudge men something that he does not possess himself, nor does he want to keep something from men that he does possess himself. It is rather a form of malice.[25] The idea of φθόνος as an evil demon is frequently encountered.[26] It is not purely fortuitous that βάσκανος or βασκανία is often used in later texts instead of φθόνος or φθονερός.[27] Βάσκανος originally meant possessed or bewitched, for example, by the evil eye.[28] Later it came to be used for the malicious and as it were bewitching entanglement brought about by the powers of fate and death and from which it is impossible to escape.

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[24] MAMA 8.417.18-23: ὧν ἕνεκα ἁπάντων πρὸς τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς δόξης ἑρπύσας ὁ φθόνος τὸ κοινὸν ἡμῶν ἀγαθὸν νεμεσήσας ἀπήνεγκεν ἐνερείσας εἰς μέρη τοῦ σώματος τὰ εὐχρηστότατα πανκρατιασταῖς τοῦς ὤμους. See R. Merkelbach, "Der griechische Wortschatz und die Christen", *ZPE* 18 (1975), p. 124.

[25] Despite the fact that gods are discussed in this text, not fate, a fragment by the Roman annalist Q. Claudius Quadrigarius (F 9 Peter), found in A. Gellius (*Noct. Att.* 17.2.16) is worth quoting: Nam haec maxime versatur deorum iniquitas, quod deteriores sunt incolomiores neque optimum quemquam inter nos sinunt diurnare.

[26] See, for example, E. Peterson, Εἷς Θεός. *Epigraphische, formgeschichtliche und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, Göttingen (1926), p. 34ff.; C. B. Welles, "Inscriptions from Dura-Europos", *YCS* 14 (1955), p. 153; L. Robert, "Recherches épigraphiques", *REA* 62 (1960), p. 354 and *Hellenica* XI-XII, Paris (1960), p. 23; XIII (1965), p. 265, 268. See also Versnel, *Studi Storico Religiosi* 1 (1977), p. 29, note 46.

[27] Erinna called Hades βάσκανος already in the fourth century B.C. (*A.P.* 7.712, followed by *A.P.* 7.13). See also, for example, Plut. *Mul. virt.* 254e; *Non posse* 1090c; *GV* 1114 (= *GG* 388); *EG* 345; 379.1; 381; 496.6; 569a.3. See also the decree for

It is not simply occasional offshoots of the early idea of the envy of the deity that belong to the literary tradition. We are also bound to include many other later statements in which the envy of the deity or fate is mentioned among the numerous models ("Schablonen") of a society that was highly developed from the literary point of view. The persistence of this theme of envy in epitaphs and in the written tradition is clear evidence of this. The theme was even used quite frequently by such Christian authors as Gregory Nazianzen in epigrams (see note 20). The invidia theme is also found quite often in Latin Christian epitaphs.[29]

On the other hand, however, it would seem that the idea that men do not enjoy unadulterated good fortune and that great successes are often followed by adversity and even catastrophe is universally human. This universally human idea would, moreover, seem to underlie both the early Greek concept of the envy of the deity and the Hellenistic views concerning fate and life. In the Hellenistic period, however, this change in fortune was not attributed to personal, anthropomorphically conceived gods, but rather to a supra-individual world-power, frequently the Tyche.

This Tyche, which was often personified, was extremely important in the Hellenistic period.[30] There was an awareness that οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ποικιλώτερον τύχης.[31] As we have seen, the Hellenistic and

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the athlete M. Alfidius, who died during the contest in Naples (this has been reprinted by Merkelbach, *ZPE* 18, 1975, p. 146ff.), r. 14-16 and *MAMA* 8.417.19ff. (see above, note 24). Iunius Pollux (7.108) observed that joking amulets had been found in forges ἐπὶ φθόνου ἀποτροπῇ; in this context, he quoted from a comedy by Aristophanes that has not been preserved (F 826 Blaydés): βασκάνιον ἐπὶ κάμινον ἀνδρὸς χαλκέως. See, for βασκανία and related words, P. Steinlein, Φθόνος *und verwandte Begriffe in der älteren griechischen Literatur*, Erlangen Mach. schr. (1941), p. 103ff.

[28] See Theocr. 6.39; cf. A. F. Gow *ad l.*

[29] See Lier, *Philologus* (1903), p. 474, note 26.

[30] See Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* II, Munich (1961^2), p. 201ff.; E. Bayer, *Demetrios Phalereus der Athener*, Berlin (1942) (= Darmstadt, 1969), p. 164ff.

[31] *Menandri Sententiae*, ed. S. Jackel, F XVIII, p. 22, r. 26.

post-Hellenistic concept of an envious power ruling the world was essentially different from the earlier idea of the envy of the deity. What is more, it is very questionable whether the later concept emerged from the earlier idea, which seems to have had no essential religious significance by the fourth century B.C. Nevertheless, it is a very striking fact that the quality of envy or ill-will, which is in itself not a particularly obvious characteristic, was, during the Hellenistic period, ascribed to the Tyche, which possessed superior power and was compensatory or capricious and sometimes simply malicious. It would seem to be not entirely improbable that this particular quality at least was taken from the earlier Greek idea of the envy of the deity, an idea that was universally known from literature. Instead of fearing the ill-will of the gods, then, Polybius was able to invoke precisely these gods to protect him against the envy of fate.

II

We may, of course, legitimately ask whether what Polybius said about the envy of Tyche might not simply have been a rhetorical embellishment, as a suitable conclusion to his historical work. This is all the more likely as there is no reference at all to the envy of Tyche in those parts of his work that have been preserved, despite the fact that a great deal of importance is attached to Tyche throughout his Histories.[32] On the other hand, such rhetorical floscules are not in keeping with the style of an author such as Polybius. Especially at the solemn conclusion of his work, in which all the gods are addressed, a light-hearted or playful reference to the envious nature of the goddess of fate as a hackneyed popular idea or something similar would have been most unsuitable, even in the work of a less pessimistic author.

What is more, as we have already seen, the idea of an envious Tyche was not unknown in the Hellenistic period. The traditions concerning Aemilius Paullus (which may even have been taken from

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[32] See F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* I, Oxford (1957), p. 16ff.; *Polybius* (Sather Classical Lectures 42), Berkeley, Los Angeles and London (1972), p. 60ff.; K. von Fritz, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity*, New York (1954), p. 388ff.; P. Pédech, *La méthode historique de Polybe*, Paris (1964), p. 336ff.

Polybius' Histories) and Camillus are examples of this and they certainly come from the Hellenistic period. The clearest evidence of the familiarity of this idea of the enviousness of fate during the Hellenistic period, however, is the existence of the tradition that even Epicurus was ready to pray, in the manner of women, for the gifted young man[33] Pythocles, that retribution (νέμεσις) and φθόνος would not strike him because of his superior talents.[34]

In the Hellenistic period, then, men were clearly so conscious of the arbitrary nature of inevitable fate that the theme of ill-will was transposed from the early idea of the envy of the deity to the later concept of the enviousness of fate. This illustrates how insecure and helpless many men felt during that later period with regard to their fate. We may therefore conclude that Polybius was perfectly serious when he described Tyche as 'envious' at the end of his Histories.

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[33] He probably died before his nineteenth year. See Philod., *De morte* XII, 32ff.; Epic., F 161 and 165 Us.

[34] Plut., *Adv. Col.* 1124c.

THE LEGEND OF CYBELE'S ARRIVAL IN ROME

JAN BREMMER
(Utrecht)

In 204 B.C. the Romans festively introduced into their city the Anatolian goddess Cybele,[1] whose stone had arrived by ship from the Troad.[2] Her sea-journey was completely immemorable but from the last stage of her journey, from Ostia to Rome, a legend[3] arose from which we will discuss some details. Our main source is Ovid who gives the following account:

> "She had arrived at Ostia, where the Tiber divides to join the sea and flows with ampler sweep. All the knights and the grave senators, mixed up with the common folk, came to meet her at the mouth of the Tuscan river. With them walked mothers and daughters and brides, and the virgins who tended the sacred hearths. The men wearied their arms by tugging lustily at the rope; hardly did the foreign ship make head against the stream. A drought had long prevailed; the grass was parched and burnt; the loaded bark sank in the muddy shallows. Every man who lent a hand toiled beyond his strength and cheered on the workers by his cries. Yet the ship stuck fast, like an island firmly fixed in the middle of the sea. Astonished at the portent, the men did stand and quake. Claudia Quinta traced her descent from Clausus of old, and her beauty matched her nobility. Chaste was she, though not reputed so. Rumour unkind had wronged her, and a false charge had been trumped up against her: it told against her that she dressed sprucely, that she walked abroad with her hair dressed in varied fashion, that she had a ready tongue for gruff

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[1] I would like to thank F. Graf and Th. Korteweg for their comments on this paper.

[2] On Cybele, see H. Graillot, *Le culte de Cybèle* (Paris 1912); W. Burkert, *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* (Stuttgart 1977), 276-278; M. J. Vermaseren, *Cybele and Attis* (London 1977); idem, *Corpus Cultus Cybelae Attidisque* (CCCA), EPRO 50, vols 1-9 (Leiden 1977ff.). On the name of the goddess, Cybele/Kubaba, see E. Laroche, *Koubaba, déesse anatolienne, et le problème des origines de Cybèle*, in *Éléments orientaux dans la religion grecque ancienne* (Paris 1960); E. J. Furnée, *Die wichtigsten konsonantischen Erscheinungen des vorgriechischen* (The Hague/Paris 1972), 215 n. 66.

[3] For all sources, see E. Schmidt, *Kultübertragungen*, RGVV VIII, 2 (Giessen 1910), 1-30.

> old men. Conscious of innocence, she laughed at fame's untruths; but we of the multitude are prone to think the worst. When she had stepped forth from the procession of the chaste matrons, and taken up the pure water of the river in her hands, she thrice let it drip on her head, and thrice lifted her palms to heaven (all who looked on her thought that she was out of her mind), and bending the knee she fixed her eyes on the image of the goddess, and with dishevelled hair uttered these words: 'Thou fruitful Mother of the Gods, graciously accept thy suppliant's prayers on one condition. They say I am not chaste. If thou dost condemn me, I will confess my guilt; convicted by the verdict of a goddess, I will pay the penalty with my life. But if I am free of crime, give by thine act a proof of my innocency, and, chaste as thou art, do thou yield to my chaste hands'. She spoke, and drew the rope with a slight effort. My story is a strange one, but it is attested by the stage.[4]

Ovid's version, as he himself (326) indicates, was evidently influenced by the fact that this tale of Claudia was acted out on stage. The most likely occasion for such a performance of Claudia's feat was the Megalesia, the yearly festival of the Magna Mater, during which, since 194, plays had been performed.[5] One can hardly doubt that a play concerning a noble lady whose behaviour was not beyond suspicion must have been highly attractive for a public confronted with the attempts of August to improve the morals of precisely the class to which Claudia belonged.[6]

Cybele, however, was not the only one who stranded on arrival. The same fate happened to Heracles, as appears from the following local legend from Erythrae:

> But the statue (of Heracles) at Erythrai is not like the statues they call Aiginetan or the most ancient Athenian statues, but sheer Egyptian if ever a statue was. There was a wooden raft the god sailed on from Phoenician Tyre, though why this should happen even the Erythraians are unable to say: but when the raft reached the Ionian sea they say it

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[4] Ov. F. IV.291-328 in the translation by J. G. Frazer, *Ovid's Fasti* (London/New York 1931), 211-213. For a general commentary on the passage, see F. Bömer, *P. Ovidius Naso. Die Fasten* II (Heidelberg 1958), 234-236; for the iconography, see CCCA 3, no. 218f. and index *s.v.* Cybele. For her conditional confession (320f.), cp. R. Pettazoni, *La confessione dei peccati* III (Bologna 1936), 123; for the form of her prayer, see A. Henrichs, HSCP 80 (1976), 275f.

[5] Graillot, *o.c.*, 84-86.

[6] Cp. P. Csillag, *Das Eherecht des Augusteischen Zeitalters*, Klio 50 (1968), 111-138; R. I. Frank, *Augustus' Legislation on Marriage and Children*, CSCA 8 (1975), 41-52.

> anchored at the Middle cape, which is a mainland cape, the midmost that you pass sailing out of harbour at Erythrai to the island of Chios. When the raft came to the cape, the Erythraians took great trouble and the Chians showed no less enthusiasm each to bring the statue to their own city. Now there was an Erythraian who lived by fishing out at sea and had lost his eyesight from a disease; in the end this fisherman (who was called Phormion) saw in a dream that the women of Erythrai had to cut off their hair and the men must plait the women's hair into a cable and pull home the statue with it. The city women utterly refused to obey the dream, but those Thracian women who were enslaved or living in freedom in Erythrai allowed their hair to be cut off, and so the Erythraians hauled in the raft. The Thracians are the only women allowed into the Herakleion, and the people there still preserve the rope of hair even in my time; and in fact they say the fisherman's eyes were open and he could see for the rest of his life.[7]

To these two legends a third has to be added. Similar motifs as are encountered in the classical legends can also be found in the medieval 'Anschwemmungslegenden'. From these legends we will adduce the following one of the Wimpassinger Kreuz, a thirteenth-century crucifix — more than seven meters high and four meters wide — which perished in 1945 in the fire of the Viennese Stephansdom: Around 1350 a great cross with the image of the crucified saviour painted on it floated down the Donau and was stranded near Rossau where it proved to be impossible to remove the cross from this place. The following day a procession of the clergy with the population arrived and a simple Franciscan pulled the statue out of the river with his girdle without any difficulty.[8]

When we compare these three legends, we notice the following similarities: 1. There is a rather unusual statue. 2. It arrives from a distant place. 3. Near its place of destination it runs aground. 4. The statue is moved by or through mediation of persons who are outside or at the margin of society or the ruling social class. It is the aim of our contribution to discuss the last two motifs. Why is the solution brought about by an 'outsider' and why did these statues run aground before arriving at their place of destination?

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[7] Paus. 7.5.5-8 in the translation by P. Levi, *Pausanias. Guide to Greece* I (Harmondsworth 1971), 242f. For the cult of Heracles in Erythrae, see F. Graf, *Nord-Ionische Kulte*, forthcoming.

[8] Cp. L. Schmidt, *Die Volkserzählung* (Berlin 1963), 265-276 ("Das Wimpassinger Kreuz"). Schmidt gives a critical evaluation of the "Anschwemmungslegenden". See also L. Röhrich, *Sage und Märchen* (Freiburg 1976), 50 Abb. 6 for a picture of a similar crucifix which was reputed to have arrived via the river.

We will approach these problems by taking as our point of departure the second motif: the statues are coming from a distant place. They are therefore — it is immaterial for our purpose if this is in reality or according to the legend — strangers who are incorporated into a new society. This means that our problems have to be situated in the context of the rites of passage.

It is now nearly seventy years ago that Arnold van Gennep[9] published his classic study on the rites of passage. Van Gennep showed that a fixed scheme could be discovered not only in the important passages in life — such as birth, maturity, marriage, and death — but also in the territorial passage and the passage from peace to war and from Old to New Year. The scheme is as follows. At first there is the separation from the old situation, the 'rite de séparation', next the period of transition, the 'rite de marge', and finally the passage to a new situation, the 'rite d'aggrégation'. These rites receive more or less attention depending on the importance of the passage.

In the beginning Van Gennep's study did not receive the attention it deserved. As regards the French, this will have been due to the dominating influence on French academic life of Durkheim and his school who hardly took Van Gennep seriously.[10] Outside France the obscurity of the author and the language will have been responsible for the lack of response. Yet even in this period two important works have been published in which Van Gennep's insights were applied with success. The first is the classic study of the Tsonga by

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[9] A. van Gennep, *Les rites de passage* (Paris 1909). In the recent reprint (Paris 1969) the notes in Van Gennep's own copy have been added. On Van Gennep, see K. van Gennep, *Bibliographie des œuvres d'Arnold van Gennep* (Paris 1964), 4-12; N. Belmont, *Arnold van Gennep* (Paris 1974); H. A. Senn, *Arnold van Gennep: Structuralist and Apologist for the Study of Folklore in France*, Folklore 85 (1974), 229-243.

[10] Cp. G. Davy *apud* S. Lukes, *Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work*, 1973^1 (Harmondsworth 1975), 524 n. 35.

Henri Junod.[11] Junod knew Van Gennep personally. In 1912 he had been appointed to the then recently established chair for Swiss folklore at the university of Neuchâtel but resigned in favour of Van Gennep — it would prove to be Van Gennep's only academic post — who, however, was unable to stay long in Switzerland. Already in 1915 he was expelled by the Swiss government because he had published proof in the *Dépêche de Toulouse* that pro-German Swiss had violated the neutrality of Switzerland.[12] Junod was evidently deeply impressed by Van Gennep and in his own study he analysed the life of the Tsonga as a series of passages from an old into a new situation.[13] The second work is Wagenvoort's study of Roman dynamism[14] where he especially applied Van Gennep's ideas in his analysis of the *contagio* 'pollution'.

It is only since 1960 that Van Gennep has received the attention he deserves.[15] This favourable development can hardly be separated from the growing influence of structuralism and — what has probably been even more important — the fact that his work was translated into English.[16]

From a theoretical point of view little progress has been made since Van Gennep in the analysis of the rites of passage. This is the reason that we have to be rather brief as regards our first problem since a study on the person who brings about a passage does not seem to exist.[17] Yet, as regards this person there seems to be a recurring pattern. Claudia is suspected of unchastity and does not behave like a proper *matrona.* The statue of Heracles is brought in on advice of a *blind* man after a sacrifice of *Thracian* women, that means to say non-Greek women. Here we even have a double opposition to normality: women[18] and aliens.[19] The Wampinger Kreuz is landed by a mendiant friar, the lowest class of monks.[20] These examples are not unique. Prometheus,[21] who brought about the passage from chaos to civilisation by his rapture of fire (cp. *infra*), was a Titan, a being in between gods and men. The culture-hero is indeed often a smith or someone else who is at the margin of society.[22] Even if he is a god he is generally characterised as a trickster, the rogue who moves about outside the social order.[23] In all these cases the transition is effected by someone who is at the margin or outside the human or divine society. Evidently order cannot be established by a person who already is or is to become a part of that order.

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[11] H. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, 2 Vols. (London 1927^2); on Junod, see H. P. Junod, *Henri A. Junod: Missionaire et Savant* (Lausanne 1934).

[12] Cp. K. van Gennep, *o.c.*; Belmont, *o.c.*, 17.

[13] Cp. Gluckman, in Gluckman (n. 15), 8f.

[14] H. Wagenvoort, *Roman Dynamism*, 1947^1 (Westport 1976^2). On Wagenvoort, see J. H. Waszink, *Hendrik Wagenvoort (23 augustus 1886 - 15 januari 1976)*, Jaarboek Koninklijke Ak.Wetens. 1976, 1-7.

[15] Cp., e.g., M. Gluckman (ed.), *Essays on the ritual of social relations* (Manchester 1962); R. Horton, *Ritual Man in Africa*, Africa 34 (1964), 85-104; E. R. Leach, *KIMIL: A Category of Andamese Thought*, in P./E. Maranda, *Structural Analysis of Oral Tradition* (Philadelphia 1971), 22-48; Van Baal (n. 25); M. Vizedom, *Rites and Relationships: Rites of Passage and Contemporary Anthropology*. Sage Research Papers in the Social Sciences (Cross-cultural Studies Series), Vol. 4, series no. 90-027 (Beverly Hills/London 1976); Turner (n. 26) and Honko (n. 24).

[16] A. van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, translated by M. B. Vizedom and G. L. Caffee (London 1960).

Concerning our second problem, we are in a more comfortable situation. Although the position of the person who brings about a transition has not yet been sufficiently analysed, progress has been made with other aspects of the rites of passage. The problem of the classification of these rites has been studied by Lauri Honko[24] and J. van Baal.[25] The latter has pointed out that Van Gennep's weak point is the absence of an analysis of the most varied part of the rites, the proper rite of transition. This absence has now recently been remedied by Victor Turner[26] who has shown that this liminal period, as he calls the period of transition, is characterised by reversals and confusion of status and a series of oppositions with normal life such as different clothes, behaviour and place of habitation.

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[17] But see now E. Leach, *Culture and Communication* (Cambridge 1976), 82.

[18] For women as marginals in the polis, see P. Vidal-Naquet, *Esclavage et gynécocratie dans la tradition, le mythe, l'utopie*, in C. Nicolet (ed.), *Recherches sur les structures sociales dans l'antiquité classique* (Paris 1972), 63-80.

[19] For Thrace as the foreign country *par excellence*, see I. Chirassi-Colombo, *The Role of Thrace in Greek Religion*, in *Primus congressus studiorum Thracicorum. Thracia* II (Serdicae 1974), 71-79.

[20] Cp. G. Widengren, Orientalia Suecana 2 (1953), 78-85.

[21] On Prometheus, see L. Séchan, *Le mythe de Prométhée* (Paris 1951); J. Duchemin, *Prométhée* (Paris 1974) and, especially, J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* II (Paris 1971^4), 5-15; idem, *Mythe et société en grèce ancienne* (Paris 1974), 177-194.

[22] Cp. H. Tegnaeus, *Le héros civilisateur* (Uppsala 1950).

[23] Cp. P. Radin (with K. Kerényi and C. G. Jung), *Der göttliche Schelm* (Zürich 1954); idem, *The trickster, a study in American Indian mythology* (London 1956); M. Luscott-Ricketts, *The North American Trickster*, HR 5 (1965/66), 327-350; L. Makarius, *Le mythe du "Trickster"*, RHR 175 (1969), 17-46; B. Babcock-Abrahams, *"A Tolerated Margin of Mess"*, *The Trickster and His Tales Reconsidered*, J. Folklore Institute 11 (1975), 147-186.

Also, however, as regards the rites of separation and incorporation progress had been made. In 1916 the American anthropologist Elsie Clew Parsons[27] had already demonstrated on the basis of some rites of passage — initiation, wedding, funeral and mourning rites — that the element of delay and resistance is an important factor in these rites. Society and/or the individual has, or pretends to have, great difficulty in changing status or position. There is often resistance against this change but — and this has been mainly overlooked by the scholars of the nineteenth-century — this resistance is never carried through to the very end.

The examples Parsons gives are very interesting and can often be parallelled in ancient Greece. We begin with the initiation for which we will offer some instances not mentioned by Parsons. Among some of the North-American Nootkan tribes "the affair was initiated by the kidnapping of the principal novice by (men dressed up as) Wolves who pounced on him without warning and carried him off. Of course, this was all staged: the novice had to be in the right place at the right time".[28] Among the Nawdeba of Togo future novices were surprised in their house and, although they tried to escape, were carried by force to a place where they were tattood on their shoulders and on their face: the sign that initiation had started.[29] Among the Wagenia of Zaïre, during their most recent initiation, only the very first novices (but in the light of other parallels this seems to be a later development) were forcefully captured during a game of football(!), a trap designed by the novices of the previous initiation.[30]

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[24] L. Honko, *Zur Klassifikation der Riten*, Temenos 11 (1975), 61-77; idem, *Theories concerning the ritual process: an orientation*, in L. Honko (ed.), *Studies in the methodology of the science of religion* = Religion and Reason 13 (The Hague/Paris/New York 1978), 526-554.

[25] J. van Baal, *Symbols for Communication* (Assen 1971), 133-139.

[26] V. W. Turner, *The Forest of Symbols* (London 1967), 93-111; idem, *The Ritual Process* (Harmondsworth 1974^2); idem, *Process, System and Symbol: New Anthropological Synthesis*, Daedalus 1977, 3, 61-80.

[27] E. C. Parsons, *Holding back in crisis ceremonialism*, Am. Anthrop. 18 (1916), 41-52.

[28] Ph. Drucker, *The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes* = Smithsonian Institution Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 144 (Washington 1951), 392ff. At some places there was a mass kidnapping, cp. Drucker, 399.

A similar capture for which the Greeks explicitly used the word *harpage* 'robbery, capture, seizure', we also encounter in an initiatory context in Greece, namely on Crete.[31] Here, at the end of the initiation the novices, provided that they had famous ancestors or were a captivating beauty,[32] were captured by an adult for a homosexual relationship, a well-known part of many initiations.[33] During this capture it was necessary that the boy ran away to be pursued by his prospective lover and his own friends until he was taken to his lover's *andreion* 'men's house'. The ritual character of the novice's resistance against his capture appears from the fact that this 'kid-napping' was really a *must* since it was considered a disgrace not to have had one, if at least one came from the proper class. It is therefore completely understandable that Plutarch calls the practice "the so-called capture".[34]

A similar capture was a part of many wedding ceremonies. It is superfluous to adduce here examples since the rite has been extensively described by the Victorian scholars such as McLennan,[35] Dargun,[36]

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[29] Cp. D. Paulme (ed.), *Classes et associations d'âge en Afrique de l'Ouest* (Paris 1971), 41-52.

[30] A. Drogers, *De gevaarlijke reis. Jongensinitiatie bij de Wagenia van Kisangani* [Zaïre] (Diss. Amsterdam 1974), 71.

[31] Cp. Strabo 10.4.21 = Ephoros FGH 70 F149.

[32] This seems to be a later development since the proper initiation is clearly restricted to the upper classes, see the examples collected by J. Bremmer, *Heroes, Rituals and the Trojan War*, SSR 2 (1978), 18.

[33] Cp. A. Brelich, *Paides e parthenoi* (Roma 1969), 35; A. Dundes, Man 11 (1976), 233f; neglected by K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London 1978), 189f.

[34] Plut. *M.*11 F τὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ καλούμενον ἁρπαγμόν.

[35] J. F. McLennan, *Primitive Marriage, An Enquiry into the Origins of the Form of Capture in Marriage Ceremonies* (Edinburgh 1865). The recent reprint (Chicago/London 1970) contains a valuable bio- and bibliography of McLennan by Peter Rivière.

Robertson Smith,[37] Spencer[38] and Westermarck,[39] who were fascinated by this ritual and generally considered it a survival of the (desirable) times that the women were really captured.[40]

Much less attention was given to the fact that the bridegroom too in some cases had to be forced to marry. Among the Caucasian Abschases the bridegroom ran away on his wedding-day and hid himself, and, finally, had to be forced to come back.[41] A similar custom existed among some Indian Garo tribes as we learn from an account of Playfair,[42] a former deputy commissioner of Easter Bengal and Assam: "...it is the custom for a man to refuse at first to marry the girl who has sought his hand, and to run away and hide himself. A party of friends seek for him, and bring him back by force — and apparently very unwilling — to the village, whence he usually escapes. He is captured a second time, but should he run away a third time, it is taken for granted that he really does not wish to marry the girl, and he is allowed to go free". The custom could cause certain complications since Playfair continues: "I have known this custom to form the subject of judicial proceedings, for

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[36] L. Dargun, *Mutterrecht und Raubehe und ihre Reste im germanischen Recht und Leben* (Breslau 1883). On Lothar von Dargun (1853-1893), see the *Polski Slownik biografczny* IV (Warsaw 1938), 436f.

[37] W. Robertson Smith, *Kingship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, 1885^1 (Cambridge 1903^2), 89-99. On Smith, see T. O. Beidelman, *W. Robertson Smith and the Sociological Study of Religion* (Chicago/London 1974).

[38] H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology* I (London 1876), 652-657; idem, The Fortnightly Review, N.S. 21 (1877), 895-902 (a polemic against McLennan). Spencer explained the resistance of the bride as being due to real or pretended sexual coyness — an explanation typical for the Victorian bachelor that Spencer was. On Spencer, see J. D. Y. Peel, *Herbert Spencer, The Evolution of a Sociologist* (London 1971).

[39] E. Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage* I (London 1891), 383-402 and *The History of Human Marriage* II (London 1921^5), 240-277. Westermarck 1921, 260f. also considers the custom of barring the wedding procession as a survival of the capturing of the bride but this holding-up is just another example of delay and resistance in the rites of passage as is shown, in an exemplary investigation, by D. Dünninger, *Wegsperre und Lösung* (Berlin 1967). On Westermarck, see R. Lagerborg, *Om Edward Westermarck* (Helsinki/Copenhagen 1951).

[40] For modern anthropological views, see E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Position of Women in Primitive Society* (London 1965), 14; R. Firth, *Symbols, Public and Private* (London 1973), 110; J. Goody, *Production and Reproduction* (Cambridge 1976), 2.

[41] N. V. Seidlitz, Globus 66 (1894), 40.

[42] A. Playfair, *The Garos* (London 1909), 67.

a man appeared in court one day, at Tura, and filed a petition in which he claimed compensation from the father of a girl having failed to give him his daughter in marriage. The complainant explained that he had been chosen by the girl but, according to custom, he had refused to marry her and had run away. To his disgust, nobody came to seek for him, and the girl chose and married another man who was less strict in his ideas of Garo etiquette".

The ritual character of this kind of resistance has been seen for the first time in the classic study on the funerary rites by Robert Hertz[43] who explained the capture as a resistance against the transition from one group to another. Shortly after he was followed by Van Gennep[44] who, probably independently, had arrived at the same conclusion.

Such a capture — the same word *harpage* is used — could also be found among the Spartans where it preceded the wedding ceremony. Our source, Plutarch (*Lyc.* 15.4), is unfortunately rather short but McLennan[45] noted already that from this report it appears "that the seizure was made by friendly concert between the parties".

The third example mentioned by Parsons is the complex of funeral and mourning rites, and the belief that the soul of the deceased lingers on for some time in the vicinity of its former residence. For the first part of this example parallels do not exist, to my knowledge at least, but the belief that the soul does not go immediately to the Underworld could be found among the Greeks in the Archaic Age since they believed that the soul only settled in the Beyond when the funeral rites had been concluded which was a process of some days.[46]

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[43] R. Hertz, *Contribution à une étude sur la représentation collective de la mort*, Année Sociol. 10 (1907), 48-137 = idem, *Mélanges de sociologie religieuse et folklore* (Paris 1928), 1-83 = idem (translated by R. and C. Needham), *Death and the Right Hand* (London 1960), 27-86. On Hertz, see E. Durkheim, *Notice sur Robert Hertz*, L'annuaire des anciens élèves de l'École Normale Supérieure, 1916, 116-120; Evans-Pritchard *apud* Hertz 1960, 9-24.

[44] Van Gennep 1960 (n. 16), 124.

[45] McLennan, *o.c.*, 13. J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée* I, 140 still supports the idea of a real capture.

[46] See my *The Early Greek Conception of the Soul*, forthcoming.

Although it should now be clear that the elements of resistance and delay in the rites of passage could also be encountered among the Greeks, we will adduce one more example. It is reported that every year the inhabitants of Locris sent two girls to Ilion who were obliged to remain there for a year. It is not necessary to discuss this rite — which is derived from an ancient initiation ritual — in detail since this has recently been done in a very fine way by Fritz Graf,[47] but there is one part of the rite which is of interest for our argument. Aeneas Tacticus (31.24) relates that the inhabitants of Ilion were unable to prevent the girls from entering the city even though they did their utmost to stop them. It is clear that here too we have a case of a ritual, not real, resistance since it is unthinkable that such a small city as Ilion[48] .would have been unable to prevent the maidens from entering.

The interesting feature of this ritual is that the transition from Locris to Ilion, the proper rite of separation, was considered to be so radical that the rite is divided again in three parts, as a proper rite of passage. We know nothing concerning the parting in Locris but it is unthinkable that no kind of farewell took place. The journey over sea is then the transitional period and the secret entry into Ilion the rite of incorporation into a new level of existence.

The same elements of delay and resistance can also be found in mythology. The myths around the Trojan War provide two clear examples. When Ulysses is invited to join the war, he unsuccesfully simulates madness to escape participation.[49] Even clearer is the start of the war. When all the ships are ready, the expedition cannot start because the wind has abated.[50] The mythical tradition explained this calm in an aetiological way — Agamemnon would have killed a deer of Artemis — but we suggest that the origin of this motif lies in the inability of the Greek mind to accept that the greatest war in their history could start 'without ado': the beginning of this war had to be delayed just as participation in this war could not possibly have taken place without a certain resistance.

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[47] F. Graf, *Die Lokrischen Mädchen*, SSR 2 (1978), 61-79. When I was preparing this article it appeared that Fritz Graf had approached this ritual detail in a way similar to my own, adducing the same Greek rituals. I may therefore refer the reader to his article in which he will find more anthropological parallels for the rites discussed here.

[48] For the small size of Ilion in Hellenistic times, see J. M. Cook, *The Troad* (Oxford 1973), 100.

[49] Apollod. *ep.* 3.7; Hyg. *fab.* 95; Servius *Aen.* 2.81; Schol. Lyc. 815.

[50] For the sources, see C. Robert, *Die Griechische Heldensage* III.2 (Berlin 1923), 1099f.

Compared with Greece our knowledge of Roman ritual is rather poor. Yet, from Rome too we can adduce two examples. In historical Rome initiation rituals are not testified but we have a 'capture-scene' in the Roman wedding ritual where the bride had to be pulled away from her mother's lap.[51]

The idea of delay can be found in Christian Rome. When the English bishop Augustine asked Pope Gregory the Great whether it was allowed for a man who had had intercourse with his wife to enter the church before he was washed, the pope answered that "it has always been the custom of the Romans *from ancient times*, after intercourse with one's wife, to seek purification by washing and reverently to abstain from entering the church *for a brief period*".[52] Even if purified, a man cannot enter straight into the church: the transition would have been too abrupt.

We have one example left, albeit from literature. When Aeneas has gone down the Underworld to pluck the golden bough, the plucking is described in the following way (Verg. *Aen.* 6.210f.):

> corripit Aeneas extemplo, avidusque refringit,
> *cunctantem*, et vatis portat sub tecta Sibyllae.

"At once Aeneas takes hold of the bough and breaks it off avidly, although it resists, and carries it to the home of the prophetic Sibylla". Illustrious Vergilian scholars such as Norden,[53] Williams[54] and Austin,[55] all want to explain *cunctantem* only as a botanical detail: the tree is tough. It is true, the plucking of a bough normally meets with some resistance — a detail Vergil certainly would have cared for — but this does not explain the stress laid on the detail, a stress which is accentuated by the enjambment of *cunctantem.* No, here the delay dramatizes the plucking of this highly important bough. Certainly, Aeneas will receive the bough but he will not gain possession without resistance.

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[51] Cp. Festus 364 L *Rapi simulatur virgo ex gremio matris, aut, si ea non est, ex proxima necessitudine, cum ad virum traditur, quod videlicet ea res feliciter Romulo cessit*; see also Cat. 61.56ff., 62.33 and, perhaps, Macrob. *Sat.* 1.15.21.

[52] Beda *Hist. Ec.* 1.27 in the translation by B. Colgrave / R. A. B. Mynors, *Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People* (Oxford 1969), 95.

[53] E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro, Aeneis Buch VI* (Leipzig/Berlin 1926^3), 193.

[54] R. D. Williams, *The Aeneid of Virgil, Books 1-6* (London 1972), 472.

[55] R. G. Austin, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos liber sextus* (Oxford 1977), 101.

To these classical examples of delay and resistance we may add a few instances from other cultures. Among many peoples myths tell how the change from chaos to civilisation could only be brought about by the robbery of a vital element, usually fire.[56] The myths speak, however, not only of fire. The possession of all sorts of vital elements for the life of the community or group — such as water,[57] cereals,[58] 'Rauschtrank'[59] and *soma*[60] — are explained through a 'robbery-myth'. Although these myths have aroused the necessary scholarly discussion, attention never[61] seems to have been paid to the question as to why these elements had to be robbed in the first place. We suggest that it was necessary to the primitive mind that these robberies took place since in all these cases man is promoted to a higher level of existence and such a promotion could not possibly have been imagined to have occurred without a certain resistance from the side of the gods or whosoever was thought of as possessing the vital element.

Finally, we will adduce one example from the Old Testament: Saul's election as king. When it was clear that Saul would be the future king, the people went looking for him "and when they sought him, he could not be found. Therefore they inquired of the Lord further, if the man should yet come thither. And the Lord answered, Behold, he hath hid himself among the stuff. And they ran and fetched him thence...".[62] The example is unique in the Old Testament but when we compare similar hidings in other rites of passage, we can hardly escape the conclusion that the author of *Samuel* gives us here a valuable insight into the way the king's election must have happened in real life.[63]

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[56] Cp. A. Kuhn, *Die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Göttertranks* (Gütersloh 1886²); J. G. Frazer, *Myths of the Origin of Fire* (London 1930); S. Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* I (Copenhagen 1956²), 224; C. Lévi-Strauss, *Le cru et le cuit* (Paris 1964), passim; M. Kuusi, *Beiträge zur Feuermythologie*, in *Miscellanea K. C. Peeters* (Antwerpen 1975), 384-389; H. Aufenanger, *Die Herkunft des Feuers im religösen Denken schriftloser Völker*, in H. Janssen e.a., *Carl Laufer MSC, Missionar und Ethnologe auf Neu-Guinea* (Freiburg/Basel/Wien 1975), 244-257.

[57] A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion* I (London 1913²), 42-44; F. Boas, *Bella-Bella Tales* (New York 1932), 5; A. Krause, *The Tlingit Indians*, 1885¹ (Seattle 1956), 178; Thompson, *o.c.*, 194f. and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Zande Trickster* (Oxford 1967), 38f.

[58] Cp. T. Obayashi, *Das Körnerdiebstahl-Motiv in Ostasien*, in *Festschrift A. E. Jensen* II (München 1964), 433-459.

[59] Cp. R. Doht, *Der Rauschtrank im germanischen Mythos* (Wien 1974), 36-168.

[60] Cp. U. Schneider, *Der Somaraub des Manu. Mythus und Ritual* (Wiesbaden 1971).

[61] But see W. B. Kristensen, *Godsdiensten in de oude wereld* (Utrecht/Antwerpen 1966), 124f.

It will by now be clear to the reader why, in our vision, the ship with Cybele ran aground and the raft with Heracles and the Wimpassinger Kreuz became stuck fast not far from their destination. The introduction of these objects of worship could not possibly have been imagined as having happened in a smooth way.

We possess even another striking parallel for this resistance during the introduction of a new god: the arrival of Dionysos. His arrival everywhere meets with resistance which the god *always* defeats. A discussion of the myths and rituals concerning this fascinating god (for the myths cannot be separated from their ritual background) will, however, have to be reserved for another occasion since the necessary length of such a discussion would exceed the limits of the present collection of studies and evoke an understandable resistance from the side of the editor!

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[62] 1 Samuel 10.21-23. For resistance as a recurrent feature of the prophetic call, see W. Richter, *Die sogenannten vorprophetischen Berufungsberichte* (Göttingen 1970), 145f.

[63] It will hardly be chance that there existed a tradition concerning precisely the inthronisation of Saul, cp. H. Ringgren, *Israelitische Religion* (Stuttgart 1963), 201: "Als Saul um 1020 v. Chr. zum ersten König Israels gemacht wurde, war man sich offenbar dessen bewust, dass *etwas Neues von aussen her* (my italics) in Israel eingeführt wurde".

THE CISTA MYSTICA IN THE CULT AND MYSTERIES OF ISIS

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1. Concrete evidence concerning the *cista mystica* of Isis is indirect only and scarce, dating from Roman times.

Texts. From Tibullus (Hopfner, 148) we learn that the *cista* was light, from Apuleius (Griffiths 1975, 82) that one man could carry it. To Plutarch we are indebted for an account of the pouring of drinking water into a golden casket inside the *cista*, while the people shouted "Osiris has been found"; Griffiths 1970, 180. That the *cista mystica* was meant here (*De Iside et Osiride*, ch. 39) may be inferred[1] from a wall painting in the Pompeian Iseum where it is associated with the *inventio* of Osiris.

Monuments. Monumental sources may be listed according to categories A-E.

A. Three-dimensional representations, e.g. Beneventum, Museo del Sannio n. 289: Müller, 106/7, Pl. 32,2 (h. 47 cm).

B. Reliefs on altars and gravestones, e.g. Rome, Museo Capitolino: Malaise, 113 (Roma, 5).

C. Reliefs on sarcophagi, e.g. Heyob, *The Cult of Isis among Women in the Graeco-Roman World* (Leiden, 1975), 62.

D. Frescos, e.g. Pompeii, see above: Malaise, 280 (Pompei, 47), Pl. 44.

E. Carvings on vases, e.g. Tran tam Tinh, *Le culte des divinités orientales en Campanie* (Leiden, 1972), 10, 20.[2]

As far as the archaeological evidence goes, the *cista* is characterized by cylindrical shape, wickerwork construction, one or two serpents inside or outside it, and a crescent on the front.

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[1] As observed by Malaise, 280.

[2] On the *cistophoroi* see § 7.

2. With Griffiths and others[3] I think it plausible that this important *cista* was of Egyptian origin; see too my final remarks, § 8. If this is granted, we have two objects to discuss: the "mystery box (*hn*)" and the "mystery chest (*ʿfd.t*)", each appearing in an Osirian context.

3. Griffiths[3] identifies our *cista* with the "mystery" (or: "mysterious", "secret") "box", and refers to the *Khoiak ritual* of Denderah. A commentary[4] in that text describes a basket of rushes, containing the mystery box made of reeds. Inside the box was a vase, inside the vase the head of Osiris. Although the reed construction seems to favour this hypothesis, I cannot agree with it. Plutarch's explicit account of the pouring of water raises insurmountable problems. Denderah mentions the "august head" of the god as contents, the tradition of Bubastis[5] his young son Horus and the goddess Bastet, and the *Book of Caverns*[6] the solar eye. In none of these cases is the pouring of water appropriate.

4. A close connection with the "mystery" (or: "mysterious", "secret") "chest" was suggested by Kristensen, though indirectly so. He used a rather general line of argument and quoted an unreliable Egyptian commentary.[7] I do feel, however, that he was right, but for different reasons. The "mystery chest" of Osiris was not, as Kristensen thought, a coffin; it was the "canopic box" containing the viscera of the dead god and, in consequence, those of every dead person: Heerma van Voss 1969 and 1971. To impregnate these organs with Nile water was a well attested ritual to bestow new life upon them.[8] In my opinion this was the background to Plutarch's account, although embalmment was not practised outside Egypt.

5. When mummification was brought to a stop it meant a change in the role of Anubis, as Grenier pointed out, p. 170/1. The god ceased to be the divine embalmer and keeper of the internal organs.

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[3] Griffiths 1975, 222, 224, 225, 226.

[4] Ed. Chassinat (Le Caire, 1966/8), l. 66. See Heerma van Voss 1969, 4 for a warning about the reliability of commentaries such as this.

[5] Goyon, *Kêmi* 18 (1968), 41.

[6] Second division, third register. Ed. Piankoff (Le Caire, 1946), Pl. XX (l. 50/2) and X; cf. his edition of the tomb of Ramesses VI (New York, 1954), Fig. 11a.

[7] *Symbool en werkelijkheid* (Arnhem, 1954), 274; Heerma van Voss 1969, 8-9.

[8] Stricker, *OMRO* 49 (1968), 30/1.

His statue was no longer needed as in Pharaonic times on top of the "canopic box". But he continued to be *psychopompos*, and he kept a place quite near[9] the successor to that box, as we see from Apuleius, and e.g. the altar in Rome cited in § 1.

6. Both sources make it clear that the position of the *cista* was no less prominent than that of its Egyptian predecessor in the funeral procession. Apuleius seems to refer to it as the "shrine" (*sacrarium*),[10] thus recalling the occasional development of the small "mystery chest" into an elaborate form.[11]

7. This chest shows a winding snake on the long side of the lid.[12] To the Egyptians such a picture was a real animal. We should combine the fact with another observation. To influence from the Dionysiac (Bacchic) cult on its Isiac colleague the *cistophoroi* attest. On these coins from Asia Minor (and Crete) the *cista* of Dionysus is figured as a basket characterized by an emerging serpent; the *corona isiaca*[13] sometimes accompanies it.[14] These two points together, I think, explain the iconography of paragraph 1. The original rectangular wooden chest for the viscera was replaced, perhaps gradually, by a cylindrical basket suitable for accommodating snakes. The transformation was all the more acceptable, because both Isis and Osiris were known to the Graeco-Roman Period in serpent form.[15]

8. The findings of paragraphs 4-7 agree with observations concerning other aspects of the Isiac cult and mysteries. I have space in this contribution only to mention the *inventio* (cf. § 1),[16] the *hydreion*,[17] the fashioning of a crescent-shaped (cf. § 1) image,[18]

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[9] Cf. Heerma van Voss 1969, note 30.

[10] Griffiths 1975, 88, 256.

[11] Heerma van Voss 1969, 7, and 1971, 72.

[12] Heerma van Voss 1969, frontispiece. Cf. e.g. Quibell, *Tomb of Yuaa and Thuiu* (Le Caire, 1908), Pl. XV (Cairo Museum C.G. 51013).

[13] Malaise, 238.

[14] Leclant-Clerc, *Inventaire bibliographique des Isiaca, E-K* (Leiden, 1974), 151. — Griffiths 1975, 226 reaches the same conclusion (evident influence).

[15] Heerma van Voss, *Hermeneus* 17 (1945/6), 109/11.

[16] Griffiths 1970, 452.

[17] Griffiths 1970, 437/8; Bonnet, 527/8.

[18] Griffiths 1970, 180; Bonnet, 471/2.

the confession,[19] and the secret character of the mysteries.[20] Despite Hellenistic adaptations, they have in common a clear Osirian framework, a solid Egyptian base.

ABBREVIATIONS

Bonnet: *Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte*^{2} (Berlin, 1971)
Grenier: *Anubis alexandrin et romain* (Leiden, 1977)
Griffiths 1970: *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride* (Cardiff, 1970)
Griffiths 1975: *Apuleius of Madauros The Isis-book* (*Metamorphoses, Book XI*) (Leiden, 1975)
Heerma van Voss 1969: *Een mysteriekist ontsluierd* (Leiden, 1969)
Heerma van Voss 1971: "*Toetanchamon's schrijn met Anoebis*", *ZÄS* 97 (1971), 72/4
Hopfner: *Fontes historiae religionis Aegyptiacae* (Bonnae, 1925)
Malaise: *Inventaire préliminaire des documents égyptiens découverts en Italie* (Leiden, 1972)
Müller: *Der Isiskult im antiken Benevent und Katalog der Skulpturen aus den ägyptischen Heiligtümern im Museo del Sannio zu Benevent* (Berlin, 1969)

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[19] Griffiths 1975, 53, 271, and *Book of the Dead*, spell 125, in particular.

[20] Cf. a passage such as in the *Khoiak ritual*, ed. Chassinat (see note 4), l. 79-80, for an understanding of this interpretation.

DER SCHATTEN IM HELLENISTISCHEN VOLKSGLAUBEN

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In der Ethnologie ist es eine bekannte Tatsache, dass der Schatten in vielen Kulturen eine weit wichtigere Rolle spielt als in unserer Gesellschaft, zumal in primitiven Kulturkreisen, aber nicht nur da.[1] Er ist dann nicht nur die Stelle, wo das (Sonnen-)Licht nicht durchdringen kann, also nicht nur *privatio*, sondern hat eine ganz eigene Bedeutung und Funktion: Der Schatten eines Menschen oder eines Tieres (bisweilen auch eines Objekts) ist dessen Seele, dessen Lebenskraft, dessen belebter Doppelgänger oder *alter ego*.[2] Man kann jemandem schaden, indem man seinen Schatten gewalttätig behandelt. Und es kann gefährlich oder auch segensreich sein, wenn man vom Schatten bestimmter Menschen oder Tiere berührt wird. Schatten und Leben sind so sehr identisch, dass viele die Mittagsstunde fürchten, weil dann der Schatten kleiner wird. Der Schatten verschwindet, wenn man stirbt. Viele magischen Praktiken sind auf diesen Glauben begründet. Das heutige Kinderspiel, bei dem man einander auf den Schatten zu trampeln versucht, hat auch diesen Hintergrund (wie Kinderspeiele so oft noch alten Volksglauben bewahrt haben). Bei sehr vielen Völkern und Kulturkreisen haben Ethnologen dieses Phänomen beobachtet und beschrieben; auch bei vergangenen Kulturen hat man aufgrund literarischer Reste diese Vorstellung nachweisen können. Für die hellenistisch-römische Kultur ist das einschlägige Material m.W. jedoch nie gesammelt und vorgelegt worden.[3] Ich habe vor einigen Jahren eine kleine Materialsammlung vorgenommen und veröffentlicht; das jedoch unter einem sehr speziellen Blickwinckel und an einer für Altphilologen ziemlich unzugänglichen Stelle.[4] Nun möchte ich dieses Material erneut präsentieren, aber gesichtet, um etliche neue Texte reicher und, hoffentlich, Altphilologen und Religionsgeschichtlern besser zugänglich.

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[1] Siehe J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough III: Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London 1911³, 77ff. (in der gekürzten einbändigen Ausgabe, London 1922, 250ff.); J. von Negelein, "Bild, Spiegel und Schatten im Volksglauben", *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 5 (1902), 1-37; F. Pradel, "Der Schatten im Volksglauben", *Mitteilungen der schlesischen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde* 12 (1904), 1-36; B. Ankermann, "Totenkult und Seelenglaube bei afrikanischen Völkern", *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 50 (1918), 89-153; M. Bieler, "Schatten", *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens* IX (Berlin 1940), 126-142; H. Fischer, *Studien über Seelenvorstellungen in Ozeanien*, München 1965, *passim*; Für Westeuropa siehe das Kapitel "Ohne Schatten, ohne Seele" in E. L. Rochholz, *Deutscher Glaube und Brauch im Spiegel der heidnischen Vorzeit* I, Berlin 1867, 59-130. Man findet auch einiges in H. B. Alexander, "Soul (Primitive)", *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* XI (1920), 727; W. Brede Kristensen, *The Meaning of Religion*, Den Haag 1960, 410f.; G. van der Leeuw, *Phänomenologie der Religion*, Tübingen 1956², 324f., 328f.

[2] L. Lévy-Bruhl, *L'âme primitive*, Paris 1927, 161: "Très souvent, dans les représentations collectives des primitifs, le 'principe vital', ou 'vie', de l'individu ne se distingue pas de son ombre, de son image ou de son reflet (réflection). Les observateurs rapportent constamment qu'au dire des indigènes leur ombre est leur 'âme'". Bieler, *art. cit.* 127: "Der Schatten gilt einer Person oder Sache als wesentlich zugehörig. Das äussert sich in dem Glauben, der Schatten habe dieselbe Macht zu wirken wie sein Träger, umgekehrt aber widerfahre dem Menschen, was seinem Schatten widerfährt".

Beginnen wir mit einer Reihe bemerkenswerter Texte, die traditionsgeschichtlich zusammenhängen; sie handeln alle vom Schatten der Hyäne:[5]

Aristoteles fr. 369 Rose (= Aelianus *Nat. anim.* VI 14) τοῖς κυσὶ δὲ ἐπιτίθεται ἡ αὐτὴ (sc. ἡ ὕαινα) τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνον· ὅταν ᾖ πλήρης ὁ τῆς σελήνης κύκλος, κατόπιν λαμβάνει τὴν αὐγήν, καὶ τὴν αὐτῆς σκιὰν ἐπιβάλλει τοῖς κυσί, καὶ παραχρῆμα αὐτοὺς κατεσίγασε, καὶ καταγοητεύσασα ὡς αἱ φαρμακίδες εἶτα ἀπάγει σιωπῶντας, καὶ κέχρηται ὅ τι καὶ βούλεται τὸ ἐντεῦθεν αὐτοῖς.[6]

Ps-Aristoteles *De mirabil. auscult.* 145 ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἀραβίᾳ ὑαινῶν τι γένος φασὶν εἶναι, ὃ ἐπειδὰν προΐδῃ τι θηρίον, ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιβῇ ἐπὶ τὴν σκιάν [vielleicht ist zu lesen προΐδῃ τι θηρίον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἐπιβῇ ἐπὶ τὴν σκιάν], ἀφωνίαν ἐργάζεται καὶ πῆξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κυνῶν.

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[3] Man findet einige kurze Bemerkungen bei Frazer, *loc. cit.*; M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* I, München 1955², 398 Anm. 3; E. Stemplinger, *Antiker Volksglaube*, Stuttgart 1948, 182. Aber in den grossen Enzyklopädien (z.B. Pauly-Wissowa) findet man keinen Eintrag "Schatten". Das Buch von V. Hölzer, *Umbra. Vorstellung und Symbol im Leben der Römer*, Dissertation Marburg 1965 (maschinenschriftlich), ist enttäuschend für unseres Thema. Es behandelt das Material ungenügend und unter zu rationalistischem Gesichtspunkt.

[4] P. W. van der Horst, "Peter's Shadow. The Religio-Historical Background of Acts V 15", *New Testament Studies* 23 (1976/7), 204-212.

[5] Siehe auch Steier in *PW Suppl.* IV (1924), 765.

[6] In *Nat. anim.* III 7 schöpft Aelianus aus derselben Tradition: κύνας δὲ ἀφώνους ἀποφαίνειν ταῖς ὑαίναις ἡ αὐτὴ (sc. ἡ φύσις) παρέσχεν. Hier gibt es eine *varia lectio* ... τὰς ὑαίνας ὅταν αὐταῖς τὴν σκιὰν ἐπιβάλῃ.

Plinius Maior, *Nat. hist.* VIII 106 ... *umbrae eius* (sc. *hyaenae*) *contactu canes obmutescere et quibusdam magicis artibus omne animal quod ter lustraverit in vestigio haerere.*

Solinus XXVII 24 *qui forte si venantes umbram eius* (sc. *hyaenae*) *dum sequuntur contigerint, latrare nequeunt voce perdita.*

Geoponica XV 1,10 (p. 433 ed. H. Beckh) ὕαινα φυσικῷ τινι λόγῳ τῇ ἀπὸ σελήνης νυκτερινῇ σκιᾷ τοῦ κυνὸς ἐπιβᾶσα ὥσπερ διὰ σχοίνου ἀπὸ ὕψους κατάγει αὐτόν (mss. ἑαυτήν).

Proclus, *In Rempublicam* I p. 290,10-19 Kroll καὶ γὰρ αἱ σκιαί, αἷς τὰ εἴδωλα συζυγεῖν φησι (sc. Plato), τοιαύτην ἔχουσι φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ αὗται σωμάτων εἰσὶ καὶ σχημάτων εἰκόνες, καὶ παμπόλλην ἔχουσιν πρὸς τὰ ἀφ' ὧν ἐκπίπτουσιν συμπάθειαν, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ ὅσα μάγων τέχναι πρός τε τὰ εἴδωλα δρᾶν ἐπαγγέλλονται καὶ τὰς σκιάς. καὶ τί λέγω τὰς ἐκείνων δυνάμεις; ἃ καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἤδη ζῴοις ὑπάρχει πρὸ λόγου παντὸς ἐνεργεῖν. ἡ γὰρ ὕαινα, φασί, τὴν τοῦ κυνὸς ἐν ὕψει καθημένου πατήσασα σκιὰν καταβάλλει καὶ θοίνην ποιεῖται τὸν κύνα.[7]

Timotheus von Gaza in M. Haupt, *Opuscula* III, Leipzig 1876, 279 ὅτι ἐν σελήνῃ ἐρχομένῃ ἐὰν κυνὸς ὄντος ἐπὶ στέγους λάβηται κάτωθεν τῆς αὐτοῦ σκιᾶς, αὐτὸν καταφέρει ἄνωθεν τὸν κύνα.[8]

Obwohl es kleine Variationen in dieser Tradition gibt — das eine mal trampelt die Hyäne auf den Schatten des Hundes, das andere Mal wirft sie ihren eigenen Schatten auf den Hund —, sieht man hier doch eine ziemlich ungebrochene Überlieferung über die magische

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[7] Siehe die kurzen Notizen von A. J. Festugière, *Proclus. Commentaire sur la République* II, Paris 1970, 98f. Anm. 3.

[8] Timotheus ist auch die Quelle der *Aristophanis Historiae Animalium Epitome* (ed. Sp. Lambros, *Supplementum Aristotelicum* I, Berlin 1885) II 320 λέγεται δὲ καὶ βλέπειν ὕαιναν ἴσα καὶ φωτὶ κατὰ νύκτα καὶ μεμνῆσθαί πως γοητείαν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως. ὅθεν δὴ νυκτὸς σελήνης ὑπολαμπούσης, κύνα πρὸς τῷ τέγει κείμενον ἄνωθεν αὐτὸν καθαιρεῖ τῷ εἰδώλῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σκιᾶς ἀρρήτως καταφαρμάξασα. μέλει τοιγαροῦν αὐτῇ καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶ δύναμις λάθρα τῇ σκιᾷ προσβαλεῖν καὶ μηδεμίαν τῷ κυνὶ παρασχεῖν αἴσθησιν.

Kraft eines Tierschattens vom 4. Jahrhundert vor Chr. ab bis weit ins Mittelalter.

Aber auch über die Kraft der Schatten von Menschen haben wir unzweideutige Zeugnisse aus der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit:

Ennius *ap.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* III 12,26 (Thyestes, der eine Freveltat begangen hat, sagt:) *Nolite, hospites, ad me adire, ilico istic, ne contagio mea bonis umbrave obsit. Tanta vis sceleris in corpore haeret.*[9]

Plinius Maior, *Nat. hist.* XXVIII 69 *magi vetant eius causa contra solem lunamque nudari aut umbram cuiusquam ab ipso respergi* (man darf nicht auf jemandes Schatten urinieren).

Im Neuen Testament *Acta* V 15 (über die Einwohner von Jerusalem) ... ὥστε καὶ εἰς τὰς πλατείας ἐκφέρειν τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς καὶ τιθέναι ἐπὶ κλιναρίων καὶ κραβάττων, ἵνα ἐρχομένου Πέτρου κἂν ἡ σκιὰ ἐπισκιάσῃ τινὶ αὐτῶν.[10]

Defixionum Tabellae 190,4ff. (ed. A. Audollent, Paris 1904, 249): *Dii i(n)feri, vobis com(m)e(n)do il(l)ius mem(b)ra, colore(m), figura(m), caput, capill(os), umbra(m), cerebru(m), fru(n)te(m), supercilia, os,* etc.

Eine merkwürdige Stelle findet man in Dio Chrysostomus LXVII 4-5, weil Dio dort den Aberglauben, dass jemandes Gesundheit und Kraft von der Länge seines Schattens abhängig sei, als imaginär schildert, obwohl es eine bei vielen Völkern, auch bei den alten Griechen, geläufige Vorstellung ist.[11] Er sagt: εἰ οὖν τις εἴη τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπός οἷος ζῆν πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ σκιάν, ὥστε αὐξομένης μὲν αὐτῆς ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ μεγαλαυχεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς θύειν αὐτός τε καὶ τοὺς φίλους κελεύειν, βραχυτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης λυπεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι ταπεινότερος, καὶ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἐλάττων γίγνηται, καθάπερ αὐτὸς φθίνων, θαυμαστὴν ἄν, οἶμαι, παρέχοι διατριβήν. ... τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ὁτὲ μὲν λυποῖτ' ἄν, ὁτὲ δὲ χαίροι. πρωῒ μὲν ἐπειδὰν ἴδῃ τὴν σκιὰν ἑωθινὴν πάνυ μακράν, τῶν τε κυπαρίττων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τείχεσι πύργων σχεδὸν μείζω, δῆλον ὅτι χαίροι ἂν ὡς αὐτὸς ἐξαπίνης γεγονὼς τοῖς 'Αλῳάδαις ἴσος καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν βαδίζοι ἂν καὶ εἰς τὰ θέατρα καὶ πανταχόσε τῆς πόλεως ὅπως ἂν ὑπὸ πάντων βλέποιτο. περὶ δὲ πλήθουσαν ἀγορὰν ἄρχοιτ' ἂν σκυθρωπότερος αὑτοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀναχωροίη. τῆς δὲ μεσημβρίας αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν ὀφθῆναι ἀνθρώπῳ τινὶ καὶ ἔνδον μένοι ἂν ἐγκλεισάμενος, ἐπειδὰν ἐν τοῖς ποσὶ βλέπῃ τὴν σκιάν· πάλιν δὲ περὶ δείλην ἀναλαμβάνοι ἂν αὑτὸν καὶ γαυρότερος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἑσπέραν.[12]

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[9] Siehe H. D. Jocelyn, *The Tragedies of Ennius*, Cambridge 1967, 421 (*ad loc.*).

[10] In diesem Zusammenhang muss auch auf eine andere Stelle bei Lukas hingewiesen werden, nämlich in seinem Evangelium I 35 (obwohl dort nicht vom Schatten eines Menschen, sondern einer Gottheit die Rede ist): auf Maria's Frage, wie sie ohne Mann schwanger werden kann, antwortet der Engel Gabriel: πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σέ, καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι· διὸ καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἅγιον κληθήσεται, υἱὸς θεοῦ. Dies heisst doch nichts anderes als dass der Schatten Gottes Maria beschwängert, eine Vorstellung, die zwar keine Parallele hat in der nahen Umwelt des Neuen Testaments, aber wohl im alten Ägypten. Es gibt einen altägyptischen Text, der vom Samenerguss des Schattens des Gottes spricht (siehe Text und Kommentar bei B. George, *Zu den altägyptischen Vorstellungen vom Schatten als Seele*, Bonn 1970, 113ff.). So weit kann die Kraft des göttlichen Schattens gehen. Siehe über diesen Text im Lukasevangelium meinen Aufsatz in *New Testament Studies* 23 (1976/7), 211f. Die Stelle Acta V 15 wird ungenügend behandelt von W. Dietrich, *Das Petrusbild der lukanischen Schriften*, Stuttgart 1972, 238f.

[11] Siehe Frazer, *op. cit.* 86f.

Man kann hier auch die Texte nennen, die, obwohl sie nicht direkt vom Schatten sprechen, der Furcht vor der Mittagsstunde (wenn der Schatten klein ist) Ausdruck verleihen, z.B. Lucanus, *Bellum* III 423ff.; Philostratus, *Heroicus* I 3; Porphyrius, *De antro nymph.* 26; usw.[13]

Es gibt vier Stellen, die bisweilen in diesem Zusammenhang aufgeführt werden,[14] deren Deutung jedoch strittig ist. Die Texte handeln davon, dass man seinen Schatten verliert, wenn man in einen bestimmten Zeustempel eintritt. Polybius XVI 12,7 τὸ γὰρ φάσκειν ἔνια τῶν σωμάτων ἐν φωτὶ τιθέμενα μὴ ποιεῖν σκιὰν ἀπηλγηκυίας ἐστὶ ψυχῆς· ὃ πεποίηκε Θεόπομπος, φήσας τοὺς εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄβατον ἐμβάντας κατ' 'Αρκαδίαν ἀσκίους γίνεσθαι. Pausanias VIII

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[12] Über diesen Passus Frazer, *op. cit.* 87: "The rhetorician who thus thought to expose the vanity of fame as an object of human ambition by likening it to an ever-changing shadow, little dreamed that in real life there were men who set almost as much store by their shadows as the fool whom he had conjured up in his imagination to point a moral. So hard is it for the straining wings of fancy to outstrip the folly of mankind".

[13] Mehr Stellen bei W. Drexler, "Meridianus Daemon", in W. H. Roscher (ed.), *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* II (1897), 2832ff., der jedoch eine andere Interpretation vorschlägt.

[14] Nilsson, *Gesch. der griech. Rel.* I 398 Anm. 3; Auch Th. H. Gaster, *Myth, Legend, and Custom in the Old Testament*, New York 1969, 791.

38,6 τὸ δὲ ὄρος παρέχεται τὸ Λύκαιον καὶ ἄλλα ἐς θαῦμα καὶ μάλιστα τόδε· τέμενός ἐστι ἐν αὐτῷ Λυκαίου Διός, ἔσοδος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐς αὐτὸ ἀνθρώποις· ὑπεριδόντα δὲ τοῦ νόμου καὶ ἐσελθόντα ἀνάγκη πᾶσα αὐτὸν ἐνιαυτοῦ πρόσω μὴ βιῶναι. καὶ τάδε ἔτι ἐλέγετο, τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ τεμένους γενόμενα ὁμοίως πάντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ παρέχεσθαι σκιάν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐς τὸ τέμενος θηρίου καταφεύγοντος οὐκ ἐθέλει συνεσπίπτειν ὁ κυνηγέτης, ἀλλὰ ὑπομένων ἐκτὸς καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ θηρίον οὐδεμίαν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ θεᾶται σκιάν. χρόνον μὲν δὴ τὸν ἴσον ἔπεισί τε ὁ ἥλιος τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καρκίνον καὶ ἐν Συήνῃ τῇ πρὸ Αἰθιοπίας οὔτε ἀπὸ δένδρων οὔτε ἀπὸ τῶν ζῴων γενέσθαι σκιὰν ἔστι· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ Λυκαίῳ τέμενος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐς τὰς σκιὰς ἀεί τε καὶ ἐπὶ πασῶν πέπονθε τῶν ὡρῶν. Plutarch, *Quaest. Graec.* 39, 300C τὸ μέντοι σκιὰν μὴ πίπτειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐμβάντος εἰς τὸ Λύκαιον λέγεται μὲν οὐκ ἀληθῶς, ἔσχηκε δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυράν. πότερον τοῦ ἀέρος εἰς νέφη τρεπομένου καὶ σκυθρωπάζοντος ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰσιοῦσιν; ἢ ὅτι θανατοῦται μὲν ὁ ἐμβάς, τῶν δ' ἀποθανόντων οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ λέγουσι τὰς ψυχὰς μὴ ποιεῖν σκιὰν μηδὲ σκαρδαμύττειν; Scholion zu Kallimachos, *Hymn.* I 13 (p. 42 Pfeiffer) πᾶν ζῷον εἰσιὸν ἐκεῖ (in den Zeustempel) μεμολυσμένον ἄγονον ἐγίνετο καὶ σκιὰν τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι ἐποίει. In keinem dieser vier Texte wird unzweideutig gesagt, dass das Verlieren des Schattens die genannten schädlichen Konsequenzen hat. Also kann es sein, dass es sich um zwei verschiedene Traditionen handelt, eine über die schädlichen Folgen (Tod, Unfruchtbarkeit) des Eintretens in diesen Zeustempel, die andere über das Verlieren des Schattens nach dem Eintreten in dieses Heiligtum. Dennoch kommt es mir logisch vor, einen Zusammenhang zwischen diesen beiden Traditionen anzunehmen, dass also doch gemeint ist, der Schattenverlust habe Tod oder Unfruchtbarkeit zur Folge. Sonst kan man diese Stellen kaum erklären.[15]

Auch bei einigen anderen Texten ist es unsicher, ob sie hierhin gehören oder nicht. Das sind die Stellen, die vom günstigen oder ungünstigen Einfluss des Schattens bestimmter Bäume handeln. Plinius,

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[15] Siehe die Diskussion bei W. H. Roscher, "Die Schattenlosigkeit des Zeus-Abatons auf dem Lykaion", *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie* 38 [145] (1892), 701-709 (702: "hier weicht ... der schützende dämon von der person des gottentweihenden eindringlings und überlässt ihn den schrecken des todes"). Siehe auch A. B. Cook, *Zeus. A Study in Ancient Religion* I, Cambridge 1914, 66f.

Nat. hist. XVII 18 bespricht ausführlich die Eigenschaften verschiedener Baumschatten, wobei das Leitprinzip ist: *umbra aut nutrix aut noverca est.* Lucretius VI 783-5 sagt: *arboribus primum certis gravis umbra tributa usque adeo, capitis faciant ut saepe dolores, siquis eas subter iacuit prostratus in herbis.* Man vergleiche Vergil, *Eclogae* X 75f. *surgamus, solet esse gravis cantantibus umbra, iuniperi gravis umbra, nocent et frugibus umbrae.*[16] Im Lichte der früher zitierten Texte kan man vielleicht verteidigen, dass auch hier derselbe magische Hintergrund im Spiel ist. Ganz sicher bin ich mir dessen jedoch nicht.[17]

Es gibt noch drei Stellen, die zwar *stricto sensu* nicht hierhergehören, die jedoch σκιά in einem uns ungewöhnlichen Sinne verwenden. *Papyrus Maspero* II 67188 παραφύλαξόν με ἀπὸ παντὸς πονηροῦ πνεύματος, ὑπόταξόν μου πᾶν πνεῦμα δαιμονίων φθειροποιῶν ... καὶ πᾶσα(ν) σκιά(ν).[18] *Hippiatrica Berolinensia* CXXX 135 βοήθημα πρὸς πάθη διάφορα καὶ πρὸς τὸ σκιὰς ἐκ τῶν στάβλων διῶξαι. Wahrscheinlich bedeutet σκιά hier "böser Geist", eine Bedeutung die herrührt aus der Benennung der Verstorbenen als "Schatten", schon bei Homer geläufig.[19] Der Totenschatten hat m.E. jedoch einen anderen Hintergrund als der Schatten, mit dem wir uns in diesem Aufsatz beschäftigen. Schliesslich gibt es noch einen merkwürdigen Passus bei Philostratus, *Vita Apollonii* III 15 (über die Brahmanen): ὑπαίθριοι ... δοκοῦντες αὐλίζεσθαι σκιάν τε ὑπεραίρουσιν αὐτῶν, καὶ ὕοντος οὐ ψεκάζονται, καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ ἡλίῳ εἰσίν, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται.[20]

Das einschlägige griechisch-römische Material ist hiermit, soweit ich es kenne, dargestellt. Es kann aber noch einigermassen komplettiert werden mit jüdischen Quellen der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit. Es gibt schon einige, sei es sehr wenige, Ansätze zu diesem Gedanken im Alten Testament.[21] An den meisten alttestamentlichen Stellen bedeutet Schatten (*ṣel*) einfach "Schutz", auch wenn das von Personen gesagt wird. Aber wenn Numeri XIV 9 zu den Israeliten über die Bewohner von Kanaan gesagt wird: "Fürchtet nicht die Bewohner des Landes; wir werden sie verschlingen. Ihr Schatten ist von ihnen gewichen", dann kann das nur bedeuten: Ihre Lebenskraft ist von ihnen gewichen.[22] Interessant ist nun, dass zwei Targume (aramäische Übersetzungen des A.T.) aus römischer Zeit diesen Text auch genau so übersetzen,[23] diese Vorstellung also kannten.

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[16] Andere lateinische Stellen bei Hölzer, *Umbra* 61ff. Siehe auch Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* III 1, 647F.

[17] Siehe aber Pradel, *art. cit.* 29ff. und Bieler, *art. cit.* 129ff.

[18] Zitiert nach J. H. Moulton - G. Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*, London 1930, 578.

[19] Z.B. *Od.* X 495, XI 207. Vgl. Pradel, *art. cit.* 3ff.

[20] Eine sehr rätselhafte Stelle ist Herondas, *Mime* I 15f. τὸ γὰρ γῆρας ἡμέας καθέλκει κἠ σκιὴ παρέστηκεν. Vielleicht ist hier der Schatten als Schutzgeist oder Genius gedacht (wie auch im neugriechischen Volksglauben; siehe Pradel, *art. cit.* 13ff.), vor dem man sich auch fürchten kann; vgl. den Ausdruck "seinen Schatten fürchten" in Plato, *Phaedon* 101d; Aristophanes, fr. 77 (weitere Stellen bei Pradel 13). Es ist unsicher ob Lukian, *Menippus* 11, auch in diesen Zusammenhang gehört.

Bemerkenswert ist auch, dass die Septuaginta Hiob XV 29 (der hebräische Text ist ganz unsicher) über den Bösen, der nicht gedeiht, übersetzt mit οὐ μὴ βάλῃ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν σκιάν. Auch hier kann man diesen bekannten Volksglauben im Hintergrund vermuten.[24] Eine Verbindung zwischen Kraft und Schatten ist vielleicht auch in LXX Psalm CXXXIX 8 vorausgesetzt: κύριε κύριε, δύναμις τῆς σωτηρίας μου, ἐπεσκίασας ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλήν μου ἐν ἡμέρᾳ πολέμου. Hier findet man nahezu dieselbe Kombination von δύναμις und ἐπισκιάζειν, die man auch in Lukas I 35 antrifft (s.o. S. 30 Anm. 10). Wie weit dieses Element von Kraft auch in Texten wie Deuteronomium XXXIII 12 ὁ θεὸς σκιάζει ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ πᾶσας τὰς ἡμέρας mitspielt, ist schwer zu sagen.

In rabbinischen Texten findet man wenig. Im Mischnatraktat *ʿAbodah*

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[21] Das A.T. steht damit nicht isoliert im alten Orient. Welche Rolle der Schatten spielte im babylonisch-assyrischen Bereich, kann man z.B. sehen im Artikel *Ṣillu* in *The Assyrian Dictionary*, vol. 16, Chicago 1962, 189-192. Das altägyptische Material ist behandelt worden von B. George, *Zu den altägyptischen Vorstellungen vom Schatten als Seele*, Bonn 1970. Alle alttestamentlichen Stellen über den *ṣalmawet* (Todesschatten) können hier ausser Betracht bleiben, weil *ṣalmawet* bedeutet: tiefe Finsternis; siehe D. Winton Thomas, "Ṣalmawet in the Old Testament", *Journal of Semitic Studies* 7 (1962), 191-200.

[22] Siehe auch Gaster, *Myth, Legend, Custom* 301. Auch für Klagelieder IV 20 ("in seinem Schatten [sc. des Königs] werden wir leben") könnte diese Bedeutung erwogen werden (Gaster, *ibid.* 827); aber vergleiche Jesaja XXXII 2.

[23] J. W. Etheridge, *The Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan ben Uzziel on the Pentateuch* II, New York 1865 (repr. 1968), 279: "their strength is departed from them" (Onkelos); 383: "the strength of their power has failed from them" (Jonathan).

[24] So wenigstens Gaster, *op. cit.* 791.

Zarah III 8 wird gesagt, dass man nicht im Schatten einer Aschera (d.h. eines als Götzenbild einer Göttin verehrten Baumes) sitzen darf (im Kommentar zu dieser Stelle im babylonischen Talmud, *'Abodah Zarah* 48b-49a, wird dieses Thema ausführlich behandelt). Aber derselbe Text sagt auch, dass wer da sitzt, dennoch nicht unrein wird. Das macht es unsicher, ob dieser Text in unseren Zusammenhang passt. Auffallend ist jedoch, dass in Mischna *Oholoth* II 1ff. gesagt wird, dass alle, die überschattet werden von etwas, das auch einen Leichnam überschattet, dadurch unrein werden.[25] Ein Schatten kann also doch kultisch unrein machen.

Im Talmud gibt es zwei Stellen (*Horayoth* 12a und *Kerithoth* 5b-6a), wo man feststellt, dass der Verlust des Schattens zugleich den Verlust der Seele anzeige (vgl. auch *Jebamoth* 122a). Auch im Talmud, *Pesachim* 111a-b, gibt es schliesslich noch einen Passus über den schädlichen Schatten bestimmter Bäume; hier gibt es grosse Ähnlichkeiten mit den genannten Texten von Plinius u.a. (s.o.). Wie gesagt, sind wir hier auf unsicherem Boden. Diese wenigen jüdischen Texte lassen jedoch keinen Zweifel daran, dass auch im Judentum der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit sich diese Vorstellung vom Schatten als einflussreicher Kraft vorgefunden hat.[26]

Es würde zu weit führen, auch das einschlägige Material aus gnostischen Texten zu präsentieren. Hier gibt es sehr spezifische und komplizierte Probleme. Es sei lediglich darauf verwiesen, dass auch hier das Motiv vom Schatten als *alter ego* eine Rolle spielt; man betrachte z.B. zwei Stellen in der Schrift *Vom Wesen der Archonten* 137,23ff. und 142,11ff.[27] Die gnostischen Texte, zumal die aus Nag

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[25] Das Prinzip wird so formuliert von H. Danby, *The Mishnah*, Oxford 1933, 649 Anm. 3: "From Num. 19,14 it is inferred that all (men and utensils) who are under the same tent or roof as a corpse (i.e. a dead human body or a part of it), or who are overshadowed by something which also overshadows a corpse (...) suffer corpse-uncleanness and remain unclean for seven days".

[26] Dies wird noch bestätigt vom Text in der Apostelgeschichte V 15 her, der von Leuten in Jerusalem handelt (s.o. im Text). In viel späteren rabbinischen Schriften trifft man unsere Vorstellung auch gelegentlich an; siehe J. D. Eisenstein, "Death", *Jewish Encyclopedia* IV (1903), 486 und M. Gaster in *Germania* 26 (1881), 210ff.

[27] Ausgabe von R. A. Bullard, *The Hypostasis of the Archons*, Berlin 1970, 24f., 34f. Einige, wenn auch ungenügende Bemerkungen zu diesen Stellen findet man in einem Aufsatz von J. P. Culianu, "La femme céleste et son ombre", *Numen* 23 (1976), 191-209.

Hammadi (die, obwohl schon vor mehr als 30 Jahre gefunden, noch nicht alle publiziert worden sind), verdienen nähere Untersuchung.

Das aufgeführte Material aus griechischen, lateinischen und jüdischen Quellen hat jedenfalls gezeigt, dass diese über die ganze Welt verbreitete Vorstellung auch in der hellenistisch-römischen Periode üblich war.[28]

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[28] Dass es auch Kritik an dieser Vorstellung gegeben hat, ergibt sich aus den zitierten Texten von Polybius und Plutarch.

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ΒΟΤΡΥϹ ΒΟΗϹΕΙ

The Age of Kronos and the Millennium in Papias of Hierapolis

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(Leiden)

Millenarian belief took its rise in a coalescence of various strands.* It emerged first about 100 A.D. in Christian circles in Asia Minor. Judaism provided the notion of a future period of blessedness in which the Messiah would reign on earth with his righteous before the final consummation of all things and the definitive manifestation of heavenly peace and bliss everlasting.[1] Mazdean apocalyptic contributed to fix the duration of this interim at a thousand years.[2] In addition, however, the concept of the thousand-year period of terrestrial blessedness was occasionally connected with originally Greek ideas concerning the happy life enjoyed long ago under the reign of Kronos (ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος). The present paper aims to indicate traces of this Greek myth in the chiliastic apocalypse transmitted by Papias of Hierapolis.

Papias, a Christian of Hierapolis in Phrygia, wrote his five books entitled *Exposition of the Sayings of the Lord* (Λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξήγησις) sometime in the first half of the second century A.D. Only a few scanty fragments of the work have survived in the form of quotations in the writings of later authors.[3] Irenaeus (*Adv. Haer.* V 33, 3-4) quotes from Papias' fourth book a prophecy allegedly pro-

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[1] P. Volz, *Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, Tübingen 1934², repr. Hildesheim 1966, 71-77 and 226-227.

[2] A. Wikenhauser, "Die Herkunft der Idee des tausendjährigen Reiches in der Johannes-Apokalypse", *Römische Quartalschrift* XXXXV (1937) 1-24. F. Cumont, "La fin du monde selon les mages occidentaux", *Revue de l'histoire des religions* CIII (1931) 29-96.

[3] The best edition of the fragments is O. de Gebhardt and A. Harnack, ed., *Barnabae Epistula*, Lipsiae 1878, Appendix pp. 87-104. But see n. 5 below.

nounced by Jesus, describing the luxuriance of nature in the millennium. According to Irenaeus, it had been handed down orally by John, a pupil of Jesus, and subsequently by Elders who had seen John. Papias himself indeed intimated in the proem to his *Exposition*, quoted by Eusebius (*H.E.* III 39), that he intended *inter alia* to illustrate his commentary on Jesus' words by quoting oral traditions which had passed through the following stages of transmission: Jesus → Jesus' disciples, among them the Elder John → hearers of John → Papias.[4]

Jesus' apocalypse on the millennium, as quoted by Irenaeus from Papias, runs as follows:[5]

> "The days shall come wherein vines shall grow each having ten thousand branches, and on every branch ten thousand shoots, and on every shoot ten thousand clusters, and in every cluster ten thousand grapes, and every grape when it is pressed shall yield five and twenty measures (*metrētes*) of wine. And when any of the saints taketh hold of one of the clusters, another will cry out: I am a better cluster, take me, through me bless thou the Lord. Likewise also [Jesus said] that a grain of wheat shall bring forth ten thousand ears, and every ear shall have ten thousand grains, and every grain shall yield five double pounds of clean flour; and all other fruits and seeds and plants according to the agreement that followeth with them [*sc.* in the same proportion]: and all animals using those foods which are got from the earth shall be peaceable and in accord one with another, subject unto men with all obedience".

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[4] I cannot go here into the numerous problems connected with the interpretation of this proem, but in my opinion it cannot be concluded from the words of this preface that Papias was personally acquainted with the Elder John.

[5] I follow, with some small changes, the translation of M. R. James, ed., *The Apocryphal New Testament*, Oxford 1924, repr. 1955, 36-37. The Greek text of Irenaeus' *Adv. Haer.* V is lost. In A. Rousseau's recent critical edition of this book (Sources chrétiennes 153, Paris 1969), which is based on the Latin and Armenian MS. tradition, the text of the passage under consideration differs in several details from the text adopted in De Gebhardt-Harnack and in Funk-Bihlmeyer, *Apostolische Väter*. Rousseau's text runs as follows: "Venient dies in quibus vineae nascentur singulae decem millia palmitum habentes, et in unoquoque palmite dena millia brachiorum, et in unoquoque brachio dena millia flagellorum, et in unoquoque flagello dena millia botruorum, et in unoquoque botro dena millia acinorum, et unumquodque acinum expressum dabit vigintiquinque metretas vini. Et cum apprehenderit aliquis sanctorum botruum alius clamabit botrus: 'Ego melior sum, me sume, per me Dominum benedic'. Similiter et granum tritici decem millia spicarum generaturum, et unamquamque spicam habituram decem millia granorum, et unumquodque granum quinque bilibres similae dare mundae, et reliqua autem poma et semina et herbam secundum congruentiam his consequentem, et omnia animalia his cibis utentia qui a terra accipiuntur pacifica et consentanea invicem fieri, subjecta hominibus cum omni subjectione".

Of course, nothing warrants the assumption that the words quoted really derive from Jesus. Yet it is clear that whoever may be the author of the passage, he draws heavily on traditions current in Jewish and Jewish-Christian apocalyptic. This has long been noticed for the motif of the abundantly growing vines. In the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch (29,5), which dates from the end of the first century A.D., the fertility of nature in the Messianic era is described in similar terms:[6]

> "The earth also will yield its fruit ten thousand fold, and on one vine there will be a thousand branches, and each branch will produce a thousand clusters, and each cluster will produce a thousand grapes, and each grape will produce a *cor* [= 393 litres] of wine".

Felicity on earth during the period from the imprisonment of the evil angels until the final judgement is depicted in the same way in the pre-Christian Apocalypse of Henoch (10,19):[7]

> "The vine which one will plant will yield thousands of *prochous* [a Greek liquid measure] of wine, and of the seed every grain will produce a measure of corn, and of the olive-tree every olive will yield ten *bath* [a Hebrew liquid measure[8]] of oil".

A Hebrew Apocalypse of Elijah (6,4) of the 3rd century A.D. says that in the Messianic interim of forty years, preceding the great battle of Gog and Magog against the saints of the Lord, nature will become exceedingly fertile:[9]

> "Then a *cor* of wheat will yield nine hundred *cor*: likewise will do the vine and the oil. All trees will be laden with wonderful fruits, for Scripture says: 'You, mountains of Israel, you shall put forth your branches' [Ezekiel 36,8]".

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[6] James, *Apocryphal N.T.*, 37. The translation used by James is that of R. H. Charles, *The Apocalypse of Baruch*, London 1896, 54-55. Baruch 29, 5, as well as the Papias-fragment and *Kethuboth* 111b, is also referred to by P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum N.T. aus Talmud und Midrasch* IV, Munich 1928, 889 and 951.

[7] M. Black, ed., *Apocalypsis Henochi Graece*, Leiden 1970, 26.

[8] The Hebrew *bath* (בת) equalled about the Greek *metrētēs* = almost 40 litres.

[9] M. Buttenwieser, *Die hebräische Elias-Apokalypse*, Leipzig 1897, 20 and 64; P. Riessler, *Altjüdisches Schrifttum ausserhalb der Bibel*, Heidelberg 1928, repr. Darmstadt 1966, Ch. 16, p. 237.

The idea expressed in *Apoc. Bar.* 29 (quoted above) that in the Messianic era each grape will contain a *cor* of wine was placed on a biblical foundation in the Babylonian Talmud, *Kethuboth* 111b:

> "In the world to come ... there will be no grape that will not contain thirty kegs of wine, for it is said in Scripture: 'And of the blood of the grape thou drankest foaming (חָמֶר) wine' [Deut. 32,14]: read not 'foaming' (חָמֶר) but 'a *chomer*' (חֹמֶר)".[10]

Papias, or his informant, was not the only Christian author who knew and adopted the tradition just traced. In the Apocalypse of Paul (22), written in the 4th century, it is related that Paul, when he was taken up into the "third heaven" (II Cor. 12,2), was led into Paradise, where he was struck by the fruitfulness of the trees:[11]

> "Each vine had ten thousand shoots, and each shoot had ten thousand clusters, and each cluster had ten thousand grapes".

And to quote yet another example, the Apocalypse of John the Lord's brother[12] which is quoted in an Encomium on John the Baptist tells how the Saviour took the apostles to Paradise. There Thomas asked him how much fruit the trees bore. The Lord answered:

> "I will hide nothing from you about the things concerning which ye have questioned me. As regardeth the vine, concerning the fruit of which ye have asked, there are ten thousand bunches of grapes upon it, and each bunch will produce six *metrētes* of wine. As regards the palm-trees in Paradise, each cluster yieldeth ten thousand dates, and each cluster is as long as a man is high. So likewise is it in the matter of the fig-trees: each shoot produceth ten thousand figs, and if three men were to partake of one fig, each of them would be satisfied. On each ear of the wheat which is in Paradise there are ten thousand grains, and each grain produceth

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[10] The consonants of the two Hebrew words are identical. A *chomer* is a Hebrew measure of capacity equalling the *cor* = 393 litres.

[11] E. Hennecke and W. Schneemelcher, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen* II, Tübingen 1964, 536-567, see p. 550.

[12] E. A. Wallis Budge, *Coptic Apocrypha*, London 1913; the quotation is from p. 348. In Budge's translation the Apocalypse goes under the name of "John the brother of the Lord". M. R. James, *Apocryphal N.T.*, 37, tacitly changed the name of John into that of James, probably because he thought that among Jesus' brothers there is no John, whereas James is the best-known of them (see e.g. Mark 6, 3; Matth. 13, 55; Gal. 1, 19). However, a brother of Jesus named John is mentioned by many textual witnesses (among them Codex Vaticanus, first hand, and Codex Bezae) in Matth. 13, 55; see the critical apparatuses *ad loc.*

> six measures of flour. And the cedars also are on the same scale: each tree produceth ten thousand cones and is of a very great height. And the apple-tree and the thourakion-tree are of the same height; there are ten thousand apples on each shoot, and if three men were to partake of one apple, each of them would be satisfied".

As late as the 5th century, a Byzantine recension of the Life of Alexander[13] (III 5) describes the land of the Brahmans as so fertile that Alexander found "the shoot of the vine having thousand bunches of grapes". The agreement with the passages cited above need not be accounted for by supposing that the report about Alexander's travels was influenced by Jewish or Christian literature. The description of India in the late *Vita Alexandri* derives indirectly from Onesicritus.[14] Now although this writer personally visited India, he depicted the country as a true wonderland. In this he was seemingly swayed by the Indian doctrine of the *yugahs* (i.e. the four world-periods succeeding each other in eternally repeated cycles or *calpahs*) according to which after a period of gradual degeneration the golden age (*kṛta*) would return. Onesicritus thus seems to have painted India in the colours of the golden age of Brahman apocalyptic which he may have come to know on the spot. The chronological apocalyptic system of India, however, is somehow related to the corresponding systems of Babylon and Persia,[15] which in the Hellenistic era influenced both Jewish literature (e.g. Daniel) and such Greek and Roman writings as the Sibylline oracles and Vergil's fourth Eclogue. It is not surprising, therefore, that certain details of apocalyptic thought with which Onesicritus became acquainted in India, also ended up — though transmitted by an entirely different route — in apocalypses like those of Henoch, Baruch and Elijah, and in the *Exposition* of Papias.

It is clear that Papias in his account of the abundant fertility of nature in the millennium is greatly indebted to Jewish apocalyptic.[16] The same applies to his description of the vegetarianism of animals, their peaceful coexistence and their submission to man. We shall not proceed to show this in detail, but rather call attention to the single sentence in the apocalypse preserved by Papias for which parallels from Jewish literature seem to be lacking:

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[13] H. van Thiel, *Leben und Taten Alexanders von Makedonien* (Texte zur Forschung 13), Darmstadt 1974, 128: τὸ τῆς ἀμπέλου κλῆμα ἔχον βότρυας χιλίους.

[14] Van Thiel, 189. Compare also Strabo XV 1, 21 δένδρα παράδοξα ἡ Ἰνδικὴ τρέφει ... Ὀνησίκριτος ... διηγεῖται ... with Pliny *N.H.* XV 68: "Onesicritus tradit in Hyrcania [on the Caspian Sea] multum nostris esse dulciores fertilioresque (sc. ficos), ut quae modios CCLXX singulae ferant".

[15] B. Gatz, *Weltalter, goldene Zeit und sinnverwandte Vorstellungen* (Spudasmata 16), Hildesheim 1967, 7-27 and 195-196.

> "Et cum apprehenderit aliquis sanctorum botruum alius clamabit botrus: 'Ego melior sum, me sume, per me Dominum benedic'".
>
> "And when any of the saints shall have taken hold of a cluster, another cluster shall cry: 'I am a better cluster; take me, bless the Lord through me'".

As a parallel to this bizarre statement L. Ginzberg[17] cited a passage from a haggadic source: "If some one will try to pick a fig on the Sabbath, in the time to come, it will exclaim: 'It is Sabbath'". This is perhaps a valuable parallel in as far as it attests that in Jewish apocalyptic imagination the fruits of the earth could occasionally be represented as speaking with a human voice. Yet the passage referred to by Ginzberg contains no allusion to the extraordinary fecundity of nature in the world to come which is characteristic of the apocalypse quoted by Papias. Nor is the exclamation of the figs in the passage adduced by Ginzberg an invitation to partake of the fruits, as in Papias, but just the opposite: the figs warn against eating on the Sabbath. In addition it must not be overlooked that the source quoted by Ginzberg, *Midrash Tehillim*, is dated to the later centuries of the Geonic period (600-1100).[18]

Furthermore, it is not the belief that the trees of Paradise can speak with human voices which calls for elucidation. The evidence for such a belief was already collected from pagan, early Christian, Jewish and Mohammedan sources by M. R. James in a digression under the heading "The Legend of the Speaking Tree", written by way of illustration of Testament of Abraham 3 (B):[19]

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[16] W. Bauer, "Chiliasmus", *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* II (1954) 1076 was probably right in writing: "Auch bei Papias ... stammt die ... chiliastische Begeisterung aus Palästina. Dorthin gehören seine Hauptgewährsleute (III 39, 4; 7-9; 14); und was er (nach Iren. V 33, 3f.) in Übereinstimmung mit den "Ältesten" von der unglaublichen Fruchtbarkeit im Reiche der Gerechten zu erzählen weiss, hat nächste Parallelen im jüd., besonders rabbin. Schrifttum".

[17] L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews* V, Philadelphia 1925 (1955^7), 142. His quotation is from *Midrash Tehillim* 73, 335.

[18] H. L. Strack, "Midrasch", *Real-Encyklopädie für prot. Theologie und Kirche*^{2}, IX, Leipzig 1881, 748-761, see p. 759.

> "When they [Michael and Abraham] approached the city, at a distance of three stadia, they found a big tree with three hundred branches, like a tamarisk. And they heard a voice singing from the branches: 'Holy (are you)...'".

However, none of the speaking trees mentioned by James is represented as inviting to eat from its fruits. It is, therefore, especially the episode of the grapes asking to be eaten which needs comment.

The motif of food offering itself for consumption was a favourite theme of Greek comedy. Here it originated as a parody of the widely spread myth of the γῆ αὐτομάτη, according to which in olden times, in the days of Kronos' reign, the earth had produced food spontaneously, without agency of men and without any agricultural intervention. In fact, the spontaneous fertility of the earth is the most prominent and the most stereotyped ingredient of descriptions of "life under Kronos". The numerous authors, from Homer to Claudian, who used the myth of the γῆ αὐτομάτη need not be enumerated here, they have been listed by B. Gatz.[20]

Highly instructive is the example of a travesty of Kronos' golden age which we owe to Telecleides (*c.* 440 B.C.) in his *Amphictyons*:[21]

> "I will, then, tell of the life of old which I provided for mortals. First, there was peace over all, like water over the hands.[22] The earth produced no terror and no disease; on the other hand, things needful came of their own accord. Every torrent flowed with wine, barley-cakes strove with wheat-loaves for men's lips, beseeching that they be swallowed if men loved the whitest. Fishes would come to the house and bake

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[19] M. R. James, *The Testament of Abraham*, Cambridge 1892. On the Legend of the Speaking Tree, see pp. 59-64. This reference I owe to the kindness of Prof. Smit Sibinga. The quotation from ch. 3 (B) is from the translation by M. E. Stone, *The Testament of Abraham Translated*, Missoula (Montana) 1972. In recension A, the corresponding passage runs as follows: "As they went from the field toward his house, by that path there stood a cypress tree and at God's command the tree cried out in a human voice and said, 'Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord God...'". For another speaking tree, see Genesis Apocryphon XIX, 16.

[20] Gatz, *Weltalter, goldene Zeit*, 229 under B.I. 1. For the origin of the motif of food offering itself to be eaten as a parody of the γῆ αὐτομάτη, see p. 118.

[21] Preserved in Athenaeus VI 268 b-d. The translation is that of C. B. Gulick in the Loeb series, London/New York 1929.

[22] Proverbial expression denoting anything easy to obtain, thus Gulick.

> themselves, then serve themselves on the tables. A river of broth, whirling hot slices of meat, would flow by the couches; conduits full of piquant sauces for the meat were close at hand for the asking, so that there was plenty for moistening a mouthful and swallowing it tender. On dishes there would be honey-cakes all sprinkled with spices, and roast thrushes served up with milk-cakes were flying into the gullet. The flat-cakes jostled each other at the jaws and set up a racket".

In this fragment one can simply observe how the idea of the automatically producing earth fades into that of the self-presentation of all sorts of food. Similar descriptions of life in primitive times, when Kronos was king, had already been given by the comic poets Cratinus (450/425 B.C.) and his contemporary Crates.[23] The latter depicted, in his *Wild Animals*, an era in which all work performs itself:

> "Where's the cup? Go and wash yourself. Walk this way, my barley-cake. The pot should disgorge the beets. Fish, get up! 'But I'm not yet done on the other side!' Well, turn yourself over, won't you? and baste yourself with oil and salt". (...) "Warm baths from the sea (...) flow of their own accord into every man's basin, and the water will say: 'Stop me!' And the ointment-bottle, full of perfume, will come immediately, of its own accord, and so will the sponge and the sandals".

It is in these burlesque parodies of the age of Kronos that the European notion of the land of Cockaigne has its roots.[24] For even in Attic comedy the attributes originally belonging to the parodied golden age were already transferred to several other lands and regions existing in human imagination, e.g. the Lower World and Persia, often pictured as fabulously prosperous. For example, in the *Miners* of Pherecrates (*c.* 440/420 B.C.), the Lower World is represented as a land abounding in exquisite foods:[25]

> "All things in the world yonder were mixed with wealth and fashioned with every blessing in every way. Rivers full of porridge and black broth flowed babbling through the channels spoons and all, and lumps of cheese-cakes too. Hence the morsel could slip easily and oilily of its own

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[23] Athenaeus VI 267e-268a. I follow Gulick's translation.

[24] For the history of the motif of Cockaigne, see J. Poeschel, "Das Märchen vom Schlaraffenlande", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur* V (1878) 389-427; E. Schmidt, "Das Schlaraffenland" in his *Charakteristiken*, 2. Reihe, Berlin 1901, 51-70; J. Bolte and G. Poívka, *Anmerkungen zu den Kinder- u. Hausmärchen der Brüder Grimm* III, Leipzig 1918, 244-258; Gatz, *Weltalter, goldene Zeit*, 116-121.

[25] Athenaeus VI 268e-269e.

> accord down the throats of the dead. (...) Roast thrushes, dressed as for a meat-dish,[26] flew round our mouths entreating us to swallow them as we lay stretched among the myrtles and anemones. And the apples! The fairest of the fair to see hung over our heads (...). And whenever one had eaten or drunk of these things, straightway there came forth once more twice as much again”.

In the *Sirens* of Nicophon[27] (*c.* 410-380), another comedy containing a description of a land of fantastic abundance, mention is made of a flat-cake giving orders to be eaten (πλάκους ἑαυτὸν ἐσθίειν κελευέτω). And in the *Thurio-Persians* of Metagenes[28] (*c.* 400 B.C.) Thurii is eulogized as a land where “cutlets automatically stewed dart downwards into the mouth”.

After the motif of food presenting itself to be eaten had frequently been employed in Old Comedy (the evidence quoted above is only a selection), it became of less regular occurrence in later Greek literature. Yet it appears from occasional references to the topic in Hellenistic sources that it had taken a firm root in the imagination of the times. Petronius, for instance, styled the ideal place which pessimists tend to localize anywhere except where they happen to be the land “where roast porkers walk about”.[29] According to Lucian,[30] drudging labourers are apt to think that the life their masters lead is as much as ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος and that honey simply streams into the mouths of their masters from heaven (καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ μέλι αὐτὸ ἐς τὰ στόματα ἐσρεῖν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ). At the Banquet of the Blest there is nobody who fills the drinking-cups, for as soon as one has picked two or three cups from the trees surrounding the place of the feast and placed them on the table, they fill themselves of their own accord with wine.[31] And to quote a final example, Philostratus[32] tells on the authority of Damis how Apollonius, when attending a banquet of the sages and the king of India, witnessed that the food was served up by nobody, but dished up itself of its own accord:

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[26] It is not entirely clear to me what the Greek text means exactly: ὀπταὶ κίχλαι γὰρ εἰς ἀνάβραστ' ἠρτυμέναι... Gulick translated: “For roast thrushes, dressed for a *réchauffé*, ...”. The reading of the Greek text is highly problematical.

[27] Athenaeus VI 269e.

[28] Athenaeus VI 269f.

[29] Petronius 45, 4: “Tu si aliubi fueris, dices hic porcos coctos ambulare”.

[30] *Fugitivi* 17.

[31] Lucian, *Verae Historiae* II 14. Here as well as in the land of Amor and Psyche (Apuleius, *Metam.* V 3) foods are served by gentle breezes of wind.

> "Dried fruits and bread and vegetables and the dessert of the season all came in, served in order, and set before them more agreeably than if cooks and waiters had provided it".

One should not only consider the references just quoted from Hellenistic sources, but also take into account that the passages cited above from Old Comedy were all preserved in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistae* (probably completed in 192 A.D.) and that, consequently, from the fifth century B.C. up to the Christian era they have been able to nourish and stimulate popular phantasy. Thus one may realize that the crying bunches of grapes in Papias' millennium form a less isolated phenomenon than they might seem to be at first sight.

The preceding observations lead me to venture the following hypothesis. Although Papias' chiliastic apocalypse draws for the greater part on traditions current in Jewish apocalyptic, the motif of the bunches asking to be picked and eaten is a reminiscence of the self-presentation of foods originally belonging to the parodies of the myth of life under Kronos, and subsequently employed in descriptions of all sorts of "utopian" regions (Lower World, Persia, India, the Islands of the Blest, and so on). Of course, there is no reason to suppose that the author of the apocalypse handed down by Papias was himself acquainted with descriptions of Kronos' reign or with any of the passages mentioned above. The evidence rather suggests that in the first century A.D. the idea of food offering itself to be eaten had become a stock element in the account of utopian lands and that, as a commonplace in such descriptions, it could easily slip into the picture of the kingdom of Christ owing to the fact that the fantastic abundance of the millennium resembled very much that of various utopian lands in Hellenistic popular imagination.

One more remark must be made on the particular form in which the motif at issue has been phrased in the text as cited from Papias by Irenaeus. In the Latin translation (which proves to be very literal where it can be compared with sections which are also extant in Greek) the sentence in question runs:

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[32] *Vita Apollonii* III 27. The quotation is from Conybeare's translation in the Loeb series, London/New York 1912.

> "Ego melior sum, me sume, per me Dominum benedic".

The first two members of this exclamation present no serious difficulty, although any retranslation into Greek must needs remain doubtful. Does "melior" stand for χρηστότερος (cf. Luke 5,39 *text. rec.*) or for βελτίων (as A. Rousseau has suggested[33]) or for κρείσσων (the most common word for "better")? As the meaning required here is "tasting better" and this idea is best conveyed by χρηστότερος, this word is more likely to have been used by Papias' informant than either of the two other words.

The final member of the sentence is somewhat more problematic. "Benedic" stands no doubt for εὐλόγησον.[34] The bunch says: "Bless the Lord through me". The blessing referred to here is plainly the benediction pronounced at meals as practiced in Judaism and Christianity. The expression "per me Dominum benedic" even creates the impression of being due to someone who was familiar with Jewish religious observances. Rabbinic Judaism, indeed, held that even if a man ate only grapes, he had to say a benediction; it was a point of debate whether three benedictions were necessary or one would do.[35] Apart from this, the words of the apocalyptic fragment transmitted by Papias reflect exactly the view and notions connected with the Hebrew equivalent (ברך) of this εὐλογεῖν: the object of the blessing before and after meals was God, not the food. One blessed God over the food. Greek Christian writers soon yielded to the temptation of making the food or drink the object of the blessing (Mark 8,7 εὐλογήσας αὐτά; Luke 9,16 λαβὼν δὲ τοὺς πέντε ἄρτους...

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[33] In his retranslation from Latin into Greek in A. Rousseau, ed., *Irénée de Lyon. Contre les hérésies, livre v*, vol. II (Sources chrétiennes 153), Paris 1969, 415.

[34] Rousseau gives εὐλόγει in the present tense, but for an invitation to pronounce no more than a blessing the aorist is more adequate.

[35] Mishna *Berakoth* 6, 8: "If a man ate figs, grapes or pomegranates, he should say the three benedictions after them [i.e., as for a complete meal], thus Rabban Gamaliel [130-160 A.D.]. But the sages say: One benediction (having) the force of the three (will suffice)". The blessing in the case of grapes ran: "Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the World, who bringest forth fruit from the vine".

εὐλόγησεν αὐτούς). The author of Papias' apocalypse, however, sticks to the more primitive conception.

Finally, the words "per me", too, reveal a semitic background. The Latin translator obviously tried to render some Greek expression for "by means of", "through", "by". This has rightly been seen by Rousseau, and it is quite understandable that he retranslated "per me" into δι' ἐμοῦ.[36] Yet this was an unfortunate guess, for "blessing the Lord by means of a bunch of grapes" (εὐλογεῖν τὸν Κύριον διὰ βότρυος) is an awkward expression which, moreover, does not make sense. The food over or for which the blessing is pronounced at a meal, and which forms, so to speak, the cause of the blessing addressed to the Lord, is never introduced by the preposition διά, but by ἐπί, περί, ὑπέρ or ἐν. It is not difficult to see which of these four prepositions figured in the Greek text underlying the clause "per me Dominum benedic". It can only be ἐν, misinterpreted by the Latin translator as an instrumental ἐν (ב), but in reality the equivalent of על, which is the normal preposition for "over" or "for" in phrases like "saying the benediction *over* or *for* the wine". The Greek equivalent ἐν occurs in Philo, *Spec. Leg.* II 175:

> οὔθ' ὅσιον (ἦν) ἀπολαῦσαι καὶ μετασχεῖν τινος τῶν πρὸς ἐδωδὴν μὴ ἐν οἷς εὐπρεπὲς καὶ θέμις εὐχαριστήσαντας...[37]
>
> "It would be unlawful to enjoy and partake of any form of food over which thanks have not been offered in the proper and rightful manner..."

and in Aristides, *Apologia* 15,10:

> προστάγματα αὐτοῦ [τοῦ Χριστοῦ] ἀσφαλῶς φυλάττουσιν, ... εὐχαριστοῦντες αὐτῷ κατὰ πᾶσαν ὥραν ἐν παντὶ βρώματι καὶ ποτῷ...
>
> "We closely keep his [Christ's] commandments, ... offering him thanks every hour for everything we have to eat and to drink..."

To these instances[38] of "saying grace for food" with the adjunct indicating the food introduced by ἐν, there can be added an example of εὐλογεῖν in the sense of "blessing (the Lord)" with a causal adjunct not especially indicating food, but "his marvellous works" in general, yet equally introduced by ἐν; Testament of Simeon VI 7:

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[36] Rousseau, *Irénée* (cf. n. 33), 415.

[37] Εὐχαριστέω, used for thanksgiving or benediction for food, "say grace", is entirely synonymous with εὐλογέω.

[38] I owe these two references to Conzelmann's contribution on εὐχαριστέω in G. Kittel-G. Friedrich, *Theol. Wörterb. z. N.T.* IX, 397-405, see p. 398, line 4/5.

> εὐλογήσω τὸν ὕψιστον ἐν τοῖς θαυμασίοις αὐτοῦ.
>
> "I shall bless the Most High because of his marvellous works".

It can safely be concluded that the preposition "per" in the exclamation of the grapes represents the Greek preposition ἐν.[39]

A Jewish tendency in the content as well as the wording of the final clause of the exclamation of the grapes is undeniable. One must therefore take full account of the possibility that the exclamation of the grapes is due to a Jewish author. Such an authorship, however, would by no means detract from the tenability of the hypothesis raised above, according to which the apocalypse handed down by Papias took up an element from Hellenistic utopian thought which had originally belonged to the comic representation of the ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος. The confluence of Jewish and Greek traditions is a far from surprising phenomenon about the turn of the first century A.D.

Hardly two centuries after Papias wrote his *Exposition*, another adherent of Millenarianism in Asia Minor, Lactantius, wrote a full and detailed account of the joys, the peace, the harmony and the abundant fertility of nature in the thousand-year kingdom of Christ.[40] In it all attributes of the age of Kronos, the golden age, and the Messianic kingdom of Jewish eschatology have been united and integrated. In a way, Lactantius realized very well that his concept of the millennium resulted from a fusion of disparate traditions, witness his words: "tunc fient illa quae poetae aureis temporibus facta esse jam Saturno regnante dixerunt". The complete integration of *Regnum Saturni* and *Regnum Christi* in the *Divinae Institutiones* of Lactantius is the result of a development of centuries, a development of which Papias' crying bunches of grapes seem to represent an early phase.

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[39] On the basis of the preceding analysis, the following tentative reconstruction of the sentence at issue might be ventured: Ἐγὼ χρηστότερός εἰμι, ἐμὲ λάβε, ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸν κύριον εὐλόγησον. This reconstruction aims to correct that of Rousseau at three places (Rousseau reads βελτίων, δι' ἐμοῦ and εὐλόγει). In combining the verbs λάβειν and εὐλογῆσαι, the invitation of the grapes strikingly concurs with more than a dozen passages in the New Testament in which the account of a meal is introduced with the stereotyped terms λαβὼν (or ἔλαβεν) ... εὐλόγησεν (or -γήσας/εὐχαρίστησεν/-ήσας).

[40] *Divinae Institutiones* VII 24. Lactantius wrote this work at Nicomedia (Bithynia) in 304-311.

THE REALITY OF THE INVISIBLE

Some Remarks on St John XIV 8 and Greek Philosophic Tradition

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The purpose of this paper is to suggest a background for John XIV 8ff. and some related passages in the Fourth Gospel which could help us to make somewhat more sense of them than on the surface they might appear to contain. Since this background will turn out to be a well-known doctrine of Greek philosophy, we shall have occasion in the course of our discussion to deal with certain aspects of that subject as well. Obviously in a field beset with so many dangers and difficulties some of our results will have to remain uncertain or at best problematical. At the end one thing, however, will hopefully appear to have been firmly established: that the questions with which the following will confront us have at least been well worth asking.

Introduction

First we might make some introductory remarks about the context of John XIV 8ff. Usually one considers as such the textual unit running from XIII 31 - XIV 31 and commonly referred to as the first of Jesus' so-called Farewell Discourses, which as a whole occupy chapters XIII 31 - XVII. At least for the first of these, to which for the present purpose we may as well limit ourselves, this designation seems particularly well chosen. For in it even at first sight all kinds of features appear which have more than once been demonstrated to be typical of the Farewell Discourse or Testament as known mainly from Jewish-hellenistic and early christian literature.[1] Jesus is portrayed as a teacher of wisdom, in fact as personified wisdom itself which after its disappearance, according to a much quoted saying,[2] people will search for in vain. Indeed Jesus by addressing his pupils with the characteristic τεκνία (XIII 33[3]) is announcing his departure in the near future. As inheritance to the circle of his friends[4] he leaves behind a "new commandment"[5] of which the main purport is mutual love (XIII 34[6]). So far everything indeed seems to point to the literary form of a Farewell Discourse in which certain concepts of the Jewish-hellenistic wisdom tradition are reflected. At XIII 36, however, there appears to be something of a rupture. Before being able to add some more remarks on the newly introduced theme of the "new commandment", Jesus is interrupted by one of his disciples who asks him where he will go. This interruption again leads to a kind of dialogue in which two other disciples take part

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[1] Some useful studies on this subject include E. Stauffer, *Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Stuttgart 1948^4, pp. 327-330 (Beilage VI "Abschiedsreden und Abschiedsszenen"); *id.*, *RAC* I 29-35 *s.v.* Abschiedsreden; J. Munck, "Discours d'adieu dans

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le Nouveau Testament et dans la littérature biblique", *Aux sources de la tradition chrétienne* (Mélanges offerts à M. Maurice Goguel), Neuchâtel-Paris 1950, pp. 155-170; H. J. Michel, *Die Abschiedsrede des Paulus an die Kirche Apg. 20, 17-38* (StANT 35), München 1973; U. B. Müller, "Die Parakletvorstellung im Johannesevangelium", *ZThK* 71 (1974), pp. 31-77; A. Lacomara, "Deuteronomy and the Farewell Discourse (Jn. 13:31-16:33)", *CathBiblQuart* 36 (1974), pp. 65-84.

[2] In vs 33 Jesus refers explicitly to what in VII 33f. he had said to the Jews (cf. VIII 21). On the wisdom-affiliations of this saying see R. E. Brown, *The Gospel according to John* (*I-XII*), Garden City, New York 1966, p. 318. R. Bultmann, *Das Evangelium des Johannes*, Göttingen 1964⁹, pp. 232f. suggests some gnostic, particularly mandaic parallels. More interesting to compare is certainly *Ev. Thom.* 38, which, if Fitzmyer's reconstruction is to be trusted, is also represented among the Oxyrhynchus Logoi (cf. J. A. Fitzmyer, *Essays on the Semitic Background of the New Testament*, Missoula, Montana 1974, pp. 410-412). This subject I intend to discuss on a future occasion.

[3] As can easily be inferred from O.T.-books like Prov. and Sir. it was customary for teachers of wisdom to address their pupils as "sons" or "children".

[4] It is interesting to observe that in the Farewell Discourses Jesus designates his disciples not only as his "children", but also as his "friends" (XV 13-15). That this latter expression has to be taken in the sense of the Greco-Roman idea of friendship is shown by the fact that it appears especially in connection with Jesus' death (XV 13; cf. XIII 1 and, of course, X 11 and I John III 16). For to sacrifice one's life for his friends was generally considered to be the highest possible demonstration of friendship. Cf. the collection of materials by G. Stählin, *ThWNT* IX, p. 151.

[5] Cf. a characteristic passage like *Test. Benj.* X 4f., where Benjamin qualifies the divine commandments which he hands over to his sons as their "only inheritance", which they have in their turn to transmit to their children εἰς κατάσχεσιν αἰώνιον.

[6] For some parallels see E. Stauffer, *Theologie* (cf. n. 1), p. 328.

and the subjects discussed are first Jesus' departure (ὑπάγειν) to the Father and afterwards the identity of the Father himself (XIV 8-14). With XIV 14 the dialogue is more or less brought to a close and in vss 15ff. the theme of the "new commandment" reappears, as it seems, however, without being connected either explicitly or implicitly with the immediately preceding discussion. Vss 16f. add the "spirit of truth" to the inheritance which Jesus will leave to his disciples and, after a digression in vss 18-20, vs 21 returns to the theme of Jesus' commandments. Although in vs 22 Jesus is again interrupted by one of his disciples, this time no change of subject occurs. The remaining part of the chapter is mainly about preserving the commandments, i.e. the words that Jesus will leave behind and the Holy Spirit whom the Father will send and who will remind the disciples of everything that Jesus has spoken (vs 26). In vs 27a the inheritance-theme culminates in the promise of "peace"[7] after which vss 27bff. still add a final meditation on the subject of Jesus' going away.

As appears from this survey, especially the beginning and the end of this conversation of Jesus with his disciples seem to accord full justification to its common description as a Farewell Discourse. On the other hand, however, it has to be admitted that for a not inconsiderable part of it, to which also XIV 8ff. belong, such a classification is not all that evident. As we have seen, what follows after Peter's short question in XIII 36 at first sight seems to interrupt the connection between XIII 35 and XIV 15. Although this digression, like the whole discourse with which it is interwoven, is concerned with Jesus' going away, its literary character is not that of a discourse but of a dialogue and its main intention is not so much to console and instruct pupils whom their teacher is going to leave, as to reveal the ignorance of the disciples as to Jesus' true identity and the nature of the Father to whom he is going to return. Indeed it is not surprising that on the basis of features like these in a recent discussion John XIV has been described by an American scholar as a "quasi-

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[7] This may correspond to the motif of a final blessing which occurs frequently in the testamental literature, cf. E. Stauffer, *Theologie* (cf. n. 1), p. 329, who not only quotes our passage, but also refers, perhaps correctly, to XX 21f.

Hermetic logos".[8] In support of this suggestion he might moreover have referred to such an authority as C. H. Dodd, who in his famous book on *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*[9] goes even as far as describing the Farewell Discourses in their entirety as "analogous to Hellenistic documents of the class of the *Poimandres* and the *De Regeneratione*. That is to say, they are a dialogue on initiation into eternal life through the knowledge of God, ending with a prayer or hymn which is itself the final stage of initiation".[10] However, although the idea is certainly attractive, it seems to me that this characterization of chapters XIII 31 - XVII as a "dialogue on initiation" is far too one-sided to be entirely acceptable. In my opinion it would be better to describe them as Farewell Discourses with inserted dialogical interludes similar to those that one finds elsewhere in the Fourth Gospel. In any case this is what we have in XIII 31 - XIV 31. The whole is clearly a discourse within which XIII 36-XIV 14 seem to have been sufficiently marked out as a digression. Of course, both parts are bound together by the theme of Jesus' going away (ὑπάγειν). As again Dodd already observed, the entire first Discourse "is dominated by the ideas of going and coming. Verbs expressing these ideas (ὑπάγειν, πορεύεσθαι, ἔρχεσθαι) occur at least fourteen times, with Christ as subject; and the longest passage without direct reference to going and coming is no more than five verses. The dialogue in fact is occupied with the death and resurrection of Christ".[11] What Dodd fails to notice, however, is that precisely in the inserted dialogue this "interpretation" several times takes a turn that is rather different from the one that is typical for the Farewell Discourse as such. As we would expect, in the latter Jesus' departure figures prominently as a source of distress for his disciples for which they are to console themselves with the inheritance that he promises to leave behind and which consists of such things as his words, the spirit of truth and his peace. In this respect his going away may even be said to take place for their benefit.[12] We should note that this tenor is also quite consistent with the express statement made by Jesus near the end of the Discourse of his desire to instruct his disciples on the subject of his approaching death (XIV 29). The digression of XIII 36-XIV 14,[13] however, seems to be marked by an entirely different tendency. For it apparently uses the occurrence of the verb ὑπάγειν only as an occasion to connect the theme of Jesus' going away with another typically Johannine motif, to wit that of the secrecy of Jesus' whereabouts, his place of origin especially, which is also to be his place of destination. Now to know of a phenomenon's whereabouts (πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει)[14] is, in the language of the Fourth Gospel, at the same time to penetrate into its mystery. Precisely with regard to Jesus, however, such a kind of knowledge is, according to the same Gospel, to be denied not only to outsiders, but also to the disciples themselves, at least under their present circumstances (ἄρτι XIII 33; νῦν XIII 36).[15] So e.g. the rebuttal of Peter's claim to follow his Master into death (XIII 36-38) functions here merely to illustrate the impossibility for him and his fellow disciples to make their own way to the place where Jesus intends to go. Clearly the same impression is meant to be conveyed by Thomas confessing in XIV 5 his ignorance even as to the route (ὁδός) leading up to it and by Philip's question which follows in vs 8 and to which we shall presently turn our attention. For it is highly significant that none of the questioners receives what we (or, for that matter, he) could consider as a full and unequivocal answer on the precise issue about which had been asked. Instead, as we are yet to see in greater detail in the case of Thomas and Philip, Jesus seems rather to evade the subject tenaciously and only to be willing to speak about himself as, in the present moment, he stands before them. Thus we find that, contrary to what has just been said about the character of the Farewell Discourse as such, this time the disciples' questions are not so much intended to reveal sorrow and distress as well as ignorance and blindness, whereas Jesus' answers are evasive to exactly the same degree as they are instructive. In this curious way the author who composed our dialogue is indeed, as Dodd stated, interpreting the death and resurrection of Christ. Neither the facts themselves, however, nor their traditional religious significance appear in this connection to be his main concern. Rather he wants to focus again on what also in other contexts turns out to be a central motif of his Gospel as a whole: that of the mysterious character of Jesus' origin as it has to be accounted for by the hidden nature of the Father who had sent him and to whom, as he tells his disciples from ch. XIII 31 onwards, he must also return.

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[8] J. M. Dillon in: W. Wuellner (ed.), *Protocol series of the colloquies of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture*, no. 1, Berkeley, California 1970, pp. 15f.

[9] Cambridge 1968^8.

[10] *O.c.*, p. 422.

[11] *O.c.*, p. 403.

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[12] XVI 7. Notice that the traditional association of Jesus' death with the idea of the New Covenant, the forgiving of sins etc. is conspicuously absent in all this. For the peculiar view of the Fourth Gospel regarding this matter cf. also n. 4.

[13] Except, of course, for XIV 1-4, where the dominating intention is again surely that of reassuring the disciples in their distress. This shows only the more clearly that the dialogical elements are really interwoven with the discourse as such, cf. especially the correspondence between XIV 1 and 27.

[14] III 8; cf. VIII 14. On this kind of formulas one should still consult the extensive discussion by E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, Darmstadt 1956 [= Stuttgart 1923^2], pp. 99-109. To the evidence which he furnishes many parallels from the newly discovered gnostic writings could be added. I only mention by way of example *Ev. Verit.* p. 22, 13-15. Certainly it is interesting to observe the epistemological interest shown in this way by the author of the Fourth Gospel. For the comparison of spiritual reality with natural phenomena like the wind, cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* IV 3, 14, a passage that will be dealt with more extensively below.

[15] In view of XIII 36 one should define these circumstances more precisely as earthly life. However, the implication may also partly be that the disciples have not yet been fully instructed by the "spirit of truth". On the one hand, the main function of this spirit is certainly to remind the circle of Jesus' followers of what they had already been told, but, on the other, there is also the repeated announcement of greater things which are still to follow (I 51; V 20; XIV 12). For the apocalyptic origin of the latter motif cf. *Apc. Bar. gr.* I 6; II 6; V 3; *Apc. Hen. gr.* XIV 15; *Apc. Pauli* 40. In a more platonic context we have it in the Epistle to the Hebrews, e.g. in IX 11. Cf. also the quotation from the Samaritan Liturgy in J. Macdonald, *The Theology of the Samaritans*, London 1964, p. 68.

The meaning of Philip's question

With the foregoing in mind we now turn to Philip's question as it is formulated in XIV 8: "Lord, show us the Father and it will suffice us" (κύριε, δεῖξον ἡμῖν τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἡμῖν). As Jesus' first reaction to it shows, this is not the kind of question that should be expected from someone belonging to the inner circle of his followers. Unlike what had happened before in the case of Peter, or indeed Thomas, Philip is even explicitly blamed for it: "How can you say, show us the Father!" (vs 9) Why? Most commentators argue that the rather strong note of disapproval which Jesus unmistakably voices was occasioned by the precise nature of Philip's question. According to their opinion Philip might well have been asking for some kind of special revelation, possibly even of the sort that we find advertised in gnostic or other contemporary religious documents.[16] Taken in this sense the whole of XIV 8ff. would testify to the same exclusive and sharply anti-gnostical spirit that has been thought to permeate many other passages of the Fourth Gospel too. However, exactly the contemporary parallels for Philip's question that will be discussed in our next section suggest that his short dialogue with Jesus should *not* be taken in this sense. Besides, as it is our present concern to show, even a closer scrutiny of the immediate context of Philip's question itself can make clear that what it seeks is hardly the kind of higher revelation boasted of in all sorts of esoteric religious documents of the time.

In the first place we should observe that Philip's remark does not likely belong to a category much different from that to which Peter's question in XIII 35 and that of Thomas in XIV 4 must also be reckoned. And their questions are certainly not meant by the author to betray anything but mere ignorance. This ignorance, moreover, each time has reference to something Jesus had said just before. In the same way, in order to understand the question put in vs 8, special attention needs to be given to the answer that Thomas receives in vss 6f., since it is this answer which leads straightforwardly to Philip's interruption. As we have already seen, Thomas had been asking for the meaning of the "way" of which Jesus had spoken in such mysterious language in vs 4. The only reply that he gets is an emphatic statement on the part of Jesus, that he himself is to be considered "the way, the truth and the life": "I am the way, the truth and the life. Nobody can come to the Father but through me. If you would have known me, you would have known[17] my Father also. From now on you know him and have seen him" (γινώσκετε αὐτὸν καὶ ἑωράκατε vss 6f.). As it seems, particularly this last sentence evokes the question which is now put by Philip: "Lord, show us the Father and it will suffice us". For in answering it Jesus declares for the second time, and now even more explicitly, that whoever has seen him has already seen the Father (ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐπὲ ἑώρακεν τὸν πατέρα vs 9). Thus in Philip's case also the question arises from Jesus' own words. He would like to receive some further explanations on the particular subject broached by Jesus in vs 7: that of seeing the Father.

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[16] I only quote the representative statement of R. Schnackenburg, *Das Johannesevangelium* III, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1975, p. 77: "Wegen der Abwehr einer unmittelbaren Gottesschau in 1, 18; 5, 37; 6, 46 kann man eine zeitgeschichtliche Nebentendenz vermuten. Doch lässt sich schwer sagen, ob sich die Spitze gegen jüdische Mystiker, christliche Gnostiker (vgl 1 Joh) oder überhaupt gegen die damals verbreitete Sehnsucht nach unmittelbarer Gotteserfahrung richtet". As I shall try to show, there is in fact no special reference to the mystical tendencies of the time whatever.

Leaving our discussion of Philip's question at this point for a moment, we must first make some provisional comments on Jesus' answer as far as it is recorded in vs 9. As we have already indicated earlier, our initial impression is that it is not particularly helpful. Instead of elucidating the issue raised it seems to focus almost entirely on the falsity of the question. In this respect there is no perceptible difference in the way Jesus deals with Thomas and Philip. Neither the "way" of vs 4, nor the subject of seeing the Father in vs 7 are illuminated in any detailed fashion, but both the "way" and the "Father" are immediately brought into connection with Jesus himself. Now this is indeed a technique of which the author of the Fourth Gospel shows himself rather fond. One might, e.g., point to a passage like IV 25f., where a Samaritan woman in a discussion with Jesus at one moment introduces the concept of the "Messiah". Instead of either explaining or qualifying it some way or other Jesus responds with a simple "I who speak to you am he" (ἐγώ εἰμι, ὁ λαλῶν σοι vs 26). It is the same in VI 32-35 where Jesus had been speaking to the Jews about some mysterious "bread of God" which is coming down from heaven. When finally his opponents in utter amazement ask him to give them of this bread, there is again no explanation but for the simple statement: "I am the bread of life" (vs 35). In VIII 19 we even have a case that is closely parallel to our own and shows this same technique. In the preceding passage Jesus had been alluding to the One who had sent him, in vs 18 more specifically he speaks of ὁ πέμψας με πατήρ. Immediately the Jews react by asking: "Where is your Father?" (ποῦ ἐστιν ὁ πατήρ σου; vs 18). Jesus' reply is only little more harsh than that given to Philip later, but at the same time equally evasive regarding the real point of the question. "You know neither me nor my Father", he declares, "if you had known me, you would also have known my Father".[18] It has indeed been remarked more than once that although in the Fourth Gospel Jesus is always speaking about heaven and about the Father whom he alone knows, yet the only information that is provided is expressed in stereotyped sentences whose contents show little or no variation: what it amounts to is that he has "come down from heaven" and has "been sent by the Father". But, as we have seen, the same thing happens also in the case of other unknown or mysterious entities which are time and again mentioned in the Fourth Gospel: none of them is ever really explained or clarified, but rather immediately associated with Jesus himself. Apparently the only importance attached by its author to either the "Logos", or the "Messiah", or the "Son of Man", or "the bread of God" or, for that matter, "seeing the Father" is that they all stand for Jesus. This then is why Philip's question must be considered beside the mark: he should not have shown interest in the Father apart from Jesus, for, as his Master had just before pointed out to Thomas: "Nobody comes to the Father but through me".

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[17] Against reading with P^{66} ℵ D* and, among modern scholars, Barrett, Dodd (hesitantly) and the Committee which composed the Bible Society's *Greek New Testament* (with the honourable exception of K. Aland whose severe judgement is quoted in B. M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament*, London-New York 1971, p. 243) ἐγνώκατε and γνώσεσθε instead of ἐγνώκειτε and ἂν ᾔδειτε can be adduced: 1. that nowhere in the Gospel or in the Epistles of St John the "knowledge of the Father" is represented as a kind of surplus to be added to the "knowledge of the Son"; 2. what Jesus is speaking of is not some future knowledge, but as he himself presently declares, a knowledge which ἀπ' ἄρτι is in the disciples' possession and which could have been theirs even earlier, if they had known their own Master properly; 3. the change of ἐγνώκειτε and ἂν ᾔδειτε into simple perfect and future can easily be explained by assuming that one scribe or other deliberately altered what seemed to him a rather harsh reproach to the disciples (although excellently suiting its particular context), into a kind of gnomic sentence expressing a more or less timeless truth, which would fit into almost any context.

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[18] Other passages where this technique is applied are e.g. IX 35-38 (cf. IV 25f.; now the unknown entity is: the Son of Man) and XI 24-26.

In the light of this we can now take a closer look at the exact wording of Philip's question. As has already been observed, its direct occasion is not just that, as in VIII 18, Jesus had been speaking about his Father, it is rather that he had been speaking about *seeing* the Father. Now in the Fourth Gospel as well as elsewhere in the New Testament we meet with a firm conviction that the divine world lies far beyond the reach of the human senses and that consequently God himself is absolutely invisible.[19] Although it is true that in the Johannine literature the predicate ἀόρατος itself does not occur, we may take the repeated statement that "nobody has seen God" (I 18; VI 46; cf. I John IV 12.20) to convey exactly the same meaning. It may even be of some interest that in V 37 Jesus solemnly testifies to the Jews that they never heard the voice nor saw the appearance (εἶδος) of his Father, although this is the only time that the word εἶδος is used and the passage probably contains an allusion to Deut. IV 12. However that may be, seeing the Father is in the Johannine writings always the prerogative of the Son alone and whenever it is said of others that they have "seen God" or "the Father", what is meant is not seeing in any proper sense of the word, but rather faith in somebody or even something that has been offered by God as a kind of substitute for Himself. Hereby, obviously, we have in the first place to think of Jesus. But in I John IV 7 we read that anyone who has ἀγάπη in him "is born of God and knows God" and, as the association of knowing and seeing in III 6 as well as in XIV 7 of the Gospel itself suggest, this comes very near to saying that whoever has love, has seen God. Only a little further in the same Epistle we are even told that love for our fellow men is not only a substitute for seeing God, but in a certain sense also for loving Him, since because of His invisibility, He is beyond the reach of our love as well as of our sight. Finally, when vs 11 of the Third Epistle immediately after having stated that whoever does good comes from God, declares of the evildoer that "he has not seen God" (οὐχ ἑώρακεν τὸν θεόν), the implication clearly is, that doing good in some way makes up for "seeing God" in a proper sense. If space would permit us, a similar connection could be shown in the case of some other characteristic expressions of Johannine literature, such as e.g. "keeping God's word" or "His seed within oneself". For our purpose, however, it is more important to observe the light which it throws not only on the true purport of Philip's question, but also on its setting within the context of the whole of the first Farewell Discourse. For it is precisely against accepting Jesus and the inheritance which he promises to leave behind as a sufficient substitute for a direct knowledge of the Father that not only Philip's question, but also those of Peter and Thomas seem to be directed. Their tendency is purely negative. Whereas Jesus guarantees to his followers the possession of his words and promises to send them the "spirit of truth", who will remind them of these words (XIV 26), his disciples are not going to leave it at that. They want a more direct and, especially in the case of Philip, a more palpable assurance. As we have seen, the latter does not even shrink from nearly repeating the words of the unbelieving Jews in VIII 19. Having heard Jesus speak about seeing the Father he is now no longer going to be contented with less than direct ocular proof: "Lord, show us the Father and it will suffice us".

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[19] See e.g. Rom. I 20; Col. I 15f.; I Tim. I 17; VI 16; Hebr. XI 27.

Philip's question and its background

From the foregoing we may conclude that the attitude represented by Philip in this passage of the Fourth Gospel is not simply that of someone desirous for higher revelation, but rather that of a kind of sceptic. With this attitude Philip stands not alone in ancient literature, as I now should like to point out in some detail by drawing attention to a number of parallels, all of which will appear to have something to do with the wellknown philosophical doctrine about the knowledge of God through his works (*cognitio Dei ex operibus*). After having completed our survey we'll see whether this latter connection may also shed some light on the particular way in which Jesus is referring to the "works of God" in the second part of his answer to Philip, which up till now has been left untouched by us.

The earliest parallel for Philip's impatient question that I have been able to find comes from Xenophon's *Memorabilia Socratis* IV 3.

There Socrates, according to Xenophon's description, is trying to persuade a certain Euthydemus of the gods' care and providence for mankind. Like Aristodemus in the related chapter I 4,[20] this Euthydemus appears as a typical rationalist of the sort that had become more and more common in the intellectual circles of fifth century Greece. First of all he is sharply critical of traditional religious belief and practice[21] which, in his opinion, like everything else have to stand the test of rational argument. As is usual, however, in Xenophon's representation, Socrates has little difficulty in convincing his opponent of the wrongness of his attitude. At the end of § 12 Euthydemus is even prepared to believe in the special interest that the gods apparently take in Socrates himself, as is witnessed by the inward voice spontaneously informing him in each case which things are to be done and which to be avoided.[22] However, instead of now bringing the discussion to a close, in the next §§ Socrates still goes on with adding some final arguments, which this time are of a special interest for us. Before presenting them here in a rather loose paraphrase, we may well observe that they appear to be of a more or less stock-in-trade character, since they bear no direct relation with anything Euthydemus has said or hinted at before. Possibly they derive from some lost treatise or other on the subject of piety (εὐσέβεια) addressing itself to that same category of unbelievers of which Euthydemus seems so far to have been only the mouth-piece.

"That I am telling you the truth", Socrates declares, "you will know yourself as soon as you dont't wait any longer till you have seen the appearances of the gods, but it will suffice you in order to revere and honour the gods to see their works" (ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς). For the gods, although supplying us with their precious gifts, themselves always remain invisible. To be convinced of that one has only to look to that surpassing deity that rules and upholds the whole universe (ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων) and whose mighty works are visible to us, while He Himself as the Distributor of them remains hidden from our eyes (οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τάδε δὲ οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστιν). It is the same with the sun, which manifests its presence to us all and yet does not allow itself to be inspected by the human eye: anyone who would make an attempt at that is punished by the loss of his sight.[23] Similarly in the case of the lightning, its flash is clearly perceived to come from above (ἄνωθεν), but itself it cannot be seen, neither how it draws near nor how it strikes down nor how it disappears (ὁρᾶται δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐπιὼν οὔτ᾽ ἐγκατασκήψας οὔτε ἀπιών). Yet another illustration is afforded by the winds: while being invisible themselves, their operation (ἃ δε ποιοῦσι) is manifest to us and we observe their approach.[24] Finally there is the divine element within ourselves, our soul, which though perceptibly directing our inner life is itself again invisible. "Therefore", Socrates now concludes, "we are not to despise invisible reality, but rather by noticing its power from what it brings about to honour the godhead" (ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον).

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[20] On the opinion, strongly maintained by W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, Oxford 1967², pp. 167ff. (cf. p. 244 n. 72 on Jaeger's predecessors), that in both chapters Xenophon's chief source has been Diogenes of Apollonia, see the doubts expressed by C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* I, Leiden 1963³, pp. 83f. and W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* II, Cambridge 1965, p. 379 n. 2 ("by no means certain").

[21] On the problem of atheism in classical antiquity cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* III, Cambridge 1969, pp. 235-247; W. Fahr, "ΘΕΟΥΣ ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ. Zum Problem der Anfänge des Atheismus bei den Griechen", *Spudasmata* 26, Hildesheim 1969, pp. 85-101; on the later use of the term see H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1976³, pp. 81-85.

[22] On the difference between Xenophon and Plato on this point cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Greek Philosophy* III (cf. n. 21), pp. 399ff.

This line of argument presents us with several interesting points. What in view of John XIV 8 we should notice first of all, is, of course, that Socrates is from beginning to end arguing against the desire, formulated at the outset, of seeing the gods in their visible forms. As is clear from the opening and closing sentences and also from the general drift of the treatise to which this passage belongs, in his opinion such a desire could present a serious danger to piety and therefore it has to be discountenanced as definitely and effectively as possible. Now obviously with all this Xenophon's Socrates is not directing himself to religiously minded people who were for some reason or other longing for a higher revelation, but rather to the kind of sceptical critics whose portrait Xenophon has drawn for us in the person of Euthydemus. Being only prepared to believe what they were able to see with their own eyes, they could no longer accept the existence of beings of whom nowhere the slightest visible token could be discovered. In his turn Socrates now points out to them that such a token is yet to be found even if the gods themselves do not appear to our sight. Instead of insisting on the impossible, one should rather content oneself with contemplating the works (ἔργα) of the gods, by which they reveal to us their power (δύναμις).

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[23] Cf. n. 63.

[24] Cf. n. 14.

At this point, however, a certain amount of tension cannot be left unnoticed. For whereas in the beginning Socrates refers to the gods several times in the plural, gradually our passage shows a remarkable shift of emphasis towards a kind of deity with more definite monotheistic traits. As it seems, it is in particular with the latter, by whom, according to § 15, the whole universe is held together, that the cosmic phenomena mentioned in this and the following §§ have to be closely associated. The difference makes itself felt even between the opening exhortation to Euthydemus to revere and honour the *gods* (σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς § 13) and the advice, at the end of our passage, not to despise invisible things, but to honour the divine (τὸ δαιμόνιον). For this vague and general term has certainly to be taken in a more or less monotheistic sense.[25] As will presently become clearer, the curious blend of traditional polytheistic piety and cosmologically orientated monotheism with which we are thus confronted in Socrates' epilogue has largely to be explained by the particular literary purpose which Xenophon is pursuing with this treatise. We have seen that this is the defense of traditional, that is, polytheistic piety. This is also explicitly stated in one of the following §§ where the whole exercise of piety is put under the rule of official custom (νόμος πόλεως § 16). Moreover, clearly the time-honoured gods of this official type of religion were likely to suffer most from the attacks of rationalistic sceptics like Aristodemus and Euthydemus and that precisely on account of the lack of palpable evidence in favour of their existence. Thus Xenophon's Socrates exerts himself in order to provide their invisibility with a semblance of rationality and so to avert their complete dismissal by the arguments of their critics. On the other hand, however, we shall see that the doctrine of the knowledge of God through his works (ἔργα), which is here put to their defense, had not originally been framed on their behalf. Therefore Socrates in dealing with it cannot refrain from evoking the picture of that lonely and truly all-encompassing deity whose invisible nature can indeed be divined in no better way than by gazing upon his "works" in the visible universe, by which he demonstrates his "power". In order to realise the full impact of this concept of a divinity whose very essence depends on his being invisible, we must now first interrupt our discussion for a moment to consider some of the circumstances under which it arose.[26]

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[25] For the adjectival value of τὸ δαιμόνιον and its equivalence to τὸ θεῖον in this respect see J. Burnet, *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito*, Oxford 1970^{10} on *Euthyphro* 3B5 (Notes, pp. 16f.) and 4E2 (Notes, pp. 27f.), where there are also references to some older literature.

To this end we must go back in time for at least three or four centuries to the stage in the development of Greek religion represented for us in the works of Homer. Now it goes without argument that the gods as we find them depicted on his pages are by no means without visible form. One reason for this undoubtedly is that they are more often than not acting their part on the earthly stage in a purely human disguise. But they certainly are thought to possess a characteristic appearance of their own too. This is not only shown by a passage like A 199ff., where Achilles recognizes the goddess Athena by the divine glittering of her eyes,[27] but also by a statement like that of Odysseus in ε 217, where he declares a mortal woman like Penelope to be inferior to a goddess as far as εἶδος and μέγεθος are concerned. Equally significant in this respect is the passage θ 167ff., where Odysseus is comparing men in general to the gods: either they resemble them in outward appearance (εἶδος), but then often their speech is without comeliness (μορφή),[28] or it is just the reverse — their appearance may be quite godlike while yet their inner life as revealed by their speech is found totally lacking in beauty of form. Now before such a comparison between gods and men should occasion the accusation of anthropomorphism, we should notice that in the same passage outer as well as inner beauty are clearly designated as gifts which the gods bestow upon men, be it not always in the like measure. So actually Homer is not equipping his gods with all kinds of human attributes, but, quite to the contrary, the gods are allowing men to share up to a certain extent in theirs. This is brought home to us in a particularly illuminating way by an episode from Hesiod's *Theogony* which has quite correctly often been compared with the last quoted passage of Homer.[29] In it we have a description of how the god-born king is venerated among his people because of the gifts bestowed upon him at his birth by the daughters of Zeus; among these sweetness[30] of speech and, as it seems, an impressive appearance[31] are especially prominent. Thus the king bears an inner as well as an outer resemblance to the god whose power he holds upon earth and is even worshipped as a god himself, as he moves around in the assembly of his people:

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[26] Since within our compass we cannot deal at all with the social setting of the development, we may refer for this aspect to some of the chapters of L. Gernet, *Anthropologie de la Grèce antique*, Paris 1976^2, especially to that on "Les origines de la philosophie" (pp. 415-430). Cf. also J. P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* II, Paris 1974^2, pp. 95-124.

[27] Interestingly in 194f. we hear that the goddess becomes visible to Achilles alone. The same motif occurs still in Acts IX 7 (see, however, XXII 9!). Many parallels have been collected in an article of A. S. Pease, "Some Aspects of Invisibility", *Harv. St. in Class. Phil.* 53 (1942), pp. 1-36.

> ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὥς ἱλάσκονται
> αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ, μετὰ δὲ πρέπει ἀγρομένοισι (vss 91f.)

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[28] This word in Homer still means "comeliness" and is not to be put on a par with εἶδος. Later on μορφή and εἶδος came more or less to be used indiscriminately. The distinction that Plato makes between εἶδος as inner form and the different μορφαί, or outward appearances, in which it can manifest itself, is, of course, a technichal one and peculiar to him.

[29] See M. L. West, *Hesiod Theogony*, Oxford 1971², pp. 183ff.

[30] For this motif cf. the interesting survey of J. H. Waszink, "Biene und Honig als Symbol des Dichters und der Dichtung in der griechisch-römischen Antike", *Vorträge der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* G 196, 1974.

[31] On the tacit assumption that inner and outer excellence usually go together cf. W. J. Verdenius, "Archaische Denkpatronen II", *Lampas* 3 (1970), p. 103, also *id.*, Archaische Denkpatronen III, *Lampas* 5 (1972), pp. 104ff. According to him it is the prevailing view in archaic literature.

Now although it would mean doing less than justice to the religious significance of the views expressed in passages like these to dismiss them off-hand as mere products of poetic fancy, there came a time when the Greeks themselves began to consider them in that vein. Instead of recognizing the strictly superhuman character of the gods as depicted by Homer and Hesiod, even as to their outward appearance,[32] an increasing number of rationalistic critics came to see it as their duty to stricture both poets severely for what was held to be their anthropomorphism. As far as we know, their most notorious spokesman seems to have been Xenophanes. Like as in a famous passage of Herodotus (II 53) Homer and Hesiod are mentioned together as the inventors of the Greek θεογονίη, who, among other things, had played a decisive part in fixing the images (εἴδεα) of the different gods, so in a fragment (D. B 11) of the former the same poets are represented as the main cause of the corrupted and immoral views which most of the Greeks entertain on the matter of religion. For, according to another fragment (D. B 15) of the same author, to attribute to a god a human shape (δέμας) can only be regarded as utter folly. It is quite in keeping with the strong disapproval with which Xenophanes evidently looks down upon the remarkably concrete and richly diversified world of gods and men as it faces us in the products of early Greek poetry, that he should also have inveighed against representing the gods at all as a plurality, i.e. as beings differing among themselves in outward as well as in inward properties, so that they e.g. even can get in conflict with one another. Xenophanes' godhead has to be of a somewhat more uniform and homogeneous nature. A fragment preserved by Clemens Alexandrinus attributes to him what may be qualified as a rather abstract monotheistic doctrine:[33]

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[32] For the survival of this notion far into the later hellenistic period cf. the interesting passage in the twelfth discourse of Dio Chrysostomus (XII 52), where Phidias is asked, whether with his statue of Zeus he had achieved τὸ πρέπον εἶδος καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν μορφὴν τῆς θεοῦ φύσεως, now he had depicted the god as a kind of superman (ἀνδρός τε μορφὴν ὑπερφυῆ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος δείξας). Phidias' answer is that nobody will mistake his statue for that of a mortal πρὸς κάλλος ἢ μέγεθος θεοῦ συνεξεταζόμενον.

[33] D. B 23. See especially the valuable comments of W. Jaeger, *Theology* (cf. n. 20), pp. 43f., who quite rightly observes that Xenophanes in his manner of speaking is

> Εἷς θεός, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος
> οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὅμοιος οὐδὲ νόημα[34]

This single and exalted deity who, of course, lends himself no longer to any concrete representation, Xenophanes seems to have regarded as the only Ruler of the whole universe. In fact to rule (τὸ κρατεῖν) is said by a later author[35] to have been the most characteristic activity of Xenophanes' god, since it is precisely the one which could not be shared with others: a πολυκοιρανίη being out of the question, a god who is κράτιστος has at the same time to be one. It is this doctrine with its strong Parmenidean flavour that has probably caused later doxographers to think of Xenophanes as the founder of the Eleatic school.[36] In a passage of Hippolytus' *Philosophoumena* even Parmenides' conception of the One as a sphere is attributed to him. Although this can hardly be correct, certainly the general tendency behind both Xenophanes' monotheism and Parmenides' doctrine of the One is much the same, namely that of conceiving of the deity who is the supreme Ruler of the universe in as abstract and transcendental a way as is possible within the limits of the human language. Therefore all received images and forms of expression, especially those hallowed by their long standing use in the poetic tradition, are to be flatly discarded as based on mere groundless opinion (δόξα).

Now it is important for us to realize that from a religious point of view this has to be considered a very dangerous tendency. For what it entails is among other things the complete removal of the

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still following "the old epic formulas", with their "polar juxtaposition of gods and men". I'm less sure, however, that one should take this manner of speaking nevertheless as seriously as W. Jaeger, in spite of this observation, seems to do. On the other hand, Jaeger appears to me greatly to underrate the extent in which Xenophanes' monotheism depends still on the old religious concept of Zeus as a high-god (*o.c.* pp. 46f.). On this matter one should rather consult H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1973^2, pp. 81ff. As is not unusual in the spiritual history of mankind, Xenophanes' contribution has been more important on its negative, than on its positive side.

[34] Notice that even negatively outward appearance (δέμας) and inner being (νόημα) still correspond to each other (cf. n. 31). A fragment like this shows convincingly that Xenophanes' novelty lies indeed more in what he denies than in an entirely new perception of his own. Cf. especially *Il.* B 204f. (and with this I Cor. VIII 6).

[35] Simplicius, *Phys.* 22, 22ff.

[36] See W. Jaeger, *Theology* (cf. n. 20), pp. 211f. n. 23.

divine from the world of human experience. As it is eloquently put by Empedocles (who, however strange his behaviour may often appear to us,[37] nevertheless belongs to the same rationalistic movement), God's being is entirely beyond the reach of our senses:

οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν
ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ᾗπερ τε μεγίστη
πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει[38]

It is especially the latter half of this fragment that shows us exactly the main difficulty which such elevated views of the divinity sooner or later inevitably will have to encounter.[39] The problem is not simply that it is difficult to imagine a god who is so utterly unlike anything we meet in the world of our daily experience, but rather that it is difficult to see why we should try to imagine such a god at all. If what we are told is not only that God in fact does not present Himself to our senses, but, moreover, that He simply cannot exist for them because His very nature lies outside the field of which experience is possible, the question emerges how we may still be able to convince ourselves that such a being even exists. In this respect one has surely to agree with G. Devereux when he states that "another attribution of perfection to god is another step towards atheism".[40] A god who is considered perfect to such a degree that nothing in the world of experience can any longer bear the slightest resemblance to him, a god e.g. who is proclaimed to be σφαιροειδής, is bound to be put aside some day as a mere figment of the human intellect. Indeed Protagoras came very near to this last step when he began his treatise about the gods with the famous sentence:

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[37] Cf. especially L. Gernet, *Anthropologie* (cf. n. 26), pp. 425ff.

[38] D. B 133.

[39] For a modern parallel see the pertinent criticism of Barthian theology by A. MacIntyre in J. A. T. Robinson and D. L. Edwards, *The Honest to God Debate*, London 1963, p. 218. "Barthian theology", according to MacIntyre, "contains the materials for its own self-transformation. For if the Word of God cannot be identified with *any* frail human attempt to comprehend it, the way is open for sympathy with those who reject human theologies which have attempted to substitute for the Divine Word (and perhaps Barthian theology among them)". Further on MacIntyre also uses the term "theological atheist", even before the American movement to this effect had been given any publicity whatever.

[40] Quoted by H. Lloyd-Jones, *Justice* (cf. n. 33), p. 186 n. 21.

> περὶ θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὔθ' ὡς εἰσίν, οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, οὔτ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν.

To him, evidently, the contempt shown by philosophers like Xenophanes for the old anthropomorphic deities combined with their own lofty conceptions of an invisible supramundane divinity ruling the universe in lonely pre-eminence seemed only to have prepared the way for fundamental doubt and scepticism. In this respect W. Jaeger rightly compares his statement with the protest which the author of *De vetere medicina* in his first chapter levels against what he calls the profitless speculations of the philosophers about things which lie entirely above the human reach (τὰ ἀφανέα καὶ μετέωρα). It is, Jaeger continues, characteristic of the Sophists and their period that in approaching the problem of religion "they begin with the nature of the religious subject instead of following the older philosophers and starting with the reality of the Divine".[41] That is to say, the problem now at stake is no longer simply which conception of God is to be preferred to all others, but rather whether such a conception is at all attainable or even, whether there exists something by virtue of which such a conception would be more than utterly groundless speculation. For the danger inherent in a protest like that raised by the author of *De vetere medicina* should certainly not be underrated: it is that conceptions of the deity like those framed by Xenophanes and his kind should after all have to be placed into the same category of unfounded opinion (δόξα) to which they themselves had relegated those of the common stock of mankind in general and of the poets in particular. In order to avoid this frightful prospect the philosophers from now on found themselves faced with a practical necessity of utmost importance: unless for the future they would forfeit every claim to get a fair hearing, the rehearsing of their views as to the nature and attributes of the divine had to be rigidly postponed until they had first succeeded in convincing their audience of the more elementary fact of its existence. Thus started the long and precarious combat about the reality of the Invisible which even to-day still continues. For, naturally, the θεὸς ἀόρατος of philosophers and theologians has always been and will always remain a comparatively easy target for all kinds of sceptics, especially for those whom Plato has in view when in his *Theaetetus* he complains of people who are in a habit of recognizing only what they can touch with their hands (οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι 155E).

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[41] *O.c.* p. 188.

It is evidently against this background that the development of the doctrine of the knowledge of God through his works has to be seen. Since by God's "works" we have mainly to think of the cosmic phenomena, it is easy to see that it lent itself particularly well as an argument in favour of the existence of a divine being whose outstanding characteristic we have found to be exactly his rulership over the universe. Moreover, the doctrine took full account also of the invisibility of this god. Yet it had something to offer to those critical unbelievers whose first and foremost demand was for palpable evidence. For now nothing short of the universe could be referred to as the visible substitute from which the invisible essence of its Maker could up to a certain degree be divined. On the other hand we have seen that already at the first time that we find the doctrine fully attested in what is known to us of ancient literature, it does not quite serve the purpose for which, in our opinion, it had originally been conceived. However, as we have already indicated, the reason for this lies close at hand. For Xenophon's treatise bears already that same stamp of a compromise between the philosophical radicalism of a Xenophanes and the practical exigencies of state-religion, that will afterwards appear also in many other philosophical dissertations about piety or the gods. The fact is, of course, that in spite of Xenophanes' fierce denouncements the old gods have continued to play their part on the official level throughout Antiquity and that even philosophers had to take some account of this. On the other hand, being philosophers these latter naturally had to avoid the impression that they took anything for granted. So from Xenophon onwards we find many of them occupying themselves with all kinds of arguments in order to prove the existence of beings, whose very nature rather demanded, that they should be either simply believed in or, otherwise, left alone.[42] With the θεὸς ἀόρατος of philosophy itself the case was, sure enough, entirely different. Here rational proof was not only quite appropriate, but even obligatory once every entrance had been barred to the kind of direct approach of which also Empedocles had ruefully admitted that it was still "the broadest way of persuasion leading to the minds of men". Now human nature is obstinate and it need not surprise us when we shall presently see that a desire for such a direct approach has nevertheless made itself audible time and again. Whenever this happened, however, it was the philosopher's task to discountenance it vigorously and to point instead to the universe as the only visible manifestation of a god, who himself had to remain inexorably hidden from the human eye. That on this point indeed something of a pattern emerges will appear from the examination of some other instances belonging to our list of parallels for John XIV 8ff., all of which this time date from the hellenistic period.

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[42] Of course one might think that Xenophon has also been influenced by the

The earliest among them is a passage from the speech of Balbus in the second book of Cicero's *De natura deorum*. The first part of this speech (II 2, 4-16, 44) had been devoted to a discussion of what in any philosophical treatment of religion necessarily had to be the preliminary question, namely whether we should accept the existence of divine beings at all (*esse deos*).[43] This problem being settled,

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famous theory of Prodicus on the origin of religion (on this theory, see Jaeger, *o.c.*, pp. 179f.), especially when he emphasizes that it is in their gifts to mankind that the gods manifest themselves first of all. And as Euripides' *Bacchae* 272ff. show, Prodicus' theory could indeed be interpreted in a way that made it serviceable for the defence of a rather traditional kind of piety. Yet to suggest with E. R. Dodds, *Euripides Bacchae*, Oxford 1960², pp. 104f. that it was itself "ambiguous" and not "devoid of religious feeling" seems to be going too far (see the critical remarks on this point in W. K. C. Guthrie, *Greek Philosophy* III (cf. n. 21), pp. 241f.). Certainly man's gratitude for his daily bread could somehow furnish a psychological explanation for the origin of his belief in a goddess like Demeter, but whether it could also justify this belief to the extent of even providing evidence for the real existence of such a divine being, is an entirely different matter. For the later use of Prodicus' argument in a decidedly monotheistic setting, see e.g. Acts XIV 17, where the verbal agreement with Xen. *Mem.* IV 3, 5 is particularly striking. For some other examples cf. M. Dibelius, *Aufsätze zur Apostelgeschichte*, Göttingen 1968⁵, pp. 32f.

[43] On this division which appears in many ancient treatises about the gods, or about piety cf. W. Jaeger, *Theology* (cf. n. 20), p. 43 and p. 211 n. 21. See especially *De nat. deor.* I 16, 43, where Velleius calls Epicurus' conviction as to the real existence of the gods a *fundamentum praeclare iactum* on which any argument concerning

Balbus now proceeds to deal with a second issue, which, at the same time, constitutes the principal subject of Cicero's treatise as a whole, that of the nature of the gods. To this end, however, one difficulty has to be cleared away from the outset. It is that people are in a habit to judge everything by their eyes. "Nothing is more difficult", Balbus declares, "than to subtract the mind from the customary use of our eyes" (*a consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere*[44] II 17, 45). This has led the uneducated and also philosophers who are no better than the uneducated to imagine the gods in human forms (*ut nisi figuris hominum constitutis nihil possent de dis immortalibus cogitare*). Such an opinion, according to Balbus, is hardly worth arguing about. Rather since nothing more excellent exists than the universe (*mundus*), certainly it is there that we have to look for God. Evidently Balbus' god belongs to the type we have met before: although manifesting himself in the universe, he has no visible form of his own by which he could appear to human eyes. Now sensible people will easily recognize this. But Balbus shows himself quite aware that there will

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the divine nature (e.g. that dealing with the *forma deorum* 18, 46ff.) has to rest. In I 22, 6 we read: *Quaeritur primum in ea quaestione quae est de natura deorum, sintne dei necne sint*; cf. also II 1, 3: *primum docent esse deos, deinde quales sint* and, to give only one further instance, Philo, *De spec.leg.* I 32. As we have seen, already Protagoras had conducted his researches along the same lines, be it without many positive results. However, even so he was according to later standards not to be called an atheist, for to be an atheist one had not just to doubt, but outright to deny what had become by now the first article of philosophical belief: that of the existence in whatever a form of something that could truly be called divine (see especially Philo, *De praem. et poen.* 40, quoted below in the text, and, again, *De spec.leg.* I 32, where it is explicitly stated that the question, εἰ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον had to be put ἕνεκα τῶν ἐπιτηδευσάντων ἀθεότητα). To this was, under stoical influence, sometimes added the notion of a divine providence for mankind. See e.g. the philosophical catechism quoted by Epict. *Diss.* II 14, 11: λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι μαθεῖν δεῖ πρῶτον τοῦτο, ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς καὶ προνοεῖ τῶν ὅλων καὶ οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν αὐτὸν οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διανοούμενον ἢ ἐνθυμούμενον· εἶτα ποῖοί τινες εἰσίν. (Notice here also the curious intermingling of monotheism and polytheism. As to the formulaic character of the statement cf. I Cor. XV 3ff.). Cf. also *Ench. Sexti* 380 (ed. H. Chadwick, Cambridge 1959, pp. 56f. and the note on p. 179); Lact., *De ira Dei* IV 6 and Augustine's remark in his *Confess.* VI 5, 7 that he had never degraded himself so far *ut aliquando non crederim te esse, quidquid esses, quod ego nescirem, aut administrationem rerum humanarum ad te pertinere.*

[44] Cf. A. S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum libri III*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1958, *a.l.* See also Cotta's comments in III 8, 20f.

always be certain unphilosophical spirits too, who instead of resigning themselves take offence.

The existence of quarrelsome persons of the latter sort seems also to have disturbed the inner calm of the philosopher on the imperial throne, Marcus Aurelius. At least his *Meditations* contain an item (XII 28) which addresses itself to people who used to criticize the worshippers of the gods on account of their credulity (πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιζητοῦντας· ποῦ γὰρ ἰδὼν τοὺς θεοὺς ἢ πόθεν κατειληφὼς ὅτι εἰσὶν οὕτως σέβεις;). Again it is interesting to observe that the main target of their criticism is precisely the supposed invisibility of the gods. At the same time, however, this confronts us with a small difficulty since from the opening sentence of Antoninus' reply it appears that he himself does not share the presupposition of these critics. According to him, on the contrary, the gods are visible for the eye too (καὶ ὄψει ὁρατοί εἰσιν). But this surely is no more than a somewhat mechanical repetition of a well-known Stoic argument in favour of traditional religion, which also occurs e.g. in Cicero, *De nat. deor.* II 2, 6.[45] For in what follows next the starting-point is again the notion of the gods' invisibility. Like Xenophon's Socrates Antoninus compares it with that of the soul: the latter we also honour without being able to see it. It equally sounds like a paraphrase from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* when Marcus now concludes with a reference to our experience of the divine "power" (δύναμις) as a main motive which can induce us to piety. Moreover, as in Xenophon's case, the particular emphasis laid throughout this short discussion on the traditional worship of the gods sufficiently explains, why here again the essentially monotheistic conception of an invisible god, who manifests himself in the universe, must come to the rescue of the old deities of polytheism.

A somewhat fuller and, in a particular respect, also notably divergent treatment of our theme is to be found in the XIth lecture of Maximus of Tyre, which deals with the question *Who God is according to Plato* (Τίς ὁ Θεὸς κατὰ Πλάτωνα). Its context is to be compared with that of the passage quoted from Cicero's *De natura deorum.* Just as Balbus, Maximus promises to inform his audience about the nature

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[45] See the note of Pease on pp. 552f. of his commentary (cf. n. 44).

(φύσις) of the invisible divinity (θεῖον ... ἀόρατον ὀφθαλμοῖς XI 9d) posited by Plato when speaking of the Father and Creator of the universe. By means of a set of highly rhetorical and stereotyped phrases[46] Maximus makes it clear that God is to be found in every beautiful aspect of the universe, although he is not to be identified with any particular beautiful object. Rather He is the source from which all beautiful things derive their beauty by μέθεξις. "If this will suffice", the author concludes, "you have seen God; if not, how could one ever arrive at a notion of Him? (εἰ μὲν ταῦτα ἱκανά, ἑώρακας τὸν θεόν· εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς τις αὐτὸν αἰνίξηται; XI 11d). Maybe, however, the beauty of the universe is more than some people's eyes can endure. They had better content themselves with contemplating God's works (εἰ δὲ ἐξασθενεῖς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ θέαν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὁρᾶν). As appears from the next passage by those "works" Maximus means the innumerable inferior powers, mainly the δαίμονες, who intermediate between the highest god and men. For our purpose this particular platonizing train of thought is of no special relevance. What is important, however, is that Maximus here seems to make a distinction between a more direct vision of God by contemplating the beauty of the universe and a more indirect one, mediated through his "works" (ἔργα). To be sure even that higher vision still has its limits. In the first place it is spiritual, since the divine sphere lies beyond the reach of our senses (XI 9d). But, secondly, it does not reveal the essence of God's nature to us. For although the beauty which shows itself in the universe derives from the ever-flowing and pure source which is God Himself, we can only see the former, never the source. On the other hand, in this way one is yet nearer to God, than are those who do not proceed beyond the range of inferior beings called here His "works". To grasp the full force of the distinction as it is thus introduced by Maximus, we may pause for a moment to compare it with a similar one that appears in Philo of Alexandria's *De praemiis et poenis*.

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[46] See Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* I 3 for a passage that is strongly similar in tone. The meadow and the river strikingly remind us of Prodicus' argument as it is represented in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* IX 52 (cf. IX 18).

Already in § 27 of this treatise Philo when speaking of Jacob whom he represents as a "man of practice" (ἀσκητής), points out that the highest reward to which man can get access by a constant struggle for virtue is a vision of God (ὅρασις θεοῦ). The theme is then dropped for a while, but in §§ 36ff. Philo returns to it, specifying in § 39 that also this highest privilege still remains within certain bounds: our mortal and created nature will never permit us to discover *what* God is (ὅ ἐστιν), but only *that* He is (ὅτι ἐστιν).[47] In §§ 40ff. Philo elaborates this theme further. First, in a short digression, he informs his readers that there are people who even deny that a divine being should exist at all, that means: they won't even recognize God's ὕπαρξις, i.e. the simple fact that He is (ὅτι ἐστιν). Next there are some who (like Protagoras of whom Philo is here obviously thinking) declare themselves unable to decide whether something divine exists or not (εἴτε ἐστιν εἴτε μή). Again another group is formed by those "whose notions about the subsistence of God are derived through habit rather than thinking from their educators".[48] Their piety is therefore mixed up with superstition (δεισιδαιμονία). Better than the foregoing three is surely the fourth category to which Philo now goes on and which receives more detailed attention. It is described in § 43 as consisting of those who have "advanced from down to up by a sort of heavenly ladder and by reason and reflection happily inferred the Creator from his works" (ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων εἰκότι λογισμῷ στοχασάμενοι τὸν δημιουργόν). Evidently these people have followed the advice of Xenophon's Socrates. Philo praises them but nevertheless holds them to be still inferior to the members of his fifth class, which already from the start had been the real scope of his digression. To it belong the true θεοφιλεῖς[49] whose notions concerning God's subsistence (ὕπαρξις) are not dependent on any effort of the human reason, but only on a vision granted by God Himself, for after all God is discerned through Himself alone (δι' αὐτοῦ μόνου θεωρεῖται § 45). Compared to this company of "genuine worshippers and friends of God" (§ 43) those "who are at pains to discern the Uncreated and Creator of all from His creation" (οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γεγονότων τὸν ἀγένητον καὶ γεννητὴν τῶν ὅλων σπεύδοντες θεωρεῖν § 46) are still no more than mere happy guessers (στοχασταί).[50]

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[47] For Philo's conviction that even the νοῦς cannot penetrate into the divine nature, cf. e.g. *Quod deus immut.* 62: God is not only quite different from man, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς οὐρανὸς οὐδ' ὡς κόσμος (similarly *De spec.leg.* I 44). Compare also the strong assertion in *Leg. ad Gai.* 1 and the restrictions put on the competence of the human reason in *De post. Caini* 168.

[48] It is interesting to observe that exactly this kind of piety is strongly defended by Cotta, the main speaker in the third book of Cicero's *De nat. deor.*, cf. III 4, 7.9f.

[49] On this title and on the problem whether it has to be taken in an active or in a passive sense (or, as the context of Philo's discussion seems to suggest, in both

Now as far as both Philo and Maximus are striving after some kind of substitute for a direct vision of God by the human eye, which because of His transcendence is irredeemable, they are chiefly continuing a tradition that reaches back behind Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. On the other hand, however, we also observe a considerable difference. As it is, neither Philo nor Maximus go to the extent of rejecting altogether the opinion, enunciated by Xenophon's Socrates, that one can assure himself of God's existence by contemplating His works. Yet both know of a method that is even more direct and therefore also more excellent since it proceeds by way of a spiritual vision (ὅρασις, θέα). As we have seen, such a vision cannot penetrate into God's essence. As to its contents, therefore, the kind of knowledge to be acquired in this way can hardly differ much from the *cognitio Dei ex operibus* as advertised in Xenophon's treatise. Yet the difference of which I spoke consists not only in that it is now a vision leading directly up to God Himself, no longer a strenuous effort of the human reason, by which we can convince ourselves of His existence. Together with it there is, especially with Maximus, a remarkable new emphasis

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senses at the same time) cf. the literature quoted by G. Stählin, *ThWNT* IX, p. 165 n. 178 and the materials collected in n. 182 on p. 166.

[50] One might compare with this the disparaging way in which Philo deals with the title δημιουργός in *De somn.* I 76 (cf. Novat. *De trin.* III 19), although admittedly the argument differs widely in both cases. On the other hand, the line of thought which we have found in *De praem. et poen.* (cf. for a strongly similar one *De spec. leg.* I 37f.) could lead in some way or other to the kind of distinction that the gnostics used to make between a demiurge, who clearly manifested himself in the universe, and the unknown god, who rather hid himself behind it. Cf. the gnostic exegesis of Exod. XXXIII 20 ("No man shall see God and live") quoted by Iren. *Adv. haer.* I 19, 2: Since the demiurge has in fact been seen by the prophets, this saying speaks of an unknown and entirely invisible god (περὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου μεγέθους καὶ ἀγνώστου τοῖς πᾶσιν). See E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (cf. n. 14), p. 74.

on the *beauty* of the universe as in some way a radiation of the splendor of the Invisible itself. Since in the same connection (XI 9d) Maximus stresses that God can only be intuited by what in us is most akin to Him, i.e. the eye of the spirit,[51] this new emphasis seems to be due at least partly to platonic influence, to which, of course, also the idea of μέθεξις should be ascribed. On the other hand there may have been another factor at work too, which for our purpose is even more important. Obviously the result of argumentation like that of Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* inevitably is that the universe came to be seen in an ever increasing degree as being particularly in its outward form somehow the representative of the invisible deity who manifested himself in its orderliness. According as God was divested of those qualities which, like μέγεθος, εἶδος, φυή, κάλλος, appear from Homer onwards as set elements in the description of visible reality,[52] it was the universe that in some way or other had to make up for them. To it were ascribed the attributes of surpassing beauty and greatness which in Homer are still in the possession of the gods themselves, who use them particularly as a mark of recognition when appearing to mortal eyes. Now this process could, of course, take several directions. Stoic philosophers e.g. in defining the relationship between God and the universe did not shrink from an outright identification. For a Jewish or platonist thinker this solution was, of course, impossible. But even if the division between God and the universe had to remain firmly established, still the semi-divine qualities of the latter in many cases led the way even to the highest stage of contemplation. It was only that also these qualities had to be transcended in order to arrive at a vision of the One who was their ultimate source. It is in this vein e.g. that the 6th chapter of Pseudo-Aristotle's *De mundo* lavishes words of rapturous praise on the many excellencies of the universe, only in order to direct our minds to the surpassing excellence of its Maker. In the same way a Jewish author writing under the name of Solomon points out that the "magnificent size and beauty of creation" should invoke in us a vision of the Originator of all beauty (ὁ τοῦ κάλλους γενεσιάρχης *Sap. Sal.* XIII 3). In the chapter from which this passage is quoted especially the visible aspects of the universe are brought out to the full and that for a reason which the author himself provides: man, he tells us, is most easily convinced by the beautiful things that he sees (πείθονται τῇ ὄψει, ὅτι καλὰ τὰ βλεπόμενα XIII 7). This conviction was evidently shared by Athenagoras, a christian author of the second century, for among what he calls the "pillars of piety" he mentions: τὸ εὔτακτον, τὸ διὰ πάντος σύμφωνον, τὸ μέγεθος, τὴν χροιάν, τὸ σχῆμα, τὴν διάθεσιν τοῦ κόσμου (*Leg.* IV 2).[53] And even earlier St Paul had in his Epistle to the Romans I 20, when speaking of God's invisible qualities (τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ), declared that "from the beginning of creation they could in a spiritual way be envisaged (νοούμενα καθορᾶται)[54] in the things that had been made".

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[51] For this expression cf. A. S. Pease on Cic., *De nat. deor.* I 8, 19 (cf. n. 44). In the same content as with Maximus it occurs in Philo, *De spec.leg.* I 49.

[52] To give only a few examples: *Il.* B 58 εἶδος / μέγεθος / φυή; *Od.* ε 217 εἶδος / μέγεθος; ζ 152 εἶδος / μέγεθος / φυή; σ 219 μέγεθος / κάλλος; *Hymn. ad Dem.* 275 μέγεθος / εἶδος; Ps. Arist., *De mundo* 1 σχῆμα / μέγεθος / κάλλος; *Sap. Sal.* XIII 5 μέγεθος / καλλονή; Plut., *De Alex. M. fort.* II 3, 336 B μέγεθος / κάλλος; Lucian., *Abdic.* 27, 182 μέγεθος / εἶδος; *id.*, *Hermot.* 24 σχῆμα / μέγεθος / κάλλος; Dio Chrys. XII 52 εἶδος / μορφή / κάλλος / μέγεθος / σχῆμα. To μέγεθος as a divine attribute I hope to return on another occasion.

Yet with respect to all this a qualification should be made, which will afterwards also appear to be of the greatest significance for a correct understanding of St John's Gospel. It is that as far as its relationship to God is concerned, the universe is for none of these authors actually more than a kind of mediator and in many cases not even the only or, for that matter, the highest one. Stoics as well as later Platonists had already begun to differentiate between the universe itself and the orderly structure revealed by it and in various ways to elevate the latter into a proper hypostasis of its own: that of the Logos or World Reason.[55] Jewish thinkers like Philo and the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* moreover identified this Logos with the concept of uncreated Wisdom as they derived it from their own religious tradition and christian writers soon followed in their track. No doubt even so the *cognitio Dei ex operibus* continued to play its part, for quite often it is still with the beauty and harmony of the universe that hypostases like Wisdom or the Logos are primarily associated. At the same time, however, these latter naturally tended more and more to outshine the cosmic phenomena as such, as being themselves even more radiant manifestations of the divine presence in the created universe. To a large extent this process probably has to be accounted for by the fact that mere rationalistic argumentation as to God's existence could no longer provide a sufficient basis for the kind of piety that about the beginning of our era was being cultivated by all kinds of religious sects and had found its way into many philosophical schools as well. In addition to it a way had to be found of satisfying if not the bodily, then at least the spiritual eye. Along these lines we have certainly to explain the growing popularity of the idea of a *visio Dei*[56] in which all the outward characteristics of the universe were so to say interiorized and transcended in order to point the way to that reality that was believed to be their hidden and everlasting source.

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[53] See on this passage J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, Hildesheim-New York 1970 [= Leipzig-Berlin 1907], p. 170. Cf. also *Leg.* XV 1: καλὸς μὲν γὰρ ὁ κόσμος καὶ τῷ μεγέθει περιέχων and Geffcken, p. 191.

[54] On this expression cf. especially the pertinent remarks of M. Pohlenz, Paulus und die Stoa, *ZNW* 42 (1949), pp. 70ff. Contrarily, to put it with E. Käsemann, *An die Römer*, Tübingen 1974^3, p. 35 summarily "in den Zusammenhang hellenistischer Popularphilosophie" doesn't seem to be very helpful indeed.

[55] On this development one should still consult the clear account of E. Hatch,

Now this is certainly not to deny that also the preparatory stage could at times still receive its proper due. So Philo, while extolling the true θεοφιλεῖς who know God by Himself alone, yet praises those inquirers also who by way of their reason derive His existence from His works and don't associate themselves with atheists and

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The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, London 1901^{8}, pp. 180-188.

[56] The wide diffusion of this concept an some possibilities as to its various roots have been discussed in a particularly valuable way by W. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, Göttingen 1967^{6}, pp. 164-168. That even Philo's version of it has still something to do with the contemplation of the universe appears clearly from passages like *De spec. leg.* I 37 and 49. Here I might also remind of E. Fascher, "Deus Invisibilis. Eine Studie zur biblischen Gottesvorstellung", *Marburger Theologische Studien* I, Gotha 1931, pp. 41-77, who quite correctly emphasizes the strongly rationalistic character of this kind of piety, even when it presents itself in a mystical shape. With respect to *Sap. Sal.* XIII 3-5 he even contends: "An Stelle des Glaubens tritt die logische Gedankenoperation" (p. 59).

sceptics. In the same way Maximus of Tyre advises those who are unable to arrive at what is somehow a real *visio Dei* to content themselves with looking at God's works. Even the fact that in other texts the difference is not quite explicitly stated may after all be less surprising than by now it could well appear. For, as it is at this point important for us to realize, this difference indeed hardly counterbalances what in the midst of various developments had still remained the common motive behind *both* ways of arriving at a notion of God. This is that once God's invisibility is accepted, it is inevitable that *any* kind of human knowledge of Him must remain somehow mediated and no direct entrance into His essence could be hoped for even in the highest state of contemplation. So it was always to one or other of His outward manifestations that the human mind had to resort for whatever image it would like to call up before itself of His inexpressible nature. Besides, those outward manifestations themselves almost entirely lacked the straightforward and miraculous character that is so distinctive of the apparitions of the gods as we find them e.g. in Homer. Miracles and other arbitrary acts could certainly no longer be expected of a god whose essence being invisible and transcendent was deemed to be uniform and homogeneous as well.[57] Not even when such a god granted a vision of himself to certain priviliged individuals did he proceed in an irregular and arbitrary fashion. Philo is at pains to show that only such persons are illuminated in this way who during a life-time of constant struggle for virtue have qualified themselves for it. And Maximus of Tyre reserves a *visio Dei* to those only whose nature is strong enough. So also in this respect there is no *direct* manifestation of the divine presence — no manifestation, that is to say, taking place in so glaring and unmistakable a way, that even doubters and critical unbelievers could not help recognizing it and withdrawing their qualms. On the contrary, as will appear from the passage with which we are now going to deal, even in the highly religious and mystical climate of later hellenistic philosophy such sceptics were still a quantity to be reckoned with by anyone setting out to convince his fellow-men of the reality of the Invisible.

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[57] On philosophy's attitude towards the problem of the miraculous see R. M. Grant, *Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought*, Amsterdam 1952. There is also a useful collection of essays edited by C. F. D. Moule, *Miracles. Cambridge Studies in their Philosophy and History*, London 1966^2. On the hostility towards miracles shown by many of the Presocratics and especially by the early Hippocratic authors cf. H. Lloyd-Jones, *Justice* (cf. n. 33), pp. 80f.

With these last words we have been alluding to certain statements that can be found in the fifth Logos of the so-called *Corpus Hermeticum*. As the title of this treatise indicates, in it Hermes tries to make clear to his son Tat, that God, although being invisible (ἀφανής), is at the same time most manifest of all (φανερώτατος). As we are told, such a proposition can only appear as a paradox to those who are mistaken about the nature of the invisibility which is meant by it. For God is invisible not because He is merely obscure (τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀφανές p. 60, 5), but rather because He is eternal (ἀεί ἐστι p. 60, 8) and as such brings everything else to the light while remaining Himself unseen (τὰ ἄλλα πάντα φανερὰ ποιεῖ, αὐτὸς ἀφανὴς ὤν, ὡς ἀεὶ ὤν p. 60, 9f.). But even so His invisibility could still wrongly be taken in a purely negative sense and therefore the second chapter is quite emphatic in stating that God although invisible, nevertheless appears "through everything and in everything and foremost to those to whom He Himself chooses to do so" (διὰ πάντων φαίνεται, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ μάλιστα οἷς ἂν αὐτὸς βουληθῇ φανῆναι p. 60, 15f.).[58] After that Tat is informed that the only possibility of seeing the invisible is through the eyes of the mind (τοῖς τοῦ νοῦ ὀφθαλμοῖς p. 61, 3). Certainly God does not grudge this experience to anyone since He freely manifests Himself through the whole universe (ἄφθονος γὰρ ὁ κύριος φαίνεται διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου p. 61, 4f.).[59] Next, however, the author seems to remind himself of the traditional objection that such a representation of God's invisibility would leave Him without demonstrable evidence to the human eyes. To dismantle this objection he timely anticipates it with a question of his own: "Can you then see your thought", he asks,

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[58] On this statement see E. Peterson, "Alte Schulformeln und ihre Deutungen", *ZNW* 23 (1924), pp. 293-298.

[59] Cf. W. C. van Unnik, *De* ἀφθονία *van God in de oudchristelijke literatuur*, Med. Kon. Ned. Ak. v. Wet., afd. Lett. N.R. 36. 2. Amsterdam-London 1973. On our passage see pp. 36f.

"and touch it with your hands[60] and behold the image of God?" (νόησιν ἰδεῖν καὶ λαβέσθαι αὐταῖς ταῖς χερσὶ δύνασαι καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ θεάσασθαι; p. 61, 5f.). But if this is impossible, then the desire to see God with the eyes of the body is even more absurd. Yet there is a way to see God: if you want to look at Him (εἰ δὲ θέλεις αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν p. 61, 8), Hermes continues, look at the sun, look at the cycle of the moon and the orderly movement of the stars ... So again watching the order and harmony of the universe functions as a substitute for seeing the Maker and Lord of all Himself (ὁ τούτων πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ δεσπότης p. 61, 23), which is impossible since He is a θεὸς ἀόρατος.

The last illustration which I would like to quote here in order to show something of the background of Philip's question to Jesus, comes from a christian author of the second century, Theophilus of Antioch. In the first of his three books addressed to a certain Autolycus at the outset an interesting passage occurs, which immediately puts us on the track that we are here pursuing. In it the addressee of Theophilus' work is depicted as a typical scoffer and unbeliever. Obviously we are supposed to understand that it had been in this quality too, that Autolycus had laid before the bishop of Antioch the question which opens ch. 2: "Show me your God! (δεῖξόν μοι τὸν θεόν σου)". Certainly this whole presentation excellently suits Theophilus' literary purpose, for he had clearly intended his first book to be something like a formal exhortation to piety (περὶ τῆς θεοσεβείας μου II 1).[61] Now for a λόγος προτρεπτικός the usual public consists of course of outsiders who have to be convinced of the value of whatever the author wants to hold before them. Consequently here also Autolycus has to parade as a typical outsider and his question is shown to be a thoroughly unreasonable one. First, Theophilus declares, to see God one's inner life has to be wholly without spot or stain and measured by this standard Autolycus can only be regarded as totally blind on account of his impiety (ἀσέβεια). After having elaborated this theme to some extent, Theophilus returns at the beginning of ch. 3 to Autolycus' question. He even quotes it again, but now in a slightly altered form: "You will say to me then", he now puts it, "since you see, describe the form of God for me (σὺ ὁ βλέπων διήγησαί μοι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ θεοῦ)". Theophilus' answer opens with a derogatory ἄκουε, ὦ ἄνθρωπε. For, as we now hear, the question has been wrongly put, since nothing like a visible or describable εἶδος can ever be attributed to God. His greatness, Theophilus declares at the end of ch. 4, can only be known through His works (διὰ τῶν ἔργων). Next follow, in ch. 5, the traditional comparisons with the soul, which also is invisible, but yet can be apprehended through the movement of the body,[62] with the sun[63] and with certain other situations and objects, some of which may may have sprung from Theophilus' own invention.[64] Ch. 6 now starts with a rhapsodical praise of the wonders of the universe, all of them "works of God" (τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ), and culminates in a final apostrophe addressed to Autolycus, which leaves us in no doubt as to Theophilus' intention with the preceding ἐπίδειξις. "If you know these things, o man", he exclaims, "and live in purity, holiness, and righteousness, you can see God (δύνασαι ὁρᾶν τὸν θεόν)". So Autolycus too is presented with a substitute[65] by which

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[60] Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus* 155E, cited above in the text. On the basis of the text of Nock-Festugière one can, of course, no longer use this passage as an illustration of the meaning of ψηλαφᾶν in Acts XVII 27, as had been done by E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (cf. n. 14), p. 17 and as is still done by H. Conzelmann, *Die Apostelgeschichte*, Tübingen 1972^2, p. 109 and E. Haenchen, *Die Apostelgeschichte*, Göttingen 1977^7, pp. 503f. n. 5.

[61] On the literary purpose of Theophilus' trilogy I have a separate study in preparation. Especially a detailed comparison with Philo, *De spec. leg.* I 32ff. would be of considerable interest, since here also we seem to have an example of the protreptic genre: cf. the manner in which the proselytes are referred to in §§ 51f., just after Moses has been set up as model of the "yearning for the invisible" (§ 50). Although Moses' question, as reported in § 41 (ἐμφάνισόν μοι σαυτόν), is definitely not that of an outsider (it springs from a desire to penetrate into God's essence, not from any doubt as to His existence), the way in which it is dealt with occasionally

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intersects in a curious fashion with Theophilus' reply to Autolycus (cf. especially §§ 45 and 49).

[62] Cf. Cic., *Tusc.* I 28, 70 and M. Pohlenz, *Ciceronis Tusculanarum Disputationum Libri V*, Leipzig-Berlin 1912, *a.l.*; Jos., *Bell. Iud.* VII 346.

[63] For this simile see H. Windisch, *Der Barnabasbrief*, Tübingen 1920 on V 10.

[64] For this possibility see R. M. Grant, *After the New Testament*, Philadelphia, 1967, pp. 130f. As for Philo one should also compare *De spec. leg.* 33.

[65] As to the special emphasis which Theophilus puts on the soul as a mirror in which man can detect God's presence, cf. E. P. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius. Synthesis or Antithesis?*, Leiden 1968, pp. 21ff.

his desire, as expressed at the beginning of the first chapter, can be fulfilled — i.e. to a certain extent. For as such his question had deservedly been put aside as springing from mere stupidity since it required a direct ocular demonstration of a reality which long since had been known to be entirely inapproachable by human sight.

On the basis of the instances that have been examined so far our expectation that a more or less recurring pattern would present itself seems indeed to have been fully justified. At the same time it is clear that this pattern is also in the background of John XIV 8ff. Among the common features that have appeared one of the most prominent certainly is the strong emphasis which everywhere is laid on the utter transcendence and invisibility of the divine nature. In the same connection usually some sort of awareness betrays itself, that this very invisibility might well encourage doubt and scepticism with people who, like most of us, are accustomed to take as real only what, at least in principle, they are capable of seeing with their own eyes. Sometimes a critical utterance to this effect is especially quoted — as in the case of Philip in the Fourth Gospel, in that of the anonymous opponents against whom Marcus Aurelius is arguing and, in a particularly dramatic form, in that of Autolycus in the first book of Theophilus of Antioch. In other instances, more or less tacitly, similar objections seem to have been raised. This was true e.g. of Socrates' speech in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, of that of Balbus in Cicero's *De natura deorum* and probably also of the teaching of Hermes in the fifth treatise of the *Corpus Hermeticum*. Now although cavils and queries of this kind are without exception brushed aside as being wide of the mark, yet in each case also one or more suggestions are offered as to something which might after all compensate in a certain degree for the patent impossibility to demonstrate God's existence in a way that would satisfy man's deeply ingrained desire for palpable evidence. That indeed no more than a kind of compensation is offered appears in a particularly striking fashion from the repeated use in this connection of the verb (ἐξ)αρκεῖν[66] for which Maximus of Tyre has ἱκανὸς εἶναι. Especially the latter's formulation bears an interesting idiomatic resemblance to Jesus' reply to Philip in John XIV 9: ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακεν τὸν πατέρα. "If this will suffice", Maximus declares in the same fashion, "you have seen God (ἑώρακας τὸν θεόν); if not, how can one ever divine Him!". But the similarity of these answers is not restricted to their form. Usually they also testify to what I have earlier called a rather strong cosmologically directed type of piety. In this connection we have tried to elucidate something of the origins of the particular philosophical argument in support of the existence of a deity which bases itself upon the "works" (ἔργα) by which this latter demonstrates his "power" (δύναμις) in the universe that he has made. But even when a higher hypostasis of the divine being such as Wisdom or the Logos was sought after or when a more mystical kind of piety strove for a *visio Dei* of a strongly transcendental and inwardly directed nature, the god for whom one was in search appeared still to be in one way or other the Maker of the universe and the supreme Source of all being. So even in this case his "works" cannot have been considered to be quite unimportant.

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[66] Philo speaks of τὰ ἐφικτά, *De spec. leg.* 49.

At this point we have now to turn again to the pericope of St John's Gospel with which our investigation began. As we have already seen, in answering Philip's question Jesus first neither speaks a word about the nature of his Father, nor, for that matter, even touches the subject of God's invisibility. Instead, the author of the Fourth Gospel employs his usual technique and makes Jesus immediately center all attention on his own person. Whatever and wherever the Father Himself may be, the true believer had better leave this mystery alone and, beyond that, rest firmly in the knowledge that Jesus is in the Father and the Father in Jesus (vs 10). In addition to this, however, we are now also told that the Father who dwells in Jesus remains not simply inactive, but does His "works" (τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ) through him. That the mentioning of this fact has, moreover, in this context not been entirely fortuitous, appears immediately afterwards in vss 11f. For after Jesus' unique relationship with the Father has there been emphasized for the second time, the "works" also turn up again: if Philip cannot believe Jesus because of himself, he has at least to believe on account of his "works" (διὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτά), that is to say: on account of the works of that god who dwells in Jesus. It is this statement which now requires a little more detailed attention on our part. For, as in the light of the preceding discussion we have reason to expect, there might well be a connection of some kind or other between the "works of God" mentioned here and the doctrine of the *cognitio Dei ex operibus* that has occupied us in this part of our paper.

Jesus' answer to Philip in XIV 11f. and the "works of God" in the Fourth Gospel

Our first observation concerns the rhetorical form of Jesus' saying in vss 11 f. This clearly must be labelled as a *concessio* (or, eventually, a *permissio*), another interesting example of which occurs in X 38, where in all respects we have a close parallel of our passage.[67] Here Jesus is disputing with the Jews who refuse to recognize his claim to be a god. Although first in support of it he quotes a word from scripture, he then appears to mitigate this contention by formulating it as often elsewhere in the Fourth Gospel: "I am the Son of God" (vs 36).[68] This solemn declaration is then again qualified in the following vss: "If I'm not doing the works of my Father, don't believe me. But if I am, even if you do not believe me, accept the evidence of my works, so that you may recognize and know that the Father is in me, and I in the Father (κἂν ἐμοὶ μὴ πιστεύητε, τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύετε, ἵνα γνῶτε καὶ γινώσκητε ὅτι ἐν ἐμοὶ ὁ πατὴρ κἀγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρί)". As in XIV 11f. here too Jesus first seemingly accepts his opponents' refusal to believe what he has said; however, at the same time he makes it clear that this acceptance goes only so far as the reliability of his own person is concerned, so that in conclusion the more stress can be laid on that evidence which even for his opponents is indisputable: that of his works. Now this, of course, is also the effect that the application of a rhetorical figure like the *concessio* primarily should have in view: the apparent weakening of a case, with which it starts, serves only to put into fuller relief the one argument in support of it which, in the speaker's eyes, is most decisive.[69] So Jesus also while renouncing for a moment all evidence which would only tell on account of his own person, the so-called *argumentum a persona* of ancient rhetoric, precisely in this manner can make the better use of that other kind of evidence, which has the advantage of being entirely independent of himself, because it rests on public facts, the *argumentum a re.*[70] On this ground we may conclude that here as well as in XIV 11f. Jesus wishes indeed to focus the main attention on his "works": these have to bear him out in the quality that he has claimed for himself, i.e. that of being the unique Messenger that the Father had sent into the world. But at this point we may well ask whether, properly speaking, they are to be considered his own works after all. For, as we have seen, from XIV 10 it would rather appear that Jesus' works are indeed independent of his own person in such a degree, that they can even be unreservedly qualified as the works of the Father Himself, which this latter performs through him. Now this brings us to our next question, with which we shall have to deal somewhat more circumstantially: what does the author of the Fourth Gospel understand by the "works of the Father", or, since this amounts to the same thing, by the "works of God"?

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[67] On the rhetorical figure of the *concessio* in X 38 cf. the keen observations of Calvin in his commentary *a.l.*

[68] Cf. E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (cf. n. 14), pp. 188ff.

The first time the expression occurs, it is in the singular. In IV 34 Jesus states it to be his meat to do the will (θέλημα) of the Father who has sent him "and to fulfill His work" (καὶ τελειώσω αὐτοῦ τὸ ἔργον).[71] At the end of the section to which this saying belongs he is acclaimed by a group of by-standers as "the Saviour of the world" (ὁ σωτὴρ τοῦ κόσμου vs 42). It is tempting to connect this passage situated near the beginning of Jesus' public career with the long retrospective prayer of ch. XVII where Jesus is on the point of leaving the earth and withdrawing again into the glory which he had "before the beginning of the world" (πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι vs 5). For there the terminology of IV 34 recurs when Jesus solemnly proclaims before his Father to have glorified Him on earth by fulfilling His work (τὸ ἔργον τελειώσας ὃ δέδωκάς μοι ἵνα ποιήσω vs 4).[72] Moreover, this time two aspects of this "work" are mentioned which, taken together, fit in excellently with the designation of Jesus as "Saviour of the world" which in IV 42 had been left without explanation. According to XVII 2f. the task which Jesus had come to execute had consisted in granting "eternal life" (ζωὴ αἰώνιος) to all flesh over which God had given him power, as well as in spreading the knowledge necessary for the attainment of this "life", that of the only true God and of the Messenger whom He had sent, Jesus Christ. For reasons that will presently become clearer it is important to observe here first the close association between the "eternal life" of vs 2 and the knowledge mentioned in vs 3 and, secondly, the explicitness with which in vs 3 this latter is made subsidiary to the attainment of the former.

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[69] See H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik*, München 1960, §§ 856f.

[70] On this distinction see H. Lausberg, *o.c.*, §§ 355ff. As to the use of the word ἔργα in the sense of πράγματα A. Schlatter, *Der Glaube im Neuen Testament*, Darmstadt 1963 [= Stuttgart 1927^4], pp. 195f. n. 1 aptly refers to Polyb. I 35, 4 and VII 13, 2. As elsewhere the author of the Fourth Gospel appears to make conscious use of the polyvalence of his key-words. Besides, as to the juridical form in which, according to our opinion, Jesus' way of arguing is cast, we must not forget that the Fourth Gospel continuously depicts Jesus as a μάρτυς in the full sense of the word (cf. W. C. van Unnik, *Oog en oor*, Utrecht 1973). In that quality he is time and again interrupted by several critics (mainly Jews) and required to establish the truth of his claims. In response he not only provides all sorts of arguments, but also refers to his "tokens" (σημεῖα), a term which again recalls the vocabulary of ancient rhetoric. In V 36; X 25 his ἔργα are also connected with his function as a witness. For what is aimed at by the Fourth Gospel is a true "judgement" (κρίσις VII 24!) about him.

[71] When R. Bultmann in his commentary *a.l.* (cf. n. 2) remarks that this means

Our next illustration for the meaning attached by the author of this Gospel to the "works of God" is V 17ff. In the preceding section we have been told about a healing performed by Jesus which, as vs 9 expressly informs us, had taken place on a sabbath-day. In reply to the criticism which the Jews on this account had levelled against him Jesus utters the mysterious words: "My Father works until now and I work too (ὁ πατήρ μου ἕως ἄρτι ἐργάζεται κἀγὼ ἐργάζομαι vs 17)".[73] In vss 19f. the identity between the continuous activity

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"nicht das von Gott gewirkte, sondern das von Gott ... aufgetragene Werk", he suggests a difference between these two possibilities that is certainly more apparent, than real. Cf. I Hen. V 2f., where the same word ἔργα designates the "works" of creation, but also the tasks accomplished by them; see R. H. Charles, *The Book of Enoch or 1 Enoch*, Oxford 1912, *a.l.*

[72] It is tempting again to connect this phrase in its turn with the τετέλεσται of XIX 30.

[73] For the connection with Jewish speculation on the sabbath, cf. the commentaries *a.l.*

of the Father and that of Jesus himself is emphasized again. Up till now we have still been left in the dark about what kind of activity is implied in these statements, but vs 21 finally shows us that it has indeed to be conceived not in a vague and general but in a precise and definite way: the activity proper to the Father is there stated to be that of raising the dead and giving them life and the same description also applies to that of the Son (ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐγείρει τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ ζωοποιεῖ, οὕτως καὶ ὁ υἱὸς οὓς θέλει ζωοποιεῖ). At first sight this specification might surprise us. A closer inspection, however, reveals that it is not as strange as it seems.

As appears from II Cor. I 9 and related passages, around the beginning of our era "raising the dead" had in Jewish and christian circles already developed into a standing attribute of God. So e.g. the second prayer of the well-known Shemone Esre in what probably was its oldest recension, praises God as מְחַיֵּה הַמֵּתִים[74] It is interesting to observe that this happens in a context in which God's omnipotence as Creator is the dominating theme. This again has a near parallel in Rom. IV 17[75] where, however, instead of ἐγείρειν the verb ζωοποιεῖν[76] is used: Abraham put his trust in that god "who makes the dead alive and calls into existence the things that do not exist" (τοῦ ζωοποιοῦντος τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα). Obviously the latter half of this sentence describes God's activity as Creator. It is therefore as Creator also, that He gives life to the dead. To express such a notion, the verb ζωοποιεῖν is, of course, particularly well suited. Like its equivalent ζωογονεῖν it is used in hellenistic as well as in Jewish texts of the period to describe exactly what in many contemporary circles was considered to be the most characteristic operation of God as the Maker and Ruler of all: that of giving and sustaining the life of the universe.

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[74] As to the wording of this prayer, cf. I. Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Hildesheim 1967 [= Frankfurt a. Main 1931], pp. 44f. Further parallels from rabbinic texts can be found in P. Volz, *Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, Hildesheim 1966 [= Tübingen 1934], pp. 246f.

[75] See H. Lietzmann, *An die Römer*, Tübingen 1971^5, *a.l.* and also the extensive discussion by E. Käsemann *a.l.* (cf. n. 53).

[76] The association of the two verbs is also attested in Rom. VIII 11. With John V 21 one should, of course, compare XI 25.

A few examples may suffice.[77] In a magical papyrus[78] Helios is addressed as ὁ τὰ ὅλα συνέχων καὶ ζωογονῶν καὶ συγκρατῶν τὸν κόσμον. Likewise in I Tim. VI 13 it is God "who brings everything (τὰ πάντα) to life". According to a Hermetic treatise[79] God's "life" and "movement" consist in κινεῖν τὰ πάντα καὶ ζωοποιεῖν, whereas in another place[80] the sun is called the giver of the life and movement (ζωοποιῶν καὶ ἀνακίνων) of the living beings of the universe (τὰ τοῦ κόσμου ζῷα). As for Jewish texts, in II Esdr. XIX 6 LXX God is proclaimed in a prayer as the sustainer of all life (σὺ ζωοποιεῖς τὰ πάντα) and the same idea occurs in the famous Epistle of Aristeas where in § 16 even the popular etymology of the name Zeus as deriving from ζῆν[81] is followed and applied to God as the Creator (κτίστης) of everything, by whom everything is made alive and originated (δι' ὅν ζωοποιοῦνται τὰ πάντα καὶ γίνεται). Finally one of the prayers in the somewhat puzzling Jewish-hellenistic novel of Joseph and Aseneth opens with a short enumeration of divine attributes, that especially in view of John V 21 ff. is well worth considering.[82] God is being indicated as ὁ ζωοποιήσας τὰ πάντα καὶ καλέσας ἀπὸ τοῦ σκότους εἰς τὸ φῶς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πλάνης εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἀπὸ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωήν.[83] In the light of this survey the combination of ζωοποιεῖν with ἐγείρειν as we find it in John V 21 as well as the use elsewhere of the former verb in connection with the raising of the dead become extremely significant. Probably even in Jewish surroundings as a standing attribute of God "giving life to the universe" had been introduced much earlier and found a much wider acceptance[84] than "raising the dead". Actually the latter, although possibly more or less scriptural as far as its wording is concerned,[85] may well have been consciously modelled on the former. For naturally those Jews (and certainly they were not all of them) who believed in a resurrection of the dead must have felt inclined to regard it as the supreme manifestation and, at the same time, crowning evidence of that omnipotent power by which, according to general belief, God was unintermittently giving life to the universe. In any case we can clearly see the early christians to have taken that view of the matter. This is shown e.g. by an instance like that of Eph. I 19 where the "power" (τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ κράτους τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ) by which God is said to have brought about Jesus' resurrection from the dead is clearly meant to be identical with that implied in the wording of vs 10, which vs by referring to God's "working everything according to the counsel of His will" (τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ) unmistakably typifies Him as Creator. With this one should compare a passage like Col. I 18 where Jesus' dignity of being "first born of the dead" (πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν) is closely parallel to that mentioned in vs 15, his being "first born of all creation" (πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως). Philipp. III 21 goes even to the length of endowing the resurrected Christ himself with creatorial power,[86] when it is expected of him, that he will transform the humiliated bodies of his followers into the likeness of his own resplendent body "according to the power which enables him to do everything[87] and to make all things subject to himself" (κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν καὶ ὑποτάξαι αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα). But the general view will have been not much different from the one to be found in Rom. IV 24 where the resurrection of Jesus is indeed referred to as the culminating instance of God's power as Creator to raise the dead (cf. vs 17). By bringing Jesus to life again God had demonstrated this power in an entirely satisfactory and convincing way and thereby proven Himself in matter of fact to be the only Creator and Judge of the universe.[88]

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[77] Cf. R. Bultmann, *ThWNT* II, pp. 875f. It is puzzling what makes Bultmann in his commentary (p. 184) so sure, that any Greek derivation of the use of ζωοποιεῖν in V 17 is out of the question. In fact he gives us no more than a simple assertion: "Natürlich liegt nicht die griechische Anschauung zugrunde".

[78] Preisendanz, *Pap. Gr. Mag.* VII 529f.

[79] *C.H.* XI 17.

[80] *C.H.* XVI 8.

[81] See the collection of materials in O. Weinreich, *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, Darmstadt 1968, pp. 409-412.

[82] See also the similar passage XII 2. I refer to the edition of M. Philonenko, Leiden 1968.

[83] With this one should compare the common representation in early christian literature of conversion as re-creation, e.g. in I Peter I 23 (cf. II 9: transition from darkness to light).

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[84] For rabbinical discussions about the resurrection of the dead, cf. P. Volz, *Eschatologie* (cf. n. 74), pp. 234f. But the resistance against this belief is sufficiently brought out by the lively scene depicted in Acts XXIII 6ff.

[85] Cf. P. Volz, *o.c.*, p. 246.

[86] As Calvin aptly puts it in his commentary *a.l.*

[87] In my opinion we have here not one, but two of the traditional attributes of the Creator, since τὰ πάντα, placed for stylistical reasons at the end of the sentence, belongs naturally to both infinitives and καί has no emphasis — if it had, it would detract from that laid on τὰ πάντα in a rather awkward manner. For the "power to do everything" (δύνασθαι πάντα) as a standing predicate of God, see W. Bauer, *Wörterbuch zum NT*, Berlin 1963^5, col. 410 *s.v.* δύναμαι 3); E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (cf. n. 14), p. 154 and his commentary on Verg., *Aen.* VI 117; K. F. Smith in his commentary on Tibullus I 3, 27f.; W. C. van Unnik, "Alles ist dir möglich" (Mk 14, 36), *Verborum Veritas*, Festschr. G. Stählin, pp. 27-36.

Of course, all this was only believed by christians. Hellenistic philosophers and even many of the Jews, however preoccupied they were with a conception of God which represented Him as the ultimate source of all life, felt not in the least attracted to a mythological idea like that of the raising of the dead, let alone that of the resurrection of one of their own contemporaries. This not only appears from a typical scene like that of Acts XVII 32f.,[89] but also from some of the more expressly apologetical parts of early christian literature. So e.g. the author of I Clement devotes two chapters to a defense of the resurrection with more or less rational arguments, significally concluding it in XXVI 1 with a reference to God's omnipotence as Creator. Likewise Tatian, an author of the second century, when expounding his doctrine about God and the creation of the world, feels compelled to digress for a moment to the pagan mockery about the christian belief in the resurrection of the body and to refute it by pointing out God's absolute power over the universe (*Discourse to the Greeks* ch. VI). From all this it is clear that at least for christians there was an intimate connection between what was generally understood to be God's creatorial activity of giving life and His power to raise the dead. We would like to suggest that it is this connection also which is on the background of John V 21 ff.

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[88] See especially Acts XVII 31 where Jesus' resurrection qualifies as the evidence (πίστις) offered by God of His being the supreme Judge of the universe. But this He is, of course, because He is at the same time the Creator described in the first part of this famous speech. There is, then, no cleft between the two halves, contrary to what is sometimes suggested. In my opinion the same link appears in John V 21 ff., where Jesus' power to make alive goes hand in hand with his power to judge (vs 22). This power also derives from God (vss 22.37). Cf. further n. 103.

[89] One should notice that, like as in I Cor. XV 12ff., the resurrection of Jesus is spontaneously connected with the idea of the resurrection of the dead in general. It is usually the latter which comes under attack first.

Nevertheless what has by now turned out to be a matter of common belief among christians is here given a rather particular twist, which cannot be detached from the general bent of the Fourth Gospel as such. For, although in vss 25 and 28f. the author seems at least partly to conceive of the resurrection of the dead in an ordinary literal sense, yet even here by adding the words καὶ νῦν ἐστιν to the prophetical ἔρχεται ὥρα of vs 25 he leaves us in no doubt, that he is not *only* thinking of an event to be expected at the end of the world. This is corroborated by the solemn utterance of Jesus in vs 24 that whoever accepts his word gains possession of "eternal life" (ζωὴ αἰώνιος) here and now. For certainly "eternal life" must nowhere in the Fourth Gospel be taken in a primarily physical, but rather in a spiritual sense.[90] The imagery in which it is represented may, of course, lie partly on a physical level and since it is, moreover, supposed to be the only kind of life in the real sense of the word, we must even be careful not to create the wrong impression that life of a purely physical type would be conceivable apart from it. As is clearly shown by a passage from the next chapter, VI 63: τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν τὸ ζωοποιοῦν, ἡ σάρξ οὐκ ὠφελεῖ οὐδέν (cf. vs 27!), — in the Gospel of St John physical reality is neither denied, nor simply cut off from the spiritual life; but taken in itself it is rather considered to be immaterial. For only on a spiritual level is true life possible, or, to put it in the words of V 24, whoever has "eternal life" has passed from death to life (μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωήν). To grant this kind of life has Jesus been sent from above. For we must not forget that behind Jesus' activity according to vss 17 and 20f. stands that of his Father. It is the latter's creative power that manifests itself in Jesus' works. This is emphasized again when in vs 26 we read that only of the Father can it be said that "He has life in Himself" (ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ). If the Son possesses the same privilege, that is because he has received it from Him (καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ἔδωκεν ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ). This must certainly be taken in the sense of the originally platonic notion that immortal is only what is itself the source of its own motion. As is testified by passages from Cicero such as *Tusc.* I 53ff.,[91] *De nat. deor.* II 32[92] and *Somn. Scip.* 19[93] in the hellenistic period this had become a very widespread idea which could be applied either to the soul, as had been done by Plato himself, or to the universe, or, like in our case, to God. So e.g. a stoic formula recorded by Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* IX 76 describes God as a δύναμις αὐτοκίνητος.[94] And especially the *Corpus Hermeticum* has more than one passage to the same effect. We already quoted XI 17 where the "life" and "motion" which could metaphorically be ascribed to God are defined as κινεῖν τὰ πάντα καὶ ζωοποιεῖν. Now it is particularly interesting to observe that in the same treatise we have a detailed exposition of the principle that God's activity has to be uninterrupted. "For God cannot be idle (ἀργός)", as § 5 puts it, since in that case everything would be idle". This means, as again § 14 informs us, that the whole universe would collapse (πάντα συμπεσεῖσθαι). For God's work (θεοῦ ἔργον) consists in only one thing: to cause everything to be (§ 13). And working without assistance (αὐτουργὸς γὰρ ὤν), He is always immanent in his work, being Himself what He brings forth (§ 14). Of course, a pantheistic conception like this is entirely foreign to the spirit of St John's Gospel. Yet there also it is the life which He has in Himself which God entrusts to His Son to impart it to the world (III 16f.), or rather to those out of the world that have been given to him by his Father (XVII 9). For it is certainly true that the same verb ζωοποιεῖν which in other contexts describes a cosmic activity extending itself to the universe as a whole is in our Gospel used with reference only to the small number of those, who have accepted Jesus' message and thereby been able to pass from death to life.

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[90] This may also present us with the reason, why the seemingly crude and literal statement of vss 28f. is preceded by a reassuring μὴ θαυμάζετε τοῦτο. It may indicate that Jesus is speaking metaphorically, cf. III 7. For a drastic illustration of this Johannine principle see especially VI 26f.

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[91] Cf. M. Pohlenz, *a.l.* (cf. n. 62).

[92] Cf. A. S Pease, *a.l.* (cf. n. 44).

[93] Cf. C. Meissner - G. Landgraf, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Somnium Scipionis*, Leipzig-Berlin 1915, *a.l.*

[94] Cf. the description in Ps. Arist., *De mundo* 6, 398Bf. of how God imparts κίνησις to the universe.

What has been said about the meaning of the "works of God" in the Fourth Gospel on the basis of ch. V is corroborated when, in the next chapter, Jesus replies to an obstrusive question of the Jews as to what token of his divine mission he can show and what kind of activity he is pursuing (τί οὖν ποιεῖς σὺ σημεῖον ... τί ἐργάζῃ; vs 30). He designates himself as the "bread of life" (ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς vs 35) that has come down from heaven "to give life to the world" (ζωὴν διδοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ vs 33). It also fits in with our results when in the next following Jesus goes on to emphasize again his intention to do the will of Him who sent him (τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με vs 38), at the same time relating this "will" with the granting of "eternal life" to all that God has given him, raising them up on the last day (vss 39f.). We have already noted the close association between the "works of God" and His "will" in IV 34. Besides, the same connection between God's "will" and His power (ἐνέργεια) as Creator appeared to exist in Eph. I 10. For the moment it would take us too far to enter more deeply into the intricacies with which the use of words like δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, θέλημα at a closer inspection would present us.[95] Therefore we have to content ourselves with quoting only one more passage from the *Corpus Hermeticum* in which God's creative power (ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια) is equated with His "will" (θέλησις), after which his "essence" (ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ) is accordingly defined as τὸ θέλειν πάντα εἶναι (X 2). Now this certainly has to be taken in the sense of the expression κινεῖν τὰ πάντα καὶ ζωοποιεῖν in XI 17. In the same way for Jesus executing God's "will" means doing His "work", that is to say: acting as a vicegerent of the Creator Himself whose work it is to impart life to the universe.

However in addition to "life" there is another quality which according to many contemporary texts the Creator communicates to the universe, namely "light".[96] It need, therefore, not surprise us when in John IX 3-5 Jesus comments upon the healing of a blind man, for which he is preparing himself, by saying that in this way "the works of God" must be manifested. "While daylight lasts", he continues, "we must carry on the work of Him who sent me (ἐργάζεσθαι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με vs 4); night comes, when no one can work. While I am in the world I am the light of the world (φῶς εἰμι τοῦ κόσμου vs 5)". "Doing the works of God" and "being the light of the world" are here virtually identical. Now in the religious vocabulary from which the Fourth Gospel seems to draw,[97] "light" has often a somewhat more intellectual aspect than "life", with which it is regularly combined. It is e.g. used with particular frequency as a symbol for γνῶσις.[98] Certainly one has to admit that in the Gospel as we have it such a symbolism comes nowhere clearly to the surface. On the other hand, as especially C. H. Dodd has pointed out,[99] the expression "light of the world" may well have been modelled on a much similar phrase which, in contemporary Judaism, had a wide currency as a description of the Torah, which in its turn was generally regarded to be the embodiment of all true γνῶσις.[100] However that may be, as has already been shown in our discussion of XVII 2f., one of the main functions that Jesus according to the Fourth Gospel has to fulfil certainly is to be a herald of the true and salvific knowledge of God.[101] May

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[95] With θέλημα I shall deal in another article, in which also the relationship with the Hebrew word רָצוֹן as it appears especially in Sir. will be investigated. For ἐνέργεια one should still make use of the illuminating treatment by J. Armitage Robinson, *St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians*, London 1904², pp. 241-247.

[96] For the combination of "life" with "light" see: R. Bultmann, *ThWNT* II, pp. 842f.; C. H. Dodd, *Interpretation* (cf. n. 9), pp. 17-19; *id.*, *The Bible and the*

Greeks, London 1964^{3}, pp. 133-136; W. L. Knox, *St Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, Cambridge 1961^{2}, p. 140 n. 1; H. Conzelmann, *ThWNT* IX, p. 325.343 n. 338. On Wisdom as pre-cosmic light cf. especially W. L. Knox, *o.c.*, *pass.* (see Index).

[97] In my opinion the best study on this subject remains that of C. H. Dodd quoted in n. 9. One should not speculate too much about a special gnostic or sectarian background. Cf. e.g. the pertinent remarks of K. Berger, *Exegese des Neuen Testaments*, Heidelberg 1977, pp. 230f. against W. A. Meeks.

[98] See R. Reitzenstein, *Hellenistische Mysterienreligionen*, Darmstadt 1966 [= Stuttgart 1927^{3}], pp. 292f. For Johannine literature cf. especially W. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos* (cf. n. 56), pp. 172ff.

[99] *O.c.* (cf. n. 9), pp. 84f., 204f.

[100] Compare with the rabbinical parallels adduced by Dodd e.g. *Test. Levi* XIV 4 (where the well-attested reading φῶς τοῦ νόμου may be original); Ps. Philo, *Ant.* XI 1f.; *Sap. Sal.* XVIII 4; cf. also Rom. II 19, where in the following vs the Torah is described as μόρφωσις τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

[101] On "knowledge of God" in the Fourth Gospel see C. H. Dodd, *Interpretation* (cf. n. 9), pp. 151ff. Of course, according to the synoptic gospels this function is entirely foreign to him, since there God is not in the same way represented as an unknown entity.

it not be in this sense that the Prologue stresses that the "life" which from the beginning dwelt in the Logos was at the same time the "light of men" (I 4)? Considering I 5 and 9f. where the "light" is said to have illuminated the darkness of the universe (κόσμος), one could even put it that the "life" of vs 4 as soon as it appears in the universe manifests itself as "light". This would also fit in nicely with Jesus' self-description in VIII 12 as the "light of the world" that hands over to those who follow it "the light of life" (τὸ φῶς τῆς ζωῆς). Now, as we indicated, both "light" and "life" are to be seen as strictly divine qualities.[102] Even more important in this connection is the fact, which is not always duly recognized, that "life" as well as "light" appertain to God particularly as Creator. This is clear not only from the context of John I 4, where the Logos in whom "life" and "light" are to be found has just before been designated as the sustaining principle of the universe, but also from many passages from contemporary sources. Philo e.g. explains in *De opif.* 30 the "spirit" and the "light" mentioned at the beginning of the biblical account of creation as "life" and "light" by identifying the πνεῦμα θεοῦ of Gen. I 2 with the *vis vitalis* (ζωτικώτατον πνεῦμα) of stoic cosmology. "And God is the source of life" (ζωῆς δὲ θεὸς αἴτιος), as he supplements his statement. Accordingly, in *De fug.* 198 God is called the "fountain of life" (πηγὴ τοῦ ζῆν), just as in *De somn.* I 75 He appears as the ἀρχέτυπον of every kind of light.

However, as should now finally be brought out with due emphasis, with this designation of God's creatorial power as "life" and "light" the agreement between a way of thinking like that of Philo and what one usually calls the theology of the Fourth Gospel is not exhausted. For just as in the former's cosmology, under the influence of stoic and platonizing tendencies, it is precisely God's activity as Creator which is to a large extent transferred to the Logos as a mediating agency between Him and the world, so in the Gospel of St John God is more than once said to have given His "power" (ἐξουσία) as Creator and Judge[103] to the Son, who pre-eminently in this respect acts as His vicegerent on earth.[104] Even more revealing for our understanding of this particular motif is perhaps a parallel that occurs in a writing belonging to another type of Jewish-hellenistic speculation than is represented by the work of Philo, the so-called Book of Wisdom, the XIIIth chapter of which has already briefly occupied us on an earlier occasion. This time it must be observed that this very chapter not only gives full attention to the size and beauty of the universe as supplying visible witness to its invisible Maker, but more in particular regards them as evidence of God's insurpassable "power" (δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια vs 4) as Creator. With this in mind we may next turn to the long description of Wisdom to be found in ch. VII of the same Book, which on various points shows interesting similarities to the portrayal of the Son as God's representative in the Fourth Gospel. "Wisdom", we read in vss 24ff., "moves more easily than motion itself (πάσης ... κινήσεως κινητικώτερον σοφία), she pervades and permeates all things (διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων)[105] because she is pure. Like a fine mist she rises from the power of God (ἀτμὶς γάρ ἐστιν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως), a pure effluence from the glory (δόξα) of the Almighty... She is the reflection

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[102] In I John I 5 God Himself is called φῶς; cf. Ptol., *Epist. ad Flor.* VII 7.

[103] In my opinion the combination of these two attributes is to be put on a par

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with that of ζωοποιεῖν with ἐγείρειν or, for that matter, with the use of the Hebrew word רָצוֹן in the sense of the Greek θέλημα in *Sir.* In each case Jewish (or christian) believers give a peculiar expression to what in fact was a general religious conviction of their time. For this purpose they made use of the vocabulary and the rich store of mythical concepts with which their own religious and cultural heritage provided them, but the pattern into which all this was moulded was largely the same that prevailed also in other cultural areas of the hellenistic period. To believe in God as the Maker of all had gradually become the first article of every educated form of piety, but to represent Him at the same time as the supreme Judge and to ascribe to Him the power to raise the dead was a particular Jewish (and christian) elaboration of this.

[104] Cf. R. Bultmann (cf. n. 2) on III 35 (p. 119 n. 3).

[105] On this formula cf. the article of E. Peterson quoted in n. 58. For the concept of Wisdom in *Sap. Sal.* see M. Hengel, *Der Sohn Gottes*, Tübingen 1977², p. 81, where also some references to recent literature are to be found. In my opinion one should not exaggerate the platonic, or even gnostic colouring of the author's ideas, as is done by A. Adam, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte I*, Gütersloh 1977³, pp. 49ff. ἀπόρροια e.g. is not only a "concept of later gnosticism", as Adam calls it, but also of earlier Greek philosophy, especially in cosmological contexts, and as such it can ultimately be traced back to Empedocles and Democritus. So e.g. it occurs in a purely stoical setting in *M. Anton.* II 4. For this and other references cf. E. Hatch, *Influence* (cf. n. 55), p. 177 n. 1.

of everlasting light (ἀπαύγασμα γάρ ἐστιν φωτὸς ἀιδίου), the flawless mirror of the active power of God (ἔσοπτρον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας) and the image (εἰκών) of His goodness". As will be immediately clear from her characterization as a kind of all-pervading life-power, Wisdom occupies here largely the place which in stoic cosmology is assigned to the Logos. Moreover, with respect to the frequent combination of "life" and "light" in contemporary sources, it is interesting to see her in the same connection also depicted as a "reflection of everlasting light", an expression which runs evidently parallel to the more biblically orientated phrase by which vs 25 calls her an "effluence from the glory (δόξα) of the Almighty". This, of course, strongly reminds us of the prominent role played by this very word δόξα in the religious vocabulary of the Gospel of St John.[106] However, what for the moment captivates us most in this description is certainly the way in which Wisdom here is typified as being not just the supreme manifestation, but as such also a *visible image* of God's creative energy. For this evidently means that according to the author of this Book fixing one's eyes upon Wisdom is at the same time the only way of seeing God at work. Now after everything we have said, it need hardly be emphasized that this again is of the greatest significance for our understanding of the theology of the Fourth Gospel. For one of its main intentions undoubtedly is to represent Jesus in exactly the same sense as a visible image[107] in which God's creative power, symbolized as "life" and "light", manifests itself up to a certain degree on the human scene. This is certainly what is implied by the recurring motif of the "works of God" as being executed by Jesus. For although in the narrative as such each of these "works" had, of course, to be assigned to a certain time and place, yet from what we have seen it appears that at the same time they are meant to testify to God's unintermittent activity as Creator to give and sustain the life of the universe. Therefore we may conclude that they belong after all to the same kind of "works" we have come across in connection with the ancient philosophical doctrine of the *cognitio Dei ex operibus*.

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[106] Cf. C. H. Dodd, *Interpretation* (cf. n. 9), pp. 206ff.

[107] I 14!

Here also it was first and foremost His "power" as Maker and Ruler of the universe that God was considered to reveal by His "works". At the same time to recognize this "power" was the only way open to man to convince himself of the existence of a deity whose real nature lay entirely outside the field that was covered by normal experience. Just so in the Fourth Gospel Philip, instead of having the θεὸς ἀόρατος demonstrated to him in as straightforward a way as his question to Jesus demanded, is referred to Jesus himself and to his works as the only way leading to the Father even for the most intimate among Jesus' followers.

Even at this point, however, we still cannot take final leave of our subject. For although we seem by now to have succeeded in establishing a kind of relationship between the "works of God" as referred to by Jesus in his answer to Philip and God's activity as Creator, yet the very exclusiveness with which these "works" are, on the other hand, throughout the Fourth Gospel identified with the concrete acts, and possibly also the words,[108] of Jesus himself, remains somewhat puzzling. Of course, we have met this exclusiveness to a certain extent also elsewhere. Obviously each time that over and above the cosmic phenomena as such a particular hypostasis, like Wisdom or the Logos, is introduced as a kind of special witness to God's presence in the universe, a process is started in which the latter tends to draw more and more attention towards itself, whereas the mere outward aspects of the universe gradually fall into the background. Yet a document like the Book of Wisdom, which in ch. VII shows this process to have been well on its way, is still able to point in XIII 4 also to the visible phenomena of the universe as providing evidence of God's unequalled power as Creator. In the Fourth Gospel such an instance will be looked for in vain. Instead we hear that once Jesus will have disappeared, the world will be left again in darkness (XII 35; cf. XIII 33), that is to say: without any testimony to the θεὸς ἀόρατος whom according to I 18 only Jesus had been able to make known. Now in explanation of this, one could, of course, point again to the strongly transcendental quality of everything that Jesus is said to convey. So he nowhere is just the light, but the true, that is: the essential light[109] (τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν) and the life which he grants is time and again qualified as "eternal" (αἰώνιος). In this respect the author of the Fourth Gospel may indeed have shared in the platonizing tendency which seems to have been a general feature of his time and which everywhere carried along with it a renewed or at least a heightened awareness of the supramundane character of all divine reality. But still this would only account for a comparative disregard for the cosmic phenomena in our Gospel, not for the utter neglect which actually has to be observed[110] and it certainly cannot explain the exclusiveness with which only Jesus is still allowed to function as the visible image in which God's creative energy can partially be discerned.[111] That is why at this point we cannot abstain from recognizing that, in addition to its platonizing tendency, the Fourth Gospel seems also to be affected with a rather heavy propensity towards dualism.[112] The effect of this had, of course, to be that of magnifying even further the distance between God and everything that belonged to Him on the one hand and the created universe on the other. Moreover, however, it supplies us this time also with the reason why in our Gospel this distance can only be bridged by the sending of a Messenger who is himself of a heavenly, and in the context of a dualistic conception of the universe that means, of a completely otherwordly origin,[113] no longer by a reference to the created universe as such, as was still possible for platonizing authors like Philo and Maximus of Tyre. Paradoxically it is as a complete stranger indeed, that according to St John's Gospel Jesus enters into a world, which nevertheless owes its very existence to him (I 10). Everywhere around him death and darkness exert their power, even to the extent that their counterparts: life and light are still only to be discovered in his personal presence.

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[108] See however M. de Jonge, "Signs and Works in the Fourth Gospel", *Miscellanea Neotestamentica* II (edd. T. Baarda a.o.), Leiden 1978, pp. 124f.

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[109] Cf. C. H. Dodd, *Interpretation* (cf. n. 9), pp. 139f.

[110] Mark by way of contrast the fierceness with which any belief in a unique divine messenger is attacked by a platonist like Celsus in Orig. *Contra Cels.* V 6, precisely because, according to him, the only rational attitude is to consider the cosmic phenomena as true heavenly messengers (ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐρανίους ἀγγέλους). Platonism has indeed always maintained a fundamentally optimistic view about the cosmos.

[111] It is exactly this exclusiveness in which one might detect certain gnostic overtones. For in itself, of course, the concept of a heavenly Revealer is not peculiarly gnostic at all, since *any* kind of religion presupposes either a messenger or a message from above. On the difference between the more philosophical and rational way of searching for the Divinity by contemplating the universe and, on the other hand, the gnostic idea of Christ as the only teacher about the heavenly world, cf. S. R. C. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria. A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism*, Oxford 1971, pp. 171ff. To my mind one of the most impressive statements of the gnostic view on this matter is the one found in Ptol. *Epist. ad Flor.* III 7 about the Father of the universe, whom only Jesus has revealed to us (ὃν μόνος ἐλθὼν ὁ μόνος εἰδὼς ἐφανέρωσε).

[112] Two comparatively recent monographs on this subject, in which the radical statements of the Fourth Gospel are not toned down in order to save its character as a book of the Bible, are: E. Käsemann, *Jesu letzter Wille nach Johannes 17*, Tübingen 1971³ and L. Schottroff, *Der Glaubende und die feindliche Welt. Beobachtungen zum gnostischen Dualismus und seiner Bedeutung für Paulus und das Johannesevangelium* (WMANT 37), Neukirchen-Vluyn 1970.

Yet — and this shows again that the dualism is not carried through beyond a certain point — this same dismal and cheerless universe remains up to the last page of our Gospel in a full sense the creation of the Father by Whom Jesus is sent and Whose will he has to perform. And once Jesus has entered the world, the creative energy of his Father, of however spiritual and transcendental a character it may be, also pushes its way into it again. Therefore not even in the Fourth Gospel a question like that of Philip needs after all to be left without answer. For although by Jesus' descent from heaven divine reality as such has lost nothing of its inscrutableness, at least its "works", manifesting themselves in the "life" and "light" that Jesus had come to impart, lay now open again to concrete human experience. And, as this paper has tried to show, any attempt at demonstrating the Invisible will sooner or later have to put up with no more.

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[113] See W. A. Meeks, "The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism", *JBL* 91 (1972), pp. 44-72 and also Berger's criticisms referred to in n. 97. On Jesus' otherwordliness in the Fourth Gospel there are also many pertinent observations in M. de Jonge, *Jesus: Stranger from Heaven and Son of God*, Missoula, Montana 1977.

JERUSALEM, WOHNSITZ DER WEISHEIT

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Die Spruchsammlung des Jesus Sirach stammt aus der hellenistischen Periode des Judentums. Mag man mit den meisten Forschern als Ziel des Verfassers die Bewahrung des alten jüdischen Glaubens gegen den andringenden Hellenismus ansehen,[1] oder mit der Leidener Dissertation von Th. Middendorp die Einführung bisher fremder griechischer Denkart ins Judentum[2] — in jedem Fall ist das Buch ein Dokument der zeitgenössischen Religionsgeschichte. Ursprünglich in hebräischer Sprache um 180 v.Chr. abgefasst ist es vom Enkel des Autors, der gegen 132 v.Chr. nach Alexandria kam, dort ins Griechische übersetzt.[3] Schon dieser Vorgang kennzeichnet die hellenistische Situation.[4] Das zeigt sich in der Vorrede des Übersetzers durch den Hinweis, dass sein Grossvater das Werk geschrieben habe, "weil nicht allein die, die selbst (scil. das Gesetz, die Propheten und die übrigen Bücher der Bibel) lesen, verständig sein müssten, sondern die Lernbeflissenen sollten auch den Aussenstehenden mit Rede und Schrift nützlich sein". Nach diesen Worten will das Buch den mit der jüdischen Bibel nicht Vertrauten den Zugang zur "Erziehung und Weisheit" Israels eröffnen, die in jenem Kanon enthalten sind. Der Orientale, der in den Bereich der hellenistischen Kultur tritt, sieht die literarische Tradition seines Volks als Quelle wertvoller Erkenntnis für die Aussenwelt an und meint, dass sie wegen ihrer Schwierigkeit der Verdeutlichung bedarf. Damit ist das Motiv der Übersetzung gesagt, und der Dolmetsch vergisst nicht, auch noch auf die Schwierigkeit seiner Arbeit hinzuweisen: "denn nicht hat es die gleiche Wirkung,[5] wenn ein und dasselbe in seiner ursprünglichen hebräischen Sprache ausgedrückt und wenn es in eine andere Sprache übersetzt wird; nicht allein aber dies, sondern das Gesetz selbst, die Prophezeiungen und die übrigen Bücher (scil. der Bibel) weichen nicht wenig (von der Übersetzung) ab, wenn sie in ihrer eigenen Sprache gesprochen werden". So wird die Übersetzung empfohlen durch den Hinweis auf das geheimnisvoll verschleierte Original.

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[1] Z. B. V. Tscherikover, *Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews*^{2}, Philadelphia 1961, 143ff. M. Hengel, *Judentum und Hellenismus*^{1}, Tübingen 1969, 272ff. So schon R. Smend, *Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach*, Berlin 1906, XXXIII.

[2] Th. Middendorp, *Die Stellung Jesu Ben Siras zwischen Judentum und Hellenismus*, Leiden 1972. Dort Literatur zum Problem.

[3] Diese Übersetzung ist mit der Vorrede des Übersetzers in die Septuaginta gelangt. Letzte Ausgabe: *Septuaginta. Vetus Testamentum Graecum.* Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Gottingensis XII, 2, ed. J. Ziegler, *Jesus Sirach* (*Ecclesiasticus*), Göttingen 1965.

[4] Zur Bedeutung der tatsächlichen oder fiktiven Übersetzung aus einer orientalischen Sprache siehe M. Hengel, *Judentum und Hellenismus*, 1969^1, (WUNT 10), 386ff.

Allerdings ist das Sirachbuch vollständig nur auf Griechisch erhalten, der hebräische Text dagegen unvollständig in verschiedenen voneinander abweichenden Handschriften des 9.-11. Jahrhunderts, die in der berühmten Geniza einer Kairoer Synagoge erst 1896 wieder aufgetaucht sind.[6] Später sind in Qumran und in der jüdischen Festung Masada weitere hebräische Fragmente gefunden worden, die zeitlich viel näher am Urtext stehen, aber auch schon von der Vorlage des griechischen Textes abweichen.[7] Dieser Zustand der Textüberlieferung führt dazu, dass ein Kapitel, das für unsere Überlegungen wichtig ist, nur in griechischer Übersetzung vorliegt. Wir wollen nämlich untersuchen, warum dem damals in der Griechisch sprechenden Welt lebenden Juden die Überlieferung seines Volks auch für Fremde so bedeutungsvoll erschien; oder auch: womit Verfasser und Übersetzer ihren literarischen Anspruch legitimierten. Hierauf kann das 24. Kapitel des Buches antworten, das — wie gesagt — nur griechisch vorliegt.

Sir 24 steht an einer auffälligen Stelle des Buches.[8] Das Kapitel unterbricht ungefähr in der Mitte des belehrenden Teils den Fluss der ohne erkennbare logische Ordnung aneinander gereihten moralischen Gedichte. In 23, 16 fängt ein Abschnitt über die Sünden der Wollust an, der mit der Schilderung des Schicksals der ehebrecherischen Frau endet: sie wird vor die Volksversammlung gestellt. Der Abschnitt beginnt mit δύο: "Zwei Arten begehen viel Sünden und die dritte bewirkt Zorn". Ein weiteres Gedicht schliesst sich in 25, 1 an handelnd über freundschaftliches Zusammenleben Nahestehender und unvereinbare Eigenschaften in einer Person. Auch dies wird durch eine arithmetische Bemerkung eingeleitet, die mit ἐν τρισίν anfängt: "Mit drei Dingen schmückte und erhöhte ich mich, lieblichen vor Jahwe und Menschen". Zwischen beiden Gedichten steht Kapitel 24; es beginnt mit einem Hymnus der personifizierten Weisheit auf sich selbst, dem sich eine Darstellung ihrer Wirkung auf den Verfasser anschliesst. Sie bringt ihn dazu, dass er "Lehre wie Prophezeiung" ausgiesst (Sir 24, 33).[9] Damit ist der literarische Anspruch des Buches legitimiert: seine Lehre ist aus der Inspiration der übermenschlichen Weisheit entsprungen. Die vorgetragene Theorie erinnert an Platon.[10]

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[5] Zur Bedeutung von ἰσοδυναμέω vgl. Polybius II, 56,2.

[6] Kurze Einführung in die Entdeckung des hebräischen Textes bei Middendorp mit Literaturhinweisen.

[7] Siehe zuletzt P. Rüger, *Text und Textform im hebräischen Sirach*, Berlin 1970 (BZAW 112).

[8] Häufig wird Sir 24 als Einleitung eines 2. Teils des Sirachbuchs angesehen. Hierzu vgl. J. Haspecker, *Gottesfurcht bei Jesus Sirach*, Rom 1967 (Analecta Biblica 30), 167f. (168[100]!). 176. Die von Haspecker hervorgehobene Korrespondenz von Sir 24 zu 32, 14-33, 6 im Aufbau empfinde ich nicht so weitgehend. Zur Stellung von Sir 24 vgl. auch O. Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen bei Ben Sira*, Freiburg (Schweiz)/Göttingen 1973 (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 1), 117.

Die Stellung des Hymnus im Zusammenhang des Buches beruht nicht nur auf den arithmetischen Verhältnissen der Texteinteilung, die sich wegen des Zustands der Überlieferung nicht zuverlässig feststellen lassen, sondern auch darauf, dass im letzten Abschnitt des vorhergehenden Gedichts (23, 24-27) von der Ehebrecherin gesprochen wird, die von der Volksversammlung zur Verantwortung gezogen wird. Ihr wird in 24, 1f. "Frau Weisheit" gegenübergestellt, die sich in der "Volksversammlung des Höchsten" selber rühmt.[11] Dieselbe Antithese liegt auch schon in Prov 7 und 8 vor, wo das erste Kapitel von der Hure spricht und das zweite die Weisheit in der 1.Person redend einführt. Die Kombination der literarischen Topen entspringt also der älteren jüdischen Überlieferung. Die den Gang der Belehrungen des Jesus Sirach immer wieder unterbrechenden Reflexionen[12] über die Weisheit erreichen an dieser Stelle ihren Höhepunkt, auf dem diese, das einzige Mal im Sirachbuch, persönlich das Wort ergreift.

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[9] Dem "wie Prophezeiung" im Griechischen steht das syrische "durch Prophezeiung" gegenüber, graphisch im Hebräischen leicht zu verwechseln. Die Entscheidung ist nicht leicht, da "wie Prophezeiung" auch keinen reinen Vergleich ausdrücken kann, sondern eine Wesensbestimmung (= durch): inspiriert wie Prophezieung. Wenn Segal z.St. sich nicht gut vorstellen kann, dass Jesus Sirach seine Lehre mit der von Propheten gleichsetzt, und wenn Rickenbacher 170 — trotz Hinweis auf ägyptische Parallelen — meint, dass bei Jesus Sirach Prophezeiung "natürlich nicht Bestandteil der allgemeinen Weisheitslehre" ist, dann müssen beide das Gegenteil aus Sir 24, 33 — übrigens auch aus 39, 6 — eben lernen.

[10] Plato, Apol. Socr. 12B.

[11] Bewusste Gegenüberstellung der Ehebrecherin mit der Weisheit könnte auch 23, 25.26 und 24, 16-22 sein.

Die Weisheit erzählt in dieser Rede, die bis auf eine Ausnahme durchgehend in Distichen abgefasst ist,[13] den Mythus ihrer Herkunft und ihre Wirkung: sie sei aus dem Munde des Allerhöchsten hervorgegangen und habe wie eine Wolke die Erde umhüllt, in der Höhe habe sie in einer Wolkensäule gethront. Einsam habe sie den Himmelskreis und die Tiefe, Meer und Land durchzogen, sich bei jedem Land und Volk aufgehalten. Als Ruheplatz auf der Erde habe der Höchste ihr das Volk Israel zugewiesen.[14] Sie habe daraufhin in der Stiftshütte (ἐν σκηνῇ ἁγίᾳ) gedient und schliesslich eine feste Behausung auf dem Zion gefunden,[15] wo sie ihre Herrschaft (ἐξουσία) ausgeübt habe. Im "gepriesenen" Volk schlug sie Wurzeln und wie die dortigen herrlichen Pflanzen erhob sie sich in den Regionen Judas. So verströmt sie ihren Duft und breitet ihre Zweige aus. Nun ruft sie auf, von ihrer Frucht zu essen, um bleibende Sättigung zu erlangen. Danach spricht der Autor: "Dies alles (gilt vom) Buch des Bundes[16] des höchsten Gottes, das Gesetz, das Mose uns befohlen hat als Erbschaft für die Synagogen[17] Jakobs". Im folgenden Satz kann "Mose" oder "das Gesetz" das Subjekt sein:[18] "(25) der (das) wie der Pison Weisheit zur Fülle bringt und wie der Tigris in den Tagen der Erstlingsfrüchte; (26) der (das) wie der Euphrat voll von Einsicht ist und wie der Jordan in den Tagen der Ernte; (27) der wie der "Nil" Bildung ausgiesst und wie der Gihon in den Tagen der Weinlese. (28) Nicht hört der erste auf, sie kennen zu lernen, und so hat der letzte sie nicht vollends erforscht. (29) Gefüllter nämlich ist ihr Denken als die See und ihr Rat als die grosse Tiefe". Nach diesem Vergleich des Gesetzes mit den Paradiesesströmen berichtet der Verfasser in betonter 1. Person,[19] wie er zum Kanal geworden sei, durch den die Weisheit[20] fliesst, um den Garten zu bewässern. Dort wurde sie zu einem Meer. Dadurch strahlt der Weise seine Belehrung aus, und endet: "Seht, dass ich nicht für mich allein mich abgemüht habe, sondern für alle, die sie suchen".

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[12] Die Weisheitsperikopen sind bei Rickenbacher, *op. cit.* zusammengestellt. Über Kapitel 24 als Höhepunkt: *ibidem*, 132, wie auch L. Alonso-Schoekēl, *Proverbios y Ecclesiastico*, Madrid 1968, z.St.

[13] Die nicht unwichtigen Formprobleme sollen in unsern Zusammenhang nicht behandelt werden. Vgl. vor allem Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 113ff.

[14] Die Erwähnung des Ursprungs und der Ewigkeit der Weisheit in 24, 9 nach der Zuweisung des irdischen Wohnsitzes an die Weisheit scheint den Gedankengang zu stören. Doch vollzieht sich das in 24, 3-8 Geschilderte während des vorsinaitischen, also quasi-prae-existentiellen Kreislaufs der Weisheit. Vers 9 bildet dann den Abschluss dieser Periode und leitet die Herrschaft der Weisheit auf der Erde ein; er hebt hervor, dass die in Israel wohnende Weisheit die ewige Weisheit ist. Vgl. Anm. 45.

[15] Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 122, betont die "formal" vorhandene temporale Reihenfolge von Zelt und Tempel: "Vielleicht handelt es sich auch nur um Topoi, denen automatisch ein gewisser "geschichtlicher Erdgeruch" anhaftet". Tatsächlich beginnt mit 24, 10 jedoch nach dem kosmischen Irrweg der Weisheit ihre irdische Geschichte.

[16] Zum Begriff 'Bund' bei Sirach siehe Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 166f.,

Das Gedicht spricht nicht nur über die Beziehung der Weisheit zum Verfasser und zu seinem Werk. Abgesehen von einer detaillierten literarischen Theorie, findet man eine ausführliche Darstellung der Weisheit und ihres Mythus, mit der sich die Forschung immer wieder eingehend beschäftigt hat. So wollen wir im Anschluss an bisherige Untersuchungen einige Fragen behandeln, deren Lösung uns Einblick in die Denkweise und Entwicklung des hellenistischen Judentums geben kann. Zunächst die interpretatorische Frage: wie versteht der

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J. C. H. Lebram, "Apokalyptik und Hellenismus im Buche Daniel", *VT* 20 (1970), 512ff., P.A.H. de Boer, "בברית עמד זרעם", *FS W. Baumgartner*, Leiden 1967, 25-29.

[17] Angesichts der LXX-Übersetzung von Deut 33, 4 scheint es nicht sicher, ob im hebr. Text der Plural "Synagogen" gestanden hat (Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 167), doch steht hinter der griechischen Lesart sicher die Vorstellung der Gesetzesvorlesung in den Synagogen.

[18] Sir 24, 25-29. Die hebräischen Verben dürften in 25 מלא, in 26 צוף, in 27 נבע sein, "Tage der Erstlingsfrüchte" in 24, 25 beruht auf νέων als Übersetzung von אביב (Ex 13, 4). Φῶς in 24, 26 ist Wiedergabe des hebräischen אור "Licht", verlesen aus יאור "Nil". Sirach denkt an die vier Paradiesesflüsse von Gen 2, 11-14 und erweitert sie durch zwei weitere, um den sechs Bäumen in 24, 13.14 sechs Flüsse gegenüberzustellen? (So Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 128).

[19] Betontes "Ich" als Antithese zu 24, 3. So Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 121.

[20] Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 168f., vergleicht dazu den vom Tempel ausgehenden Strom in Ez 47, 1-9.

Verfasser die "Weisheit"? Dann eine geistesgeschichtliche: welche Stellung nimmt Sir 24 in der Entwicklung des jüdischen Denkens ein? Schliesslich eine religionsgeschichtliche: woher stammt die Figur der Weisheit als zentrale Gestalt eines Mythus im Judentum?

1

Die Frage nach der Bedeutung der "Weisheit" für den Verfasser scheint Sir 24, 23 recht einfach zu beantworten: sie ist das "Buch des Bundes", dessen Identität mit dem Gesetz Moses durch das Zitat aus Deut 33, 4 ausgedrückt wird.[21] Man hat — vor allem wegen seiner Form in drei Stichen — diesen Vers literarkritisch verändern wollen.[22] Doch führt dies zu keiner eindeutigen Entscheidung über die Meinung des Jesus Sirach, da solche Korrektur willkürlich sein muss. Man kann nur etwas vorsichtiger fragen: Was bedeutet 24, 23 in seiner gegenwärtigen Form im Rahmen des Gedichts Sir 24?

Bei genauerem Hinsehen erscheint es fraglich, ob Gesetz und Weisheit hier identifiziert werden, wie man meistens meint. Aus den Bildern in 24, 30-34 geht hervor, dass die Weisheit durch den Lehrer wie durch einen Kanal den Garten — wohl den Versammlungsort der Schüler — bewässert und die Pflanzen — die Schüler also — mit "Bildung" (παιδεία) und "Lehre wie Prophezeiung" (διδασκαλία ὡς προφητεία) erfüllt, so dass Israels Bildung an spätere Geschlechter weitergegeben wird. Nach dem Vorhergehenden geht dieser Strom der Weisheit aus dem Gesetz hervor, bzw. aus dem Gesetzgeber Mose, was nach der Formulierung von 24, 23 auf dasselbe hinausläuft. Die Weisheit wird nicht mit dem Gesetz identifiziert, sondern das Gesetz, und zwar ausdrücklich als Buch, ist der Vermittler weisheitlicher Erkenntnis. Wie wenig das Gesetz dabei als juristische Grösse empfunden wird, zeigt der Vergleich der Weisheitsbelehrung mit der Prophetie. Die durch das Gesetz vermittelte Weisheit bewirkt einen inspiratorischen Vorgang, der fast mechanisch vorgestellt ist.[23]

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[21] So z.B. M. Hengel, *Judentum*, 289. J. Marböck, "Gesetz und Weisheit", *BZ* 20 (1976), 8: "erstmalig ausdrückliche Identifizierung des Gesetzes mit der vorangestellten kosmischen Weisheit".

[22] Siehe Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 125ff. und Marböck, *Gesetz*, 7f.

[23] Vgl. Haspecker, *Gottesfurcht*, 330.332[28] kennzeichnet das Verhältnis von Gesetz

Auch die Formulierung in Sir 24, 23 weist nicht eindeutig auf die Identifikation von Gesetz und Weisheit hin. Historisch wäre dies allerdings nicht undenkbar, da in der zeitlichen und geistigen Umgebung des Jesus Sirach zwei Belege für diese Identifikation vorliegen. Doch zeigt gerade der Vergleich mit Sir 24, 23 den Abstand zu ihnen. In Esra 7, 25 empfängt Esra den Befehl des Grosskönigs: "Setze entsprechend der Weisheit Gottes, die in deiner Hand ist, Richter und Rechtsprecher ein!". Der Relativsatz "die in deiner Hand ist" zeigt in Verbindung mit der Anordnung einer Verwaltungsakts durch den Grosskönig, dass es sich wie in Sir 24, 23 um ein Rechtsbuch handeln muss, nämlich die Tora. Hier wird sie tatsächlich als Weisheit bezeichnet, und zwar wohl im Sinne juristischer Klugheit. Die andere Stelle, Baruch 4, 1, ähnelt Sir 24, 23 so sehr, dass man, wie öfter geschehen, literarische Verwandtschaft annehmen kann.[24] Der Vers ist Teil eines Klagelieds, das in Bar 3, 9-11 mit der Frage beginnt, warum Israel in Feindesland sein muss. Der Grund ist nach 3, 12-14, dass es die Quelle der Weisheit verlassen hat, die ihm Leben und Frieden gegeben hätte. Die ganze übrige Menschheit, führt 15-31 aus, hat den Weg zur Weisheit nicht gefunden. "Es gibt niemand, der ihren Weg kennt und ihren Pfad erreicht", aber der Gott Israels — so 31-38 — "hat jeden Weg der Weisheit erkundet und er hat sie Jakob, seinem Knecht (Sohn?), und Israel, seinem Geliebten, gegeben". "Dann erschien sie auf der Erde und wandelte unter den Menschen". Dieser Satz zeigt die thematische Verwandtschaft des Weisheitsgedichts in Baruch mit Sir 24, 3-22, vor allem Vers 7-12, sodass die Ähnlichkeit von Bar 4, 1 mit Sir 24, 23 noch mehr auffällt: "αὕτη ἡ βίβλος τῶν προσταγμάτων τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ὁ νόμος ὁ ὑπάρχων εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. — "Diese ist das Buch der Gebote Gottes und das Gesetz, das in Ewigkeit besteht". Nach der üblichen Datierung[25] muss man wohl Bar 4, 1 als — an entscheidender Stelle umgeformte — Nachahmung von Sir 24, 23 ansehen. Doch könnte auch Baruch

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und Prophetie in Sir 24 als "Inspirationsbewusstsein des Weisheitslehrers, in dem das Gesetz schöpferisch wird". Ist aber das "Gesetz" nicht hier vielmehr als *instrumentum* verstanden?

[24] Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 126, hält mit Peters βίβλος διαθήκης θεοῖ ὑψίστου für eine später zugefügte "erläuternde Glosse aus Baruch 4, 1".

[25] Siehe z.B. O. Eissfeldt, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*^{3}, Tübingen 1964, 802f.

auf eine ältere Formulierung zurückgehen.[26] Dann hätte Jesus Sirach "αὕτη ἡ βίβλος" umgeformt zu "ταῦτα πάντα βίβλος διαθήκης θεοῦ ὑψίστου". Dieses vielleicht bewusst gewählte ταῦτα πάντα, hebr. כל־אלה, kann aber nicht die Identifikation des Gesetzes mit der Weisheit meinen. Es muss sich vielmehr auf Sir 24, 20-22 beziehen: "Die Erinnerung an mich ist süsser als Honig und mein Erbe ist mehr als 'Honigseim'.[27] Die von mir essen, werden nie mehr hungern; die mich trinken, werden nie mehr dürsten. Wer mir gehorcht, wird nicht beschämt und, die mich benutzen,[28] werden nicht sündigen". So wird genau genommen keine Identifikation zwischen Gesetz und Weisheit vollzogen, sondern nur ein Vergleich: das Gesetz gibt dem Menschen soviel, wie die Weisheit, nämlich ewige Sättigung. So strömt es auch Weisheit, Bildung und Einsicht aus, erfüllt damit den Weisheitslehrer, der die Früchte der Weisheit seinen Schülern weitergibt.

Der "Sitz im Leben" dieser Betrachtung des Gesetzbuchs als Quelle einer prophetisch inspirierten Weisheit ist der Ablauf der Ausbildung des Weisheitslehrers, wie sich sowohl aus dem Prolog der Übersetzers zum griechischen Sirach als auch aus dem Gedicht Sir 38, 34-39, 11 ergibt.[29] Dort wird diese Laufbahn folgendermassen geschildert:[30] sie beginnt mit dem Studium des "Gesetzes des Höchsten", "der Weisheit der Vorfahren" und "den Prophezeiungen", also den drei Teilen des jüdischen Kanons;[31] darauf folgt das Zuhören bei "Darlegungen berühmter Männer", das "Auswechseln von Sprüchen, das Studium von Gleichnissen und Rätseln. Als weitere Stufen werden der Dienst im Kreise von Mächtigen und Fürsten genannt, weite Reisen und schliesslich das Gebet zum Höchsten. Offenbar geht es um die Ausbildung zum Tempelbeamten.[32] Ausgangspunkt ist das

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[26] Vgl. die sachliche Übereinstimmung mit der sicher älteren Stelle Esra 7, 25.

[27] μέλιτος κήριον = צוף דבש (Prov 16, 24) Ryssel z.St.

[28] Wörtl. "die durch mich arbeiten". Vgl. 13, 4 und Jer 22, 13; 25, 14; 30, 8.

[29] Zur Beziehung von 38, 34-39, 11 zu Sir 24 siehe Haspecker, *Gottesfurcht*, 181.

[30] Zum pädagogischen Charakter des Sirachbuches siehe Haspecker, *Gottesfurcht*, 106f.131.

[31] Dies ist die älteste Erwähnung der Kanoneinteilung, die der Anordnung der LXX folgt, wie dargelegt in J. C. H. Lebram, "Aspekte der alttestamentlichen Kanonbildung", *VT* 18 (1968), 180ff.

[32] Der Hinweis von J. G. Snaith, "Ben Sira's supposed love of liturgy", *VT* 25 (1975), 167-174, auf das Fehlen kultischer und ritueller Kategorien kann kein Einwand

Studium der Bibel, dem sich alle Fertigkeiten anschliessen, die der Weisheitslehrer in profaner Hinsicht benötigt. Am Ende steht der Umgang mit Gott.[33] Die Verbindung zwischen Gesetz und Weisheit ist also weniger organisch und logisch begründet, sondern eher aus der formalen Abfolge eines Lehrganges, dessen Stufen man nacheinander durchläuft,[34] bis man den Höhepunkt der Ausbildung erreicht. Dieser wird nicht als Anwendung des erlernten Wissens dargestellt, sondern, wie in Sir 24, als Inspiration: "Wenn Jahwe,[35] der Grosse, es will, wird er (scil. der Weise) mit dem Geiste der Erkenntnis erfüllt; er wird selbst Worte seiner Weisheit ausströmen und im Gebet Jahwe bekennen. Er wird seinen Ratschlag und sein Wissen erfolgreich einsetzen und über seine (scil. Gottes) Geheimnisse nachdenken. Er selbst wird die Weisheit seiner Belehrung zeigen und sich des Gesetzes des Bundes Jahwes rühmen". Wie der Strom der Weisheit in Sir 24 geht die Belehrung vom Gesetz aus und führt über eine Fülle "profaner" Gegenstände zu inspirierter Rede. Dem entspricht auch das literarische Werk von Jesus Sirach. Seine Weisheitssprüche, die moralischen und diätetischen Belehrungen geben sich als Ergebnis der Beschäftigung mit dem Gesetz, obwohl sie formal und oft auch sachlich mit dem überlieferten Gesetz nichts zu tun haben. Man hat kürzlich die Meinung geäussert, dass Sir 24 weniger an das Sinaigesetz als an das Natur- oder Weltgesetz denkt.[36] Dies geht aus dem Text nicht hervor, da sowohl das Wolkendunkel als die Wolkensäule sich auf das Sinaigeschehen beziehen. Zudem nennt 24, 23 Mose als Gesetzgeber.[37] Aber als Gesetz bringt Sirach — soweit

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sein gegen die z.B. in Kap 50 erkennbare Beziehung des Verfassers zur Tempelorganisation, da in der hellenistischen Zeit eine weitgehende Spiritualisierung und Ethisierung kultischer und ritueller Techniken feststellbar ist (Vgl. Chairemon; A. Barucq, "Une veine de spiritualité sacerdotale et sapientielle dans l'Égypte ancienne", *Mém. A. Gélin*, Le Puys 1961, 193-202.

[33] Haspecker, *Gottesfurcht*, 180.192 betont den religiösen Grundcharakter der Weisheitslehre des Jesus Sirach.

[34] Vgl. die im Hellenismus feststellbare bewusste Systematisierung der Lehrgegenstände und des Unterrichts. Siehe vor allem M. Fuhrmann, *Das systematische Lehrbuch*, Göttingen 1960.

[35] Das artikellose κύριος muss Wiedergabe des Gottesnamens sein.

[36] J. Marböck, *Gesetz*, 9ff.

[37] Gegen die Kritik von Marböck, *Gesetz*, 8, an Hengel, *Judentum*, 253f. Von der Mitwirkung der Weisheit an der Schöpfung ist in Sir 24 nicht ausdrücklich die Rede. Vgl. auch Middendorp, *Stellung*, 59.

wir sehen, zum ersten Mal — eine rational ethische Weisheitsbelehrung, die später im Aristeasbrief[38] und im vierten Makkabäerbuch[39] zwar noch nicht als allegorische, aber doch ethisierende Auslegung einzelner Gesetzesbestimmungen fortgesetzt wird. Im Unterschied zu diesen späteren Auslegungen einzelner Stellen sieht Jesus Sirach seine ethische Belehrung als Resultat der Wirkung des Gesetzes als Ganzen an, ohne an Einzelstellen anzuknüpfen. Als Vorbild solchen Gesetzesverständnisses könnten ethische Interpretationen der ägyptischen Riten gedient haben, wie sie von dem stoisierenden ägyptischen Priester Chairemon überliefert sind.[40]

Dass das rational ethische Verständnis des Gesetzes sich im Judentum ausbreitete, vor allem wohl in Ägypten, zeigen nicht erst die umfangreichen Kommentare des Alexandriners Philo,[41] sondern schon 200 Jahre früher die Vorrede des Sirachenkels, der die erbaulichen Verhaltensmassregeln seines Grossvaters als Ergebnis des Gesetzesstudiums empfiehlt, das zu παιδεία und σοφία führt: "Da Vieles und Grosses uns durch das Gesetz, die Propheten und die übrigen Schriften, die ihnen gefolgt sind, überliefert ist, wofür man Israels Bildung und Weisheit preisen muss ... hat mein Grossvater Jesus sich noch mehr der Lektüre des Gesetzes, der Propheten und der übrigen Schriften hingegeben und, nachdem er in diesen Dingen genug Fertigkeit erworben hatte, sich veranlasst gesehen, auch selbst etwas zu verfassen, das sich auf Bildung und Weisheit bezieht".

Der Übersetzer hat also im Buch des Grossvaters das gesehen, was es, wie Sir 24 bezeugt, für diesen selbst bedeutet hat: eine selbständig verfasste inspirierte Belehrung, die "Bildung" und "Weisheit" vermittelt, deren Ausgangspunkt das Gesetz ist.

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Für die Frage nach dem Platz von Sir 24 in der jüdischen Geistesgeschichte ist man zunächst an die literarkritische Analyse des

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[38] Aristeas 144-149. Dort allerdings auch schon allegorische Auslegung 150ff.

[39] 4 Makk 5, 25f.

[40] Siehe Porphyrius, *De abstinentia* IV, 6. Allerdings dürfte Chairemon um 200 Jahre jünger als Sirach sein. Man könnte aber an Vorgänger in der Art und aus dem Kreis des Berossus denken.

[41] Siehe I. Heinemann, *Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung*. Darmstadt 1962.

Kapitels gewiesen.[42] Denn dem Leser kann kaum verborgen bleiben, dass darin die Weisheit auf verschiedene Art charakterisiert wird. In 24, 3-22 erinnert der Ich-Stil und der Aufruf zum Gehorsam gegen die Weisheit, wie auch die Antithese zur Ehebrecherin an den älteren Weisheitshymnus in Prov 8. Auch wird in Sir 24 die Rede der Weisheit wie in Prov 8 durch eine Bemerkung über die Umstände eingeleitet, unter denen sie spricht. Der Auftritt der Weisheit als Person und die Form ihrer Präsentation ist der früheren jüdischen Weisheit entnommen.[43]

Doch ist die Weisheit in Prov 8 eine statische Figur, von der nicht viel mehr als ihr Alter und ihre Anwesenheit bei der Weltentstehung gemeldet wird, dagegen in Sir 24 die zentrale Gestalt eines mythischen Ablaufs, in dem sie in verschiedenen geschichtlichen Situationen auftritt. Sie ist am Anfang aus dem Munde Gottes hervorgegangen und hat als Nebel oder Dunkel (ὁμίχλη) die Erde eingehüllt; das griechische Wort für Nebel ist an anderer Stelle[44] Übersetzung von ערפל, das auch das Dunkel bezeichnet, in dem Jahwe sich nach Ex 20, 21 auf dem Sinai niederlässt. Ihr Thron ist in der Wolkensäule, offensichtlich in jener, die Israel durch die Wüste geleitete. Doch vor der Sinaioffenbarung[45] durchzog die Weisheit

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[42] Die literarkritische Frage hat unter traditionsgeschichtlichen Aspekt gestellt W. Fuss, *Tradition und Komposition im Buche Sirach*, Ev.-theol. Diss. (masch.) Tübingen 1963. Er sieht Sir 24, 1-6.9.10a als vorsirazidisch an (Wiedergabe Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 117). H. Conzelmann, "Die Mutter der Weisheit", *Festschrift R. Bultmann* 1964, 225-234, sieht Sir 24, 3-6(7) als einen übernommenen Isishymnus an.

[43] Man kann nicht mit Middendorp, *Stellung*, 20f., die Verbindung zur Prodikosfabel über Herakles am Scheidewege in Xenophon, *Memorab.* II, 1.21f., als direkte Abhängigkeit verstehen. Doch ist diese Parallele wichtig, wohl als Hinweis auf einen gemeinsamen, vor allem formgeschichtlichen Hintergrund von griechischer und orientalischer Weisheitslehre.

[44] Siehe Joel 2, 2 Zeph 1, 15 LXX.

[45] Die Beziehung zur Heilsgeschichte Israels, die schon "am Schöpfungsmorgen" — genauer, da von der Schöpfung in diesen Versen nicht ausdrücklich gesprochen wird: — noch vor der Sinaioffenbarung hergestellt wird, ist Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 121, aufgefallen. Er spricht von einer merkwürdigen Verlegung "gegen den Anfang der Welt". Doch ist hier eher an die Präexistenz heilsgeschichtlich wichtiger Gegenstände, wie "Dunkel" und "Wolkensäule" zu denken. Auch der Befehl an die Weisheit, in Israel Wohnung zu nehmen, gehört in diese "präexistentielle" Phase der Weisheit. Schon Smend z.St. meint, dass hier die Wolkensäule des Exodus als "Gut der Zukunft" in den Himmel versetzt ist. Rickenbacher, Weisheitsperikopen, 134,

Höhe und Tiefe, Meer und Land, und hielt sich in jedem Volk und Land auf,[46] um einen Ruheplatz zu finden. Diesen erhielt sie im Volk Israel, wo sie sich "im heiligen Zelt" ἐν σκηνῇ ἁγίᾳ d.h. in der Stiftshütte niederliess.[47] Von dort siedelte sie schliesslich auf den Zion nieder, wo sie Priesterdienst und Herrschaft ausübt. Inhalt des Mythus ist, wie die Weisheit von ihrem himmlischen Ursprungsort aus eine Wohnstätte sucht und sie schliesslich im Jerusalemer Tempel findet, wo sie zur Herrscherin und Priesterin eingesetzt wird.[48]

In der Zeit des Verfassers gilt die Weisheit, die in Prov 8, 1-3; 9, 3-5 auf der Gasse nach Menschen sucht, also als Herrscherin und Priesterin, die im Mittelpunkt des Jerusalemer Kultus steht. Sie hat ein offizielles Amt im Volk Israel, und der Mythus erzählt, wie es dazu kam. Damit wird der Weisheit eine besondere Rolle in der Geschichte Israels zugewiesen, und der Leser des Mythus soll ihre Spuren in der heiligen Geschichte wiedererkennen: als Dunkel, das Jahwe auf dem Sinai umgab; als Wolkensäule, die das Volk begleitete; als Wolke, die sich auf der Stiftshütte niederliess; als Herrlichkeit Gottes, die im Tempel wohnt — in all diesen Gestalten war die Weisheit anwesend in Israels Geschichte. Sie ist nicht nur, wie in Prov 8 eine überirdische Gestalt, sondern das verbindende

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erkennt das für die griechische Übersetzung an, weist aber die Annahme für den hebräischen Text unter Hinweis auf den syrischen ab. Doch scheint mir der Syrer dogmatisch zu korrigieren. Auf die Vorstellung einer Präexistenz der "Heilsgüter" weist auch 24, 8, wo nicht nur die Weisheit, sondern auch ihr Zelt, Ruhe findet. Übrigens ist von der Weisheit als Schöpfungsmittler die früheste Erwähnung Sap. Sal. 8, 4. vgl. J. M. Reese, *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences*, Rom 1970, 41 Anm. 46.

[46] Die übliche Bevorzugung der Lesart ἡγησάμην in 24, 6 (so Korrektor in A, der Syrer und die lateinische Übersetzung), gegenüber ἐκτησάμην, ist unbegründet, da sie eine Erleichterung des Textes ist. ἐκτησάμην — das keinen Sinn gibt — entspringt einem Versehen in der hebr. Überlieferung: קניתי (= ἐκτησάμην; hebr. Qal von קנה, "kaufen, erwerben) ist verschrieben aus קננתי "ich habe genistet, ein Nest gemacht" (hebr. Piel von קנן; Jes 34, 15 Jer 48, 28 Ez 31, 6 Ps 104, 17 Sir 37, 30).

[47] Hier dürfte an Ex 40, 34-38 gedacht sein, wonach sich die Herrlichkeit Gottes in einer Wolke in der Stiftshütte niedergelassen hat.

[48] Der Akt der Niederlassung ist recht diffizil ausgedrückt: die Weisheit will in "jemandes Erbbesitz übernachten", sie erlangt "Erbbesitz in Israel", sie "festigt sich" auf dem Zion. Sie schlägt Wurzel im "Anteil Jahwes, seines Erbbesitzes". Sichtlich ist Jahwe der Besitzer des Landes (Deut 32, 8), doch hat die Weisheit ein Erblehen.

Glied zwischen Himmel und Erde, das in Israels Geschichte gewirkt hat und in seinem Tempel noch wirkt.

Auffallend sind die Kategorien, in denen ihre gegenwärtige Wirksamkeit beschrieben wird:[49] "Ich schlug Wurzel im gepriesenen Volk; wie eine Zeder wuchs ich empor auf dem Libanon, und wie eine Zypresse auf dem Gebirge Hermon; wie eine Dattelpalme wuchs ich empor in Engedi und wie eine Rosenpflanzung in Jericho und wie der köstliche Weinstock in der Ebene". Die Ausbreitung der Weisheit wird mit der Fruchtbarkeit des heimischen Bodens verglichen. Schliesslich beginnt sie gar zu duften, wie die kostbaren Salben des Orients: "Wie Zimt und aromatischer Dornstrauch gab ich Duft von mir und wie die auserwählte Myrrhe strömte ich Wohlgeruch aus, wie Galbanum, Onyx und Stakte und wie die Weihrauchwolke in der Stiftshütte". Diese Bilder greifen auf die Beziehung zum Kultus zurück.[50] Doch auch der Vergleich mit dem Blühen der Natur und den Kostbarkeiten des Landes verbindet sich so stark mit der Weisheit, dass sie selbst zur Trägerin der Fruchtbarkeit wird: "Ich breitete wie eine Terebinthe meine Zweige aus, und meine Zweige sind Zweige der Herrlichkeit und der Lieblichkeit. Ich, wie ein Weinstock, liess Lieblichkeit sprossen, und meine Blüten sind Früchte der Herrlichkeit und des Reichtums". Am Ende bleibt auch das Angebot der Weisheit auf der Grenze zwischen geistiger und materieller Gabe: "Kommt zu mir, die ihr mich begehrt, und sättigt euch von meinen Früchten; denn mein Gedächtnis ist süsser als Honig und meine Nachlassenschaft mehr als Honigseim. Die mich essen, werden nicht mehr hungern. Die mich trinken werden nicht mehr durstig sein". Die Symbolik schildert die Wirksamkeit der Weisheit als die einer Fruchtbarkeitsgöttin, unter deren Regiment sich paradiesische Üppigkeit ausbreitet.

Zu dieser materialistischen Schilderung der Wirkung der Weisheit gesellt sich die in 24, 13-14 hervortretende geographische Komponente. Die Wirkung der Weisheit wird räumlich bestimmt. Sie wirkt auf einem Gebiet, das im Norden durch Libanon und Hermon begrenzt ist, im Süden durch Engedi, im Osten durch Jericho und im Westen durch die Ebene.[51] Damit dürfte das ideale Wohngebiet Israels umschrieben sein, in dem die Weisheit eingewurzelt ist und sich wie ein schützender Baum ausbreitet. Ihre enge Beziehung zur Hauptstadt und ihre Verbindung mit dem landwirtschaftlichen Gedeihen des Landes, legen die Vermutung nahe, dass die Weisheit hier die Funktion einer nationalen Schutzgöttin über Stadt und Land übernommen hat.

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[49] Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 123, hebt hervor, dass sich von diesen Pflanzen- und Ortsnamen in Prov 8 und auch sonst in Prov nichts findet.

[50] In 24, 15 c.d ist auf das heilige Räucherpulver in Ex 30, 34 angespielt (Smend z.St.).

Wie sich die flüchtige Tyche in Antiochia und anderen Städten niedergelassen hat, um als Stadtgöttin das Füllhorn auszuschütten,[52] so hat die Weisheit nach langer Irrfahrt in Jerusalem Fuss gefasst, um Fruchtbarkeit und Wohlstand zu verbreiten. Die zahlreichen Stadtgründungen der hellenistischen Zeit,[53] bei denen oft eine neue, oder alte autochthone, Gottheit in neuem Gewande zur Patronin der Stadt wurde, könnte hier anregend gewirkt haben. Auch die Tatsache, dass eine solche Gottheit, wie Tyche, eine Abstraktion sein konnte, könnte bei der Wahl der Weisheit als Beschirmerin von Stadt und Land eine Rolle gespielt haben. Man kann fragen, warum nicht Jahwe selbst, der seit Salomo hier seinen Tempel hatte, zum Stadtgott geworden ist. Aber er war, wohl auch durch die Ausbreitung der jüdischen Diaspora, zum Universalgott geworden, und die Weisheit hat die typische Funktion einer Nebengottheit. Eine solche weibliche Nebengottheit gab es bei den Juden in Elephantine, und zum mindesten zeitweilig auch in Jerusalem.[54] Dass die Wahl auf die Weisheit fiel, muss man als Zeichen für den Einfluss des Stands der Weisheitslehrer im hellenistischen Jerusalem werten.

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[51] Auf Grund der syrischen Übersetzung sieht Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 123, πεδίον als Übersetzung שפלה an, der topographischen Bezeichnung des westlichen Vorlandes von Juda. Ebendort erwartet er in 24, 14d statt des Verbums ἀνυψώθην eine Ortsangabe am Ende des Verses. Der Syrer liest "am Wasser". Vielleicht stand im hebr. Text etwas Deutlicheres. ("Im Garten Gottes"? Vgl. Ez 31, 8).

[52] Hierüber T. Dohrn, *Die Tyche von Antiochia*. Berlin 1960. Ich danke B. Hartmann, Leiden, für den Hinweis.

[53] Siehe V. Tcherikover, *Die hellenistischen Städtegründungen von Alexander dem Grossen bis auf die Römerzeit*. Phil. Suppl. 19, 1 (1927), 1-216. Der Verfasser hat seine Forschungen auf diesem Gebiet in die jüdische Geschichte eingearbeitet in seinem Buch "Hellenistic Civilization" (S. Anm. 1).

[54] Zu Elephantine siehe B. Porten, *Archives from Elephantine*, Berkeley 1968; zu Jerusalem z.B. Jer 44, 15-19.

Die ihrem ursprünglichen Wesen fremde Funktion der Beschützerin und Retterin Israels, die dem Charakter einer Stadtgöttin entspricht, hat die Weisheit auch weiterhin behalten. Nach Sap.Sal.10 hat sie schon Adam bei seinem Fall "beschützt" und "errettet", ebenso half sie Noah, Abraham, Lot, Jakob und Joseph. Die siebte Rettung, die des Mose, wird dann ausgedehnt auf das ganze Volk, und so ist die Weisheit die Beschützerin Israels beim Auszug aus Ägypten (Sap.Sal. 10, 15). In diesem Zusammenhang werden die für eine nationale Schutzgottheit charakteristischen Verben διαφυλάττειν, ῥύεσθαι, σώζειν immer wieder benutzt.

Schliesslich sei noch ein möglicher Hinweis auf das Vorhandensein einer Schutzgöttin für Jerusalem und Juda erwähnt: der Gebrauch des Wortes צבי im Danielbuch. Judäa wird in Dan 11, 16.41 ארץ הצבי, Land der Zierde, genannt. In Dan 8, 9 ist die צבי eine Gestalt, oder ein Gegenstand, dem der Angriff des "kleinen Horns", Antiochus' IV., gilt. Sie ist vielleicht identisch mit der אמת in Dan 8, 12,[55] der "Wahrheit", deren Vernichtung das Horn erstrebt. Dass die צבי im Tempel wohnt, ergibt sich aus Dan 11, 45, wo der Zion הר־צבי־קדש "Berg der Zierde des Heiligtums" genannt wird. So ist mit ihr die nach Ex 40, 34 im Tempel wohnende "Herrlichkeit Jahwes" zu vergleichen. Andererseits zeigt auch die Weisheit von Sir 24 eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit mit der in der Wolke wohnenden "Herrlichkeit".[56]

Doch auch die Situation, in der die Weisheit in Sir 24, 1.2 auftritt, passt zu ihrer politischen Funktion: "Die Weisheit lobt sich selbst und in der Mitte ihres Volkes rühmt sie sich; in der Volksversammlung (ἐκκλησία) des Höchsten tut sie ihren Mund auf und vor seinem Heere rühmt sie sich". Sie redet in einer himmlischen Ratsversammlung, wo über das Schicksal der Völker verhandelt wird. Zugleich steht sie inmitten eines irdischen Volkes, für das sie in einem irdischen Tempel Sühnedienst vollzieht. All das sind politische Funktionen, die geschichtlich wirksam werden. So ist sie eine echte Mittlergestalt, die Irdisches und Himmlisches verbindend den Ihren Schutz und Errettung schafft.[57]

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[55] Der Ausdruck אמת könnte die ägyptische Gottheit Maat bezeichnen, die die kosmische und soziale Ordnung sichert. Vgl. J. C. H. Lebram, "König Antiochus im Buch Daniel", *VT* 25 (1975), 768f.

[56] Vgl. Anm. 47.

Wenn man vom ersten Teil des Kapitels zum oben behandelten Vergleich der Weisheit mit dem Gesetz in 24, 23ff. übergeht, dann erkennt man, dass hier nur lose und nicht sehr geschickt ein weiteres Gedicht an das vorhergehende angeknüpft ist.[58] "Ταῦτα πάντα", das formal das Gesetz mit den Segnungen der Weisheit parallelisiert, gibt sich der genaueren Betrachtung als ein ziemlich willkürlich formulierter Übergang zu erkennen. Denn in Wirklichkeit wird der Vergleich zwischen beiden Grössen nicht durchgeführt, sondern schon in 25-29 ist das Gesetz eine Quelle, aus der die Weisheit hervorgeht, wie die Weltströme aus dem Paradies. Dies widerspricht dem Anfang des Weisheitsgedichts. Was zunächst ein Vergleich war, wird eine kausale Abfolge, in der das Gesetz nun die Ursache wird: die Weisheit geht aus ihm hervor. Damit verändert sie ihr ganzes Wesen: aus der Gestalt, die in der Urwolke zum Sinai und weiter zum Zion zog, um zu verhüllen und zu beschützen und schliesslich als lebendiger Baum Nahrung zu spenden, wird sie zum Strom, der als Abgeleitetes aus dem Urersten, dem Gesetz hervorquillt. So wird die Ursache zur Folge. Eine weitere Wandlung: die Person, die wandert, herrscht, beschützt und belebt, wird zum Stoff, zum Material, eine neutrale Kraft, die einen Kanal durchfliesst und stofflich automatisch Wirkungen erzeugt. Die Göttin wird zum Medium.

Der Vergleich der Weisheitslehre mit der Prophetie in Sir 24, 33 und die Parallele in 39, 6, wo die Wirksamkeit des Weisen als Erfüllung mit dem πνεῦμα συνέσεως dargestellt ist, zeigen, dass das Verständnis der Weisheit als neutraler Kraft die eigene Auffassung des Jesus Sirach ist. Man sieht auch, in welchem geistigen Zusammenhang dieses Weisheitsverständnis im Judentum Eingang gefunden hat. Die Weisheitslehrer, die die Weisheit als neutrale Kraft auffassen, wollen Propheten sein, auch wenn sie schlicht und hausbacken belehren. Sicher stammt die Verbindung von Weisheit und Prophetie aus den Kreisen, denen wir die Sammlung der israelitischen Traditionsliteratur zu einem gegliederten Kanon verdanken.[59] In Sir 44, 1 - 49, 13 tritt ihr Einfluss deutlich zu Tage, und auch dort ist das prophetische Element unverkennbar. Allerdings ist die Verbindung von Weisheit und Prophetie schon früher greifbar: in Prov 1, 20-30; 8, 1 ff. — dessen Nachwirkung man in Sir 24 spürte — ähnelt die Gestalt der Weisheit der eines rufenden Propheten. Sirach greift auf ältere Traditionen zurück.

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[57] Man wird also 24, 1 auf das irdische Volk Israel beziehen können, über das die Weisheit herrscht, 24, 2 dagegen auf die himmlische Ratsversammlungen. Diskussion der verschiedenen Lösungen, doch mit anderem Ergebnis siehe Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 118ff.

[58] W. Baumgartner, "Die literarischen Gattungen in der Weisheit des Jesus Sirach", *ZAW* 34 (1914), 172f. hat den Gegensatz in Form und Inhalt, der 24, 23ff. vom Vorhergehenden unterscheidet, deutlich gesehen. Segal z.St. setzt die Zäsur ebenfalls hinter 24, 22 (Wechsel des Subjekts). Man hat die Schwierigkeiten, die Vers 23 bietet, durch Konjekturen zu ändern gesucht. Doch eine befriedigende Lösung hat sich nicht gefunden. Es bleibt dabei, dass der Vers nicht gut erhalten ist. Diskussion der Lösungsversuche mit eigenem Vorschlag bei Rickenbacher, *Weisheitsperikopen*, 126.

Das kann aber nicht verdecken, dass sowohl Geist als Prophetie hier auf eine neue — man kann sagen: griechische — Manier verstanden sind. Prophetie ist als ein technischer, naturwissenschaftlich beschreibbarer Akt aufgefasst. Als solcher ist sie nicht mehr die Vermittlung einer frei aufgenommenen Botschaft, die aus der Begegnung eines Menschen mit der übermächtigen göttlichen Persönlichkeit entstanden ist, sondern die Wirkung eines stoffartig dahinströmenden Geistes in einem Medium, das durch diesen Vorgang den Lauschenden Bildung und Weisheit vermittelt. Die Erinnerung an die stoische Auffassung des Geistes als Stoff liegt nahe.[60]

So sind in Sir 24 zwei Gedichte verbunden, deren Vorstellung dessen, was Weisheit ist, bei beiden charakteristische Unterschiede aufweist. Die der Urzeit entstammende Person der Weisheit ist in Sir 24, 1-22 zur Stadt- und Landesgöttin geworden, die die Wohlfahrt von Staat und Volk sichert. Dies Bild der Weisheit war während des dritten Jhdt. v.Chr. im hellenistischen Jerusalem entstanden und gehörte zu dem geistigen Erbe, das Sirach übernommen hatte. Denn er war mit dem Tempel eng verbunden, und der Mythus der Göttin

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[59] Zum Kanonverständnis des Jesus Sirach siehe zuletzt J. C. H. Lebram, "Aspekte der alttestamentlichen Kanonbildung", *VT* 18 (1968), 173-189.

[60] Siehe *VSF* III 310_{24} (Nr. 1051) — Clemens Alexandrinus — und Plotin Enn. IV, 7.4.

"Weisheit" stammte gewiss aus den Kreisen des Jerusalemer Kultpersonals.[61]

Sirach interpretierte diese Überlieferung jedoch — sicher ohne einen Gegensatz zu fühlen — mit einem andern (übernommenen?) Liede, dessen Auffassung von der Weisheit aus dem Geiste der stoischen Logoslehre gespeist war. Dies andere Bild der Weisheit empfand Sirach weder als neu, noch als unjüdisch; hier — in 24, 23-34 — war die Weisheit der Gottesgeist, der in den Propheten gewirkt hatte. So dokumentiert Sir 24 den Übergang von einem älteren zu einem neueren Weisheitsverständnis, das später seinen Ausdruck in Sap. Sal. 7, 22-27 gefunden hat, wo von der Weisheit gesagt wird: "Denn in ihr ist ein verständiger Geist, heilig, einzigartig, vielfältig, fein, beweglich, durchdringend, unbefleckt, deutlich, unversehrt, Gutes liebend, scharf, unbehindert, wohltätig, menschenfreundlich, fest, sicher, mühelos, alles vermögend, alles leitend und durch alle Geister hindurchgehend, die vernunftvollen, die reinen, die allerfeinsten. Denn die Weisheit ist beweglicher als jede Bewegung; sie gelangt und geht durch alles wegen ihrer Reinheit; denn sie ist ein Hauch der Macht Gottes und ein unvermischter Ausfluss der Herrlichkeit des Allherrschers; darum dringt in sie nichts Unreines ein. Ein Abglanz ist sie nämlich des ewigen Lichts und ein unbefleckter Spiegel der Kraft Gottes und ein Abbild seiner Güte. Obwohl sie eine ist, kann sie alles, und in sich selbst ruhend erneuert sie das All und dadurch, dass sie von Generation zu Generation in heilige Seelen eintritt, bereitet sie Freunde Gottes und Propheten".

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Das Auftreten der personifizierten Weisheit und ihres Mythus im Judentum hat man immer wieder auf den Einfluss ausserjüdischer Religionen zurückgeführt.[62] Die Annahme ist, wenn auch nicht unter allen Aspekten notwendig, so doch naheliegend. Auch innerisraelitische

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[61] In gewissem Sinne nähere ich mich der Auffassung von E. G. Bauckmann, "Die Proverbien und die Sprüche des Jesus Sirach", *ZAW* 72 (1960), 48f., nach der 1-22 übernommen sind und ab 23 ein Zusatz beginnt.

[62] Hierüber siehe die ausführliche und instruktive Erörterung der Forschung bei Hengel, *Judentum*[1], 275-318.

Motive haben zur Entwicklung der Weisheitstheologie beigetragen. In letzter Zeit hat man an ein Bedürfnis der nachexilischen Gemeinde gedacht, an eine Kraft zu glauben, die das unbegreifliche Weltgeschehen doch in einer gewissen Ordnung hält.[63] Solche Allgemeinheiten sind schlecht zu widerlegen, aber nie zu beweisen. Immerhin weisen diese Vermutungen darauf hin, dass man in der religiösen Umwelt des Judentums bisher kein frühes Beispiel einer Hypostase der Weisheit angetroffen hat, noch weniger hat ihr Mythus eine Parallele.

Nun braucht uns die Entstehung der Hypostase als solcher hier nicht zu beschäftigen, da Sir 24 die Personifikation der Weisheit in Prov 8 voraussetzt. Doch bleibt die Frage, wie die Weisheit die Form und den Mythus erhalten hat, der in Sir 24 vorliegt. Die Annahme, dass hier ein alter bis dahin unterdrückter Mythus auftaucht,[64] ist nicht beweisbar, und sie rechnet nicht damit, dass gerade im Zeitalter des Hellenismus die Mythologisierung geschichtlicher Verhältnisse beliebt war.[65] Mit Recht betont H. Conzelmann, dass zwischen mythischem Stoff und reflektierender Mythologie unterschieden werden muss.[66] Der "Weisheitsmythus" in Sir 24 ist gut als "reflektierende Mythologie" zu erklären.[67] Er soll die Besonderheit Israels ausdrücken, die es als Volk der Weisheit aus allen Völkern heraushebt. Damit ist ihm einerseits die damals bewunderte "uralte Weisheit des Orients"[68] zugeschrieben, und anderseits ein wohl der persischen Zeit entstammendes mythisches Motiv weiterentwickelt, das man in Deut 32, 8.9

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[63] So B. L. Mack, *Logos und Sophia*, Göttingen 1973, (StUNT 10), 42ff.

[64] U. Wilckens, *Weisheit und Torheit*, Tübingen 1959 (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 36), 165ff.

[65] Vgl. J. J. Collins "Jewish Apocalyptic against its Hellenistic Near Environment", *BASOR* 220 (1975), 30f.

[66] H. Conzelmann, "Die Mutter der Weisheit", *FS Rudolf Bultmann*, 1964, 225-234. Siehe S. 227.

[67] Die Funktion der Weisheitsspekulation als Ausdruck theologischer Überlegungen ist in letzter Zeit öfter hervorgehoben worden. So ist für J. Marböck, *Weisheit im Wandel*, Bonn 1971 (BBB 37), 130, die theologische Weisheit bei Sirach ein neuer Ausdruck des Selbstverständnisses Israels. Die Wohnungsnahme der Weisheit in Sir 24, 11 ist ein "sehr zeitgemässes und notwendiges Wiederaufnehmen des Erwählungsgedankens". Vgl. auch B. L. Mack, "Wisdom, Myth and Mytho-logy", *Interp.* 24 (1970), 46-60.

[68] M. Hengel, *Juden, Griechen und Barbaren*, Stuttgart 1976 (SBS 76); A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom*, Cambridge 1975.

findet;[69] danach hat Gott bei der Verteilung der Völker unter die Engel dem Volke Israel dadurch eine besondere Stellung zugestanden, dass er es als sein Teil und Erbe selbst geführt hat. War damals Israel unter den Völkern das Volk Jahwes, so nun das Volk der Weisheit und der Weisen.

Welcher mythische Stoff könnte die Grundlage oder Anregung für die Mythologisierung der Weisheit in Sir 24 gewesen sein? Wieder ist ein Satz Conzelmanns wichtig: "In diesem Synkretismus ist jede präzise Ableitung verfehlt".[70] Die Weisheit ist "ein hervorragendes Beispiel eines reichlich zu belegenden Göttertypus, der nicht anders als synkretistisch existent ist". Man müsse deswegen nicht nach der Göttin "Weisheit" und ihrem Mythus suchen, sondern nach einer "echten" Göttin mit ihrem Mythus und dessen späteren Bearbeitungen, die den Aspekten der jüdischen Weisheit parallel sind. Conzelmann sieht die "vielnamige" Isis als die nächstliegende Parallele an und vermutet in Sir 24, 3-6(7) einen übernommenen Isishymnus, der im Blick auf die Jerusalemer Verhältnisse erweitert worden ist.[71] Damit dokumentiert Sir 24 die Beteiligung des Judentums an der Theologie des Isis-Typs.

Zur Entstehung der Weisheit[72] aus dem Munde des Höchsten vergleicht Conzelmann den ägyptischen Mythus: Der Allherr begattet sich selbst und spuckt Schu (Luft) und Tefnut (Feuchte) aus. Allerdings ist diese Entstehungsart gerade nicht von Isis überliefert. Besonders schwierig gestaltet sich der Versuch, die kosmische Wanderung der Weisheit als Mythus der Isis zu erweisen. Nach Plutarch ist der Urgott der Bleibende, d.h. das Sein, Isis aber die Bewegung.[73] Daraus leitet Conzelmann den Kreislauf der Weisheit ab. Doch ist der philosophische Vergleich zu allgemein und könnte als solcher auch für die Interpretation anderer Gottheiten benutzt werden. Die mit dem Kreislauf verbundene ἀνάπαυσις sieht Conzelmann als häufiges Isis- und Weisheitsmotiv an, allerdings nicht in den Aretalogien, sondern im Isismythus, wofür er die Erzählungen von Psyche und Jo anführt. Doch führen synkretistische Identifikationen,[74] die uns aus der Literatur bezeugt sind, keineswegs immer notwendig zur Übertragung von Mythen einer Gestalt auf die andere. Da die Aretalogien der Isis das Motiv auch nicht verwerten, bleiben die Belege schwach. Nach Apuleius, Met. XI 15.1 gelangt der Myste "ad portum quietis", was doch kaum Beweiskraft für die These von Conzelmann hat. Die angeführte Stelle Ps. Clemens Recogn. II, 22 zeigt eher, dass dies Motiv dem Typus des Offenbarungsmittlers eigen ist als der Isis: "nam ipse verus propheta ab initio mundi per saeculum currens festinat ad requiem". Überhaupt geht Conzelmann die Deutung des Kreislaufmotivs nicht von dem Zusammenhang von Suchen- Wandern-Finden- Ruhen an, wie es Sir 24 doch nahelegt, sondern stellt zunächst fest, dass der Kreislauf der Weisheit durch den Kosmos Ausdruck ihrer Allherrschaft ist, was sich doch nicht aus Sir 24 erschliessen lässt. Das ermöglicht ihm, alle hymnischen Selbstprädikationen der Isis als Herrscherin des Kosmos als Parallelen zu Sir 24 anzuführen. Ähnliches geschieht mit dem auch der Isis zugeschriebenen Prädikat μόνη, das ihre Alleinherrschaft in der Welt betonen soll. In Sir 24 drückt es die Einsamkeit der Wanderung durch die Weiten des Kosmos aus, ist also nicht mit dem Epitheton der Isis vergleichbar. Wieder bleibt nur eine späte nicht ohne Weiteres brauchbare Stelle aus Apuleius übrig: "Solis ambagibus dispensans incerta lumina".[75]

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[69] Vgl. auch Sir 16, 26.27, wo aber wohl die Verteilung der physikalischen Wirkungsbereiche an die Himmelskörper gemeint ist (Ryssel z.St.).

[70] Conzelmann, *Mutter*, 227.

[71] Conzelmann, *Mutter*, 228ff.

[72] Die folgenden Belege aus Conzelmann, *Mutter*, 228-231.

[73] Plutarchus, *De Iside et Osiri*, 372f.

So liegen tatsächlich einige allgemeine Analogien zwischen Isis und der Weisheit in Sir 24 vor. Auch wird Isis als φρόνησις, ἐπίνοια, πρόνοια[76] bezeichnet, und bei Plutarch ihr Name von οἶδα und ὄν abgeleitet.[77] Doch dürfte dies nicht genug sein, um die Benutzung eines Isishymnus in Sir 24 glaubhaft zu machen. Zudem weichen die uns bekannten Isisaretalogien in Form und Aufbau von Sir 24 ab. Sie bestehen aus einer fast durchgehenden Folge von Selbstprädikationen im Ich-Sil, die gegeneinander ziemlich selbständig sind. Ein entscheidender Unterschied scheint auch zu sein, dass die Weisheit als Nebengottheit sich strukturell von der umfassenden Weltherrin und Allmutter Isis unterscheidet. So lässt sich aus Sir 24 auch die von M. Hengel einmal beiläufig geäusserte Vermutung nicht begründen, dass "der Isiskult im 3. Jhdt. v.Chr. auch in Jerusalem einzudringen versuchte und dass jüdische Weisheitsschulen in einer Art von polemischer Umkehrung Selbstprädikationen der damals an Einfluss gewinnenden Isis-Astarte auf die göttliche Weisheit übertrugen".[78]

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[74] Siehe Herodotus, *Historiae* II, 41.1, wo die Gleichsetzung von Jo und Isis, auf den der Isis heiligen Kühen beruht.

[75] Apuleius, Metam. XI 2.5. Mit Recht zieht Conzelmann nicht die Zeilen M44/45 der Isisaretalogie heran (Dieter Müller, *Ägypten und die griechischen Isis-Aretalogien*, Berlin 1961 (ASAW.PH 53,1), 73): "Ich bin in den Strahlen der Sonne; ich bin bei der Fahrt der Sonne dabei", da es in Sir 24 nicht um die Teilnahme am Sonnenlauf, einem geordneten kosmischen Vorgang geht, sondern um das Suchen mit dem Ziel des Findens.

[76] Hengel, *Judentum*^{1}, 285^{325}.

[77] Plutarchus, *De Iside et Osiri* 335 A/B. 375 D.

Conzelmanns Versuch beweist also seine eigene These, dass "in diesem Synkretismus jede präzise Ableitung verfehlt" ist. Doch ist das Unternehmen nicht unberechtigt, da tatsächlich Ähnlichkeiten mit anderen Gottheiten anregend gewesen sein könnten. Doch sollte man weniger Einzelzüge vergleichen, sondern mehr auf die Gesamtgestalt sehen und auch historische Hinweise beachten. Dazu kann man von der Beobachtung ausgehen, dass die Weisheit nach Sir 24, 1-22 die Funktion einer Stadt- und Landesgöttin übernommen hat, die in priesterlicher Fürbitte für das Volk eintritt und Segen und Gedeihen bringt. Nun ist in Jerusalem eine weibliche Gottheit bekannt gewesen, die die Funktionen einer Göttin der Weisheit und einer Beschützerin von Stadt und Land verband, nämlich Athene.[79] Die Eule, ihr heiliges Tier, erscheint einige Male auf den Münzen des judäischen Tempelstaats in spätpersischer Zeit, die für Jerusalem sicher eine prähellenistische Periode war, einmal sogar auch der Kopf der Athene.[80] Man kann hierfür, wie für dasselbe Phänomen in Ägypten, wirtschaftspolitische

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[78] Hengel, *Judentum*^{1}, 287.

[79] J. Rendel Harris, "Athena, Sophia and the Logos", *BJRL* 7 (1922/23), 56-72. S. 58: "The inquiry is particularly interesting as regards Athena, whose presence has certainly not hitherto been suspected in Jewish writings, for Athena is the Greek Goddess of Wisdom, so that the equation between Athena and Wisdom was almost inevitable to the mind of a writer who had a moderate acquaintance with Greek culture and was able to make parallels between the Hebrew and Greek religion". Athena als Göttin der Weisheit siehe Plato, *Cratylos* 407 A. Hesiodus, *Theogonie* 896.

[80] Bemerkungen und reichliche Literaturangaben hierüber zuletzt bei Helmuth Kienle, *Der Gott auf dem Flügelrad*, Wiesbaden 1975 (Göttinger Orientforschungen. VI.Reihe. Hellenistica Bd. 17), 10f. und Abbildungen.

Gründe annehmen. Doch könnte, ja muss eigentlich die Münzsymbolik Athene populär gemacht haben, vielleicht sogar als Wahrzeichen Jerusalems. Trotz aller Unklarheit und Unzuverlässigkeit der byzantinischen Überlieferung, sollte man auch daran erinnern, dass nach dem Bericht des Malalas[81] unter Antiochus IV. neben Zeus Olympios auch Athene in Jerusalem verehrt worden sei. Hier könnten alte Nachrichten mit dem Eingriff des Antiochus in Verbindung gebracht worden sein.

Bei näherem Zusehen ergibt sich eine Anzahl von Zügen, die einen Einfluss Athenes auf die Weisheitsgestalt von Sir 24 möglich erscheinen lassen. Als Stadtgöttin, die auf der Akropolis in Athen verehrt wurde, ist Athene auch von anderen griechischen Städten übernommen worden, so z.B. in Sparta,[82] dessen Kriegsruhm auf die Jerusalemer Historiographen grossen Eindruck gemacht haben muss. Sie haben sogar eine Verwandtschaft der Juden mit den Spartanern konstruiert.[83] Die Weisheit der Athene ist ebenso wie die der Jerusalemer Weisheit auf Volksversammlung und Gemeinwesen bezogen: Athene ist als "Agoraia" Vorsteherin der Volksversammlungen,[84] als "Machanitis" in Arkadien ist sie die Erfinderin von Ratschlüssen und Kriegslisten,[85] und bei Philo von Byblos wird ihr durch Kronos Attika zugeteilt — eine gute Parallele zu Sir 24, 8, allerdings erst aus der Wende des 1. zum 2. Jhdt. n. Chr. —, Ägypten wird hier übrigens dem Taut unterstellt, nicht der Isis.[86] Schliesslich ist Athene nicht wie Isis eine Weltherrscherin, sondern einer beherrschenden Gottheit als kleinere Grösse zugeteilt. Dies entspräche auch der Stellung der Weisheit.

Historisch und funktionell spricht Manches für eine Einwirkung Athenes auf die Weisheitsgestalt. Doch ist auch bei ihr die Beziehung zum Weisheitsmythus geringer. Die Geburt Athenes aus dem Haupte des Zeus steht allerdings näher bei der Entstehung der Weisheit, besonders wenn man die Bemerkung des Aristokles berücksichtigt, die Athenes Geburt als Hervortreten aus einer Wolke erklärt.[87] Ilias und Aischylos kennen ihre Herabfahrt vom Himmel.[88] Zudem ist sie die Erfinderin des Schiffbaus,[89] und schliesslich Göttin mit dem Wagen und Rosselenkerin.[90] Aber den Mythus von Wanderung, Wohnungsuche und Niederlassung kennt man von ihr nicht.

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[81] Johannes Malalas, ed Dindorf 1831, 207. Vgl. M. Hengel, *Judentum*^{1}, 541^{280}. Dort auch Literatur.

[82] Pausanias 3, 17.1 ff.

[83] 1 Makk 17, 34ff. Josephus, *Antt.Jud.* XII, 225-227.

[84] Pausanias 3, 11.9.

[85] Pausanias 8, 36.3.

[86] *Fr.Gr.Hist* 790 F" = Eusebius, Praep. ev. 1, 10, 32.38. Vgl. Hengel, *Judentum*^{1}, 343. H. Gressmann, *Der Messias*, Göttingen 1929 (FRLANT NF 26), 217f. Vgl. auch Aristides, *Panathenaikos* 19 b (161D): Attika als λῆξις Αθηνᾶς.

J. Rendel Harris hat schon 1922 die jüdische Weisheit, allerdings in der Gestalt von Sap. Sal. 7, mit Athene in Verbindung gebracht.[91] Er dachte dabei vor allem an die stoisch-orphische Kosmogonie, nach der die im obersten heissesten Aether aus Zeus entsprungene Weisheit — σύνεσις — "Pallas genannt wird wegen des Schwingens (πάλλεσθαι), die die überaus kunstreiche Vernunft ist, mit deren Hilfe der himmlische Baumeister das All entworfen hat". Sie bringt die "ewig ruhelose Bewegung" hervor, offenbar durch die Schwingungen. Diese Kosmogonie ist in den Pseudoklementinen überliefert,[92] sodass die unzweifelhaft stoischen Gedanken, die als heidnisch apostrophiert werden, dennoch von einem jüdisch-christlichen Synkretismus beeinflusst sein könnten. Die Nähe zu Sap. Sal. 7 lässt sich jedoch nicht bestreiten. Allerdings ist nach der Überlieferung die allegorische Spekulation der Stoiker über Athene schon seit den frühen Tagen ihrer Schule nicht unbekannt: schon Chrysippus hat gegen die Deutung der Athene als den vernünftigen Teil der menschlichen Psyche, das ἡγεμονικόν, gekämpft, und sein Schüler Diogenes von Babylon hat ein Buch "Über Athene" verfasst.[93] Doch die Wohnungssuche der Weisheit lässt sich aus diesen Spekulationen kaum ableiten. Dennoch ist den jüdisch-christlichen Denkern die Nähe der griechischen Athene-Interpretation zur Weisheitsüberlieferung aufgefallen. Justinus weiss, dass nach Ansicht der Griechen der erstgeschaffene Gedanke Athene war,[94] und Tertullian berichtet, dass schon für Cleanthes der Geist der "Durchwanderer des Alls" ist: Apud vestros quoque sapientes λόγον, id est Sermonem atque Rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat factitorem, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum vocari et decum et animum Jovis, et necessitatem omnium rerum. Haec Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat".[95] All diese kosmogonischen Spekulationen führen in die Nähe der Gestalt der Weisheit, und Beeinflussung ist nicht unmöglich. Aber für die Stadtgöttin im Jerusalemer Tempel ist soviel Spekulation unwahrscheinlich.

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[87] Hesiodus, *Theogonie* 924: Αὐτὸς δ' ἐκ κεφαλῆς γλαυκώπιδα γείνατ' Ἀθήνην. Aristokles nach den Scholien zu Pindar, Ol. 7, 66.

[88] Ilias 4, 74ff. Aischylos, *Eumeniden* 827.

[89] Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca* 1, 9.16; 2, 1.4.

[90] Sophocles, *Electra* 727.

[91] Siehe Anm. 79.

[92] Pseudo-Clemens, *Homil.* VI, 8. Vgl. Idem, *Recognitiones* X, 33.

[93] Zu Chrysippus vgl. *SVF* II, 256ff. Nr. 908-910, zu Diogenes von Babylon (156/55 v.Chr. mit Carneades in Rom) *SVF* III, 217. Nr. 33-35.

Wir kommen, wie Conzelmann, zu der Einsicht, dass keine präzise Ableitung möglich ist, obwohl Athene als Anregung eher in Frage kommt als die zu umfassende Isis. Um noch etwas weiterzukommen, sollte man vielleicht den oben berührten Gedanken verfolgen, dass man hier nicht mit einem Mythus, sondern mit einer Mythologisierung rechnen muss. Ich möchte darum den Mythus der wandernden Weisheit, die an einem Ort Ruhe findet, als eine Mythologisierung verstehen, die ihrer Funktion als Stadtgöttin entstammt.[96] In den Gründungssagen der Städte steht die eigentliche Gründung der Siedlung oder des Tempels häufig am Ende einer Wanderung als zwar providentiell bestimmtes, aber für die durch die Lande ziehende Schar zufälliges Ziel. So ist es z.B. bei der Gründungssage von Antiochias a. Orontes der Fall. Nachdem Jo in Tyrus verschwunden ist, wird Triptolemos von den Argivern auf Suche nach ihr ausgesandt. In Kilikien gründet ein Teil seiner Schar Tarsus. Die unter der Führung des Heros Weiterziehenden geben schliesslich die Suche auf und lassen sich am Orontes nieder.[97] Auch über Jerusalem entstanden in hellenistischer Zeit solche Sagen, nach denen Moses und die Seinen aus mehr oder minder ehrenhaften Gründen — je nach Tendenz der Sage — aus Ägypten vertrieben waren, wodurch sie unerwartet auf die Stelle des späteren Jerusalem stossen.[98]

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[94] I Apolog. 64.

[95] Apologet. 21.

[96] Gerade die Stadt wird als Ruheplatz betont: sie ist in 24, 11a als "geliebte Stadt" ausdrücklich genannt. In der Tradition ist sie der "Ruheplatz" Salomos, "dem Gott ringsum Ruhe schenkte" (So Sir, 47, 13 nach 1 Köng 5, 4, vgl. auch Deut 12, 10). So ist das "Zur-Ruhe-Kommen" des Heros auf die entsprechende himmlische Gestalt übertragen, was dem nun folgenden Gedankengang oben entspricht.

[97] Strabo, *Geogr.* 16, 2.5 (750).

Es hat den Anschein, als ob das Motiv vom zufälligen Finden einer Niederlassung auch auf die Stadtgottheit übertragen werden kann. Das könnte der Grund dafür sein, dass gerade Tyche die Gottheit sovieler Städte im kleinasiatischen Gebiet geworden ist. Zwar kennt sie keinen Mythus, aber sie ist die unsichere mit Flügeln dahinziehende Göttin mit flüchtigem Fuss auf der dahinrollenden Erdkugel balanzierend. Sie ist unstet und ihre Anwesenheit auf einem "Ruheplatz" ist von unberechenbarer Dauer oder Kürze.[99] Dennoch weiss Plutarch, dass Fortuna als Stadtgöttin am Kapitol ihre Flügel abgelegt hat, um bei den Römern sesshaft zu werden.[100] Hier ist Wanderung und Niederlassung ein typisches Motiv einer Stadtgöttin geworden. Es scheint mir nicht unmöglich, dass dies Motiv der Ursprung des Weisheitsmythus in Sir 24 ist.

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[98] Siehe J. C. H. Lebram, "Der Idealstaat der Juden", *FS O. Michel*, Göttingen 1974, 233-253; A. Momigliano, "Intorno al Contro Apione", *RFIC* 59 (NS IX), 1931, 485-513.

[99] Menander frg. 482.483.

[100] Plutarchus, *De fortuna Romana* 4.

PROVIDENCE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNIVERSE IN EARLY STOIC THOUGHT

With Some Remarks on the "Mysteries of Philosophy"

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In memoriam M. van Straaten (ob. 29.9.77)

1. The Stoics were convinced that the universe and all that it contains is ruled by a supreme power,[1] to which they gave titles such as God, World-Soul, Reason (*logos*), Nature (*physis*), Providence (*pronoia*), Active Cause, Necessity, Destiny, Fate, Common Law and Zeus.[2] The only piece of any length to have survived the wreck of Early Stoic literature is Cleanthes' famous hymn to this Zeus "called by many a name",[3] which has been preserved in Stobaeus' ample

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[1] See e.g. M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa I*, Göttingen 1943, ^{4}1970, 95, 108, and notes in II, ^{4}1972; F. Solmsen, 'Nature as Craftsman in Greek Thought' [*JHI* 1963, 473ff. =] *Kleine Schriften I*, Hildesheim 1968, [332ff.], 354-5; F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics*, London 1975, 79f.

[2] E.g. *SVF* I, 85 (god is cause), 157 (god as fire or fiery intellect), 160 (reason = fate = god = mind of Zeus), 171 and 172 (nature as demiurgic fire), 176 (fate = providence = nature), 532 (god = world-soul), 536 (Zeus = fire), 537 (the hymn of Cleanthes, s. below); II, 913 (fate = reason = truth = nature = necessity, "to which he [sc. Chrysippus] also adds other titles"), 937, p. 269, 12f. (nature = reason = fate = providence = Zeus), 1024 (nature = god), 1027 (god as demiurgic fire containing all spermatic logoi, according to which everything occurs through destiny), 1077 (god = cosmos = destiny = fire = aether). Cf. especially Diog. Laert. VII, 135 = *SVF* I, 102, II, 580 ἕν τε εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ Δία· πολλάς τ' ἑτέρας ὀνομασίας προσονομάζεσθαι ("God, Intellect, Fate and Zeus are one; and they are called by many other titles as well"), *l.c.* said to be the doctrine of both Zeno and Chrysippus. Cf. also H. Schwabl, 'Weltschöpfung', *RE* Supp. Bd. IX Stuttgart 1962, [1433ff.], 1543-4. There is a most adequate collection of texts in C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy III, The Hellenistic-Roman Period*, Leiden 1959, ^{2}1964, Nr. 899-902b, 904a, 918-921, 927, 933, 995.

[3] πολυώνυμε, in the first line (cf. also Diog. Laert VII, 135, above n. 2). Wilamowitz' observations on the terminology of the hymn are still quite pertinent: "πολυώνυμος ist der stoische Zeus, weil er mit dem νόμος und λόγος, andererseits mit dem reinen

anthology (= *SVF* I, 537).[4] In his *Personal Religion among the Greeks*,[5] A.-J. Festugière with some justification calls this hymn a prayer, for it undoubtedly ends with one.[6] He finds in it "Stoic piety, or, if you will, Stoic mysticism", viz. a "mysticism of consent". Wisdom and piety not only consist in accepting, but also in understanding and praising the divine plan executed by all beings. Human wickedness (moral evil) and human foolishness, i.e. the actions and opinions of those people who do not understand and praise what has been ordained by Zeus, are, in the final reckoning, also part of the invariable rational order of things (*SVF* I, p. 122, 13f.). The great Wilamowitz even spotted "die wärmsten Töne hellenischer Frömmigkeit" in Cleanthes' hymn;[7] consequently, he appears to have believed that, at least to Cleanthes, the Stoic god is not a merely conceptual construction,[8] but a personal presence with whom a

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Feuerelement zusammenfällt; als solches ist er φύσεως ἀρχηγός: aus dem Feuer ist alles geworden; [line] 32 ist er πάνδωρος: das ist er als ἀνάγκη oder πεπρωμένη oder πρόνοια; κελαίνεφες ἀρχικέραυνε ... ist der alte homerische Zeus, aber er bedeutet [sc. in Cleanthes] das Weltengesetz, das durch das Feuer alles beherrscht", *Hellenistische Dichtung II*, Berlin 1924, 258f. Cf. also J. Moreau's seminal study, *L'âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1939 = Hildesheim 1965, 182; Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 108; M. Lapidge, "Ἀρχαὶ and στοιχεῖα: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology', *Phronesis* 1973, [240ff.], 261, who aptly adduces *SVF* II, 1070; and already J. Adam, 'The Hymn of Cleanthes', in: *The Vitality of Platonism and Other Essays*, Cambridge 1911, [104ff.], 119f.

[4] For the transmission and emendation of the text [which is Nr. 943 in De Vogel, *Gr. Phil. III*, who aptly calls it a "compendium of Stoic theology"] s. G. Zuntz, 'Zum Kleanthes-Hymnos', *Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.* 1958, 288ff. For Cleanthes' motives in writing poetry cf. *SVF* I, 486, quoted below n. 22.

[5] Sather Class. Lect. XXVI, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1954, ^{2}1960, 105-112.

[6] In his *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, II, Le Dieu Cosmique*, Paris 1949, 310ff. Festugière translates the hymn and interprets it more fully, splendidly discussing both its traditional and its novel elements.

[7] *Der Glaube der Hellenen, II*, Berlin 1933, Darmstadt ^{3}1959, 288. M. Pohlenz, *o.c.* 27 speaks of his "gefühlsmässige Einstellung und ... persönliche Frömmigkeit"; Festugière, *Révél. II*, 311, calls him "un être profondément religieux"; M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion, II, Die hellenistische und römische Zeit*, München ^{2}1961, 261, refers to his "tief religiöse Natur"; V. Cilento, *Comprensione della religione antica*, Napoli 1967, ^{2}1972, 212, if I understand him correctly, ascribes to him an anticipation of the Christian God, "rivelato ... dallo stesso cuore dell'uomo".

[8] "Zu einem Begriffe betet kein Mensch", *Glaube I*, Berlin 1931, Darmstadt ^{3}1959, 11. Though Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.*, *l.c.*, says Cleanthes speaks not as a person but as a human being, he p. 260 calls the hymn a "Gebet". Cp. Festugière, *Révél. II*, 313: "cette prière s'adresse à un dieu, de qui l'on suppose à priori et qu'il a la puissance

personal relationship is possible. It cannot, indeed, be denied that there is an element of personal feeling in the hymn. The paradox, however, is that Cleanthes' relationship to "Zeus" remains a rational and intellectual one;[9] all he asks of his god is that man be given a share of the divine "insight" (γνώμη) which rules the universe (*ibid.*, p. 122, 30f.); he does not beg the kind of favours men usually ask for in selfish prayer. In another poem, a prayer to Zeus and Destiny[10] (*SVF* I, 527) in four lines, which survives in Epict., *Ench.* c. 53 and in a somewhat free Latin translation of five lines in Sen., *Ep.* 107, 10, all Cleanthes asks for is to be permitted to follow the divine plan of his own accord. Cleanthes' attitude toward Zeus — as that of Seneca in the letter containing the free quote — seems to contrast rather sharply with that of the older Stoics cited by the same Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* II, 35-36, where we are informed that god and destiny are not moved by prayer; here, however, Seneca refers to people who vainly ask for a change of fate.[11] We must conclude that the Stoic concept of god is tolerant of a theistic approach.

In the domain of ethics, the Stoic conception of god's fatal rule gave rise to famous perplexities regarding the evaluation of human responsibility.[12] If everything has been pre-ordained anywhere and

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d'accorder la prière et qu'il est disposé à l'accorder. [Hence] ... le fidèle magnifiera la puissance du dieu et ses bonnes intentions à l'égard des hommes". Cf. also De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, comment on Nr. 943. For interesting observations on the personal element in Cleanthes' hymn, s. M. Erren, *Die Phainomena des Aratos von Soloi, Untersuchungen zum Sach- und Sinnverständnis*, Hermes Einzelschr. 19, Wiesbaden 1967, 21.

[9] This is rather well brought out by Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht. II*, 260-1; s. further Festugière, *Révél. II*, 321f. and M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Piety*, Oxford 1948, 88 ("personal colouring" *vs* "rather icy coldness").

[10] See J. Dalfen, 'Das Gebet des Kleanthes an Zeus und das Schicksal', *Hermes* 1971, 174ff., and H. Dahlmann, 'Nochmals "Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt"', *ibid.* 1977, 342ff. — I do not know, by the way, that it is wise to make too much of the fact that the "I" speaking in this poem is a poet. Cleanthes, the philosopher-poet, speaks *ex officio*; the prayer can be repeated by each human being, *as a person.*

[11] For Seneca's evaluation of prayer cf. J. M. van Dijk, *Lucius Annaeus Seneca over de voorzienigheid en het kwaad*, thesis Nijmegen 1968, 71f., and on the Stoic view in general esp. E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, London 1911 = 1958, 235f.

[12] Cf. e.g. A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, London 1974, 163ff.; Sandbach, *o.c.* 101ff. Much of the evidence is assembled by W. C. Greene, *Moira. Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, Cambridge, Mass. 1944, ²1948, Ch. XI, 'Fate and Providence', 337ff. Cf. also De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 944a-c; Pohlenz, *o.c.*, 101ff. Cf. Edelstein,

everywhere, no room appears to be left for autonomous decisions to be made by responsible human agents. As a matter of fact, the Stoics were constrained to either leave some openings for human freedom at the cost of a loss in consistency in so far their general theory was concerned [viz. by limiting the scope of god's power of intervention[13]] or to restrict human freedom to the sphere of our mental dispositions vis-a-vis the unavoidable: what counts in this respect are our attitudes and intentions. The power or propensity of giving assent — either correctly or incorrectly — to or withholding it from[14] sense-impressions, mental images, concepts and propositions is a crucial prerogative of the human being. A rather awkward ethics, however subtly it may have been defended, above all by Chrysippus, whose emphasizing of the detached dependence and peculiar character of human nature is noteworthy.[15] It is not my intention, however,

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o.c. [below n. 18], 33: "the world necessarily includes physical and moral evil; God cannot help this".

[13] At Plut., *St. rep.* 1051Bf. = *SVF* II, 1178 Chrysippus argues that the gods do not bother about minor details and that 'Necessity' (ἀνάγκη) is to a large extent involved (cf. also *ibid.*, 1179). See below, n. 90, and Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 100, II, 57. I prefer to suspend judgement as to *SVF* II, 1183 = Philod., Π. θεῶν col. 7, 28f. and 8, 1f.; Von Arnim prints the text of W. Scott, *Fragmenta Herculanensia*, Oxford 1885, 156-7; Philodemus' text was re-edited by H. Diels, *Philodemos Über die Götter, Drittes Buch, I, Griech. Text, Abh. Preuss. Ak. Wiss.* 1916 Nr. 4, Berlin 1917 who has the fragments corresponding to *SVF* II, 1183 at p. 25-6. However, Diels' text is not based upon autopsy of the remains of the papyri and appears to be full of mistakes, s. K. Kleve, 'Zu einer Neuausgabe von Philodemos, Über die Götter, Buch I (PHerc. 26)', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 1972, 89f. In the text of Scott and Diels, which is, moreover, in crucial places conjectural, Chrysippus is quoted for the thesis that "the god is not omniscient, because he is incapable of ..." (*desunt cett.*), and (the Stoics) are criticized because, on the one hand, they ascribe all things to god, while on the other they absolve him, as he is not omnipotent, of concomitant effects. Diels' comment is interesting; he argues, *ibid.* Nr. 6, *Erläuterungen*, 19f., that god is incapable of the impossible, as e.g. of making the diagonal of a square commensurable with its side. — For Chrysippus' theory of concomitant causes and effects s. below, p. 158 and n. 90.

[14] Cf. H. von Arnim, 'Die Stoische Lehre vom Fatum und Willensfreiheit', in: *Wiss. Beilage z. 18. Jahresber. (1905) d. Philos. Gesellsch. a.d. Univ. Wien*, Leipzig 1905, [3ff.], 14f., who discusses the importance of ὁρμή; M. Reesor, 'Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy', *Phoenix* 1965, [285ff.], 287.

[15] See the excellent discussion by A. A. Long, 'The Stoic Concept of Evil', *Phil. Qu.* 1968, 329ff. Cf. also Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 104ff. and II, 59ff.; J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge 1969 = 1977, 112ff.; Von Arnim's beautiful paper referred to above, n. 14; and G. L. Duprat, 'La Doctrine Stoïcienne du Monde, du Destin et de la Providence

to discuss these vexing and oft-studied questions in the present paper. Rather, I wish to concentrate upon another, admittedly related issue, which does not seem to me to have recieved the attention it deserves or even to have been formulated at all in the proper way,[16] viz. that of the evaluation of god's part in, and his responsibility for, the periodical destruction of the ordered universe. Perhaps this is a problem more of theology, and of philosophical theology at that, than of religion; to the extent, however, that Stoic religious feeling as expressed in e.g. the above-cited poems by Cleanthes is rooted in Stoic theology, a brief exploration of this issue is not, I hope, out of order in a volume devoted to religious phenomena in the Hellenistic era.[17] Cleanthes' religiosity, moreover, is not as exceptional in Early Stoic thought as has often been suggested; perhaps our everyday notion of what constitutes "religion" is, anachronistically, more applicable in Cleanthes' case.[18]

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d'après Chrysippe', *AGPh* 1910, [473ff.], 494f. It should be considered, however, that human nature both general and individual is determined by destiny or god, cf. Plut., *Comm. not.* 1076E = *SVF* II, 937; furthermore, that each of us will make his come-back and will re-enact the same routine in each successive world-period (for Chrysippus' strong belief in eternal recurrence s. below, p. 178-9). On the contradictions in Chrysippus cf. also e.g. Greene, *o.c.* 345f., on those of Stoic theodicy generally E. Schröder, *Plotins Abhandlung* ΠΟΘΕΝ ΤΑ ΚΑΚΑ, Inaug. Diss. Rostock, Leipzig 1916, 39f.

[16] The best discussion known to me is that by my regretted collega proximus M. van Straaten, *Kerngedachten van de Stoa*, Roermond 1969, 21-30; s. further below, n. 69 and p. 180. His sudden death, which is a serious blow to the study of Ancient Philosophy in the Netherlands, deprived me of the opportunity of discussing the ideas of this paper with him.

[17] D. Babut, *La religion des philosophes grecs de Thalès aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1974, argues, in his solid chapter dealing with Stoic thought, p. 172ff., that this is more theological than religious. He fails to mention, however, Cleanthes' poems, and does not quote the Chrysippean parallel for *SVF* II, 42. — Perhaps I should add at this point that — apart from a few months in early youth — I have never been a believer in any God. But I accept the fact other people are. Experience has moreover taught me that people who believe in the existence of the divine do so in an apparently inexhaustible variety of ways, both intellectual and non-intellectual (a distinction, by the way, which it is not always very easy to make). At any rate, it would be sheer presumption, on the part of a historian of philosophy, not to take this human phenomenon very seriously indeed.

[18] Wilamowitz, *Glaube II*, 287, Nilsson, *o.c.* 261f., Cilento, *o.c.* 212f. and G. Reale, *I problemi del pensiero antico, II, Le Scuole Ellenistico-romane*, Milano 1973, 251f., for instance, take Cleanthes to be an exceptional case. The opinion of Festugière, *ll. cc.*, appears to be different, as is that of M. Spanneut, *Permanence du Stoïcisme, De Zénon à Malraux*, Gembloux 1973, who in a splendid passage, p. 31, states that

Chrysippus spoke of the *study* of theology in terms which, apparently, were destined to become popular with some of the Middle Platonists:[19] in a literal quote from the fourth book of his *On Lives*, ap. Plut.,

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the hymn is representative of Stoicism in general. My reluctance to consider Cleanthes an exception is only enhanced by the setting in which this judgement occasionally occurs: both Wilamowitz and Nilsson, for instance, seriously speak of Cleanthes as being a pure Greek in the company of those ungodly and unpoetical Semites Zeno and Chrysippus. This racist evaluation was already questioned by J. Adam, *o.c.* 115ff., who refutes earlier supporters, some of whom, ironically, praised Zeno to the skies for showing a religious depth unparalleled in Greece before his time. Prejudice, however, is ineradicable: M. Pohlenz, in his fundamental monograph on Stoicism, published in the midst of World War II, did not abstain from commenting, p. 22-30, that Zeno and Chrysippus were of Semitic stock, and apparently thought he made up for this by suggesting, *ibid.* 99f., that Zeno's belief in Providence as caring for mankind — a rather serious religious conviction — derives from his Semitic environment. Adam's job was continued by L. Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism*, Martin Class. Lect. XXI, Cambridge, Mass. 1966, 29ff.

[19] Cf. Plut., *De Is.* 382D-E, on the ἐποπτικὸν μέρος: ... οἷον ἐν τελετῇ τέλος ἔχειν φιλοσοφίας; Clem. Alex., *Strom.* I, 28, 2 τέταρτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὸ θεολογικὸν εἶδος, ἡ ἐπόπτεια, ἥν φησι ὁ Πλάτων τῶν μεγάλων ὄντως εἶναι μυστηρίων whereas Aristotle calls it 'metaphysics'; and, slightly different, Theo Smyrn., *Expos.* p. 14-15 Hiller τῇ δὲ τελετῇ ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν θεωρημάτων παράδοσις, τῶν τε λογικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν. ἐπόπτειαν δ' ὀνόμαζει [sc. Plato] τὴν περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ ὄντως ὄντα κ.τ.λ. Such terminology could obviously be justified to some extent by a reference to Plato, *Symp.* 209E-210A (the speech of Diotima on Eros) and *Phaedr.* 250C (the myth). [Plutarch, *l.c.*, mentions both Plato and Aristotle; B. Effe, *Studien zur Theologie und Kosmologie der Aristotelischen Schrift 'Über die Philosophie'*, Zetemata 50, München 1970, 94-102, argues that Plutarch interprets Aristotle in a platonizing way; he further argues that the references to the Mysteries of Eleusis in Arist, *De phil.* fr. 14 and 15 Ross only pertain to the non-discursive acquisition of knowledge of the divine by means of the contemplation of the beauty of the cosmos]. The Middle Platonist view became important in Neoplatonist writers; see, in general, P. Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre', in: *Porphyre*, *Entret. Hardt XII*, Genève 1965, 127ff., who however does not mention the Stoic parallels. Cf. also Waszink on Calc., *In Tim.* c. 127, p. 170, 10. J. Dillon, in an excellent and much-needed book, *The Middle Platonists*, London 1977, 162, 300 (on the "mysteries of philosophy" in Philo Judaeus and Albinus) and 398 (on the passage in Theo Smyrn. quoted above), suggests that this is "just another Middle Platonic commonplace"; apparently, he is unaware of the Stoic parallels, whereas Hadot's and Boyancé's contributions have been missed. Again, discussing Atticus' division of philosophy (ap. Eus., *PE* XI, 2, 1 = Atticus, fr. 1 Baudry = fr. 1 des Places into ethics — physics — logic, and his claim that the purpose of physics is "to conduct us to knowledge of things divine, the gods themselves, the first principles and all other such matters", he suggests, *o.c.* 251, that Atticus stamps a "religious tone upon his whole doctrine". From the parallels I have quoted (cf. also Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36, 33-35), it would seem that this "stamp" is neither exceptional nor insignificant.

Stoic. rep. 1035A-B = *SVF* II, 42 we read that young people should study in succession logic, ethics, and physics, and, as the final part of physics, theology, "as the transmission of theology has been called initiation in the mysteries".[20] This is confirmed by another fragment:[21] "Chrysippus says that the discourses about the things divine (περὶ τῶν θείων λόγους)[22] are appropriately called initiations (τελετάς). For these should be the last to be taught, to crown all the others [ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;[23] he means the other *logoi*, i.e. parts, of philosophy], when the soul has found its stability and confirmation and is capable of keeping silent" [as is the duty of the initiated] "vis-a-vis the uninitiated (ἀμύητους). For it is a great reward to hear what is correct about the gods and to gain self-mastery". This reference to what, at the very least, rather resembles an esoteric Stoic doctrine is not what one expects of a purely rational philosopher. What is important is that Chrysippus in this respect to some extent follows Cleanthes,[24] who had said [Epiph., *Adv. her.* III 2, 9 = *SVF* I, 538] that the gods are "mystical shapes", that the sun is the "torch-bearer", the cosmos a "mysterion" and that those people who are "filled with the divine" (κατόχους τῶν θείων) are the "initiated" (τελεστάς). Chrysippus' philosophical curriculum culminates in a sort of mysticism; Cleanthes' mysticism of consent, on the other hand, is, in the final analysis, of a rational nature.

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[20] τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος, διὸ καὶ τελετὰς ἠγόρευσαν τὰς τούτου παραδόσεις; for παραδόσεις cf. Theo Smyrn., above n. 19. C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus I*, Königsberg 1829 = Darmstadt ³1968, 123ff. argues that Chrysippus' use of this vocabulary is mere metaphor; however, he gives *ibid.* a useful collection of parallel passages.

[21] *Etym. magn.* s.v. τελετή, = *SVF* II, 1008. Of the three fragments adduced in the present paper, this is the only one to be mentioned by O. Casel, *De philosophorum Graecorum silentio mystico*, Giessen 1919 = Berlin 1967, 48 n. 2, in his disappointing discussion of Stoic views 42ff.

[22] Cp. the Stoic definition of philosophy as "striving after wisdom" (ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας) and that of wisdom as "knowledge of things divine and human" (θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμη, *SVF* II, 35; 36; cf. Cic., *Off.* I, 153; *Tusc.* IV, 57). This definition appears to be at least as old as Cleanthes (*SVF* I, 486 = Philod., *De mus.* col. 28,1ff.), who stated that, although philosophical discourse is adequate in dealing with divine and human things (τοῦ λόγου τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἱκανῶς μὲν ἐξαγγέλλειν δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα), it does not, in its unadorned, i.e. prosaic, form possess dictions suitable to divine greatness, whereas the instruments of poetry warrant the closest possible approach to the truth of the vision of things divine. Ph. De Lacey's comments on this passage, 'Stoic Views of Poetry', *AJPh* 1948 [241ff.], 270-1, though correct, are subtly disappointing. Edelstein's position, *o.c.* 34, that "Cleanthes' theistic language is mere metaphor" is, in view of the testimony of *SVF* I, 486, which he quotes incompletely, rather unfortunate.

[23] Cf. the quotation from Clement, above n. 19.

[24] Two of these fragments (that of Cleanthes and *SVF* II, 42) are splendidly discussed by P. Boyancé, *Études sur le Songe de Scipion*, Paris 1936 (thèse complémentaire), 116ff. and again in 'Sur les mystères d'Éleusis', *REG* 1962, [460ff.], 466ff.,

We may safely conclude that theology is an immensely important topic in the Early Stoa and that the attitude of the Early Stoics toward the supreme creator and ruler of the universe is not purely rational, but also emotional. This makes the part played by god in the destruction of the universe a rather sensitive issue. The evaluation of this role is closely bound up with the general question of theodicy,[25] viz. of the rational vindication of god's administration of the universe and the explanation of both physical and moral evil. I suspect, moreover, that a further investigation of the relation between god and universe in Early Stoic cosmology offers, if not an explanation, at least some sort of genetical apology for the ethical perplexities referred to above. It might be the case that, to the Stoics, divine determinism as a cosmological necessity was more important than full human autonomy (cf. below, p. 168).

2. We all know the Stoics assumed a cosmic cycle, i.e. the periodical destruction of the ordered universe by "total conflagration" (which is how I prefer to translate *ekpyrosis*) and its periodical rebirth out of the liquid mass[26] into which the fire — though remaining

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a fundamental contribution. All three are commented upon, but less well, by K. H. Rolke, *Die bildhaften Vergleiche in den Fragmenten der Stoiker von Zenon bis Panaitios*, Spudasmata XXXII, Hildesheim 1975, 222f. See further below, p. 174, 182ff.

[25] That the Stoics were the first to propose a formal theodicy is argued by e.g. P. Barth, 'Die stoische Theodizee bei Philo', *Philos. Abh. M. Heinze*, Berlin 1906, 13ff., W. Capelle, 'Zur antiken Theodizee', *AGPh* 1907, [173ff.], 176f. and C. J. de Vogel, 'Het probleem van het kwade in de antieke wijsbegeerte', in: *Theoria*, Assen 1967, [63ff.], 74f. There is an adequate collection of texts in the same author's *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 938-942. See also Moreau, *o.c.* 181-182; Greene, *o.c.* 344f.; Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 100-101. Cf. also below, p. 161f., 183 and n. 175.

[26] Cf. Zeno's interpretation of Hesiod's Chaos, *SVF* I, 103-104; for Cleanthes cf. *SVF* I, 497, for Chrysippus *SVF* II, 413, 579-581. See in general D. E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*, Ohio State Univ. Pr. 1977, Ch. III, "Cosmogony', 57ff., and my *Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract* ΠΕΡΙ ῾ΕΔΔΟΜΑΔΩΝ *Ch. 1-11 and Greek Philosophy*, Wijsg. text. en stud. 20, Assen 1971, 108 and notes. Stoic cosmological texts in

present within it[27] — converts itself when all fuel has been burnt. Sufficient data — I shall presently go into some of the details — survive to enable us to affirm that god, the supreme ruler of the universe, is, for the Early Stoics, the agent both of its destruction and of its reconstruction. However, God is also Providence, i.e. a benevolent, beneficent, wholly good power caring for and watching over all beings.[28] In what way is the excercising of providence to be reconciled with such a grim event (*quod procul a nobis flectat fortuna gubernans*, Lucr. v. 107; cf. Aristotle's remarks ap. Phil., *Aet. mu.* 10-11 = *De phil.* fr. 18 Ross) as the destruction of heaven and earth and all the living beings found therein, outstanding among whom are lesser gods and men? In other words, in what way can god be the cause of destruction without becoming evil,[29] i.e. ungodly? Is not the physical evil consisting in the ruining of the beautiful universe,[30] the home of the gods, a moral evil to the extent that

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De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III* are Nr. 904, 908. For the cosmic cycle s. Hahm, *o.c.* Ch. VI, 185ff.

[27] *SVF* I, 98, 102; II, 580. Cf. Hahm, *o.c.* 60-61 and below, n. 48.

[28] The translation of πρόνοια by "foresight" or "foreseeing" (e.g. Reesor, *o.c.* 288; Rist, *o.c.* 126-7; similarly Van Dijk, *o.c.* 86: *providentia* = "met inzicht vooruitzien") is not commendable, as my late colleague W. C. van Unnik once pointed out in public. In Cic., *ND* II, 76-80, divine knowledge is an argument in favour of the assumption that the universe is ruled by the providence of the gods; other arguments follow.

[29] Cf. Sandbach's question, *o.c.* 105, in the context of a discussion of fate *vs.* free will and the explanation of physical and moral evil within the actual universe: "How can a good God be the cause of evil?". Cf. also Greene, *o.c.* 344, and De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, 77: "If the identity of God and Providence with Nature be admitted, the problem of the origin of evil presents certain obvious difficulties". Such was already the opinion of Plutarch, *Comm. not.* c. 34, 1076C = *SVF* II, 1168: the Stoics "make god, who is good, the origin of evil" (αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσιν); the emphasis in Plutarch's chapter is, however, on moral evil.

[30] For the beauty of the universe cf. e.g. Cleanthes' fourth explanation of the genesis of the concept of the divine out of the admiration for the beauty and order of the heavens ap. Cic., *ND* II, 13-15 = *SVF* I, 528, which appears to be dependent upon Aristotle's second proof in *De phil.* fr. 12a-b, fr. 13 Ross (printed in De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. II*, *Aristotle*, *The Early Peripatetic School and the Early Academy*, Leiden 1953, ^{2}1960, Nr. 426-427; see further Effe, *o.c.* 72ff.). Cf. also Chrysippus ap. Cic., *ND* II, 17, and III, 26 = *SVF* II, 1011: a beautiful house is built for men, not mice; accordingly, the world is to be considered the house of the gods (De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 1118b). — For Cleanthes' adaptation of the '*argumentum ex gradibus*' (*De phil.* fr. 16, below, p. 143) cf. Moreau, *o.c.* 183 n. 5.

it is the ruling divine power that is responsible? That these are not stupid or captious questions becomes evident at once upon considering that the Early Stoics, or at least Zeno, must have upheld the thesis of the periodical destruction of the universe against Plato and Aristotle (and their followers), who had argued impressively in favour of the opposite assumption, viz. that the universe is indestructible — Aristotle even arguing that hence it cannot have been generated either. Theophrastus, the last fifteen years of whose directorate of the Peripatos coincided with Zeno's first fifteen as head of the Stoa and who, apparently, was one of Athens' most famous teachers of philosophy at the time,[31] never abandoned the thesis of the eternity of the universe.[32]

It will be necessary to discuss the arguments of Plato and Aristotle concerning the creation and destruction of the universe in some detail.[33]

In what may have been, in Antiquity, his most influential dialogue, the *Timaeus*, containing his cosmology, physics etc., Plato explicitly and with original arguments denied that the ordered universe will ever perish. It has been constructed out of chaos and after an eternal Model by a Divine Intelligence, the Demiurge or Craftsman, who takes special precautions in order to ensure that it will be as perfect as the circumstances in which he has to work allow it to be, and, moreover, that it will forever remain safe and sound. There is nothing at all left outside the universe, hence no *external* cause capable of excercising a lethal influence (33A), while *inside* harmony reigns among the elements (32C cf. also *Laws* X, 903B). In this way, the cosmos is a "whole" (ὅλον), 33A and 32B (ὅλον ὅτι μάλιστα ζῷον). The harmonious Soul of the universe as constructed by the Craftsman is an everlasting source of orderly motions (36Eff. and *passim*). No entity less powerful than the Demiurge himself is capable of undoing his handiwork. It is true that, theoretically, he could himself unmake what he has made, but this he will not, because to do so would be wholly out of harmony with his own nature: god is wholly good (29A and E) and has fashioned the best possible (29Aff.) cosmos [cf. the Demiurge's speech, 41Aff.; it should not be forgotten, by the way, that part of what is within the universe, viz. human bodies etc., is not made by the Demiurge, but by the other, less perfect gods. This absolves the Demiurge, though not the lesser gods, of being responsible for some forms of physical evil. Moreover, the Demiurge takes precautions of such a nature that he is not responsible for human wickedness, i.e. moral evil, 42D]. The definition of god as a wholly good being, incapable of being a source of evil and, moreover, incapable of any transmutation whatever, a novelty in Greek religious thought, is found *Rep.* II, 378E-383A. — The fact remains, however, that the *Tim.* describes the coming into being of the ordered universe (28B and *passim*). It is not necessary to enter here into the baffling question: "did Plato really mean this?"[34] [is the demiurgic intervention really compatible, for instance, with god's immutability as stipulated *Rep.* II, *l.c.*?[35]]. Suffice it to recall that there were already two schools of thought among Plato's immediate pupils, Aristotle (*Cael.* I, 10f.) holding that Plato meant what he said — which was accepted by Theophrastus[32]) —, Xenocrates (fr. 54 Heinze) and Speusippus (fr. 54b Lang) that he did not say what he meant, since what he really meant was that the universe can no more have a beginning than it can have an end. According to Xenocrates, the creation-story of the *Tim.* would only serve a didactical purpose, being a sort of translation, by Plato, of the eternal order of ontological and causal dependence into a chronological tale, just as mathematicians construct figures in order to demonstrate eternal truths.

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[31] *SVF* I, 280: "When Zeno saw how much Theophrastus was admired for his many followers, he said: 'his band is larger, mine is more harmonious'".

[32] Cf. the statement assigned to him by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 117: "Theophrastus says that those who attribute coming into being and destruction to the universe are wrong (ἀπαταθῆναι) on four very important points". No one has ever denied that at least this sentence, as distinct from what follows in Philo (*o.c.* 117-149 = Theophr., *Phys. op.* fr. 12 Diels and, in part, Theophr. fr. 30 Wimmer and *SVF* I, 106), represents Theophrastus' own position. Cf. also below, n. 43; for Theophrastus' theory of the eternal universe see further P. Steinmetz, *Die Physik des Theophrast*, Palingenesia I, Bad Homburg etc., 1964, 164f. Dicaearchus, fr. 47 and 48 Wehrli, is in favour of the eternity of the human race, which of course implies that of the universe, cf. the explicit argument of Critolaus, fr. 13 Wehrli. Censor., *De die nat.*, 4, mentions, besides Dicaearchus (= fr. 47 Wehrli) also Theophrastus and others. It should be added that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in holding, though perhaps expressing himself in a more cautious way, that Plato in the *Tim.* wrongly taught the coming into being of the universe (*Phys. op.* fr. 10 and 11 Diels; cf. Baltes, *o.c.* [below, n. 34], 22f.; also on Eudemus.

[33] It should, of course, be understood that the terms "creation" and "destruction" of the universe signify, in the context of Greek cosmology, the fashioning of the ordered structure out of a pre-existent something and its returning to this prior non-cosmic condition. — A collection of texts from the *Tim.* is in De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. I. Thales to Plato*, Leiden 1950, ^{4}1969, Nr. 349ff.; theological abstracts from *Rep.* II *ibid.*, Nr. 279. A piece of Arist., *De phil.* fr. 16 Ross is *Gr. Ph.* II, Nr. 429a; [fr. 14 and 18 Ross are *ibid.* Nr. 428a-b]; for Xenocr. fr. 54 Heinze s. *ibid.*, Nr. 764.

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[34] For a recent discussion, in favour of taking Plato upon his word, s. W. Scheffel, *Aspekte der platonischen Kosmologie*, Leiden 1976. For the discussion in antiquity see M. Baltes, *Die Weltenstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, I*, Leiden 1976 (Aristotle 4ff., Speusippus-Xenocrates 18ff.).

Aristotle considers himself the first philosopher to uphold the eternity of the ordered universe; all the others, as he argues at *Cael.* I, 10, 297b12f., holding that it has been generated, whatever differences among their views may be capable of being pointed out.[36]

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[35] When his work constructing the Soul and body of the universe had been accomplished and lesser tasks had been delegated to the lesser gods, the Demiurge "continued to abide by the wont of his own nature" (tr. Cornford, ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει, 42E). Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, London 1937, ^{5}1966, 147 n. 1. interprets this cryptic utterance as signifying that the Demiurge confines himself to his own proper activity, which on his reading of the dialogue in the sense of Xenocrates c.s. presents no difficulties. If, however, the literal interpretation is favoured, the phrase conveys the suggestion that the activity which came before perhaps implies a change of attitude. — At *Phaedr.* 245Cf., Plato proves that Soul as cause of motion is eternal; note, however, that he argues from the concept of "ungenerated" to that of "indestructible", not conversely.

[36] At *Cael.* I, 10, 279b14f. he says that both Empedocles and Heraclitus taught an eternal cosmic cycle. It is to-date generally agreed that Aristotle's interpretation of Heraclitus' cosmology is mistaken [cf. below, n. 52] and that the latter is, in a sense, his one and only predecessor. Cf. Heracl., *VS* 22B30, which denies cosmogony and proclaims that the actual cosmos [it is, for our purpose, irrelevant whether we translate "world" or "world-order"] "has always been, is, and shall always be", s. G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge 1954, ^{2}1962, 307ff. Cp. also *VS* 22B94, "the sun will not outstep its measures", quite significant when put against the theory of Cleanthes, for which see below, p. 155. It has to be admitted, however, that according to Aristotle himself "la doctrine des cycles n'est, en réalité, qu'une forme larvée de la croyance à l'éternité" (P. Moraux, *Aristote. Du Ciel*, Coll. Budé, Paris 1965, Intr. LXXIX; *ibid.*, n. 1. Moraux suggests that Aristotle is not only thinking of Heraclitus and, especially, Empedocles, but also of the myth in Plato, *Politic.* 269Cff., a point overlooked by Hahm, *o.c.* 191f.); for Empedocles, see also D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle*, Cambridge 1969, 170f.

The arguments in favour of his own thesis in *Cael.* are several; apart from the negative reasons suggested by the dialectical investigation of I, 10f., there is the positive argument from the eternal and unchanging nature of the celestial element [Aristotle had never observed or heard of a Nova] and the divine (I, 3; I, 9, 279a17f.). Ch. I, 12 contains a difficult and perhaps not wholly cogent conceptual argument.[37] It is now generally agreed, however, that the exposition of the *De Cael.* is somewhat incomplete and should be supplemented by arguments deriving from the lost work *On Philosophy.*[38] Indeed, the reference at *Cael.* I, 9, 279a30f., a propos the immutability of god, to "popular works" (ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι), applies, *pace* Simplicius *ad l.*, to this very work. By virtually unanimous consent, three anonymous arguments preserved by Philo Judaeus in what is certainly not their original wording have to be attributed to the *De phil.*[39] The first of these, a physical argument, Phil., *Aet. mu.* 20-24 = Arist., *De phil.* fr. 19a Ross, points out that, in order to be destroyed, the universe has to be affected by either *external* or *internal* causes. The first kind is excluded, because there is nothing whatever outside the "whole" or universe [cf. Plat., *Tim.* 32C-33B — quoted by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 25-26 in support of *De phil.* fr. 19a! — and, on the fact there is no body, matter, space or time outside the universe but only, in some sense of the word "outside", the Divine from which all things depend, Arist., *Cael.* I, 9, 278b21f.]. The second kind of cause does not apply, because the "part" would, in this case, have to be greater and stronger than the "whole" (τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος καὶ μεῖζον ἔσται καὶ κραταιότερον), which is absurd [for the section of the argument involved with the subordination of the parts of the universe to the whole cf. Plat., *Laws* X, 903Bf.] — The third argument preserved by Philo, a *theological* one, — I skip the second —, *Aet. mu.* 39-43 = Arist., *De phil.* fr. 19c Ross, reasons from the assumption of a Demiurge. [Aristotle's cosmology, which only knows an everlasting god as ultimate cause of everlasting order, leaves no room for a full-blown Demiurge. It will not do, however, to hold Philo responsible for a terminological modification at this point, as this would make nonsense of the whole argument. Rather, Aristotle will have discussed the issue *ex hypothesi*, i.e. dialectically, as is his wont to do with theories relevant to his actual topic in the *pragmateiai*; apparently, he did so in the first book of *De phil.* as well].[40] The argument hinges upon a Demiurge's possible motives for a destruction of an ordered universe. He would destroy the present world in order (a) either to construct, or (b) to omit to construct, another one. The latter possibility (b), however, is foreign to god's nature as a cause of order. [This dilemma is a refinement of Plato's argument in the *Tim.*, that the Demiurge will not destroy his creation because he is himself good and a cause of order in the best possible universe]. But also (a), the fashioning of a new universe, would be contrary to his nature: the substitute would have to turn out either (x) worse than, or (y) equal to, or (z) better than, the actual universe. A change for the worse (x) would imply that god's nature will have changed for the worse and is accordingly impossible. The fashioning of an equal replacement (y) amounts to a childish and foolish action on god's part, *quod non*. The construction of a better universe (z) can only be accomplished by a god whose nature has improved; consequently, he was not as good as he should have been the first time, a sacrilegious thought.[41]

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[37] Partly indebted, I would say, to the *Phaedr.*-passage mentioned above, n. 35. For a pellucid analysis of the "logical" argument of Ch. 12 regarding the mutual implication of "ungenerated" and "undestructible" cf. C. J. F. Williams, 'Aristotle and Corruptibility', *Relig. Stud.* 1966, 95ff., 203ff.

[38] Cf. A.-H. Chroust, 'Some Observations on Aristotle's Doctrine of the Uncreatedness and Indestructibility of the Universe', *Riv. crit. di storia della filosofia* 1977, 127ff., which gives a rather full survey of the *status quaestionis.*

[39] The *contents* of the first and third correspond with those attributed to what must be a popular work of Aristotle by Cicero, *Ac. pr.* II, 119 = Arist., *De phil.* fr. 20 Ross, cf. Festugière, *Révél. II*, 239. Their dilemmatic *form* and, to a large extent, their *contents* correspond to *De phil.* fr. 16 Ross, for which s. below. For these (and some other) arguments in favour of the attribution cf. Effe, *o.c.* 13f. (fr. 19a), 16f. (fr. 19c), 106 and n. 148 (fr. 16).

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[40] I agree with Effe, *o.c.* 17. For a synopsis of divergent views on this point s. H. J. Krämer, *Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie*, Berlin 1971, 128 n. 96 and, at greater length, J. Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur dieu*, Paris 1971, 323ff. Pépin's compromise, viz. that Aristotle in the *De phil.* argued in favour of a *creatio ab aeterno*, is not commendable.

[41] Cf. in general O. Dreyer, *Untersuchungen zum Begriff des Gottgeziemenden in der Antike*, Spudasmata XXIV, Hildesheim 1970, 38, who, however, 74 n. 234, 81, n. 254 and 126, n. 396 has failed to acknowledge that *Aet. mu.* 39-43 is to be attributed to Aristotle.

This argument is quite similar to the proof, from the same work, of the immutability of god summarized by Simplic., *In De cael.* p. 288,28 - 289,15 Heiberg [ad *Cael.* I, 9, 279a30f., s. above] = Arist., *De phil.* fr. 16 Ross. This starts with the famous *argumentum ex gradibus entium*: whenever and wherever there is a better, there is a best, which must be god. Now something which changes does so either under the impact of something else or of its own accord [cf. *De phil.* fr. 19a, on external and internal causes]. If something else is responsible, this has to be either stronger or weaker; if, on the other hand, what changes is changed by itself, the change will be either for the better or for the worse [cf. *De phil.* fr. 19c, on the motives for change attributable to a Demiurge]. Since, however, god is the best there is, there can be nothing stronger and better than god, whereas he cannot be affected by anything below his level. This eliminates the external cause. But he will not change of his own accord either: there simply is no better option open to him, since — being the best — he lacks nothing; a change for the worse, on the other hand, is contrary to his nature [Simpl., *l.c.*, *in fine*, correctly registers Aristotle's debt to Plat., *Rep.* II, 378Eff. Note that Aristotle's modification of Plato's argument in this case matches that of the argument concerning the Demiurge of the *Tim.*].

It should be added that the discussion about the interpretation of the *Tim.* and, generally, about the eternity of the universe, was still very much alive in Zeno's time. We have already noticed that Aristotle's interpretation of the *Tim.* was followed by Theophrastus and that the Peripatetics generally were in favour of the eternity of the universe.[32] The views of Xenocrates and Speusippus, too, were continued; especially important in this connection is the contribution of Zeno's Academic contemporary Crantor, who was, like Zeno, a pupil of Polemo and Crates, who, moreover, probably wrote the first monograph on the interpretation of the *Tim.*, and who advocated an interpretation much resembling that of Xenocrates (cf. Procl., *In Tim.* I, p. 277, 8f. Diehl and Plut., *An. procr.* 1012F-1013B).[42] Both Academy and Peripatos were, accordingly, in favour of the eternity of the universe, and the (reinterpreted) arguments of Plato and those of Aristotle must have retained their actuality. To support their own thesis in face of such arguments, the Stoics must have had rather cogent reasons. Unfortunately, our evidence is fragmentary and, at least in part, of a doubtful nature.[43] However, what we have is sufficient to fill in the overall picture.

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[42] Cf. Baltes, *o.c.* 83f.

3. Like Aristotle and Plato, but unlike Epicurus and his followers with their infinitely many universes,[44] the Stoics rejected causes of destruction outside the one universe. They held that beyond the cosmos there is only the incorporeal void,[45] whereas only body can be a cause.[46] So, if the world is to be destroyed, it must be possible to point out an immanent cause of its destruction. Aristotle, improving upon Plato's view of the harmony among the elements, had argued, *De phil.* fr. 19a, that no part of the *whole* which constitutes the ordered universe can be strong enough to destroy it. The Stoics countered this *physical* argument by presicely indicating

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[43] I refer to the four arguments purportedly quoted and refuted by Theophrastus (s. above, n. 32). It is not certain if — and if, to which extent — these arguments are to be attributed to Zeno (or the Stoics generally) and/or Epicurus c.s. Presumptive Stoic elements were first pointed out by E. Zeller, 'Der Streit Theophrasts gegen Zenon über die Ewigkeit der Welt', *Hermes* 1876, 422ff. = *Kleine Schriften I*, Berlin 1910, 166ff. Epicurean parallels were already mentioned by J. Bernays in two letters of February 1880 addressed to Zeller and first printed in the latter's *Kl. Schr. I*, 225f. They were also discovered by E. Norden, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der antiken Philosophie', *Neue Jbb. f. Phil.*, Supp. Bd. 19, Leipzig 1893, [364ff.], 440ff. The recent attempt by A. Graeser, *Zenon von Kition, Positionen und Probleme*, Berlin 1975, 187ff., to refute the scepticism of W. Wiersma, *Mnem.* 1940, 235ff. and of J. B. McDiarmid, *TAPA* 1940, 239ff., and to vindicate the attribution to Zeno (only) is, though interesting, in many ways unfortunate. The issue is still open, Hahm's terse and negative overview of the discussion previous to the publication of Graeser's study (*o.c.* 197 n. 14) being far from conclusive. — It will be clear from the sequel of this paper that I share Graeser's acceptance of the working hypothesis that the *De phil.* was important to Zeno; its rejection by H.-J. Krämer, *o.c.* 128 n. 96 seems inadequate.

[44] Epic., *Ep. Hdt.* 73-74; Phil. *Aet. mu.* 8 = Usener, *Epicurea* fr. 304; Lucr. V, 406-15 on extra-mundane fire and water as causes of the destruction of a universe. See, in general, F. Solmsen, 'Epicurus and Cosmological Heresies', *AJPh* 1951, 1ff. = *Kl. Schr. I*, [461ff.], 475.

[45] *SVF* I, 95; II, 331, 525.

[46] *SVF* I, 90; II, 140. Plut., *Comm. not.* 1073E = *SVF* II, 525, p. 166, 24f.: "they say that only bodies are existing things [*or*: "things that are"], since acting and being acted upon is the property of an existing thing (only)", ὄντα γὰρ μόνα τὰ σώματα λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν (with Cherniss' note, 773*g*). De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 901. Hahm, *o.c.* Ch. I, 'Corporealism', 3ff.

such a *part*, viz. the element of fire, and by arguing that it is exactly this which the whole cosmos comes to be at the moment of total conflagration. Fire, the "element par excellence",[47] so to speak represents the whole: during total conflagration the whole actually *is* afire, while everything within the ordered universe is informed by fire and nothing but a combination of elements ultimately deriving from fire. "Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus hold that the substance changes into *fire* as into a seed" [σπέρμα; cf. also Phil., *Aet. mu.* 94 = *SVF* II, 619; Plut., *Comm. not.* 1077B = *SVF* II, 618 and Cherniss' note *ad l.* Philo, *Aet. mu.* 94-103 argues *contra* at considerable length], "and that out of this (seed) the ordered universe is again constituted such as it was before. ... The oldest Stoics hold that everything will become *aether*" [another name for fire], "because after certain longest periods (κατὰ περιόδους τινας τὰς μεγίστας) everything is resolved into an *aetherial fire*" [Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels = *SVF* I, 107, 512; II, 596]. "The element (στοιχεῖον) of all things is *fire*.[48] ... At certain fated times (κατά τινας εἱμαρμένους χρόνους) the whole universe will be converted into *fire*; next, it is again made into an ordered universe. The *primal fire* (πρῶτον πῦρ) is so to speak a kind of seed, containing the *logoi*" [informing principles] "of all things that have become, do become, and will become" [Aristocl. ap. Eus., *PE* XV 14, 1 = *SVF* I, 98]. To designate the period from one final conflagration to another Arius Didymus also uses the expression "greatest year" (ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν μέγιστον)[49] [fr. 37 Diels =

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[47] The expression is attributed to Chrysippus, Ar. Did. fr. 21 Diels = *SVF* II, 413, p. 136, 11f., and 15f.

[48] For the generation of the elements out of fire according to Zeno cf. *SVF* I, 102 (Ar. Did. fr. 38 Diels, Diog. Laert. VII, 136, 142); for Cleanthes the same fr. of Ar. Did. = *SVF* I, 497; for Chrysippus Plut., *St. rep.* 1053A = *SVF* II, 579 and *ibid.* 1053B = *SVF* II, 605. Cf. also *SVF* II, 590 (Clem. Al., *Strom.* V 14, 104,1-105,2, whose Stoic source (c.q. the Stoic source of Clement's source) uses Heraclitus, *VS* 22B30 and 31): out of the fire comes air out of which comes sea out of which come heaven and earth and the beings encompassed thereby. On god remaining in the wet substance as spermatic *logos* of the cosmos-to-be see Diog. Laert. VII, 136 = *SVF* I, 102 and above, n. 26; on god as intelligent, and as craftsmanlike fire containing within itself all spermatic *logoi*, Aët. I 7, 33 = *SVF* II, 1027.

[49] This rare expression is, perhaps, an echo of Aristotle's *De phil.* It occurs Censor., *De die nat.* 18, 11 = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 19 Ross [first text], but I agree with Effe, *o.c.* 64ff., that the sentence about the *annus quem Aristoteles maximum potius quam magnum appellat* ("the year A. calls greatest rather than great") is on better grounds

SVF II, 599]. These terms, viz. "longest periods", "fated times" and "greatest year"[50] offer, however, only a partial description of the cyclical process, they do but indicate the bare fact that the conflagration is bound to occur or cannot fail to occur at a certain time. Though this terminology is physical to the extent that necessity and time are in a strict sense involved with an apparently lawlike physical process,[51] this process itself or rather its lawlike character is not thereby explained in physical terms.[52] Fortunately, the physical expla-

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attributable to the *De phil.* Since, on the other hand, the sequel of the "Aristotelian" passage in Censorinus is contaminated with Stoic ideas and mentions *ekpyrosis* (and cataclysm, cf. below n. 52), it is also possible that the expression "greatest year" itself, which, because of its peculiarity, is often used in favour of the attribution to Aristotle, is a Stoic contamination. In that case, there would be not much left for Aristotle.

[50] In Arist. *Mete*, I, 14, similar expressions occur (351 a 24f., 351 b 9f., 352 a 28f.).

[51] The concepts of "necessity" (κατὰ τὸ χρεών) and of "the order of time" (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν) were for the first time connected with that of the lawlike physical process by the father of Greek scientific cosmology, Anaximander, *VS* 12B1. On the lawlike physical process as Anaximander's discovery s. my brief comments in *Lampas* 1975, 318f. In the forthcoming first volume of my *Vorsokratiker* (Reclam, Stuttgart) I have dwelt upon this subject at somewhat greater length. — Though time is, to the Stoics, an "incorporeal" (*SVF* II, 331, 520, 521), it is, in the strictest of senses, linked up with motion in general and with cosmic motion in particular (Ar. Did. fr. 26 Diels = *SVF* I, 93; cf. also *SVF* I, 497, p. 111, 21-25; II, 509, 511-514).

[52] That the Early Stoics in this connection attached any importance to the coming together of sun, moon and planets in one sign of the Zodiac at the end of a Great or Greatest Year (for the term s. *SVF* II, 599, ab.) is doubtful, but is perhaps suggested by the grand reunion described *SVF* I, 510: according to Cleanthes, the other heavenly bodies join the sun at the time of *ekpyrosis*; the Great Year or the Zodiac, however, are not mentioned in this context. Pohlenz, *o.c.* II, 44, is sceptical, as is Moreau, *o.c.* 169. [Nemesius, *NH* 38 = *SVF* II, 625, is the first explicit, but rather remote testimony]. Those who wish to explain Stoic *ekpyrosis* by deriving it from the East usually quote a fragment of the Babylonian priest Berossos, a contemporary of Zeno, who wrote a *History of Babylon* [Sen., *N.Qu.* III 29, 1 = Berossos fr. 27 Schnabel, cf. P. Schnabel, *Berossos und die babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur*, Leipzig 1923, 19 and 226-7]; cf. W. Wiersma, 'Die Physik des Stoikers Zenon', *Mnem.* 1943, [191ff.], 206f. — Wiersma, however, prefers to derive *ekpyrosis* from the Pythagoreans — and B. L. van der Waerden, 'Das grosse Jahr und die ewige Wiederkehr', *Hermes* 1952, [129ff.], 140f. However, F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Vol. III C 1, Leiden 1958, Nr. 680, collected such fragments of 'Berossos' as deal with astrological matters and with the destruction of the universe under the caption "Ps. Berossos von Kos" (fr. 37 Schn. = fr. 21 Jac.). Wiersma, *o.c.* 207 admits that Berossos' "Great Year" does not fit his historical chronology and that there is no Babylonian evidence for a series of Great Years. The rehabilitation of the fragments condemned by Jacoby attempted by R. Drews, 'The Babylonian Chronicles and Berossus', *Iraq* 1975,

nation of inevitable total conflagration given by Zeno himself survives, although, to the best of my knowledge, it has been utterly neglected. It is found, with Zeno's name attached, in the treatise against the Manichaeans written by Alexander of Lycopolis, a Platonist philosopher of the later years of the third Cent. A.D., who is not listed in Liddell and Scott though he is in Lampe's Lexicon of Patristic Greek, this in spite of the fact that the rumour which makes him

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39ff. is not convincing (p. 52 he argues that "there is to-date no evidence that the Great Year originated in Greek philosophy, and so no reason why it should be denied to the scholars of Babylon", whereas we have evidence about conceptions of a Great World Year in Presocratic philosophy and none whatever about Babylon apart from the fragments of Berossos that are at issue).

It should be added that Ber. fr. 37 Schn. (21 Jac.) is hardly pertinent to the Stoic theory of total conflagration, because it mentions not only *ekpyrosis* whenever the heavenly bodies gather in Cancer, but also an equally devastating cataclysm whenever they do so in Capricorn; (Pohlenz, *o.c.* 47, following Schwartz, suggests "Berossos" connected Oriental cataclysm and Stoic *ekpyrosis*). No destruction of the universe by water is known to be valid for Early Stoic cosmology: the notion of alternate destructions by water and fire only later infiltrated Stoic thought, cf. Sen., *N.Qu.* III, c. 27-30 and *Cons. Marc.* 26, 6. *SVF* II, 608 is late too. Also Origen, *C. Cels.* IV, 64 = *SVF* II, 1174 mentions both cataclysms and conflagrations [sent by Providence!]; the attribution of this text to Chrysippus by Von Arnim, II p. 337, 14f. is, however, not sufficiently grounded. [Also note that the "hymns of the Magi" (see below, p. 182) in Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36, 47-49 describe in their more Platonizing part — based upon the imagery of the *Phaedrus*-myth — alternating *partial* destruction by fire and water, which are sharply distinguished from *total* conflagration (only!) in the more Stoicizing section 51-54. Cf. Pohlenz, *o.c.* II, 47]. Apparently, Platonic and Aristotelian ideas were later conflated with Stoic theories: Plato, *Tim.* 22Cf. — but not in the serious treatment of the Great Year at 39D, cf. Cornford and Taylor *ad l.* — loosely links up alternating cataclysms and conflagrations with the Great Year. These, however, are only *partial*, are as those cataclysms and dryings-up mentioned by Arist., *Mete.* I, 14. Aet. II 5, 3 = Philolaus, *VS* 44A18 (a garbled text) can be read as referring to either total or, more probably, only partial (cf. W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Early Pythagoreanism*, Cambridge, Mass. 1972, 315 n. 86) destructions of the cosmos by water and fire; there is, however, no evidence that this information does not derive from a pseudepigraphon. There is, in any case, no reason to follow Wiersma, *l.c.*, in the attribution of a doctrine of *ekpyrosis* to "the Pythagoreans". It is, on the other hand, true that Aristotle (cf. above, n. 36) and Theophrastus (*Phys. op.* fr. 1 Diels = *VS* 22A5, cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 8) interpreted Heraclitus as subscribing to the destruction of the universe by fire (cf. Wiersma, *o.c.* 204f. Kirk, *o.c.* 318ff.; and especially J. Kerschensteiner, 'Der Bericht Theophrasts über Heraklit', *Hermes* 1955, [385ff.], 397f., 409). Accordingly, Oriental parallels can be dispensed with, the Greek philosophical tradition itself being suggestive enough. Plato (*Tim.* 22B, Phaeton) and Aristotle (*Mete.* I 14, 352a33f., Deucalion) also refer, in this context, to myth; to a Stoic, myth is truth in a particular form.

a Christian Father has long proved unfounded. The treatise was edited as long ago as 1895 by Brinkmann for the Teubner series;[53] the Zeno-fragment, absent from *SVF*,[54] is in Ch. XII, p. 19,2f. Br. It has the form (*breves et acutulas conclusiones*, Cic. *ND* III, 18, not in *SVF*) characteristic of Zeno's arguments, and runs as follows: "'The universe (τὸ πᾶν) will be totally destroyed. Everything which burns ⟨something⟩, having ⟨what⟩ it burns, shall burn up the whole of it (ὅλον). The sun is *fire* — shall it not, then, burn up what it has?'; which entailed,[55] as he believed, that 'the universe would be totally destroyed by *fire*'".[56] This must come from Zeno's work *On the Whole*, i.e. the Universe (Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου), in which he treated the genesis and destruction of the universe.[57] It surely is not too far-fetched to posit that its underscoring of the being burnt of a "whole" and of, finally, the "all" or "universe"[58] is directed at the position of *De phil.* fr. 19a and, by implication, at that of Plato, *Tim.* 32c, *Laws* X, 903B.[59] Furthermore, in his *De an.*, II, 4, 416a9-18,[60] Aristotle had argued that the vegetative soul cannot be fire, because it is the nature of fire to go on burning as long as fuel is available, without limit, whereas each of the living beings has a limit of growth. Cf. also *Mete.* I, 3, 340a1f.: "if the intervals" [sc. between the heavenly bodies]" were filled with fire and the [heavenly] bodies themselves consisted of fire, each of the other elements would long since have been wiped out". On the face of it, therefore, it looks as if Zeno had made skilful use of an Aristotelian argument for definitely un-Aristotelian ends.[61] — The impeccable evidence of the neglected fragment is confirmed by other scraps of information: Zeno taught that the sun is an intelligent entity, kindled by exhalation from the sea (*Et. Gud.* s.v. ἥλιος = *SVF* I, 121).[62] The above-quoted fragment of Arius Didymus (*SVF* II, 599) informs us that "Common Nature becomes greater and more, and finally dries up everything and takes it back into itself"; here Nature is clearly identified with fire. Alex. Aphr., *In Mete.* p. 61, 34f. Hayduck = *SVF* II, 594 suggests that the Stoics spoke of a gradual drying-up of the sea.[63] A passage in Cicero, *ND* II, 118 = *SVF* II, 593 tells us that according to the Stoics the heavenly bodies are nourished by the vapours of the earth and sea;[64] they shed these vapours back again, with the loss of almost nothing or only a very small part of their matter; hence (n.b.: Panaetius disagreed) the cosmos will eventually become fire. In his *On Providence*, bk. I, ap. Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1052C = *SVF* II, 604 Chrysippus says that Zeus or the "Soul of the Universe ... *continually goes on growing* until it has completely absorbed matter" (my italics). We may infer that the balance of cosmic change is, however slightly, incomplete and imperfect, because a small but, in accumulation, sufficiently effective part of the moisture is not reconverted from fire. A fragment from Cleanthes confirms the circumstances of the sun's way of operating: "the sun consists of fire and is nurtured by the vapours from the Ocean, because no fire could continue to exist without some sort of food..." [Cic., *ND* II, 40 = *SVF* I, 504, the beginning]. Cf. also Cic. *ND* III, 37 =

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[53] *Alexandri Lycopolitani contra Manichaeorum opiniones disputatio.* A translation with introduction and notes by P. W. van der Horst and the present author, which first appeared in the defunct journal *Theta-Pi* for 1974, 1ff., was separately published in the same year with some corrections and additions: *An Alexandrian Platonist against Dualism: Alexander of Lycopolis' Treatise "Critique of the Doctrines of Manichaeus"*, Leiden 1974. At p. 74, n. 293-296 I have briefly discussed the Zeno-fragment.

[54] In the introduction to his edition Brinkmann already singled out this fragment for special mention; in vain. It was independently rediscovered by Pease, who, apparently unaware of Brinkmann's edition, reproduced the text from Migne, *Patr. gr.* 18, 428c (which is defective) and tersely commented: "The following passage ... merits addition on p. 32 of the first volume" [of *SVF*]; A. S. Pease, 'Paralipomena', *Class. Philol.* 1921, 200. Nobody seems to have noticed, cf. e.g. Sandbach, *o.c.* 79, whose guess, by the way, is excellent: "One can only guess at their reasons for holding it [sc. the *ekpyrosis*-doctrine]. Perhaps Zeno believed that fire would necessarily continue to convert other elements into itself as long as fuel remained"; later on, *ibid.* 120, he without qualification mentions the "orthodox view that fire will eat up all the other elements, until everything is fire". Pohlenz' similar suggestions, *o.c.* I 79, II 45, are based upon *SVF* I, 106 (cf. above, n. 32, n. 43).

[55] For a similar tagged-on conclusion cf. Sext., *M.* IX, 101 = *SVF* I, 113.

[56] ...τὸν Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κιτιέως ... λόγον, ὃς "τὸ πᾶν ἐκπυρωθήσεται" λέγων "πᾶν τὸ καῖον ἔχον ⟨ὅτι⟩ καύσῃ ὅλον καύσει· καὶ ὁ ἥλιος πῦρ ἐστιν καὶ ὃ ἔχει οὐ καύσει;" ἐξ οὗ συνήγετο, ὡς ᾤετο, "τὸ πᾶν ἐκπυρωθήσεσθαι".

[57] Diog. Laert. VII, 142 = *SVF* I, 102; cf. *ibid.* 135-6, *SVF ibid.*, where Zeno's cosmogony is attributed to Π. τ. ὅλου. In the same work, he also argued that the universe is "one" (*ibid.* VII, 143 = *SVF* I, 97). Two points of detail, traditionally belonging to the subject-matter of treatises *On Nature* (Περὶ φύσεως) are also attributed to the *On the 'Whole'*: an explanation of the eclipse of the sun (*ibid.* VII, 145f. = *SVF* I, 119) and one of the nature of thunder and lightning (*ibid.* VII, 153-4 = *SVF* I, 117). Subjects which had been treated by Aristotle in different works are accordingly reunited by Zeno.

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[58] Only later, the Stoics distinguished between τὸ ὅλον = "the universe" and τὸ πᾶν = the universe + the outside void" (*SVF* II, 522ff.).

[59] For "the whole" in the sense of "ordered universe" *c.q.* the universe inclusive of the cause of its order in Aristotle cf. also *GC* II, 10, 336b25f.; *Mete.* I, 9-10; *Met.* Λ, 10, 1075a11ff.

[60] Already referred to by Brinkmann, *ad l.* Hahm, who *o.c.* 146-8 discusses numerous passages on the relation between fire and the vegetative soul in Aristotle, concluding that, though "closely connected", they are "not identical", has missed this one. — Cf. also n. 70 *in fine*, for *GA* II, 3. In ps.Probus, *In Verg. Ecl.* p. 13, 1f. Keil — in the section, p. 10, 31ff. Keil, discussing with much doxographical learning (cf. Diels, *DG* 90f.) various theories of the elements (but note that ps.Probus' erudition is not merely doxographical) — I have found a notice concerning Aristotle which has been overlooked by Rose and others, although the contents of its second half do not exactly match any passage in the esoteric works (and are not paralleled in other doxographical accounts either): *Aristoteles quattuor esse elementa ait, aquam et terram ponderibus suis deorsum ferri, ignem et aera tenuitate sua sublevari, et his quattuor elementis quintum quasi proprium aethera addit privata mole discretum.* (13, 5f.) *Idem Aristoteles ait non esse idem ignem et aethera, diversitatemque eorum elementorum probari ex eo, quod ignis omnia consumat aether omnia conservet et nutriat.* (Transl.: "Aristotle says there are four elements, and that water and earth are carried downwards by their weights, and fire and air are elevated by their tenuity; and to these four elements he adds as a kind of special fifth the aether, distinguished by its particular mass. The same Aristotle says that fire and air are not the same, and that the difference between these elements is proved by the fact *that fire consumes all things, whereas aether sustains and feeds all things*"). This text should be studied in connexion with the passage from Cicero quoted below, n. 66 and 67.

[61] That Zeno and his followers were diligent readers of virtually all of Aristotle's "esoteric", i.e. not yet published works is a presupposition fundamental to the whole of Hahm's reconstruction of the origins of Stoic cosmology (cf. below, n. 115). It is, of course, entirely possible that they were familiar with at least a number of them. In the case of Epicurus, such knowledge is succesfully postulated by D. J. Furley, *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists*, Princeton 1967 (for other instances cf. Krämer,

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o.c. 132 n. 109) and not totally rejected even by E. Bignone, for all his championing of the "lost Aristotle": cf. the paper 'La dottrina epicurea del clinamen', *Atene e Roma* 1940, 159ff., reprinted in the second edition of his *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, [Firenze 1936], ^{2}1973, vol. II, 409ff. — It is, on the other hand, also possible that arguments similar to that in *An.* II, 4 and *Mete.* I, 3 were used by Aristotle in the context of fr. 19a in the *De phil.*, especially because the account in *Mete.*, *l.c.* and *Cael.*, II, 7 is somewhat meagre.

[62] Cf. the explanation given by Cleanthes ap. Ar. Did. fr. 39 Diels (= *SVF* I, 141, 519) of Zeno's definition of the human soul [which, according to Galen, *Plac. Hipp. Plat.* p. 248 Müller (= *SVF* I, 140), is nourished from the blood] as "sentient exhalation" (αἰσθητικὴ ἀναθυμίασις): it is an exhalation, says Cleanthes, in the sense of Heracl., *VS* 22B12, which he quotes, and sentient *qua* cognitive, in the sense that its ruling part is capable of receiving and accepting the impressions from real objects.

[63] Likewise referred to by Brinkmann *ad l.*

[64] See e.g. Lapidge, *o.c.* 272, who finds it difficult to accept this doctrine; Boyancé, *o.c.* 90 and n. 3; Sandbach, *o.c.* 78; Hahm, *o.c.* 189.

SVF I, 501, where Cleanthes explains why the sun returns from the farthest points of its orbit: *ne longius discedat a cibo* ("in order not to stray too far from its food"). Chrysippus again, in the same book of his *On Providence*, ap. Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1053A = *SVF* II, 579 says that "the heavenly bodies along with the sun are kindled from the sea"; cf. also Plutarch's introduction to this quote.

There is a serious difficulty here, however. Zeno, probably influenced in this respect by Theophrastus,[65] had rejected Aristotle's theory of the aether as the primary element distinct from the ordinary elements (fire etc.) below the moon:[66] fire itself, Zeno says, is the supreme element; it is to be identified with nature (*SVF* I, 171, several passages) and god (*SVF* I, 157, two passages). It is also the element responsible for the cognitive functions of understanding and perception.[67] But the fragment of Cleanthes (*SVF* I, 504), the beginning of which was quoted above, goes on to stipulate a distinction between two kinds of fire: burning and destructive fire on the one hand, benevolent, sustaining and vital fire on the other. The sun and the other heavenly bodies, since they are causes of life on earth, are said to consist of this vital fire, which is also present within ordinary living beings. This distinction[68] is already attributed to Zeno, Ar.

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[65] Cf. Steinmetz, *o.c.* 118ff. and already H. Siebeck, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen*, Freiburg ²1888, 223f., and E. Grumach, *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa*, Berlin 1932 = Berlin etc., ²1966, 53ff. See also my *Ps. Hipp. Tract*, 82ff., where I discuss Steinmetz' views. P. Moraux, 'Quinta Essentia', *RE* XXIV, Stuttgart 1963, [1171ff.], 1231-2, is more cautious, suggesting that Theophrastus "perhaps" gave up the aether-theory; in view of the explicit testimony of the *De ign.* [s. below, n. 68] this caution is unnecessary.

[66] Cic., *Ac. po.* I, 39 (not in *SVF*): *De naturis enim sic sentiebat* [sc. Zeno], *primum ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur non adhiberet.* Cf. Moraux' illuminating discussion, *RE* 1232: that Zeno is mentioned for his critique is truly remarkable; the position of his opponents, however, has been, in Cicero's account, doctored to suit Zeno's criticisms.

[67] Cicero continues: *statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus* (= *SVF* I, 134). In my *Ps. Hipp. Tract*, 86ff., I have discussed Stoic theories of fire at some length.

[68] Though the term "vital" seems to have been an addition by Cleanthes. I have discussed Cleanthes' vital fire in my *Ps. Hipp. Tract*, 86ff., 93ff., 103ff. Already Theophrastus distinguished two kinds of fire or rather "heat" (note that these two kinds do not constitute different elements), *De ign.* c. I 4-6; *ibid.*, VI, 44 p. 358, 21f. Wimmer he speaks of a 'life-giving and productive heat" (θερμότης ... οἱονεὶ ζῶσα καὶ γόνιμος) within living beings, than which the productive heat of the sun is even

Did. fr. 33 Diels = *SVF* I, 120: there are two kinds of fire, the one nontechnical (uncreative), converting its sustenance into itself, the other technical (craftsmanlike, creative); the latter variety is found within plants and animals, and is the substance of the heavenly bodies. Nature, too, is, according to Zeno (*SVF* I, 171), a craftsmanlike fire, the cause of rational coming into being.

We may ask, however, what becomes of this important distinction if the heavenly bodies, explicitly said to consist of the craftsmanlike kind, are simultaneously the cause of the destruction of the universe to the extent that they exactly behave like the uncraftsmanlike kind in that, however slowly, they convert their sustenance into themselves? "Zeno appears to have proposed no solution to this glaring contradiction", runs the verdict of a contemporary scholar.[69] The question,

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prior. For precedent in Aristotle s. below, n. 70 *in fine*. Plato, *Tim.* 58C distinguishes three varieties of the element fire: flames, light and "what is left in glowing embers"; he does not speak of vital fire, and aether is a form of air (58D).

[69] Lapidge, *o.c.* 273. His solution, *ibid.* 270f. is to make the craftsmanlike fire into a "principle" (ἀρχή) distinct from the ordinary, destructive "element" (στοιχεῖον); he further suggests that it is Chrysippus who, having introduced the *pneuma*, is responsible for subsequent failures to account for the distinction, *ibid.* 273f. However, the stipulation of fire the principle does not explain the consumption of moisture by the heavenly bodies, which after all consist of the craftsmanlike variety. Furthermore, the introduction of the *pneuma* by Chrysippus (cf. below, n. 151) does not interfere with the latter's *ekpyrosis*-doctrine: the fact that god remains responsible is, at first sight, as difficult in Chrysippus' case as it is in the others'. On the other hand, Lapidge has correctly insisted on what is beyond doubt a genuine problem, although he is not as unanticipated as he thinks, cf. below, on Gilbert, Boyancé, Van Straaten and Krämer. As a rule, however, scholars have failed to acknowledge it: e.g. J. Baudry, *Le Problème de l'Origine et de l'Éternité du Monde dans la philosophie grecque de Platon à l'ère chrétienne*, Paris 1931, 243; Moraux, *RE* 1233; Rist, *o.c.* 176, 203; L. Bloos, *Probleme der stoischen Physik*, Hamb. Stud. z. Philosophie 4, Hamburg 1973, 124; Spanneut, *o.c.* 23-4; G. E. R. Lloyd, *Greek Science after Aristotle*, London 1973, 28; Hahm, *o.c.* 57ff., 185ff. All these authors say that fire is the agent both of the generation and the destruction of the universe; Moreau, *o.c.* 184, even speaking of craftsmanlike fire in this connexion; this is, of course, correct, but not correct enough. K. von Fritz, 'Zenon 2) von Kition', *RE Xa*, Stuttgart 1972 [83ff.], 108 is inconclusive; he pertinently distinguishes the two fires, of which the craftsmanlike kind, he says, is responsible for cosmogony, but adds: "aber am Ende wird er [sc. the cosmos] in der ἐκπύρωσις vom Feuer verzehrt", without specifying by which "Feuer".

Van Straaten, *o.c.* 27ff., in an admirable discussion, anticipates, as a possibility, Lapidge's solution, though he does not make fire into a separate principle but identifies it with the Active Cause. He is careful to point out, however, that a duality of elemental fire is equally possible. The same view is already, *in nuce*, found in his however, is if the contradiction is as glaring as that,[70] and if the palpable paradox is less palatable than are other *Stoicorum repugnantia.*

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thesis, *Panétius. Sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine, avec une édition des fragments*, Amsterdam 1946, 66f. n. 1. See further below, p. 180. H. J. Krämer, *o.c.* 108-109, argues that fire qua principle, the "Urfeuer der Ekpyrosis", "streng genommen mit dem kosmischen Element Feuer (Äther) nicht identisch [ist]", but does not further discuss the problems this would entail.

[70] Lapidge's problem was explicitly discussed by O. Gilbert, *Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums*, Leipzig 1907 = Hildesheim 1967, 243 n. 1 and 248f. He argues that the distinction between the two fires does not preclude "ihren gemeinsamen Ursprung", *because* — as he, not wholly correctly, formulates — the sun, consisting of the one kind, is nourished by the other into which the vapours are converted. The distinction amounts to the fact that the "irdische Feuer" is uncraftsmanlike only, the heavenly apparently being both. Boyancé, *Ét.* 67ff. is somewhat inconclusive; he comments upon the distinction of two fires by Zeno and Cleanthes, and suggests that "brightness" (αὐγή) was added by Chrysippus as a third fire, or fifth element beyond the traditional four. He states that it is into this "brightness", as it is into Cleanthes' "flame", that the universe dissolves at *ekpyrosis*, without commenting upon the fact that in this way the superior "brightness" assumes the distinctive property of uncraftsmanlike fire. Sandbach, *o.c.* 72, points out, without referring to a specific text, that each element exists in several forms; *ibid.* 74 he stipulates: "fire the artificer is a form of the element fire, distinguished by its constructive effects from destructive fire", a point of view which closely approaches that of Gilbert. However, *ibid.* 74 he refuses to identify "fire the artificer" with god the *logos*, whereas *ibid.* 79 he says that nature *qua* "fire the artificer" is "god, who methodically executes the plan according to which the world" and its contents "change and grow". This generates several confusions: why cannot the god who methodically executes the plan etc. be identified with *logos*? Again, at p. 79, he speaks of the "fire to which the world returns at *ekpyrosis*" as being "the kind of fire that had previously given it its qualities"; how does this match the remark that god *qua* craftsmanlike fire is only concerned with generation? The view of Long, *Hell. Phil.* 154f. that "Zeno and Cleanthes identified *logos* with fire" and that "'Fiery' is the one qualification which 'matter' is always endowed with by its association with *logos*", is more consistent than Sandbach's. On the other hand, Long restricts the notion of fire to that of the craftsmanlike kind, not entering into the difficulties this entails for *ekpyrosis*.

Ar. Did. fr. 21 Diels = *SVF* II, 413, p. 136, 24ff. attributes to Chrysippus — who is, at the beginning of the fragment, explicitly said to follow Zeno — the assumption that the elements exist in several forms: "fire is said of all that is fiery and air of all that is airy etc." (λέγεσθαι ⟨δὲ⟩ πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπά). Seneca, *N.Qu.* III 14, 2 refers to an "Egyptian" theory, according to which each of the four elements exists in two forms, a masculine and a feminine form: male fire burns, female fire shines harmlessly — this theory is Stoic rather than Egyptian. It is interesting to compare a chapter in the Elder Pliny, *NH* XXXVI, c. 68, in which, commenting upon the effects of fire as used in technology, he somewhat naively concludes: "(fire) is an immense, unruly portion of the physical world, and one as to which it may be a matter of doubt whether there are more things it

The all-important rôle of the sun in bringing about total conflagration is anyhow undeniable: the evidence of the neglected Zeno-fragment in Alexander of Lycopolis, which has it that the sun's [slow but] complete consumption of its fuel brings about *ekpyrosis* is confirmed by a fragment of Cleanthes ap. Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075D = *SVF* I, 510: it is the sun which at the moment of *ekpyrosis* assimilates to itself the other heavenly bodies. Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus, moreover, are said to have held [*ibid.* 1075A-C = *SVF* I, 536; II, 1049] that Zeus (Cleanthes' benevolent Zeus![71]) eventually consumes into himself all the elements and literally everything[72] and that all the other gods are destroyed by this fire. Consequently, there appears to be no difference of opinion upon this point among the Early Stoics, although Chrysippus (for reasons of his own (cf. below, p. 174f.) did not single out the sun for special mention. Plutarch, being a Platonist, understandably protests (*o.c.* 1075B) that this doctrine turns god into the great destroyer and makes him weak in that he is nourished by the destruction of others.[73] Cleanthes said

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consumes or more it creates" (*inmensa, inproba rerum naturae portio et in quo dubium sit, plura absumat an pariat*).

The theory ascribed to Chrysippus to some extent recalls that of Plato, who, *Tim.* 57Cff., argued that each element exists in several forms: there are (58C) different sorts of fire, viz. flame, light and "what is left in glowing embers" when the flame is extinguished [for this reason, the theory of the three kinds of fire used by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 86-90, cf. *SVF* II, 612; — n.b. Philo argues contra *ekpyrosis* —, should not be immediately called Stoic, since it makes exactly the same distinction as the *Tim.* although the term αὐγὴ is Stoic]; similarly, there are several kinds of air: aether(!), "gloom" and nameless kinds (58D) as of water (58D-E) and earth (60Bf.). See further G. Vlastos, *Plato's Universe*, Oxford 1975, 72ff. In his *GA* II, 3, 736b35ff. Aristotle so to speak introduces another element besides his customary fire, viz. the vital heat (θερμόν or πνεῦμα) to be found in living beings, distinguished from ordinary, improductive fire and more resembling the astral element (cf. e.g. P. Steinmetz, 'Ansatzpunkte der Elementenlehre Theophrasts im Werk des Aristoteles', in: *Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast*, Verh. 4. Symp. Arist. hrsg. I. Düring, Heidelberg 1969, [224ff.], 241 (see this paper generally for the intricacies of Aristotle's elemental theory, which, however, is less schematic than Plato's, which is based upon mathematical figures, whereas Aristotle's is on qualities). It is truly remarkable, that Aristotle *ibid.*, 736a36f., refers to *An.* II, 4, which contains the passage on fire as destructive quoted p. 149.

[71] S. above, p. 129f.

[72] Cf. D. Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, Paris 1969, 209-10.

[73] *Ibid.*, 452-3 (the whole of *Comm. not.* c. 32-37 is a critique of Stoic theology). The same point is made by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 47.

that at the moment of *ekpyrosis* the cosmos changes into "flame" (φλόξ, Phil., *Aet. mu.* 90 = *SVF* I, 511; cf. the expression ἐκφλογίσθεντος τοῦ πάντος, "when the whole has completely turned into flame", Ar. Did. fr. 38 Diels = *SVF* I, 497). In his *On Providence*, bk. I, a treatise already quoted several times in the above, Chrysippus said the cosmos eventually becomes "fiery throughout" (διόλου ... ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης, ap. Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1053B = *SVF* II, 605), though it is reported elsewhere that he replaced Cleanthes' "flame" by the more refined notion of "light" or "brightness" (αὐγή, Phil., *l.c.* = *SVF* II, 611) [to the reason for this refinement I shall return below, p. 176]. What is important at the moment is that the stipulative distinction between the two kinds of fire postulated by Zeno and Cleanthes does not, apparently, preclude their fundamental unity.[74] Indeed, this becomes quite clear from the already twice-quoted Cleanthes-fragment (*SVF* I, 504), which, it will be recalled, argues in favour of the distinction; speaking of the sun, Cleanthes explicitly attributes to it properties of each distinct kind of fire, for he says: "the contact [of its rays] is of such a nature that it not only warms, but often actually burns".[75] Surprisingly, this dual attribution is made the foundation of the distinction of two kinds of fire in the sequel of the fragment, which is introduced by an *ergo* that must be among the most inconclusive in Latin literature. In *SVF* II, 599 (quoted above, p. 150) Nature, which is Zeno's craftsmanlike fire, is said to dry up all things. Furthermore, in Cleanthes' hymn (*SVF* I, p. 122, 5-10) we read of Zeus' "fiery lightning-rod" (πυρόεντα ... κεραυνόν),[76] described as the agent in the works of Nature, as giving the right direction to Common Law, as going through all things, as mingled with all heavenly bodies, in short as the instrument by which Zeus, everywhere, rules supreme. This is a poetic description of craftsmanlike fire.[77] It should not be forgotten, however, that in the context of Greek mythological tradition Zeus' lightning-rod is first and foremost an instrument of destruction. By its means, Zeus destroys and punishes his enemies and other evil-doers.[78] In the interest of justice, it might be objected. True; but the fact that it is an instrument of destruction which serves the ends of justice is exactly the point that is at issue here. If the fire of lightning is to destroy enemies, it must have other properties than those of conservation only, and conversely.

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[74] S. above, n. 70.

[75] ... *is eius tactus* [the term *tactus* also occurs Sen., *N.Qu.* III, 14, 2, above n. 70] *est, non ut tepefaciat solum, sed etiam saepe comburat.* Boyancé, *Ét.* 70-1 n. 4 aptly adduces Phil., *Conf. ling.* 156 = *SVF* II, 664: ὁ ἥλιος ... τῇ μὲν ἀλεαίνει τῇ δὲ καταφλέγει. It should be added, however, that Boyancé *ibid.* 89 does not enter into the fallaciousness of the argument in *SVF* I, 504.

[76] That the dual nature of fire is implicit in the image of the hymn was pointed out to me by my colleague J. M. Bremer in the discussion following a talk I gave to the Societas Philologica at Amsterdam, 29-10-77. — I should perhaps add that I am aware of the fact, invariably pointed out in the commentaries on the hymn, that Cleanthes' image is dependent upon Heracl., *VS* 22B64. True, but the distinction between ordinary and craftsmanlike fire is not in Heraclitus. The *ekpyrosis* isn't either,

Accordingly, the solution to the "glaring contradiction" referred to above hinges upon the fact that the effective action of fire is, during cosmogony, wholly benevolent in the sense described; that, within the generated and ordered universe itself, its action is for the most part benevolent, but also to a slight extent apparently non-benevolent; and that, in the long run, the latter capacity comes to predominate throughout. We may infer that, at least for Zeno and Cleanthes, there is a double cycle of fire in its opposite aspects, in which the craftsmanlike fire and the destructive fire dominate at opposite ends of the cycle, whereas during the stretches in between each in turn slowly gains the upper hand.[79]

It is interesting to observe that this Early Stoic doctrine was changed by certain later Stoics precisely because they were, apparently, dissatisfied with the fundamental identity of craftsmanlike and destructive fire [I refer to such as did not, like Chrysippus' pupil Zeno of Tarsus[80] and the somewhat later Boethus of Sidon,[81] and Panae-

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whatever Cleanthes' own views on this point may have been. So what we have here is dependence in the form of immediate *interpretatio Stoica.*

[77] Festugière, *Révél. II,* 318f. says lightning and "Feu-Logos" are not identified, but that it is inevitable that "le corps igné [of lightning] ne fasse songer à la nature, ignée aussi, du Logos qui circule à travers toutes choses, mêlé aux corps ignés des astres". N. Festa, *I frammenti degli Stoici antichi, II,* Bari 1935 = Hildesheim 1971, 81 n. *i* says the lightning-rod is the symbol of fire.

[78] Rolke, *o.c.* 227 admits that the traditional image evokes all sorts of associations.

[79] A noteworthy renascence of the Presocratic notion of cosmic justice.

[80] *SVF* III, I Zeno Tars. 5 = Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels; this brief note tells us he

tius,[82] abandon the theory of *ekpyrosis* altogether]. According to the Stoics mentioned at Phil., *Aet. mu.* 8-9 = *SVF* II, 620 god is only the cause of the world's coming into being, whereas its destruction is the work of "the indefatigable force of fire".[83] The unanimous view of the Early Stoics (e.g. Diog. Laert. VII, 137 = *SVF* II, 526), on the other hand, is that it is god who not only generates all things, but, so Diog. L., also "after certain periods of time assimilates them to himself" (cf. also above, p. 154, on Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075A-C).[84] Suggestions similar to that in Philo are found in Seneca: at *De ira* II, 27 he argues that the gods are wholly good and that such natural phenomena as seem harmful to us "have their own laws" (*suas ista leges habent*); at *N.qu.* VI 3, 1 he states that the gods are not involved in natural disasters, which have — with only a slight change in terminology — "their own causes" (*suas ista causas habent*). Cf., for a similar view, Phil., *De prov.* II, 102: god is not responsible for physical evils, which are a mere consequence of elemental change.

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suspended judgement. Philo, *Aet. mu.* 77 (= *SVF* III, II, Diog. Bab. 27) affirms that Diogenes [of Babylon] in old age suspended judgement too; Aet., II 32, 4 = *ibid.*, 28 gives his computation of the Great Year.

[81] *SVF* III, VI Boethus Sid. 7 = *Phil., Aet. mu.* 76. In my *Ps. Hipp. Tract*, 128-9 I have briefly discussed the lack of enthusiasm for *ekpyrosis* among some of Chrysippus' pupils and certain Middle Stoics. Cf. also Pohlenz, *o.c.* I 186, 190. Significantly, the Stoic doctrine defended in Cic., *ND* II, 85 has it that the union of the parts of the world must be either eternal [Panaetius' view] and continue in the same beautiful shape we actually see, "or at any rate extremely durable, continuing for a long and so to speak immeasurable time" (*aut certe perdiuturna, permanens ad longinquum et inmensum paene tempus*). Cf. also Philo, *Aet. mu.* 75 = *SVF* II, 459 (in part).

[82] Fgt. 64-66, 68, 69 Van Straaten. See, for discussion of Panaetius' view, Van Straaten's *Panétius*, 67f.

[83] On this passage s. R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften, II*, Leipzig 1882 = Hildesheim 1964, 770-1. Hirzel also refers to the fragments of Posidonius (ap. Aët.) and Cleanthes and Chrysippus (ap. Calc.) cited below, and already aptly contrasts *SVF* II, 620 with the orthodox view of *SVF* II, 526. Capelle, too, *o.c.* 184, enlarges upon the distinctions in respect of theodicy between Early and Middle Stoa; his suggestion, *ibid.* 181f., that it is Posidonius who is responsible will to-date perhaps not be generally acceptable; indeed, he fails to account for the early (partial) parallels, whereas some of his arguments in favour of Posidonius' decisive contribution, e.g. that Ps.Arist. *De mundo* is "Posidonian", are out.

[84] In this context, the Stoic prepositional sequence ἐξ οὗ — ἐν ᾧ (or δι' οὗ) — εἰς ὅν discussed by H. Dörrie, 'Praepositionen und Metaphysik', *Mus. Helv.* 1969, 217ff. is important: the reference is to god.

Seneca is not very consistent,[85] however, in so far as elsewhere he makes god responsible for cosmic cataclysms and conflagrations.[86] It is by no means unlikely that such later Stoic corrections of the original doctrine are somehow connected with Posidonius' explicit distinction between Zeus, Nature and Fate, Aët. I 28, 5 = Posidonius fr. 103 Edelstein-Kidd,[87] although the interpretation of this fragment is rendered very difficult for lack of further information. It is certainly arguable that there is an element of Platonic influence in Posidonius' view.[88] It should also be pointed out, however, that according to Cleanthes (Calc. c. 144 = *SVF* I, 551) there is a certain amount of difference between Providence and Fate in that all things which are according to the former are also according to the latter, but not conversely [note, by the way, that the difference is only partial and that, unlike Posidonius, he does not mention Nature and speaks of Providence, not Zeus]. It is by no means sure that this statement applies to cosmology,[89] although a cosmological interpretation is possible, and was perhaps advocated by later Stoics. It should furthermore be pointed out that Chrysippus, discussing physical evil [with the significant exception of *ekpyrosis*] in the context of theodicy, among other things suggested the possibility that physical evil is caused indirectly, that what we have here is not fatality but "confatality", i.e. concomitant or accidental fatality, a notion which is perhaps best rendered in terms of a compromise made by god, as some things inevitably have to be taken into the bargain even by him.[90]

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[85] At *N.Qu.* II 45, 2 he identifies god and nature. At *N.Qu.* II, 46 his point of view approaches that of Chrysippus' "confatality", cf. below, n. 90. A Platonizing touch is found *De prov.* 5, 9: "the Demiurge is incapable of changing matter" (*non potest artifex mutare materiam*; cf. also *Ep.* 58, 27). *Ep.* 65, 10 he quotes with complete approval Plato, *Tim.* 29Df. god makes the world as best he can. H. Steiner, *Theodizee bei Seneca*, thesis Erlangen 1914, pertinently comments on these and related passages.

[86] *N.Qu.* III, c. 27ff.

[87] I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften, II*, Breslau 1928 = Hildesheim 1968, 82f. gives a commendable interpretation of the Posidonius-fragment and a related passage.

[88] Cf. Hirzel, *o.c.* 771.

[89] Greene, for instance, *o.c.* 344-5 suggests it pertains to moral evil and human responsibility, adducing the prayer that ends the hymn, for which s. above, p. 130.

[90] Cf. Gellius, *NA* VII 1, 7-13 = *SVF* II, 1169 (It has not been, I believe, generally noticed that the example of the fragility of the skull, inevitable if higher, cognitive purposes are to be served, is already in Plato, *Tim.* 75Bf.); Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1050E =

However, Chrysippus definitely disagreed with Cleanthes by subscribing to the view already held by Zeno (*SVF* I, 160, several passages), viz. that Providence and Fate are the same [Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1056C = *SVF* II, 937; Calc., *l.c.* = *SVF* II, 933].[91] Finally, it is of some interest to note that the section *On Fate* in Calcidius (c. 142-190), which defends a (Middle) Platonist view of Fate and Providence against the Stoics, argues that Providence is above Fate, whereas the common Stoic mistake is to identify them.[92] Apparently, the orthodox and ancient view either regained the upper hand or was, for a Platonist, the easier one to refute.

We may conclude that, in Early Stoic thought, explicitly in Cleanthes, implicitly in Chrysippus' theodicy, there are in any case some hints regarding the difficulties of reconciling Fate and Providence which later (properly: Later Early and Early Middle) Stoics could make use of as underpinnings in order to formulate their own solutions.[93] This makes it all the more interesting that the Early Stoics, sharply differing in this respect from such later followers as are mentioned by Philo, were adamant in giving god and Providence full responsibility for total conflagration.

4. No evidence has survived, or perhaps I should say has yet been recognized, which is as obviously pertinent to the reconstruction of Zeno's opposition to the position represented by the theological argument at Arist., *De phil.* fr. 19c Ross, as is, in my opinion, the passage from Alexander of Lycopolis to that of his critical reaction to the physical argument of fr. 19a Ross. [It will be recalled that, in both fragments, Aristotle continues and improves upon earlier arguments of Plato, and that in Plato the physical and the theological aspects are not as seriously distinguished as in Aristotle]. It is, however, possible to reconstruct Zeno's point of view in this respect by starting from a, by no means fully original, hypothetical consideration of the form this opposition may concievably have assumed,

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SVF II, 1176; *ibid.* 1051C = *SVF* II, 1178, p. 338, 33: "he (sc. Chrysippus) says that Necessity (ἀνάγκη) is to a large extent involved". S. above, n. 12.

[91] Cf. also above, n. 2.

[92] This is well brought out by J. den Boeft, *Calcidius on Fate*, thesis Leiden 1970.

[93] See further the final section of this paper, below p. 186f.

and by attempting to discover to which degree the extant evidence — to my regret, I have not this time stumbled across a neglected fragment by Zeno again — either supports or contradicts this hypothesis.

As will be recalled, Plato had argued that the Demiurge has made his creation proof against both inside and outside causes of destruction; furthermore, that he will never destroy his own handiwork. Aristotle had argued that (a) a Demiurge, if good, will never destroy the cosmos he has made and, *a fortiori* — should we nevertheless suppose him to have done so — will not abstain from constructing another one, because order is superior to chaos; furthermore, that (b) such another cosmos, if created, would have to be either better than, equal to, or worse than the actually existing one: a trilemma with three dead ends.

Presumably, Zeno's answer was worked out along the following lines. (a) Since the — for physical reasons already wholly inevitable — total conflagration, or conversion of the ordered universe, its parts, and all separate things, into one fiery condition means a return to what may be considered the by all means best possible state of affairs, in which only god and nothing else is present in matter or substance, the destruction of this ordered set of separate things does not result, as on Plato's view, in a contradiction in respect of god's nature or, as on Aristotle's view, in an equally contradictory state of chaos, but, on the contrary, in one of better and higher organization.[94] The best condition substance is able to acquire is evidently that in which divine unity has been most fully realized. This condition is not "cosmic" in the ordinary sense of the word but, if I may say so, "meta-cosmic". Accordingly and, to some extent, surprisingly, it is not so much the destruction of the universe which has to be vindicated as is its generation, since this, on what I suppose to have been Zeno's view, would be tantamount to a return to a state inferior to that at *ekpyrosis*.[95] I do not, of course, suggest that Zeno would have been obliged to defend a creation of the ordered universe against Plato and Aristotle: according to Plato, such a creation is a wholly good event, whereas Aristotle, for all his denying of its possibility, clearly rates creation higher than destruction (cf. Phil. *Aet. mu.* 10-11 = *De phil.* fr. 18 Ross, where those who let the universe be destroyed as well as generated are accused of "terrible atheism"; no such charge is levelled against those who merely generate it).[96] What I wish to say is, rather, that Zeno was obliged to submit an explanation of the rebirth of the universe on his own terms; the need arose in a situation of his own devising and exactly because he held the position he did. Furthermore, the explanation offered had better not be out of harmony with the theoretical presuppositions of his system.

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[94] Cf. Moreau, *o.c.* 168: "L'Univers rentre ainsi, à intervalles périodiques, dans son état d'homogénéité primitive"; Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 79: "So steht am Ende unserer Weltperiode die Rückkehr in den feurigen Urzustand, die Ekpyrosis, die aus der Vielheit wieder die Einheit herstellt"; Arnold, *o.c.* 191.

[95] Cf. H. von Arnim, *Die europäische Philosophie des Altertums*, in: *Die Kultur der Gegenwart, T. 1 Abt. 5: Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Leipzig-Berlin ^{2}1913,

Here his rejection of transcendentalism, in whatever form, proved a boon and a blessing. Zeno's god is a physical, corporeal entity, not something beyond matter, as in Plato and Aristotle, but inseparably bound up with it. We may say that if there are serious limits to this god's omnipotence, it is exactly here that they have to be situated.[97] God does not act *ad libitum* — indeed, no Greek philosophical god since Plato does — but, being corporeal, he is not exempt from the laws of physics. These laws can be said to be of his own devising,[98] i.e. they have been instituted as such as a result of god's being what he is *ab aeterno.* But the lawlike physical process, however much it be, as on Zeno's view, a self-directed one, remains a *physical* process. There is, accordingly, a limit to the duration of matter in its best possible, i.e. wholly fiery and divine, state, just as there is a limit to the duration of the ordered universe: when all the fuel has been consumed, i.e. turned into fire [as it

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[94-263], 212: "Nun besteht aber die Entfaltung der einen Substanz [Von Arnim means substance *plus* god] zu einem Kosmos in ... einem teilweisen Hinabsinken der Substanz auf niedere Daseinsstufen".

[96] Cf. Effe, *o.c.* 14f.

[97] Edelstein, *o.c.* 33 links the limitation of god's power to the fact fire is its manifestation.

[98] Cf. Seneca's happy formula, *De prov.* 5, 8: *Semper paret, semel iussit* ("having once given the command, he always obeys"). — It should, of course, be added that in the Stoa — as with the majority of Greek philosophical schools or individuals — no fundamental distinction is made between moral and physical laws.

must be since substance is not quantitatively infinite],[99] a gradual quenching of the fire sets in and spreads until, according to an abstract from the "On the 'Whole'", only a "liquid mass" is left, in which the fiery god is "still present as spermatic *logos*", "just as the seed in the seminal fluid" (Diog. L. VII 135-136 = *SVF* I, 102).[100] I suppose that this watery state of the totality of substance is where the cosmic cycle is, so to speak, at its lowest ebb, and that the creation-in-phases of the ordered universe out of this humid "seed", slowly reverting to or developing into other elementary states is "good" in the sense required above precisely because it also is the first important step towards the next *ekpyrosis.*[101]

It will be recognized that in this way Aristotle's first dilemma in *De phil.* fr. 19c is neatly answered; his other dilemma, or rather trilemma, (b) regarding the position of a Demiurge as related to the sort of new world he is going to create, can also be answered. (b′) No change, for better or for worse, of god's nature is involved, if the recreated universe is, both as to its structure and as to its history, the exact replica of its predecessor. The only point made by Aristotle which it is arguable was perhaps not answered, is his statement that the fashioning of an equal universe entails the notion of a Demiurge who is "someone labouring in vain" (ματαιόπονος), destroying and rebuilding at his pleasure like a child playing. It is not certain, however, that this point is not an interpolation, inserted by a later Peripatetic, a "heretical" Stoic [or even Philo himself], in order to make Aristotle's argument apply to orthodox Stoic cosmology as well.[102] But let us assume that the point was already made in the *De phil.*; if so, it could have been met by the argument that, surely, the creation of a universe that is in every detail indistinguishable from its predecessor is no child's play, and that a Demiurge, who saves appearances by the fashioning of a product which both accounts for the phenomena of transitoriness and satisfies the need for cognitively grounded statements (s. below), does not labour in vain.[103] What's more, the expression (sc. "equal") presumably used by Aristotle in this context does not suggest a repetition of same in the sense of eternal recurrence, but only in that of identity of general structure: the other world would be just like ours and contain the same species of living beings, but not necessarily the same individuals.

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[99] Ar. Did. fr. 20 Diels = *SVF* I, 87: "the eternal substance of all things becomes neither more nor less", i.e. is finite.

[100] Cf. above, p. 145.

[101] Cf. Moreau, *o.c.* 171: the cosmogony "aboutit à la conflagration".

[102] Cf. Plut., *De E* 393Ef. and Baltes, *o.c.* 206 ("Ammonius" uses the argument against *the ekpyrosis*).

When, now, we turn to consider some of the other evidence — some points of a physical nature already having been mentioned —, we shall see that the information at our disposal not only does not contradict our hypothesis, but fits it rather well. According to Tatian, *Adv. Graec.* 5 = *SVF* I, 109, Zeno argued that Anytus and Meletus will again accuse (sc. Socrates);[104] the example beautifully fits Zeno, who was an admirer of Xenophon's *Memoir of Socrates* and was even, according to anecdote, won over to philosophy by hearing it recited.[105] Accordingly, the history of humanity will ever repeat itself (Zeno is credited with other examples as well). Tatian's testimony is fully confirmed by a notice in Aëtius, I 27, 5, purporting to be an abstract from Zeno's work *On Nature* (Περὶ φύσεως):[106] "Zeno said that Destiny is the power which moves matter in the same respect and in the same way and that it makes no difference to call it (sc. Destiny) Providence and Nature". In view of the fact that Zeno taught a cosmic cycle, this statement cannot apply to a static condition — actually Zeno says Destiny "moves" matter — but must pertain to eternal recurrence. Now, apart from its explicit identification of Destiny, Providence and Nature,[107] this abstract is fundamental for its description of the *modus quo* of the providential, natural and necessary determination of matter qua being moved κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαυτῶς ("in the same respect and in the same way"). This is a formula with a history. It is prefigured in Parmenides,[108] and used by Plato to characterize the way of being of the transcendental Forms as "those things that are always, in the same respect and in the same way", τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαυτῶς ἔχοντα: cf. the passage introducing the other-wordly Ideas, *Phaed.* 78C-D; *Rep.* V, 479A; *Soph.* 248A (the partly critical account of the theory of the "friends of the Ideas"); *Politic.* 269 (where it is denied of what is corporeal and only granted to what is most divine). Of especial importance, in our connexion, is that Plato, in the *Tim.*, uses it to qualify the Ideal Model imitated by the Demiurge for the creation of the Universe (29A; cf. also 27D-28A). In the same work, Plato uses a form of the expression to characterize the "everlastingly immutable motion of the fixed stars" (40B ἀπλανῆ τῶν ἄστρων ... κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐν ταὐτῷ στρεφόμενα ἀεὶ μένει); similarly, of their rational motion, *Laws* X, 898A-B. The influential ps.Platonic *Epinomis*, famous for its doctrine of astral religion, uses the expression of the heavenly bodies generally: the regular motion of these entities proves that they are intelligent living beings; the "necessity" (ἀνάγκη) of Soul and Intellect is the strongest there is (982B-D).[109] Aristotle continues this line of thought; speaking of the heavenly bodies in general, he says, *Met.* K 6, 1063a13f.: "those things which are always in the same condition" (τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἐχόντων),[110] whereas the First Unmoved Mover "cannot", of course, "ever change its condition in whatever respect" (e.g. *Met.* Λ 7, 1072b8 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς).

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[103] Cf. Sandbach, *o.c.* 79: "... it was necessary that if there were successive world-cycles, they should be identical, since Providence, which is responsible for everything, must order the world in the best way possible, and it it plausible that there cannot be two ways equally good". Similarly Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 81.

[104] Cf. also *SVF* II, 625-626.

[105] Diog. Laert. VII, 1 = *SVF* I, 1; Them., *Or.* 23, 295D = *SVF* I, 9.

[106] This — in itself common — title is lacking in the "Schriftenverzeichnis" of Diog. Laert. VII, 4 = *SVF* I, 41. *Lectio facilior* for Π. οὐσίας (Diog. Laert. VII 134 but not in the list of VII, 4) or even for the better attested Π. τοῦ ὅλου, listed Diog. Laert. VII, 4 and cited five times (s. above, n. 57)?

[107] Cf. also above, n. 2. On *Heimarmene* and *Ananke* as being, for Zeno, "durchaus identisch", cf. W. Gundel, *Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene*, Hab.-Schrift Giessen 1914, 62; as being identical for Chrysippus *ibid.*, 64f.; and, as being, to some extent, distinct for Chrysippus *ibid.*, 67f.

Zeno, in what is undoubtedly one of his major contributions to the history of thought, gave this Platonic-Aristotelian formula a new sense. Rejecting the self-identical invariability of entities or motions that never change at all, he posits that of *what invariably changes in exactly the same way*. We may presume that he was familiar with the discussion concerning the correct interpretation of the creation-story of the *Tim.*;[111] we know that he rejected Plato's transcendental, Ideal Model, as we also know that he rejected Aristotle's double physics, of two worlds, one below the moon and one above, each with its own laws, topped by a supra-physical Unmoved Mover who is in no way directly concerned with what is going on in the universe. Plato's theory of Ideas had been devastatingly criticized by Aristotle both in his popular and in his esoteric works, whereas Aristotle's own cosmological solution had been very severely criticized and in part abandoned by Theophrastus. The cosmological question could by no means be considered as having been solved; accordingly, the positions of all contributors to the discussion were still relevant. Zeno's theory is a *critical alternative* to both the Platonic and the Aristotelian position. In the *Tim.*, 29Df. Plato had distinguished between "being, which never becomes", which is eternal and the object of knowledge because it is always the same, and incessant becoming, which comes into being and vanishes, which is never the same and therefore the object of "opinion together with sensation". The visible world is, in a way, an amalgam of both; by Providence of the Demiurge, it is also a rational, ensouled, living being (30B-C). He had fashioned it after the Eternal Model by persuading Necessity (48Af., 56C) — the Receptacle (50C) or Mother of Becoming (50D) or Nurse (49A) or Place (52A) —, i.e. the other, independent principle, interpreted by Aristotle and Theophrastus as "matter", to tolerate the structures he imposes. Now this interpretation by Aristotle (e.g. *Phys.* IV, 2, 209b10ff.; *GC* II, 1, 329a9ff.; *Cael.* III, 8, 306b16f.) and the cautious Theophrastus (*Phys. op.* fr. 9 Diels, "Plato ... wishes to make the substrate a principle etc.") is a simplification which does no justice to the theoretical subtleties of Plato's account; the correctness of this reading is not, however, what is at issue here: what is important is that Zeno had at his disposal an authoritative

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[108] *VS* 28B8,29, of ungenerated, imperishable, motionless Being: "abiding as the same in the same and in itself it is at rest" (ταὐτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτῷ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται).

[109] Cf. L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis*, Mem. Am. Philos. Ass. 107, Philadelphia 1975, 269f. The "necessity" of this passage is not that of the *Tim.*, which is the cause of *ir*regularity.

[110] Cf. H. Happ, 'Kosmologie und Metaphysik bei Aristoteles', in: *Parusia, Festgabe J. Hirschberger*, Frankfurt/M. 1965, [155ff.], 165f.

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[111] Cf. above, p. 140, p. 143, and Hahm, *o.c.* 189.

Peripatetic interpretation of the *Tim.*[112] Theophrastus not only spoke of receptive matter in this context, but also of another principle, viz. god and the good as cause and mover (αἴτιον καὶ κινοῦν).[113] Theophrastus, that is, already left out the Model *qua* principle, presumably subsuming it under "god and the good".

Plato himself had admitted that his cosmology cannot claim scientific status, since the discourse does not pertain to the ideal object of knowledge, but only to its approximation in the creation of the Demiurge. The whole of Timaeus' speech is only an "approximative" or "plausible account" (εἰκὼς λόγος,[114] 29B-D and *passim*), expressing the approximation, through the providential intervention of the Demiurge, by the visible world or "image", "copy" (εἰκὼν), of the Model. What Zeno, whose reading of Plato will have been influenced by Theophrastus', does, is to abolish the distinctions so carefully made by Plato: that between being and becoming as well as that between god or Providence, and Necessity or "matter";[115] he substitutes eternal and invariant, i.e. cyclical, becoming through providential divine necessity.[116] In Plato, the "physical" principle is independent, so the incorporeal Intellect or god has no other option than trying to persuade it; in Zeno's theory, all things that are, and are causes, are corporeal and physical,[117] and Reason and substance or matter, though both distinguished in reality and distinguishable in thought, are actually always united and always work together.

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[112] This case (cf. also above, n. 33 *in fine*, for Theophrastus' contribution to the dispute on the eternity of the world) is exactly similar to that of the influence of the *interpretatio Peripatetica* of Presocratic philosophers, cf. above, n. 36, n. 52 *in fine*. The importance of Theophrastus' example is minimized by Hahm, *o.c.* 51 n. 23, and by Krämer, *o.c.* 120 n. 62. Krämer's interesting and admirably erudite discussion of the "Vorgeschichte der stoischen Prinzipienlehre", *ibid.* 108ff., which he finds in the tenets of the Early Academy, is rendered less useful because he tends to exclude other influences; the parallels he has collected, however, illustrate how much the points of discussion at issue were in the air towards the end of the 4th Cent. B.C.

[113] Diels *ad l.* already compares Arist., *Met.* A 6, 988a7ff., where Aristotle indeed ascribes a doctrine of two principles to Plato, viz. the final and the material cause. Aristotle, however, here identifies the final cause with the Ideas and the One, whereas the material cause is also the Dyad, sc. the "Great-and-Small". I cannot enter into the problems of interpretation connected with this second principle or into the theoretical, non-physical or idealist aspects of Aristotle's own concept of "matter". It is, for our purpose, sufficient to take notice of the fact that in Aristotle's physical and biological treatises (but by no means only there) "matter" tends to be used in a materialist sense, viz. that of the "stuff" of which things consist; cf. H. Happ, *Hyle. Studien zum aristotelischen Materie-Begriff*, Berlin 1971, 809f.

[114] Cf. B. Witte, 'Der Eikōs Logos in Platons Timaios', *AGPh* 1964, 1ff.

[115] Hahm, in an admirable chapter, *o.c.* 35-48, argues that the Stoics were primarily influenced by Aristotle [his argument, however, implies that they went through the whole of Aristotle's *œuvre* with a rather fine comb]. Stoic "matter" is that of Aristotle "universalized" (*ibid.* 39), whereas the Stoic active cause is dependent both upon Aristotle's Prime Mover or God (*ibid.* 41-42) and upon the theory of causality in, especially, the biological works, where formal, final and efficient cause tend to coalesce

In this context, Zeno also uses ideas developed by Aristotle, who had not only spoken of the eternal circular motion of the heavens

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and to oppose the material cause (*ibid.* 45f.). These operative forms are immanent in nature (*ibid.*). He adds (*ibid.* 39f.) that the "universalization" of Aristotelian matter finds precedent in the *Tim.* and that the immanence of the moving cause is prefigured in that of Plato's World-Soul (*ibid.* 42), while the demiurgic operations of forms in nature find precedent in Plato's Demiurge. He concludes, *ibid.* 47-8: "The Stoic matter could be viewed as an adaptation of Plato's receptacle; the Stoic active principle could absorb both Plato's demiurge and his world soul". However, Hahm's argument, if I understand him correctly, suggests that the Stoic adaptation of the *Tim.* is only a sort of afterthought, whereas I would prefer to think that it is the Peripatetic interpretation of the *Tim.* which, first and foremost, is what is at issue here: if Plato and Theophrastus already interpreted the Receptacle as "matter", and if Zeno believed this interpretation to be correct, no difference between Plato and Aristotle would, on this account, ensue for Zeno. The same point can be made about Theophrastus' interpretation of Plato's Demiurge: if, as is likely, he subsumed the ideas under the active cause and the "good", the way would be open for an Aristotelizing interpretation which would to some extent make the *Tim.* look like an early, not yet wholly scientific form of Aristotelian cosmology (which, of course, it is, although to-date we would formulate the relation differently). Consequently, I find Hahm's final remark, *ibid.* 48, that in the Stoic "synthesis the original elements, drawn largely from Plato and Aristotle, are so tightly welded that they lost most of their Academic and Peripatetic character" wholly acceptable in that it puts Plato and Aristotle on a more equal footing.

For a point of view similar to Hahm's s. Solmsen, *Kl. Schr. I*, 345ff., where it is argued that the Stoic conception of nature as craftsman is unthinkable without Aristotle's example of purpose or *logos* in nature, since Plato had made the Craftsman an external factor (*ibid.* 344; this leaves out of account, however, the contribution of the lesser gods), but that the Stoics returned to Plato for their divinisation of this force (*ibid.* 354-5). Moreau, *o.c.* 160, argues that the Stoic "matter" is Aristotelian, their active cause Platonic, which is only partly correct; *ibid.* 174 he correctly states that the Stoic concept of nature is influenced by Aristotle's.

[116] Cf. Moreau's formula in this context, *o.c.* 168: "Il s'agit donc d'une éternité qui n'est que l'absolu d'un ordre de succession dans le temps; l'absolu se trouve ainsi engagé dans le devenir; nous assistons à une transposition historique de la dialectique platonicienne", etc.

[117] Cf. above, n. 46 (*SVF* II, 525).

(*Met.* Λ 7-10; *Cael.* I, 3; 9; and elsewhere) but had also explained the cycle of sublunar elemental transformation (this "cycle" is also mentioned by Plato, *Tim.* 49C) and that of the reproduction of living beings (a similar motif is in Plato, *Symp.* 208A-B) in the chance-infested regions far below the moon as an approximation of the invariantly self-identical heavenly cycles.[118] For this approximation god, favouring "the best",[119] is responsible (*GC* II, 10, 336b25ff.; cf. also *GA* II, 1, esp. 731b31f.: "that which becomes is eternal in the way possible for it"). It is plausible that the theory of the dependence of these lower cycles upon the higher was also expounded in the *De phil.*,[120] but my argument does not depend on this assumption. Zeno appears to have modified this Aristotelian theory in an original way by so to speak telescoping the heavenly cycles and the cycles of becoming into one and the same cycle: Aristotle's "nature" is reunited. He was only able to do so, however, at the considerable cost of eliminating irregularity or chance or accident from nature — i.e., from nature below the moon, too — and of sacrificing man's autonomous responsibility for his behaviour.[121] The advantage of this solution, however, is that it satisfies the conditions, almost invariably stipulated in Greek philosophy, which objects of knowledge must satisfy in order to be dependable: epistemologically puritanical conditions of permanence and invariance.[122] The events caused by Zeno's Destiny-Providence-Nature are more reliable than those of Plato's "approximative" physics, and just as cognitively reliable as are, for instance, the eclipses of the moon discussed by Arist., *An. Po.* I, 8, 75b32f.: "it is clear that demonstrations and cases of knowledge of frequently happening events, as for instance an eclipse of the moon, are eternal in so far as they refer to events of a specific sort, whereas they apply to particular events in so far as they are not eternal" (sc. because the state of affairs which is expressed in the proposition is not a continuous, but an intermittent one). Zeno's alternative to Aristotle's cosmology satisfies conditions which the latter would have found it difficult to refute without making an appeal to data of experience concerning indeterminated or accidental events[123] or without, of course, rejecting Zeno's system as a whole.

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[118] Cf. Happ, 'Kosm.' 169f. and F. Solmsen, *Aristotle's System of the Physical World*, Ithaca N.Y. 1960, 339f., 387f., 426.

[119] This recalls the mood of the *argumentum ex gradibus* (ab., p. 143).

[120] Cf. Effe, *o.c.* 42ff.

[121] Whereas Aristotle had made sublunar matter, in a sense, responsible, not in itself but *per accidens*, of physical evil (cf. Happ, *Hyle* 767, 772), and man for moral evil (cf. e.g. *EN* III, 5, 1113b2-1114b25).

[122] Cf. my remarks in *Lampas* 1975, 318f., and J. Hintikka, 'Time, Truth and Knowledge in Ancient Greek Philosophy', *APhQu* 1967, 1ff., repr. (with a slightly changed title) in *Time and Necessity*, Oxford 1973, 62ff.

It will be clear that I assume that Zeno, in face of the theological arguments connected with the question of the generation and destruction of the universe as found in the *Tim.* as well as in the *De phil.* [and, presumably, other works by Aristotle], had no other choice. The doctrine of eternal recurrence (*SVF* I, 109) in its theoretical expression (*SVF* I, 176) is the only possible answer to the objection that to destroy (and remake) the world he has made would be contrary to the nature of god.

It is, of course, true that a doctrine of eternal recurrence including the return of individual persons is attributed by Eudemus (fr. 88 Wehrli = *VS* 58 B34) to certain Pythagoreans; this theory even affords a closer parallel to Zeno's doctrine than the cosmologies of Empedocles and Heraclitus as described by Aristotle,[124] which do not involve a repetition of history. It is also true that Zeno is said to have written a book called *Pythagorica.*[125] No testimony regarding its contents survives; it has been plausibly inferred, however, that it mentioned the Pythagorean theory discussed by Eudemus.[126] It is, indeed, plausible that theories of such Pythagoreans, the cosmological myth of Plato's *Politicus*, Empedocles' cosmic cycle, Heraclitus' supposed cosmic cycle and Aristotle's own cycles did inspire Zeno. However, we should be wary of believing this tracing of precedents to be a sufficient explanation of Zeno's theory; his system is not a mere summation of parallels, but an original view, originating in a well-defined problem-situation. The scholastic adage *quidquid recipitur*

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[123] Cf. e.g. *Phys.* II, 5-6; for the in itself unsatisfactory discussion of this topic see W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, London 1923, ^{5}1949, 77f. *De int.* 9 is more satisfactory.

[124] Cf. above, n. 36, n. 52 *in fine*.

[125] Diog. Laert. VII, 4 = *SVF* I, 41, cf. p. 72, Nr. XXI.

[126] Cf. e.g. W. Wiersma, *Mnem.* 1943, 104f.; Hahm, *o.c.* 186.

recipitur ad modum recipientis is also pertinent in Zeno's case.[127] If he borrowed a theory of eternal recurrence, he did so because, in face of the arguments of his Academic and Peripatetic opponents, he rather badly needed it; what's more, he firmly put it in the context of a well-balanced general physical and cosmological theory.

Explicit evidence concerning the returning of all things to god at *ekpyrosis* as being, according to Zeno, a positive event there is none. Such a qualification, however, seems to be entailed by the above-studied statement (*SVF* I, 176) that the cause of matter being moved in the sense of eternal recurrence of same is not only Destiny and Nature, but also Providence. At this point I should like to append a further suggestion as to the possible contents of the *Pythagorica.* A likely relation between Zeno and Empedocles has already been mentioned.[128] Now, if it is possible that Zeno discussed the Pythagoreans likewise referred to by Eudemus, it is also possible that in the *Pythagorica* he discussed Empedocles. The latter's physics is to-date generally and correctly interpreted as constituting a critical reaction to the theories of Parmenides; it is also recognized that his ethics, such as found in the *Katharmoi*, is largely Pythagorean (vegetarianism, the cycle of metempsychosis).[129] Ancient sources, too, point both at Parmenides and at the Pythagoreans. Theophrastus, *Phys. op.* fr. 3 Diels (= *VS* 31A7) says Empedocles was an admirer and follower of Parmenides, "and even more of the Pythagoreans" (καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν Πυθαγορείων). Zeno's somewhat younger contemporary Timaeus of Taormina, ap. Diog. Laert. VIII, 54 (*VS* 31A1, Tim. fr. 14 Jacoby 566) is reported to have told, in the ninth book of his

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[127] Hahm, *o.c.* 48 [similarly elsewhere] says the Stoïc system has a "soul of its own"; an acceptable, but not very cognitive statement.

[128] Above n. 36, n. 52 *in fine.* Van Straaten, *Kerngedachten* 27, pertinently compares the periodical supremacies of the immanent forces of Love and Strife, which are the moving causes in Empedocles' cosmic cycle, with *ekpyrosis* and cosmogony in the Stoic cycle.

[129] For Empedocles' reaction to Parmenides, see e.g. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy, II, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*, Cambridge 1965, 138ff., esp. 147-8, and my paper in *Phron.* (below, n. 132), 35f.; for his Pythagoreanism Guthrie, *o.c.* 250f. (but Guthrie tends to underplay the Pythagorean elements) and G. Zuntz, *Persephone, Three Essays on Religion and Thought in Magna Graecia*, Oxford 1971, 264ff.

History of Magna Graecia, that he was a pupil of "Pythagoras" and was banished from the Pythagorean community on account of plagiarism.[130] Timaeus, beyond doubt, is exaggerating; his testimony, however, combined with that of Theophrastus and others, anyhow reveals that, for whatever reason (correct or incorrect), Empedocles was at an early date regarded as a Pythagorean — a view which need not have limited itself, like our modern one, to Empedocles' psychology and vegetarianism. What is above all important is that Zeno's reading of Empedocles will have been conditioned by that of Theophrastus, just as his reading of Plato will have been. If he read Empedocles — no text of Empedocles, inclusive of scholia, survives as in the case of Hesiod[131] or other poets — he may have found in him what he needed for a further answer to the theological objections of Plato and Aristotle: a cosmic cycle ending in complete harmony and unity, since at the end of each cosmic period "all things come together in order to be one in Love" (ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, *VS* 31B17, 7, cf. 16).[132] This same cosmic Love is responsible for the fashioning of living beings at the beginning of each cosmic period.[133] Though Love is, in Empedocles, not a teleological force, it otherwise performs the functions of Zeno's Providence. There are, naturally, major differences: in Zeno we do not have, as in Empedocles, elements which are irreducible substances, but elements reducible to the primary, fiery element which in its pure form is — as, again, not in Empedocles[134] — to be identified with nature and god. In Empedocles, moreover, an evil force, disruptive Strife, is responsible for the destruction of the harmonious divine sphere in which all things have become homogeneously mingled, and hence for the generation of the cosmic structure

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[130] Many other ancient authors who attribute Pythagorean leanings to Empedocles are mentioned by Diog. Laert., VIII 54ff. = *VS* 31A1.

[131] (Cf. above, n. 26). *SVF* I, 100 and 105 are from the Hesiodus-scholia; information similar to that in I, 105 is quoted in a scholion on Apoll. Rhod. (I, 104) and by ps.Probus, *In Verg. Ecl.* (*SVF* I, 103). Cic., *ND* I, 36 = *SVF* I, 167 mentions Zeno's interpretation of Hesiodus, cf. also *ND* II, 63 = *SVF* II, 1067; Diog. Laert. VIII, 48 = *SVF* I, 276 apparently quotes from it. An echo of Zeno's study of Empedocles is probably to be found in the same commentary of ps.Probus, *In Verg. Ecl.* p. 10, 31 - 11, 6 Keil, which, surprisingly, is only partially printed in the Zeno-section of *SVF* I at the end of 102 [or perhaps not so surprisingly: exactly the same piece is printed by A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London 1891, *ad* his Zeno fr. 52, p. 101], and more fully as *SVF* I, 496 [Cleanthes; here Von Arnim prints the text of Pearson, Cleanthes fr. 20, p. 249-50, which, starting at p. 10, 31 Keil, has more at the beginning than the fragment of *SVF* I, 102]. In *SVF* I Von Arnim omits both times ps.Probus' reference to Empedocles, which, however, he prints *SVF* II, at the end of 413, which text, accordingly, = *SVF* I, 102 *in fine* + the reference to Empedocles. I translate the text of *SVF* II, which starts at p. 10, 33 Keil: "That of these" [sc. the four elements] "all things are subsequently formed is taught by the Stoics Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus of Soli and Cleanthes of [Thasus, read:] Assus" (this is where *SVF* I, 102 and 496 stop), "who considered (*habuerunt*) Empedocles of Agrigento to be the originator" (sc. of this doctrine), "who wrote about these (sc. elements) in the following way...". A quotation follows in Greek, viz. Emp., *VS* 31B6 (three lines, the last with a corrupt ending, of which Von Arnim only gives the first), which identifies the four elements as gods: brilliant Zeus [= fire or aether], lifegiving Hera [= earth], Aidoneus [= air], and Nestis [= water]. [For the interpretation of this fr. see F. Buffière, *Les Mythes d'Homère et la Pensée Grecque*, Paris 1956, 96f.; Guthrie, *o.c.* 144f.; J. Bollack, *Empédocle, 3, Les Origines, Comm. 1*, Paris 1969, 169ff.; and W. Burkert, rev. Bollack, Gnomon, 1972, 434f. In ps.Probus, p. 11, 7-21, 26 (cf. above, n. 60 *in fine*), there is a very substantial discussion of the elements in philosophical thought and in poetry, ending with the Zeno-fragment *SVF* I, 103, p. 21, 21f. Keil; ps. Probus himself belongs to those who interpret Hera

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in Empedocles as earth, but he also discusses the other interpretation]. If other information from scholia or commentaries on poetic works is accepted for Zeno, this testimony should be acceptable as well. That these lines may have appealed to Zeno is evident. I cannot, however, enter here into the Stoic physical allegoresis of the traditional gods; for its fine flowering in ps.Heraclitus' *Allegorical Interpretation of Homer* see e.g. J. Pépin, *Mythe et Allégorie, Les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-Chrétiennes*, Aubier 1958, 161f. Von Arnim's unhappy treatment of this important testimony on the Stoics' interest in Empedocles may have been responsible for the fact that it was missed by Pépin, who mentions Emp. B6 *o.c.* 406, n. 64, but adds that Empedocles "présentait, de ces quatre dieux, une interprétation physique assez éloignée de l'exégèse stoïcienne classique". Classic Stoic exegesis, however, was rather versatile (cf. e.g. *SVF* II, 1076-1077). Pythagorean echoes in Cleanthes (Sun = Apollo, harmony of spheres) are discussed by Boyancé, *o.c.* 91ff.

[132] The argument of Emp. B17 is complicated by the fact that he discusses individual beings and the universe at the same time, at least in the first lines (cf. my 'Ambiguity in Empedocles B 17, 3-5', *Phronesis* 1972, 17ff. and A. A. Long, 'Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle in the Sixties', in: A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), *The Presocratics, A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York 1974, 397ff.); this, however, need not concern us here. For the "sphere of love" as god cf. *VS* 31B31, B27, B28, B29.

[133] *VS* 31B35, 4f., B73, B75, B86, B87, B95, B96, B98 and other texts, conveniently assembled by J. Bollack, *o.c.* *2. Les Origines, édition critique*, Paris 1969, 129ff. ("L'Atelier d'Aphrodite"). Cf. also F. Solmsen, 'Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmogony', *Phronesis* 1965, 109ff. = *Kl. Schr. I*, [274ff.], 282f.

[134] Though fire is "Zeus" (*VS* 31B6, ab. n. 131) and plays an important role in zoogony (B62, B73).

of heaven and earth, sea and air, which we inhabit.[135] In Zeno, on the other hand, cosmogony is part of the same providential process.[136]

This relation to Empedocles must, however, remain conjectural. If my suggestion is not acceptable, we must fall back upon *SVF* I, 176 and say that if all things happen according to Providence, so does *ekpyrosis*. Furthermore, since the cosmic cycle is explictly ascribed to "Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus" (*SVF* I, 107, 512; II, 596, all from Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels),[137] we are in a position to adduce the more explicit evidence found among the remains of Cleanthes and, especially, Chrysippus, who are, moreover, nowhere accused of significantly deviating from Zeno on this point,[138] whereas the differences to be found or constructed between the doctrines of the individual Early Stoics were mercilessly exploited by later writers, be they merely critical or openly hostile.

5. Cleanthes attributed the leading rôle in *ekpyrosis* to the sun, who is in his system the ruling part (*hegemonikon*) of the universe, and who is to be identified with Apollo[139] and with the Zeus we know from the *Hymn*.[140] We have explicit testimony that the other heavenly bodies, when the end of a cosmic period draws near, of their own accord approach "Zeus" and allow themselves to be reunited

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[135] *VS* 31B17,8 and B17,16-18, B31; A42 = Arist., *Cael.* III, 2, 301a12f.: Empedocles only gives the cosmogony of Strife, not one of Love; A37 = Arist., *Met.* A 4, 985a21f.; A49 = Aet. II 6, 3, the most explicit passage. See further Solmsen, *Kl. Schr. I*, 282f.

[136] More things in Empedocles may conceivably have pleased Zeno, e.g. the characterization of the divine in *VS* 31B134 [from bk. III of the physical poem and wrongly put among the fragments of the *Katharmoi* by Diels and Kranz] as a "holy mind... hurrying through the cosmos with swift cares". Cf. *SVF* I, 157, on god as "fiery intellect" and *SVF* I, 153, on the omnipresence of Providence. So may the fragment from the *Katharmoi* (*VS* 31B135) quoted by Arist., *Rhet.* I, 13, 1373b14f., on the "law binding for all stretched throughout the aether".

[137] Cf. above, p. 145.

[138] In principle, of course, i.e. as far as the interpretation of *ekpyrosis* as a *positive* event is concerned; the actual filling in of this notion could vary.

[139] *SVF* I, 540, 541. Cf. Boyancé, *Ét.* 90, and 'L'Apollon solaire', in: *Mélanges J. Carcopino*, Paris 1966, [148ff.], 166f.

[140] *SVF* I, 537, cf. above, p. 130, and *SVF* I, 536, cf. above, p. 154. Cf. Boyancé, *Ét.* 87: "Le soleil est au centre et de la physique et de la théologie de Cléanthe, et le fait le plus significatif est sans doute qu'il soit ainsi au centre de l'une et de l'autre".

with him; [so, eventually, also the other gods incorporated in the other elements];[141] "the stars, being gods, contribute to their own destruction, since they cooperate with the sun in view of *ekpyrosis*" (Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075D = *SVF* I, 510). It is, consequently, the "torch-bearer" (= the sun) of the cosmic mysterion who summons the "mystic shapes" (= the gods)[142] for the grand reunion, to which they come voluntarily, in which all things become "flame".[143] Surely, this description of total conflagration is in terms of a final apotheosis, i.e. a positive event.

The evidence concerning Chrysippus is far more extensive than that about Cleanthes; the first thing to be noted is that the above-mentioned testimony ascribing to Cleanthes the assimilation of the other gods to "Zeus" joins Chrysippus' name.[144]

Chrysippus speaks of total conflagration in wholly positive terms; we may say that he succeeds in succesfully standing the arguments, of Plato and Aristotle, regarding the incompatibility of the destruction of the universe and the concept of god, on their head. Significantly, certain important verbal quotations are from the first book of his *On Providence*;[145] in itself, this is already expressive of his evaluation of total conflagration.

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[141] Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075A-C = *SVF* I, 536 and II, 1049, i.e. both Chrysippus and Cleanthes (cf. above, p. 154). It should be noted that *SVF* I, 510 = *Comm. not.* 1075D belongs in the same chapter: Plutarch criticizes the theory of total conflagration both in Cleanthes and Chrysippus. For this chapter as a whole s. M. Pohlenz, 'Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker', Hermes 1939, [1 ff.], 27f. = *Kleine Schriften I*, hrsg. H. Dörrie, Hildesheim 1965, [448ff.], 474f., who compares this section with Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 36, for which see below, p. 181f. and n. 172.

[142] *SVF* I, 538, cf. above, p. 135-6.

[143] *SVF* I, 511, cf. above, p. 155, Boyancé, *Ét.* 67, 89.

[144] *SVF* I, 536 = *SVF* II, 1049. Cf. above, n. 141.

[145] Von Arnim, *SVF* III, p. 203 XLVIII lists 12 fragments which mention the title; six of these contain verbatim quotations; of the latter, two from bk. I and another one from a not-numbered book, refer to *ekpyrosis*, while three are from bk. IV, and deal with Destiny, Providence and human responsibility. Of the doxographical references, two are to bk. I (*SVF* II, 633, the universe is a living being; 644, the ruling part of the universe is the purest part of the aether); four do not specify from which book they derive (*SVF* II, 623, on eternal recurrence; II, 634, the world is administrated by Intellect and Providence; II, 687, the stars are living beings; II, 1023, on the World-Soul and the names of the gods). A rather good impression of the contents of *On Providence* is to be culled from A. Gercke, *Chrysippea*, in: *Fleck. Jbb.* Supp. Bd. XIV, Leipzig 1885, 690-781 (also separatim), where p. 705ff. the fragments listed by Von Arnim and other fragments probably to be attributed to this work are printed; indeed, Von Arnim *l.c.* refers to this valuable book himself.

Chrysippus, using a mixture of physico-biological and religious language, explicitly denies that the universe is destroyed or, as he says, "dies". "Zeus" goes on growing until he has assimilated all things to himself, "for, since death is the separation of soul from body, whereas the Soul of the cosmos not only is not separated, but continually goes on growing until it has completely absorbed into itself the matter, it should not be affirmed that the cosmos dies" [from *On Prov. I*, ap. Plut., *St. rep.* 1052C = *SVF* II, 604].[146] In the same book he said, in similar terms: "When the universe is fiery throughout, it consists *ipso facto* of its own soul and [that soul's] leading faculty (*hegemonikon*); when, however, having changed into the moisture and the soul left within [that moisture], it has changed, in a way, into body and soul with the result that it is a composition of these, it has to be explained in different terms" [Plut., *St. rep.* 1053B = *SVF* II, 605]. Both Chrysippus and Cleanthes are said (several book-titles being mentioned, among which the *On Providence*) to have held that only Zeus is immortal and draws everything else into himself at *ekpyrosis* [Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075A-C = *SVF* I, 536; II, 1049]. Summarizing Chrysippus' views, Plutarch, without referring to a specific work—in view of the context, provenance from *On Providence I* (cf. above, *SVF* II, 605) is likely—, affirms [*Comm. not.* 1077D-E = *SVF* II, 1064] that Zeus and the ordered universe resemble the composite human being, Providence resembling the soul, and quotes verbatim: "when total conflagration has occurred, Zeus, the only among the gods to be indestructible, retires into Providence; then, having become united, both continue to exist in the single substance of the aether". Here the language is still physico-biological, but the religious terminology is more predominant: this is no longer a purely physical theory — for what, in physical terms, is "Providence"? Cf. also a similar summary, *ibid.* 1065B (not in *SVF*): "Zeus, having dissolved all matter into himself, becomes one and abolishes all further differences". The identification of World-Soul and Providence is confirmed for Chrysippus by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 47-48 = *SVF* II, 613, that of Zeus and World-Soul (if the text is to be trusted) by Philod., *De piet.* col. 11 = *SVF* II, 1076, cf. also Cic., *ND* I, 39-41. For the importance of Providence in Chrysippus' system we may refer to his polemics against Epicurus and others who eliminated Providence, Plut. *St. rep.* 1051D-E = *SVF* II, 1115 (cf. also *Comm. not.* c. 32, which discusses the Stoics' continuing debate with the Epicureans; 1075E = *SVF* II, 1126 and Usener, *Epicurea* fr. 368). Finally, a question of Chrysippus, quoted by Alex. Aphr., *Quaest.* II, 28 = *SVF* II, 1118 from a not-specified work, rhetorically asks what is left of god if the excercising of providence is abstracted (and what of snow, if whiteness and cold, of fire, if heat, etc.).

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[146] For the physical aspects of these and other fragments s. above, p. 150f.

It is, furthermore, reported — without identification of the work in which this theory occurred — that, according to Chrysippus, the cosmos, at *ekpyrosis*, turns into "light" or "brightness" (αὐγή, Phil., *Aet. mu.* 90 = *SVF* II, 611).[147] It is, however, plausible that this information goes back to *On Prov. I.* We have already noticed that, according to Chrysippus in this same work, the cosmos in its fiery state consists of the *hegemonikon* of the World-Soul. We know, from Diog. Laert. VII, 139 = *SVF* II, 644, that Chrysippus in *On Prov. I* stated the *hegemonikon* to be the heavens or, more precisely, "the purest part of the aether", viz. the αὐγή. Arius Didymus confirms this, fr. 29 Diels = *SVF* II, 642: according to Chrysippus, the *hegemonikon* is the purest and finest aether, because this is what is most moveable and what makes the whole movement of the cosmos (sc. the heavens) turn round. So, if the ruling part of the universe consists of purest aether or "brightness", and if it is said, in *On Prov. I*, that the universe at *ekpyrosis* wholly becomes its ruling part, the remark in Philo concerning the brightness into which the universe changes at total conflagration may safely be attributed to *On Prov. I*, too. Chrysippus here improves upon Cleanthes, who had made the sun the ruling part, and had said everything became "flame".[148]

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[147] Cf. Boyancé, *Ét.* 65ff., esp. 67f., 76f., and my *Ps.Hipp. Tract*, 112 and n. 242 [to-date, I would no longer follow Boyancé in calling the αὐγή a "fifth element"]. Cf. also Sandbach, *o.c.* 78; he suggests that Chrysippus may have chosen αὐγή because "light is associated with knowledge" (for which association I know no Stoic parallel. Is it, perhaps, permissible to think of the *epopteia*?) J. B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus*, Leiden 1970, 123 states that Chrysippus considered *ekpyrosis* not a destruction of the world, but only a "change" into fire. Cf. also Hahm, *o.c.* 194 and *ibid.* 198 n. 18 (on αὐγή), who, correctly, as I believe, points out that Chrysippus' introduction of αὐγή does not represent "any significant change in doctrine" (correctly, that is to say, if "doctrine" is replaced by "evaluation").

From such statements by, and testimonies concerning, Chrysippus, it follows beyond doubt that in his view the state of affairs during total conflagration is far superior to that of the familiar, ordered universe. Only Zeus or the ruling part of the World-Soul and Providence are left in a substance that is fiery throughout, or rather in the purest kind of fire or aether ("aether" is mentioned as the "single substance" at *SVF* II, 1064).[149] All things have become reunited into this one pure god: the unity or "sympathy" of things is far better realized during *ekpyrosis* than either before or after. Simultaneously, whatever vestiges of grimness total conflagration might still have possessed in the theories of Zeno (who has all things return to "fire", though, of course, this notion carries, as we have seen, important qualifications) and Cleanthes (who has all things return to "flame", undoubtedly qualified in a similar way), is abolished when this event is spoken of in terms of "brightness"; the absorption of all things into light is hardly to be regarded as something even imaginatively to be feared.[150] So the apparent difficulties inherent to the "two fires doctrine", viz. that of the destructive *vs.* the craftsmanlike variety, are to a large extent surmounted by the introduction of this most subtle and wholly innocuous third kind of fire. "Brightness" is a sort of culmination of the other kinds of fire, a synthesis, of especial importance in cosmology, which resolves the earlier antithesis.[151] Hence Chrysippus' explicit emphasis upon the position of Providence at *ekpyrosis*: Zeus retires into and unites with Providence, a Providence which, perhaps paradoxically, no longer cares for individual things and phenomena, but only for itself — though we must immediately add that this "itself" is simultaneously the whole of things in the best possible condition: surely the best performance Providence can be credited with. A passage in Seneca (*Ep.* 9, 16 = *SVF* II, 1065), which does not mention Chrysippus' name but may be assumed to echo his position, says, commenting upon the life of the Stoic Sage: "it will be like that of Jupiter, who, when the world has been dissolved, the gods have been indistinguishably reunited, and nature [sc. the craftsmanlike fire in its informing capacity] is inactive for a while, finds a resting-place within himself, given over to his own thoughts".[152] I agree with Long that this description recalls that of Aristotle's god, the Unmoved Mover, having himself as the everlasting object of his own thought.[153] But the Unmoved Mover, being only the separately existing, unextended Form that is the remote final cause of order in the universe, is definitely not to be identified with Providence, whereas Chrysippus' god, being extended and forever remaining united with matter, takes care of it both during total unification at *ekpyrosis* and, in innumerable ways, when it is organized within the created world. "Destiny", Chrysippus stipulated in his *On Destiny* and other works, "is the rational ground (*logos*) of the things in the cosmos which are administrated through Providence".[154] We have already taken into account that he even identified Destiny and Providence.[155] It is the "Reason (*logos*) according to which the things that have happened have happened, the things that happen happen, and the things that will happen will happen".[156]

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[148] Cf. above, p. 155; Boyancé, *Ét.* 67.

[149] Cf. above, p. 175.

[150] In a wholly different context, viz. a discussion of the end of Boethius' *Consolatio*, C. S. Lewis, *The Discarded Image, An Introduction to Medieval and Renaiscance Literature*, Cambridge 1964 = ^{4}1970, 90 uses a simile which is not inappropriate in our context: "we are made to feel as if we had seen a heap of common materials so completely burnt up that there remains neither ash nor smoke nor even flame, only a quivering of invisible heat".

[151] Note that the universe at *ekpyrosis* does *not*, according to Chrysippus, turn into *pneuma*; the latter, introduced by Chrysippus as a sort of successor to craftsmanlike fire, plays its rôle in cosmogony and especially in the established cosmos. Cf. e.g. Long, *Hell. Phil.* 155f.; Hahm, *o.c.* 158ff.

In this context it is important to notice that, like Zeno, Chrysippus was a staunch defender of the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Significantly, we have again a quotation from *On Providence* (no book-number given; not, I suppose, from bk. I), which reveals to which extent these things, for Chrysippus, hang together. It has been preserved by Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* VII, 23 = *SVF* II, 623: in the new world, we shall again be present in our actual shape. Alex. Aphr., *In An. Pr.* p. 180, 31f. Wallies = *SVF* II, 624 gives an abstract from Chrysippus' *On the Cosmos*: everything shall be individually the same again. Origen points out, by the way, that this is epistemologically difficult, since individual *a* in period *b* would be indistinguishable from *a'* in *b'* (*SVF* II, 626, 628). Since no one will ever be in a position to actually compare *a'* and *a*, this objection is not valid;[157] it illustrates, however, how far Chrysippus went with eternal recurrence. Only epistemologically irrelevant, minor details, such as a mole (pigmentation) of the facial skin, could be different (cf. *SVF* II, 624, p. 190, 7).

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[152] Cf. Arnold, *o.c.* 192-3.

[153] *Hell. Phil.* 155 n. 2. Note, however, that Seneca, unlike the verbatim fragment from Chrysippus, does not mention Providence and that the Aristotelian reminiscence may be a later intrusion; the 'inactivity' can, however, be paralleled from Boethus' argument *contra* at Phil., *Aet. mu.* 83-84, cf. below, p. 187 and n. 197.

[154] Aet. I 28, 3 = *SVF* II, 913, p. 264, 18-19.

[155] Above, p. 159. Cf. also Festugière, *Révél. II*, 334; Greene, *o.c.* 342: "Fate or Providence, two faces of a single reality"; E. Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien Stoïcisme*, Paris 1910, ²1951, 203f. Cf. also above, n. 2.

[156] Again *SVF* II, 913, p. 264, 20-21.

Eternal recurrence is not only compatible with Providence, it is, as we have already pointed out, absolutely indispensable if the cosmic cycle and the agency responsible for it are to be considered "good".[158]

The Stoic concept of Providence has, as a rule, been a favourite butt of critical comment. Edelstein argued that the world, to the Stoics, is only a "brute fact",[159] and that, if they speak of "God's providence, one must not forget that this providence is identical with nature and necessity".[160] However, also the converse is true: whenever they speak of nature and necessity, they also mean Providence, which is, I suppose, their way of saying that the world is *not* a brute fact.[161] It has also been argued that the Stoics perhaps did not need Providence for physical reasons, but stuck to it because they "wanted to believe in it"; thus Festugière,[162] who is certainly correct in bringing the religious factor into play. I think, however, that this explanation does not go far enough, and that it is arguable that the Early Stoics needed Providence not only to accomodate evil in the actual world, but also because it helped them to both understand and argue that the so-called destruction by total conflagration of this world is not an evil contrary to god's nature, but a boon and a blessing.

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[157] Stoic epistemology needs the postulate that there are no two different individuals which are indistinguishable. Presumably, we have to add: within one and the same cosmic period.

[158] Above, p. 162f.

[159] *O.c.* 33; Long, *Evil* 333, objects. Pearson, *o.c.* 88 finds the Stoic concept of Providence strange. Capelle, *o.c.* 178f. suggested that the Early Stoics restricted the scope of Providence to the ethical sphere and explained physical evil not in terms of Providence, but "mechanistically".

[160] *Ibid.* 34.

[161] Gould, *o.c.* 125 even suggests that Cleanthes and Chrysippus follow Plato, viz. Plato's theory of the good Demiurge — a statement which, as we have seen, needs considerable qualification.

[162] *Révél. II*, 334-5; this is one better than Moreau, *o.c.* 173, who says Providence

Van Straaten argues that the fire to which all things return at *ekpyrosis* — though an explanation in physical terms is, in his opinion, possible — should more properly be called "meta-physical".[163] Although it is, perhaps, not permissible to use the term "meta-physical" in connection with the monistic and materialist Stoic system, Van Straaten is surely right in pointing out that the fire which eventually absorbes and dominates all things is of a very peculiar kind. Though this is most explicit in Chrysippus — who, as will be recalled, on the other hand maintained that all types of fire are forms of one and the same element[164] — it is, as we have noticed, implicit in the theories of his predecessors. Total conflagration is a form of apotheosis.

As is occasionally the case with language of a theological or even mystical bent, however, there is also an erotic or sexual image involved; notions such as that of *ekpyrosis*, and that of the production of a fiery seed which becomes a watery mass in which fire is still present just as sperm in the seminal fluid, can also be understood in a biological sense.[165] The suggestion is that of orgasm and its consequences. Perhaps I am perverse in suspecting a sexual metaphor when Chrysippus (*SVF* II, 1064) speaks of the "becoming united" (ὁμοῦ γενομένους)[166] of Zeus and Pronoia and in thinking of a *Hieros Gamos* at top level. It should be admitted that Zeus and

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"ne peut trouver dans leur empirisme un fondement suffisant". Hahm, *o.c.* XV, says he will inquire into Stoic cosmology without discussing in detail god, providence and fate; it is in itself significant that such an inquiry is to a large extent possible.

[163] *Kerngedachten* 27; cf. *ibid.* 28f., on the "metaphysical interpretation of Stoic *ekpyrosis*".

[164] Above, n. 70 *in fine*.

[165] Hahm, *o.c.* 75ff. excellently discusses the biological imagery in Stoic cosmogony and even mentions (*ibid.* 71-2) the Zeus-Hera painting [s. below], but refrains from linking up *ekpyrosis* with orgasm.

[166] Cf. terms such as μιγῆναι, συγγίγνεσθαι.

Pronoia (Providence) are, in a sense, always united; during *ekpyrosis*, however, they become more united than ever. The religious overtones of this ultimate copulation are perhaps less easy to detect for modern ears than those of the almost protestant *Hymn* of Cleanthes. The bisexuality of Zeus-cum-Pronoia can, however, be paralleled from that of the gods generally in Serv., *In Aen.* IV, 638 = *SVF* II, 1070. Zeno and, *pluris verbis*, Cleanthes and Chrysippus interpreted the myth of the castration of Uranus as meaning that the "heavenly element, which is highest and aethereal, i.e. fiery, which creates all things by itself, is devoid of that part of the body which requires conjunction with that of someone else in order to procreate" (Cic., *ND* II, 63-64 = *SVF* II, 1067). Chrysippus scandalized quite a few good and pious people by his interpretation of a pornographic painting representing Hera practicing fellatio on Zeus;[167] according to Origenes, he drily said that it dealt with the reception of spermatic *logoi* by matter. Finally, there is a passage in the famous *Borysthenic Oration* of Dion Chrysostomos [first cent. A.D.] (*Or.* 36, 55-57 = *SVF* II, 622). Pohlenz believed this passage is derived from a Stoic source;[168] the whole cosmological setting is certainly Stoic, and Dion even uses the rare term "brightness" (αὐγή),[169] which directly points at Chrysippus. Describing what happens immediately after[170] *ekpyrosis* with a wealth of cosmological and sexuological detail, Dion adds: "this is the blessed marriage of Zeus and Hera, which the sons of the wise sing in secret mystery-rites"[171] (II, p. 189, 19f.). It is true that this tale is part of a larger story which Dion, rather fancifully, attributes to "Magi";[172] this particular Stoic section, however, to a certain extent fits Chrysippus.[173] And even if Dion's story is discounted,

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[167] Diog. Laert. VII, 187 = *SVF* II, 1071; Theoph., *Ad Aut.* III, 8 = *SVF* II, 1073; Orig., *C. Cels.* IV, 48 = *SVF* II, 1074. Hahm, *o.c.* 71-2, 75 refuses to be shocked and omits the revolting details; J. Bidez-F. Cumont, *Les Mages Hellénisés, Zoroastre, Ostanes et Hystaspe d'après la tradition grecque, I, Introduction*, Paris 1938, 95-6 say: "Chrysippe s'était livré à ce propos a des spéculations scabreuses, dignes d'un freudiste". Exactly.

[168] In the *Hermes*-paper, *l.c.* (above, n. 141) and *Die Stoa II*, 45f., esp. 46. Pohlenz also points out that the *Hieros Gamos* is a typically Greek, not a Persian, motif. [On the Hieros Gamos in Philo, cf. Festugière, *Révél.* II, 549]. Earlier scholars, among whom I. Bruns, *De Dione Chrysostomo et Aristotele critica et exegetica*, Kiel 1892, attributed the cosmology of Dion's "Magi" to Chrysippus; L. François, *Essai sur Dion Chrysostome*, Thèse Paris 1921, pointed at Posidonius as chief source (*o.c.* 33ff.), but on insufficient grounds.

[169] Dion 36, 55, cf. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa II*, 47 and above, p. 176. Chrysippean are also the identification of the superior horse [cf. n. 158] at conflagration with the "soul" (of the charioteer) or rather with the "thinking and leading part of it", 36, 54 and the comparison of the liquid mass throughout which god is present as sperm within the seminal fluid with the living being which is a composite of soul and body, 36, 57 (above p. 175).

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[170] Total conflagration itself is described 36, 51-55 [an abstract at *SVF* II, 602] in a setting also derived from the *Phaedrus*-myth: it is the superior horse of the team of four that converts all the others into itself. As Pohlenz (*ll. cc.*) points out, the imagery used (melting of wax figures) is paralleled in Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075C = *SVF* II, 1049.

[171] Τοῦτον ὑμνοῦσι παῖδες σοφῶν ἐν ἀρρήτοις τελεταῖς Ἥρας καὶ Διὸς εὐδαίμονα γάμον. Hahm, who discusses *SVF* II, 622 *o.c.* 61, leaves out the "blessed marriage".

[172] I think Pohlenz, *Die Stoa II*, *l.c.* has succesfully refuted the claims of Bidez and Cumont, *o.c. I*, 91f. and *II*, *Les Textes*, 142ff., who argue that the "hymns" are Persian or at least Mithraic, and that the Hellenized Magi themselves are to be credited with the Platonic and Stoic elements which also the learned authors acknowledge. To support this claim, they significantly leave out a very technical paragraph in Dion 36, 54, *o.c.* 150. However, what we have here is *interpretatio graeca*: Greek cosmology in partly Oriental trappings, "philosophes persifiés" rather than "mages hellénisés". When I accuse Dion of being fanciful, I do not mean he is an exception in his time. *Mithras Platonicus* has now been studied by R. Turcan, Leiden 1975, who also discusses the "hymns" in Dion (9f.) (he appears to be right in being sceptical about the Mithraic interpretation of Bidez-Cumont); however, he has not consulted Pohlenz. R. Merkelbach, 'Die Kosmogonie der Mythras-Mysterien', *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 34, 1965, 218ff. argues that the cosmogonical significance he wishes to attribute to the representations of Mithras slaying the bull derives from Plato's *Tim.* I am in no position to judge this interpretation of the Mithraic mysteries; the reference to the *Tim.*, however, is not enough: also the Stoa should be taken into account in such contexts, and especially the Platonizing Stoics and Stoicizing Platonists of the first centuries B.C. and A.D.

[173] It is not, however, certain that Dion knew much more about the contents of Chrysippus' "mysteries of philosophy" than we do; he may have filled in the details by himself, using the materials from *On Providence I* and the interpretation of the pornographic painting; cf. also Pohlenz, *ll.cc.*, on the possibility that Dion used a source similar to that of Plutarch. A somewhat free treatment of Stoic materials on Dion's part would tally with his equally free handling of Platonic and Persian motifs.

Dion further suggests, 36, 58ff., that the new-begotten universe, a thing of beauty, is "much more splendid than it appears today" because it is "fresh from the hand of its maker", and works this out in some detail. This can be paralleled from Sen., *N.Qu.* III, 28, 7: god destroys the universe by either cataclysm or conflagration (for this pair s. above, n. 52) because he "decides to start better things and finish with what is old" (*cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri*); cf. also *Cons. ad Marc.* 26, 6. If the new universe is to be better than its predecessor in an absolute sense, the other parallels enumerated show that the *ekpyrosis* and generation of the universe were referred to by Chrysippus in terms that are, also, religious.[174] Accordingly, his remarks about the theological discourses to be taught at the end of the philosophical curriculum as being the "mysteries of philosophy" can hardly be explained away as mere verbiage. The Stoics were as capable of interpreting "myth" allegorically, i.e. in physical terms, as they were of giving their physics and comology a theological colouring.

As a last remark, I wish to add that Chrysippus' final solution to the theological problems of *ekpyrosis* is not, of course, wholly satisfactory. It might be even described as a sort of trick, which converts evil into good in a purely stipulative way. Chrysippus is consistent, however, in that his explanation of physical evil in the actual universe as being, when viewed from the proper perspective, good in the sense of being indispensible for the good of the whole etc.,[175] is, all things considered, not much more plausible than his pious vindication of total conflagration.

6. A, to a certain extent legitimate, objection to the above-attempted reconstruction of the Early Stoic evaluation of total conflagration would be that we have no information as to theological arguments *contra* this positive evaluation. This is correct as far as Zeno and

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difficulties arise in face of the arguments of Aristotle in the *De phil.*, which I suppose to have been answered by Zeno and his followers. (cf. above, p. 141f., p. 160f.). The parallel in Dion, however, helps us to explain Seneca correctly: the new world is better than the old only in the sense of being young in its youth, whereas our present world is perhaps already past middle age. Such a theory of eternal rejuvenation is not impossible for the Early Stoics, too: the new world will become old in its turn, etc. In this way, eternal recurrence of same is saved and Aristotle's theological argument circumvented.

[174] "Diese Lehre vom Weltbrand und der Wiedererneuerung, der Palingenesie, war für die Stoa viel mehr als eine rationale Hypothese" (Pohlenz, *Die Stoa I*, 79).

[175] Cf. e.g. *SVF* II, 1176; and II, 1177 = Plut., *St. rep.* 1049A-B, from *On Gods III*: wars are useful as a remedy against overpopulation, interesting as an example of an apparent evil for which providence is responsible; the argument itself is as old as the *Cypria*, fr. I Allen; indeed, Plutarch *l.c.* adds that Chrysippus called Euripides and others to witness for this evaluation of the Trojan war. Cf. also Sen., *Ep.* 74, 20; these three texts are in De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 940a, b. Cf. further Chrys., *On Nature II* ap. Plut., *St. rep.* 1050F = *SVF* II, 1181 (De Vogel, *o.c.* Nr. 941b). See further above, n. 12, 13, 15, 25, 90.

Cleanthes are concerned;[176] it is, of course, true that the Peripatetics contemporary to the two first Stoic scholarchs stuck to the position of their school;[177] perhaps they did not bother to refute the Stoic doctrine in every detail. The last Early Academic to be interested in the interpretation of the *Tim.*, Crantor, was in favour of the eternity of the universe.[178] The Early Sceptic Academy does not seem to have bothered about cosmology. A possible echo of Early Peripatetic controversy against Zeno is perhaps contained in the disputed[179] final section of Phil., *Aet. mu.* According to Philo, Theophrastus argued, on *empirical* grounds, against those who destroy and generate the universe. It is anyhow remarkable that Alex. Lyc. Ch. XII, which contains the neglected Zeno-fragment on *ekpyrosis*,[180] also preserves a refutation ascribed to a serious philosopher[181] who does not belong to the Platonist persuasion, and that this argument *contra*[182] is an empirical argument, just as those preserved under Theophrastus' name by Philo.[183] If it is possible to refute one's opponent's physical premiss, there is perhaps no need to bother about his theological conclusion. A similar position is possible when — as in the case of the Megarian philosopher Alexinus[184] — the Stoic proof that the universe is an ensouled and rational being can be refuted by *reductio ad absurdum*. We know, however that Alexinus wrote much against Zeno without being informed as to the further contents of his polemics.[185]

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[176] We have, however, an argument by Zeno's contemporary Alexinus of Elis against Zeno's proof that the universe is an intelligent and ensouled being (*SVF* I, 111 = Sext., *M.* IX, 104 and, in a slightly different version, Cic., *ND* II, 21 and III, 22). Alexinus' refutation is preserved nominatim by Sextus, *M.* IX, 108 (= Alexinus, fr. 94, in K. Döring, *Die Megariker, Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien*, Amsterdam 1972) and, in a slightly different anonymous version, by Cic., *ND* III, 23 (= fr. 95 Döring). This shows, by the way, that the refutation in Cic., *ND* III, 23 should not immediately be attributed to Carneades (so De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 1117a), though he may of course have used it.

[177] Cf. above, p. 138 and n. 32.

[178] Above, p. 143 and n. 43.

[179] Cf. above, n. 32, n. 43.

[180] Cf. above, p. 148.

[181] τις τῶν χαριέστερων; in Aristotle, at least, χαρ. is standard designation of philosophers whose point of view has something to commend itself, e.g. *Met.* K 2, 1060a25, Λ 10, 1075a26, *De resp.* 27, 480b29.

[182] "What I for one have seen yesterday and a year ago and a long time ago, and what I similarly see today, I do not see to have suffered at all through the fire of the sun. But in the course of time some little damage should have been done if we are to believe that the whole universe will ever be destroyed by fire".

[183] Cf. our translation [above, n. 53], 74 n. 295.

[184] Cf. above, n. 176.

The case of Carneades is difficult. This great opponent of Chrysippus not only attacked Stoic ethics and epistemology, but also Stoic theology. As far as we can judge, his polemics were directed more at the premisses of the Stoics than at their conclusions. Unfortunately, the section of Cic., *ND* III, dealing with the Sceptic arguments against the Stoic doctrine of the providential administration of the universe by the gods is lost: there is a large lacuna at III, 65.[186] We know, however, that Carneades by means of a *sorites* proved that Zeus and the sun cannot be gods.[187] He also proved that god cannot be finite, for whatever is finite is part of the infinite and the part is of necessity weaker than the whole.[188] He further proved that god cannot be corporeal, for whatever is corporeal is capable of change, i.e. also of a change for the worse, and eventually perishable.[189] Furthermore, god cannot, if corporeal, consist of a single substance, such as fire.[190] I may be over-sensitive in detecting in these arguments, which all depend upon a concept of god as an eternal being incapable of change, an echo of the theology of Plato and Aristotle, but I do no see how the argument that god cannot change for the worse and that he cannot be conceived as the weaker part of a larger whole can be otherwise explained than as a reminiscence of Aristotle's *argumentum ex gradibus* (*De phil.* fr. 16 Ross) and of the argument of the part being weaker than the whole (*ibid.* fr. 19a) and of the argument that god cannot change for the worse (*ibid.* fr. 16 and fr. 19c).[191] We also know that Carneades argued against Stoic determinism[192] and against the theory of Providence as excercised in the actual universe.[193] Without any doubt, we would have better information regarding Carneades' arguments against the Stoic concept of Providence if a pious person had not torn out the now missing section in the archetype of our manuscripts of the *ND*. As it is, a separate argument against the rôle of god and Providence at *ekpyrosis* is not, to the best of my knowledge, attested in Carneades' name. We may, however, presume that if the excercising of Providence in the existing universe is capable of refutation, that of it at *ekpyrosis* is a necessary corollary.

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[185] Diog. Laert. II, 109 and 110 (fr. 92 and 93 Döring); cf. Dörings comments, *o.c.* 123.

[186] Cf. Pease *ad l.*

[187] Sextus, *M.* IX, 182-4; Cic., *ND* III, 43ff. Cf. B. Wisniewski, *Karneades, Fragmente, Text und Kommentar*, Wroclaw etc. 1970, fr. 93 and 94.

[188] Sextus, *M.* IX, 148-50, cf. 176-7.

[189] Sextus, *M.* IX, 141, 143, 145, 146-7, 151, 157, 160, 166, 170, 180-81; Cic., *ND* III, 29-34 (fr. 93 and 94 Wisniewski; De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 1120).

[190] Sextus, *M.* IX, 181; Cic., *ND* III, 35f. (text of Cicero not in Wisniewski).

[191] Cf. above, p. 143f., p. 141f., where I have also argued that Aristotle's arguments are a continuation of Plato's. A parallel for Carneades' use of earlier arguments is

Thanks to Philo, we can at least pick up the thread about the mid-second century B.C. A version of Aristotle's argument from internal and external causes developed by Carneades' contemporary — he went with him to Rome in the famous embassy of 155 B.C. —, the Peripatetic Critolaus, is preserved *Aet. mu.* 74.[194] Philo, *o.c.* 76, also informs us about the Stoic renegade Boethus, a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon, who likewise used a version of the argument from external and internal causes[195] against ekpyrosis (*Aet. mu.* 78 =

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perhaps that of the argument of Alexinus (ab., n. 176), which anyhow has reached us through Sceptic channels. It is, of course, well-known that Sceptics generally used all the arguments available.

[192] E.g. Cic., *De Fato* 31-33 (fr. 103 Wisniewski; De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 1124).

[193] Porph., *De abst.* III, 20 (fr. 99 Wisniewski, *SVF* II, 1152); Cic., *Ac. pr.* II, 120 (fr. 98 Wisniewski, De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 1119b, *SVF* II, 1161). Perhaps the argument against the gift of reason to man as proof of divine providence at Cic., *ND* III, 77f. (De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 1119a) is also attributable to Carneades. For information (and speculation) as to Carneades' arguments against the Stoic theory of Providence see further V. Brochard, *Les Sceptiques Grecs*, Paris ^{2}1887 = ^{3}1959, 138ff., J. Baudry, *o.c.* 266f., and L. Robin, *Pyrrhon et le Scepticisme Grec*, Paris 1944, 110f.

[194] Philo certainly attributes this argument to Critolaus ("φησι"). F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles, X, Hieronymos von Rhodos, Kritolaos und seine Schüler* etc., Basel/Stuttgart ^{2}1969, 65f. is right in pointing out that *Aet. mu.* 55-90 as a whole cannot belong to Critolaus: the "Weitschweifigkeit ihrer Umgebung" in his opinion sharply contrasts with the "knappe Syllogismus" of the two sections he accepts as fragments. This argument is not valid, however, against *Aet. mu.* 74, for, although Philo's hand is visible, this passage is not that prolix. Effe, *o.c.* 12 n. 29 and *ibid.* 19 acknowledges that the fragment at *Aet. mu.* 74 is a version of the argument of *De phil.* fr. 19a Ross, but, following Wehrli, is hesitant in pronouncing it authentic.

[195] Cf. Effe, *o.c.* 11-12 (he *ibid.* points out that Boeth. at *Aet. mu.* 78-82 uses *De phil.* fr. 19b Ross, and at 82-84 uses *De phil.* fr. 19c).

SVF III, VI, Boeth. Sid. 7), and mentions the scepticism of Diogenes of Babylon (*Aet. mu.* 77 = *SVF* III, II, Diog. Bab. 27), also a member of the embassy. Now Philo, *o.c.* 47, after his quotation of the three arguments from the *De phil.*, argues that the Stoics, by having the cosmos burn up and be reborn again, "destroy Providence, i.e. the World-Soul"[196] and proves this, surely at second or even third hand, by turning an argument of Chrysippus (*SVF* II, 397) against that illustrious author (*o.c.* 48-52). Boethus argues in a similar vein (*Aet. mu.* 83-84 = *SVF* III, VI, Boeth. Sid. 7): *ekpyrosis* is impossible because god or the World-Soul would be "inactive"[197] during it, whereas he exercises Providence in the actual world.[198] We may conclude that Chrysippus' explicitness about the role of God and Providence at *ekpyrosis* attracted toward itself the sort of criticism echoes of which are preserved by Philo.

At *Aet. mu.* 85, continuing on his own the argument of Boethus, Philo adds that the destruction of the universe is not only blasphemy (ἀσέβημα), but that, moreover, a rebirth is impossible if the agent of destruction is fire, so that the blasphemy is "double". He also refutes, certainly echoing the arguments of Peripatetics[199] and/or renegade Stoics, the Stoic counter-argument that fire remains present in the moisture as a seed (*ibid.*, 94-103). *Ibid.* 118 summarizes the previous arguments, from the fragments of *De phil.* up to, I think, the specific arguments against *ekpyrosis*: a destruction of the universe is theoretically possible (a) either by other, viz. external and/or internal, causes (cf. *De phil.* fr. 19a Ross, Critolaus, Boethus), or (b) by god himself (cf. *De phil.* fr. 19c Ross and the orthodox Stoic doctrine) — "but to say it is destroyed by god is by far the most impious thing one can say".[200] We may conclude that, among the Stoics after Chrysippus, the old Platonic and Aristotelian arguments *contra* the perishability of the world finally made converts and that, as far as the discussion with the Stoics was concerned, the Sceptics apparently claimed the epistemological, ethical and theological field and left cosmology proper to the Peripatetics.[201] In itself, this setting lends further probability to the general hypothesis of this paper. Chrysippus' revival of Stoicism apparently occasioned a revival of traditional arguments, which could be used *contra* — a revival, precisely, to which we owe e.g. Philo's preservation of the abstracts from *De phil.* If Zeno himself argued against Plato and Aristotle, this counter-revival is more understandable that if he did not.

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[196] Chrysippean terminology, cf. above, p. 175.

[197] Effe, *o.c.* 29-30 proves that the argument from inactivity used by Boethus is ultimately Aristotelian (at p. 30 he gives parallels from the *pragmateiai*, at p. 25f. he argues that it already figured in the *De phil.*). This further illustrates the penetration of Peripatetic arguments in Stoic circles. See also above, p. 150f.

[198] Cf. Arnold, *o.c.* 95: "Ingenious controversialists now pressed the Stoics to explain how their deity excercised providence during the periodic intervals in which the universe had no separate existence. This and like arguments had an immediate effect. Boethus of Sidon" etc.; cf. also *ibid.*, 192: after Chrysippus, "owing to *the positive influence of Plato and Aristotle* and the critical acumen of Carneades, many leading Stoics abandoned" ekpyrosis (my italics). For the echoes of this critique in Plutarch, cf. above, p. 154 and n. 73.

[199] Von Arnim's thesis that Philo used Peripatetic sources ('Über die pseudophilonische Schrift Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου', in: *Quellenstudien zu Philon von Alexandrien*, Berlin 1888, 1-52) is still — though not without modifications — generally accepted, cf. e.g. Wehrli, *l.c.* [above, n. 194], Effe, *o.c.* 9ff., Baltes, *o.c.* 33f. I do not know, however, that this excludes the use of Middle Stoic sources.

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[200] Baltes, *o.c.* 191 f., esp. 201 ff. interestingly discusses the after-life of the argument of *De phil.* fr. 19c Ross in Neoplatonist authors.

[201] Cic., *Ac. pr.* II, 122-128 eloquently gives the Sceptic position: natural philosophy is fascinating, but certainty is by no means to be obtained. It is not, however, certain that this section is to be ascribed to, ultimately, Carneades (as is argued by Baudry, *o.c.* 266).

THE INTERPRETATIO JUDAICA OF SARAPIS

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Text and Author

The Mishnah tractate ʿAbodah Zarah or Strange Worship, which deals with idolatry, lays down for Palestine Jewry of the Imperial Period a great number of prescriptions and practical rules concerning the second commandment: "You shall not make yourself a graven image..." (Exodus XX 4). Among them we have: 42-b. "If one finds utensils upon which is the figure of the sun or moon or a dragon, he casts them into the Salt Sea. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says: If it is on precious utensils they are prohibited, but if upon common utensils they are permitted".[1] The Babylonian Talmud adds to this passage various opinions and discussions of Jewish scholars on the matter, and the conclusions they reached. One is the prohibition of a Rabbi Jehudah who is quoted by another scholar named Raba (died A.D. 352): "For it has been taught: R. Judah also includes the picture of a woman giving to suck and Serapis. A woman giving to suck alludes to Eve who suckled the whole world, Serapis alludes to Joseph who became a prince (*sar*) and appeased (*hephis*) the whole world. [The picture of Serapis is only prohibited when he is represented as] holding a measure and is measuring, and that [of Isis] when she is holding a child and giving it to suck".[2] The words in brackets have been added by the translator, the Hebrew text having only: "And he is holding a measure and is measuring and she is holding a child and suckling it". Other translators, however, make similar additions; Goldschmidt: "Jedoch nur wenn er ein Mass hält...";[3] Billerbeck:

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[1] I. Epstein, *The Babylonian Talmud, Seder Nezikin*, vol. IV (ʿAbodah Zarah translated by A. Cohen) London 1935, p. 211.

[2] Epstein, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

[3] L. Goldschmidt, *Der babylonische Talmud mit Einschluss der vollständigen Mišnah.* vol. VII, The Hague 1933, p. 945.

"Aber dies (dass Geräte mit diesen beiden Figuren zur Nutzniessung verboten sind) gilt nur wenn..."; [4] only Lieberman has: "A genuine Sarapis is only one who...". [5]

In the Tosephta, which is not so much a commentary on the Mishnah as a parallel collection of rules finished after A.D. 400, [6] there is a paragraph corresponding to the above quotation from the Talmud: "The scholars say: Prohibited (for use) is only that (sculpture) in whose hand there is a staff, or a ball, or a bird, a sword, a crown, and a ring, an idol, and a serpent; and on precious (objects) such as bracelets, noserings, necklaces and seal-rings, behold, these are prohibited; but on those held in low esteem such as kettles, water-heaters, pans, boilers, basins, linen cloths, and coins, behold, these are permitted. If one has found a ring on which there is the image of the sun, the image of the moon, the image of the dragon, he shall take them to the Salt Sea, and so also the image of a (woman) giving the breast (i.e. Isis) and Sarapis". [7]

The Rabbi Jehudah on whose authority Sarapis images were forbidden is dated by Billerbeck to about A.D. 150, [8] but that does not imply very much about the date of the additional explanation that Sarapis is the same as Joseph. It is quite possible that it goes back to Raba, a Babylonian scholar who quoted R. Jehudah, and as a consequence the explanation would have to be dated *c.* 300-350. As it is, this dating of R. Jehudah is not certain either, for among the 44 or so scholars known by the names of Jehudah or Juda(n) — which were used promiscuously — there are eight that are sometimes or always quoted in the "Ocean of the Talmud" without either patronymic or surname, as in our passage. The earliest of them is

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[4] H. Strack-P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*, vol. IV-1, Munich 1928, p. 393.

[5] S. Lieberman, *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine*, New York 1950, p. 138; for the bibliography of this passage and related questions see p. 137 note 87, and also S. Krauss, *Griechische und Lateinische Lehnwörter im Talmud, Midrasch und Targum*, Hildesheim 1964 (repr.), vol. II, p. 412 and E. R. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, New York 1953, vol. II, p. 283, notes 550 and 552.

[6] *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Jerusalem 1971, vol. XV, col. 1284.

[7] *ʿAb.Zar.* V (VI) 1 (ed. M. S. Zuckermandel, Jerusalem 1963 (repr.), p. 468; cf. the German translation in Strack-Billerbeck, *op. cit.*, vol. IV-1, p. 393.

[8] Strack-Billerbeck, *op. cit.*, vol. IV-1, p. 393.

Jehudah b. El'ai *c.* A.D. 150, the latest, a Judan, who lived about 350 in Palestine.[9]

If we now consider the datable Sarapis images of Palestinian provenance, which are in fact those occurring on coins, a kind of object expressly mentioned in our Tosephta quotation as allowed to be used by Jews, it turns out that Sarapis coins were minted in Jerusalem/Aelia Capitolina under the emperors Antoninus Pius and his successors up to Hostilianus, a son of Decius, who died A.D. 251; at Caesarea Maritima from Trajan to Volusianus (251-253); at Ptolemais/Acco coins from M. Aurelius to Salonina empress of Gallienus (253-268); similar coins are known from Diospolis/Lydda, Eleutheropolis/Bethogabris, Neapolis/Samaria, Tiberias, and apparently also Sepphoris.[10] The period covered by these issues makes it possible for either the earliest or the latest R. Jehudah to have actually handled such a coin.

Further traces of Sarapis worship in Palestine are the votive inscription of the 3rd legion "Cyrenaïca" in Jerusalem to Juppiter Optimus Maximus Sarapis (A.D. 116/117), and those of Hegesandros, his wife Xenarchis and their children to Sarapis and Isis (Samaria, 3rd cent. B.C.?), of Malchus son of Demetrius to Zeus Helios Megas Sarapis and Isis (Gerasa, A.D. 142/3), and of Augas son of Malchion to Sarapis alone (Gerasa, 2nd-3rd century A.D.).[11]

Images of Isis in Palestine are less frequent. One instance is a coin of Ptolemais/Acco bearing on the obverse Philip Junior (248-249) son of the emperor Philippus Arabs, and on the reverse Harpocrates approaching a seated Isis with his hand to his lips.[12] Of the well known Isis image which is evidently meant by the Talmud and Tosephta and usually called "Isis Lactans" no instances are known from Palestine proper. Tran tam Tinh surmises in his monograph on this goddess that she may have been worshipped in Palestine before Alexander the Great, but there is nothing to bear this out beyond a statuette found in Tafas in Southern Syria.[13]

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[9] See Strack-Billerbeck, *op. cit.*, vol. V-VI: *Rabbinischer Index. Verzeichnis der Schriftgelehrten. Geographisches Register*, Munich 1963 (2nd ed.), pp. 173-179 and 199-200.

[10] L. Kadman, *Corpus Nummorum Palaestinensium*, vol. I: *The Coins of Aelia Capitolina*, Jerusalem 1956, pp. 39-42; vol. II: *The Coins of Caesarea Maritima*, Jerusalem 1957, pp. 56-57; vol. IV: *The Coins of Akko Ptolemais*, Jerusalem 1961, pp. 152-153; cf. B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum*, Oxford 1911, p. 802, and G. F. Hill, *A Catalogue of the Greek Coins in the British Museum: Palestine*, Bologna 1965, pp. xv, 43, 51, 62, 70, 74, 142.

[11] L. Vidman, *Sylloge inscriptionum religionis Isiacae et Sarapiacae*, Berlin 1969, nrs. 362, 361a, 366, 367.

[12] See Head, *op. cit.*, p. 794 and Kadman, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, pp. 154-155.

There are also some doubtful instances of Sarapis in Palestine. It must remain an open question whether the place named "Berenice's Harbour" from where Zoilus wrote in 258/7 B.C. to Apollonius, Ptolemy the II's minister of finance, to urge that a Serapeum be built there,[14] is identical with the sea-port of Gaza at the mouth of the Wadi Ghazzeh; or whether the statue of a bearded god found there in 1878 — who wears no calathos, and is not accompanied by a cerberus — is really a Sarapis.[15] Seyrig's undocumented remark that there was also a Sarapis cult in Ascalon seems equally doubtful.[16] A coin is known of this town on which there is an Egyptian-looking deity, standing on three lions and bearing Osiris' attributes, but that is not necessarily a Sarapis either.[17] Ascalon was also the birthplace or the dwelling place of an astrologer named Serapion Ascalonites, who is mentioned and quoted about 490 A.D. by Fulgentius. No conclusion can be drawn from this combination of names. His first name need not mean that Sarapis was worshipped in his native town any more than his surname need mean that his native town was Ascalon, for Diodorus "of Tarsus" was born in Antioch and Epiphanius "of Salamis" (Cyprus) was born in Judaea.[18] In this connection it is interesting to note that names compounded with Sarapis were apparently not given to Jews, in spite of Tcherikover's remark to that effect in the introduction to his edition of Jewish papyri.[19] His prosopography does not contain a single instance of a Jew called Sarapion or the like, nor does the index to Frey's corpus of Jewish inscriptions.[20] The Isis counterpart, "Isidorus", on the other hand has been in use by Jews up to the present day.

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[13] V. Tran tam Tinh-Y. Labrecque, *Isis Lactans: Corpus des Monuments Gréco-Romains d'Isis Allaitant Harpocrate*, E.P.R.O. vol. XXXVII, Leyden 1973, p. 9 and p. 77 nr. A-29.

[14] P.S.I. 435.

[15] L. H. Vincent, *La Palestine dans les papyrus ptolémaïques de Gerza*, Revue Biblique XXIX, 1920, pp. 161-202, especially 172-175. Cf. M. Cary, *A History of the Greek World 323-146 B.C.*, London 1959 (2nd ed.), p. 372.

[16] H. Seyrig, *Antiquités Syriennes*, Syria XIII, 1932, p. 358 n. 1.

[17] Head, *op. cit.*, p. 804.

[18] Fulgentius, *Mitologiae* I 14.

Christian Parallels

Back to the Talmud: if we assume that the explanatory remark to the effect that Sarapis is Joseph and Isis is Eve goes back to R. Jehudah, and if we further identify this scholar with the earliest possible namesake who is sometimes quoted without surname, that is, R. Jehudah (b. El'ai) *c.* 150 A.D., only then would our Talmud passage be the oldest known testimony for the interpretation of Sarapis as Joseph, but all this is by no means certain. It cannot be excluded, therefore, that the oldest source we have is actually Melito bishop of Sardes, who died before A.D. 190. But the whole question who was first may be irrelevant, since the interpretation has roots going back at least to the 2nd century B.C., and formed part, therefore, of the common Jewish-Christian tradition.

In his apology for Christianity, preserved in Syriac, which he addressed to an Antoninus Caesar who has sons, that is Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius, Melito wrote: "The Egyptians worshipped Joseph, a Hebrew, who was called Serapis, because he supplied them with sustenance in the years of famine".[21] This remark belongs to a whole series of "euhemeristic" interpretations of gods, such as Athena and Hercules, whom Melito considers to have been in origin deified historical persons. He combats idolatry by unmasking the pagan gods as ordinary people, but his own identifications he regards of course as unquestionable. If the Talmudic passage is unique, as far as I know, in Jewish literature, Melito's testimony has found imitators:

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[19] V. A. Tcherikover-A. Fuks, *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, vol. I, p. 29 and vol. III (1964) Appendix II pp. 167-196.

[20] J. B. Frey, *Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaicarum*, Rome-Paris 1936, vol. I, pp. 604, 614-616, 625; vol. II (1952) has no index of proper names.

[21] W. Cureton, *Spicilegium Syriacum: Containing Remains of Bardesan, Meliton, Ambrose and Mara Bar Serapion*, London 1855, pp. 43-44; cf. I. Lévy, *Nebo, Hadaran et Sérapis dans l'Apologie du Pseudo-Méliton*, Revue de l'Histoire des Religions XL, 1899, pp. 370-373.

Tertullian makes use of the same interpretation of Sarapis, when he in his turn addresses an *Apology* in A.D. 197 to the governors of the Roman provinces: (II 8) "For this Serapis was formerly called Joseph from the family of the saints". Then there follows the Biblical account of Joseph after which Tertullian continues: "They have called him Serapis after the headdress which adorns his head: the "modius form" of this headdress impresses on the mind the memory of his corn distribution; from the ears of corn by which its brim is marked it appears that the concern for fruits was burdensome" (litt.: *supra caput*: "above his head"). In this apology there is, as in Melito's *Oration to Antoninus Caesar*, a discussion on the various pagan deities, though a more elaborate one. He likewise sees these gods as deified men and women and describes Serapis as "*divus Joseph*", saying that for the Egyptians, accustomed to worship animals, it was only a little step to deify a man.[22]

After Christianity had been adopted as the official state religion it was at once in a position to combat the different heathen creeds including the widespread Sarapis cult, and consequently the criticism of the identification of Sarapis and Joseph became more pronounced. About 346-350 Firmicus Maternus, a Sicilian of senatorial rank, composed a treatise *On the Error of Pagan Religions* to instigate the emperors Constantius and Constans to extirpate paganism. This author expresses himself as follows about the patriarch Joseph (ch. 13): "For him the Egyptians have built temples after his death in accordance with a traditional institution of their own nation, and in order that posterity should be grateful for the righteous corn distribution (*dispensatio*) the corn measure (*modius*) with which he had distributed the corn among the hungry was placed on his head. And he also took his name from his first ancestor, so that he might be worshipped in more solemn fashion. For as he had been the great-grandson of Sarah, from whom when she was ninety years of age Abraham through God's mercy had got a son, he was given the Greek name Serapis, that is Σάρρας ἀπό (*sic ms.* a; Σάρρας παῖς Bursian's conjecture), but as Joseph did not want this it happened only after his death. For his pious soul, devoted to the highest god, could not have been seduced to so great a crime as to furnish by means of his own name temptations to sin for superstitious people, knowing as he did that it was (written) in God's holy laws that no man should venerate or worship such a thing".

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[22] J. W. Ph. Borleffs, *De Tertulliano et Minucio Felice*, Groningen 1925, p. 67 has pointed out that Tertullian misinterprets here Minucius Felix, *Octavius* XXIX 4 where it is said that the Egyptians chose themselves a man whom they venerated as a god. From the parallels adduced by Quispel it is clear that such a practice existed in the village of Anabis and that it was a living person who was deified (Clem. Homil. VI 23 and Porphyry, *De abstinentia* IV 9). See G. Quispel, *A Jewish Source of Minucius Felix*, Vigiliae Christianae III, 1949, p. 116 and note 9.

Half a century later Rufinus of Aquileia (*c.* 345-410/1) tells in his *Church History* (XI 23) about the destruction in 391 of the Sarapis statue and temple in Alexandria. In this connection he enumerates the different theories current on the origin of the god: "Some assert that the statue was made in the honour of our Joseph because of the distribution of corn (litt. "measuring": *dimensio*) by which he came to the aid of the Egyptians in time of famine". From this wording it is clear that he himself does not agree with the explanation. He also mentions alternatives: Juppiter, the potency (*virtus*) of the Nile, a Memphite king who helped the Alexandrians with corn during famine, theories which he all ascribes to "the pagans".

St. Augustine was still more outspoken: in *De civitate Dei* book XVIII which he composed in the year 425[23] he retells in chapter 4 the Biblical story of how Joseph and later on Jacob came to the land of Egypt; in chapter 5, however, he relates that Apis king of the Argives came over to Egypt from Greece, and was after his death worshipped as Serapis, which name St. Augustine, on the authority of Varro, explains as "coffin (σορός) of Apis" (cf. Plutarch, *De Iside* 362c). In the telling of these two stories in immediate succession I can only see a flat rejection by St. Augustine of the current Joseph/Sarapis equation, and not his agreement with it as von Simson argues:[24] to St. Augustine Serapis is the same as Apis who had come from Greece and not from Canaan.

The rejection was openly stated by his contemporary, Paulinus of Nola (353-431) who denounced the idea that Sarapis was the son of Jacob as nothing but a mendacious trick of Satan: *Carmen* XIX 98ff. "From Egypt Satan has fled where he had adopted a thousand shapes and a thousand names to match these various monsters. Thus he endeavoured to transform Joseph into Serapis by hiding the venerable name under a pernicious one, although the very shape of the statue inspired belief in the idol: the modius rests on his head because in times of old he gathered the corn through God's inspiration before the famine came, fed the countless heathens of Egypt with the former abundance, and satisfied the infertile years from the fertile. But lest the saint should be worshipped any longer with pagan honours God's sublime spirit sharpened the minds of the devout crowd through his inspiration, and has put an end to the cult of this nefarious demon by throwing down and crushing Serapis". This happened in the year 391.

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[23] P. Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, London 1967, p. 378: Chronological Table E.

[24] O. G. von Simson, *Sacred Fortress: Byzantine Art and Statecraft in Ravenna*, Chicago 1948, p. 135 n. 4.

We see that as long as the Christians felt the need to justify for their beliefs they made use of the Sarapis/Joseph equation without too much criticism (Melito, Tertullian); the Talmud, too, states it as a fact. This attitude is rather like that of Artapanus who equated Moses with Mousaios the mythical poet, singer and prophet of the Greeks, and even regarded Moses as having been the teacher of Orpheus (ap. Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* IX 27). In later times, however, criticism became more lively. The deification did occur, it is admitted, but against his will (Firmicus Maternus), it is seen as the work of Satan himself (Paulinus), or mentioned merely as one of several possibilities (Rufinus), and eventually dropped (St. Augustine). Against this latter background it really must be doubted, with Schapiro, whether in the Joseph scenes carved on the ivory throne of Maximianus bishop of Ravenna from 546-554, the typical headgear worn by Joseph is indeed the Sarapis modius taken over from that god[25] as is sometimes assumed.[26] The reasons why three scenes on this bishop's throne are devoted to the patriarch Joseph must be sought in the elaborate parallelism that had been created in patristic literature between the lives of Joseph and Christ,[27] and also in the fact that Joseph's career was held forth as the ideal both for clergy and state officials. This is seen, for instance, in Philo's *De Josepho* and St. Ambrose's *De Joseph patriarcha.*[28] This crown of Joseph is not so much a modius adorned with ears of corn but rather resembles a jewelled crown, or the turreted crown as worn by the goddess Tyche. Schapiro makes it clear that we here have to do with the so-called *modiolus*, the crown which the Byzantine emperor received from the Senate and Prefect of Constantinople, in contradistinction to the diadem which he received from the Patriarch of that city.[29] Because of its similarity with the modius as worn by Sarapis, Hecate, Artemis, this crown was called the modiolus; its immediate prototype might have been the statue of Tyche with modius that stood in Constantinople up to the 9th century.[30] The relation between Joseph's modiolus and Sarapis' modius is therefore at best indirect: the sculptor portrayed the viceroy of Egypt as wearing the crown which in his own time represented the aspect of government by the imperial power.

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[25] M. Schapiro, *The Joseph Scenes on the Maximianus Throne in Ravenna*, Gazette des Beaux Arts XL 1952, pp. 27-38.

[26] P. David's appendix in: W. de Grüneisen, *Sainte Marie Antique*, Rome 1911, p. 501; C. Cecchelli, *La Cattedra di Massimiano ed altri avori romano-orientali*, Rome 1936, p. 127ff.; G. W. Morath, *Die Maximianskathedra in Ravenna*, Freiburger Theologische Studien Heft LIV, Freiburg-Br. 1940, p. 63ff.; von Simson, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

Attributes of Sarapis according to Talmud and Tosephta

If not all the Christian authors quoted above objected to the Joseph/Sarapis equation, they certainly objected to the god as such, and this in fact applies to Rabbi Jehudah as well. He does indeed postulate the identity of the two, but not out of any tolerance for the Egyptian god. It is his specific aim to prohibit all gods and idols along with their symbols and attributes: staff, ball, bird, sword, crown, ring, idol, snake, sun, moon, dragon. A statue with a ball in its hand, for instance, may have been forbidden by the Tosephta because the god Helios is pictured holding a globe and a whip as appears from a coin of Caesarea.[31] The staff was an attribute of Sarapis among others. A statue holding an image in his hand may also be this god. On coins several gods appear with a bust in their right hand. It seems likely that the bust represents the emperor, and Sarapis is thus represented on a Jerusalem coin of Diadumenianus (217-218).[32] The author of the Tosephta passage may have had such cases in mind.

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[27] P. Fabre, *Le développement de l'histoire de Joseph dans la littérature et dans l'art au cours des douze premiers siècles*, Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire. École française de Rome, XXXIX 1921-22, pp. 194-195; Schapiro, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[28] Schapiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

[29] P. Charanis, *The Imperial Crown "modiolus" and its Constitutional Significance*, Byzantion XII 1937, pp. 189-195, especially 194-195, and: *The crown Modiolus once more*, Byzantion XIII 1938, pp. 377-383; cf. Schapiro, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

[30] Charanis, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.

Of great interest is the additional comment in the Talmud that Sarapis is holding a measure and measuring. The Hebrew word used here for "holding": נקיט could by extension mean "having" or "wearing". The word for "measure": גריוא, indicates a dry measure and clearly refers to the modius. But as it is also said that he "is measuring" the more obvious implication of the passage seems to be that Sarapis does so with his modius, and that is precisely where the problems begin to appear. By the side of Isis Lactans there would have been then a "Sarapis Metiens", but no such Sarapis has been found: Hornbostel describes extensively the different types of the deity in sculpture and on coins, and from the rich collection of illustrations it appears that whenever the modius or calathos is present it is placed on the god's head.[33] This led Goodenough to suppose that perhaps the Talmudist had mistaken a Sarapis with a cornucopia in hand for one holding a corn measure,[34] but this is not very likely. First, such a Sarapis is very rare — Hornbostel has no clear example[35] — and secondly the cornmeasure which many people today may never have seen was a common object in antiquity, including Palestine, as in the New Testament, "Nor do men light a lamp and put it under the bushel (μόδιος) but on the lamp-stand" (Matt. V 15). The definite article in this passage might even suggest that there was such a thing in every house used as a flour bin, and so it is unlikely that a Jew of that time would make such a mistake here.

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[31] Kadman, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 59.

[32] Kadman, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 128.

[33] W. Hornbostel, *Sarapis: Studien zur Überlieferungsgeschichte, den Erscheinungsformen und Wandlungen der Gestalt eines Gottes*, E.P.R.O. vol. XXXII, Leyden 1973.

[34] E. R. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols ...*, p. 282 n. 545.

[35] Cf. Hornbostel, *op. cit.*, p. 344ff.

If not with a modius, with what else can Sarapis have been thought to be measuring? The Suda lexicon dating from the 10th century, in its Sarapis entry describes the Alexandria statue which was demolished in 391 as follows: "Some say that this (statue) is Zeus, others the Nile because of his having a modius on his head and the cubit, that is to say, the measure (μέτρον) of the water, others (that it is) Joseph, still others that he had been a certain Apis, a rich man and king from Memphis, who from his private means furnished the Alexandrians with food when famine came...". This sets problems, too, since no statue or image has come down to us of a Sarapis holding a cubit in his hand. Perhaps "his having" (τὸ ἔχειν) does not mean exactly that but refers more generally to the fact that a copy of the cubit — with which Sarapis is associated in literature as will appear below — belonged to the inventory of his temple. Rufinus tells us that it was the custom when the Nile began to rise again to bring a cubit, the unit by which the increase was measured, to the temple of Sarapis, who was believed to make the Nile waters return every year, but that after the destruction of temple and image in 391 this cubit was deposited in a Christian church, which caused great joy to the emperor.[36] Is it far fetched to assume that the knowledge of such facts led a rabbi to see in Sarapis' sceptre or staff, a frequent attribute of his, which on coins, moreover, may not have been any too clear, a measuring rod by which he "is measuring"?

Sarapis and Joseph

It is now time to look more deeply into the reasons which led the Jews to consider Sarapis as Joseph, for there can be little doubt that they were the initiators of the story and not the Egyptians, just as Artapanus equated Moses and Mousaios (see above), and Eupolemos declared the identity of Enoch and Atlas, of Kush and

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[36] *Hist. Eccl.* XI 30; cf. D. Bonneau, *La crue du Nil*, vol. I: *Ses descriptions, ses explications, son culte d'après les auteurs grecs et latins, et les documents des époques ptolémaïque, romaine et byzantine*, Paris 1964, pp. 321, 429, 430. According to Theophanes (Migne *P.G.* 107, p. 88) it was Constantine who decreed about 310 that the cubit had to be deposited in a church. Julian undid this (Sozomenus V 3).

Asbolos (ap. Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* IX 17),[37] evidently from the desire to reduce Greek mythology to Biblical history. For it is hardly conceivable that an Egyptian priest would go so far as to identify the supreme god of his own time-honoured religion with a human being who figured in the history of a foreign tribe. But on the other hand when we learn that Typhon, the abhorred enemy of Osiris, was by some considered to have fled to Palestine after his fight with Horus and to have become there the father of Judaeus/Judah and of Hierosolymus/Jerusalem (Dino ap. Plut. *De Iside* 363c-d), we may safely assume that behind such stories (cf. Tacitus *Hist.* V 2) there was ultimately hidden some Egyptian nationalist, who wanted to bring into disrepute the large Jewish contingent among the population of Alexandria.

As to the supposed Hebrew derivation of the name from *sar hephis* "the prince appeases", which is not given as such but is implied by the Talmud, it must certainly have been worked out after the identification with Joseph had been made and not itself given rise to it, since "the prince appeases" does not automatically bring to mind the character of Joseph. The derivation is in any case interesting because it seems to retain the initial consonant of the second part of the compound name Osar-Ḥapi which was lost in the Greek rendering (ʽΟ)σαρᾶπις, at least as written.

Although Goodenough says with regard to Sarapis/Joseph: "No further light can be thrown on the identification, and one must only guess at its origin...",[38] it seems to me that the various quotations which we have seen above do nevertheless contain some indications where the light is to be looked for. First of all it is clear that Sarapis and Joseph were both, though each in his own way, suppliers of corn, Sarapis because he was practically identical with the Nile, the cause of the annual irrigation and thus fertility itself. This "giving of bread" was on the other hand a main feature of the extensive parallelism which Church Fathers drew between Joseph and Jesus Christ, who gives or is the bread of life (e.g. Matt XIV 19 and

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[37] Cf. I. Lévy, *Sarapis*, Revue de l'Histoire des Religions LX, 1909, p. 297 n. 1.

[38] E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light. The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism*, Amsterdam 1969 (repr.), p. 294.

John VI 35). As Joseph in the Old Testament eventually accepted even the farmers' arable land as payment for food (Genesis XLVII 20), it is not surprising that he could also be connected with such a thing as agricultural reform. Artapanus says that it was Joseph who had the soil redistributed among the peasants and had the different plots properly demarcated, because up to then the Egyptians had practised agriculture ἀτάκτως, without any order (ap. Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* IX 23). Such activities are also attributed by Plutarch to Osiris, who for him is the same as Sarapis (*De Iside* 376a). He relates that according to the Egyptian tradition "Osiris when he was king of the Egyptians at once freed them of their helpless and savage way of life by showing them the fruits (of the field) and by giving them laws" (*De Iside* 356a). Diodorus Siculus, a contemporary of Julius Caesar, says the same but in more detail: "(They say) that after Osiris had married her (Isis) and had taken over the kingship, he did much to better social life. First he stopped men from eating one another, for after Isis had discovered the fruit of wheat and barley, which grew haphazardly over the land among the other vegetation but unknown to man, and after Osiris had also devised the cultivation of these fruits, all gladly changed their diet..." (I 13, 5-14, 1).

The identification of Sarapis and Joseph led to a certain similarity in their representations. That Sarapis is pictured with his attribute the modius as headdress is well-known. That he was also represented in association with another measure, the cubit, appeared above from the Suda and Rufinus, for Sarapis was the cause of the annual recurrence of the Nile waters, and their height was measured in cubits. In his *Oration on Sarapis* Aelius Aristides, who visited Egypt in 142/3, says of the god: οὗτος ἄγει Νεῖλον ὥρᾳ θέρους, οὗτος χειμῶνος ἀνακαλεῖ: "He drives up the Nile in summertime, he calls him back in winter" (par. 32). One of his many epithets, therefore, was Νειλάγωγος.[39] According to Pliny the Elder (about A.D. 60) sixteen cubits was the most favourable height of water: "iustum incrementum est cubitorum XVI" and he adds: "fourteen cubits bring joy, fifteen cubits safety, sixteen luxury" (*Natural History* V 58).

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[39] Vidman, *op. cit.*, p. 219 no. 458.

There is the well-known Vatican sculpture of the River Nile lying back with sixteen little gods frolicking about and upon him, who according to several ancient authors symbolize the ideal height of water for irrigation, sixteen cubits. Pliny describes a similar sculpture: "... while sixteen children play around him, standing for as many cubits, of the highest increase of that river when it rises" (*Natural History* XXXVI 58). Apparently there existed a number of copies of it, for Lucian of Samosata (about A.D. 175) refers to it with the same comment in his treatise on "*The Professor of Public Speaking*" (par. 6), and says that it was the Egyptians themselves who explained these "cupids" as "cubits": "... children playing around him: 'cubits' (πήχεις) the Egyptians call them". Philostratus the Elder (about A.D. 225) may have seen the same copy as Pliny, since it was at Naples that he admired all the statues, including Nilus and the Dwarfs, which he describes in his work *Imagines*; the title which he gave to the description of our sculpture was ΠΗΧΕΙC, after the dwarfs or cupids (*Imagines* I 5). Nile measure and corn measure, therefore, were both closely connected with the fertility aspect of Sarapis who was sometimes invoked as Πλουτοδότης or Τροφεύς.[40]

In addition to this the "measure" of Sarapis received a wider meaning. Right at the beginning of his *Oration on Sarapis* Aristides justifies himself for the fact that it has been composed in prose, whereas gods in literature are traditionally addressed in poetical form, "metrically" (par. 4ff.). But as prose is the more original use of language and verse comes later, Aristides says that in this case he prefers prose (par. 8). The metres of the poets should be given only to lines of verse and can be compared with the measures (μέτρα) of the merchants in the market-place, such as the choinix and the kotyle. Both kinds of measure are manifestations of that higher Measure which is the general principle of order and should as such also be applied to prose (parr. 10-11). It is difficult not to see in these remarks some allusion to the modius as a symbol of order — though like the cerberus and other attributes it is not actually mentioned. The allusion is particularly striking in par. 21 where Aristides summarizes the character of the god and his functions as follows: "And certainly, as he encompasses *all* the measures (μέτρα) of life for mankind and is the dispenser (ταμίας) of the time to be lived (by them) he may in accordance with this be correctly considered to include all things and steer (κυβερνᾶν) as it were our whole life". Rufinus expresses a similar thought when speaking about the common identification of Sarapis and Juppiter, "on whose head the modius has been placed because it indicates either that he rules (*moderari*) all things with measure and moderation (*mensura modoque*) or that he gives life to mortals by abundance of fruits" (*Hist. Eccl.* XI 23). Thus in respect of Sarapis we have the following terminological complex: μόδιος/modius – modus – moderari/κυβερνᾶν – mensura/μέτρον – ταμίας – and πῆχυς/cubitus.

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[40] Vidman, *op. cit.*, p. 196 no. 389; Hornbostel, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

If we now turn to Joseph we see that in the Old Testament he purchased the superfluous corn of the seven good years and sold it to the hungry in the lean years, first for money, then for their cattle and pack-animals, next for their land, and finally for their own bodies. In this way he kept alive the people to whom he had been sold as a slave and enslaved them all in his turn, except for the priests (Genesis XLVIII 13-26). In the Book of Jubilees XL 13 it is even said that there was so much corn that "they could no longer count and measure it for its multitude".[41] In the further tradition of the Joseph story it is often this element of "meting out", "measuring", that comes to the fore, although in the Old Testament the sacks of Joseph's brothers are simply filled, and it is not clear how the price was fixed, whether according to dry measure or to weight. But although the Egyptian verb for "measuring" *ḫ3j* can also mean "to weigh", measuring must have been the usual method. In the so-called "negative confession" in the Book of the Dead, in which the dead man enumerates to the gods all the sins and crimes which he did *not* commit, we read: "Oh Ruty (i.e. Amon) coming forth from heaven, I have not diminished the modius (*dbḥ*)".[42] Several terms connected with measuring and corn are accompanied in the hieroglyphs by the determinative ideogram of a corn measure, from which corn is seen pouring out.

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[41] R. H. Charles, *Pseudepigrapha*, Oxford 1963 (repr.), p. 71.

[42] Chapter CXXV line 6 (E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Book of the Dead* (*Egyptian Text*), London 1898, p. 253); I owe this reference to my colleague Dr. D. van der Plas at Horssen. Cf. also from the New Testament: Luke VI 38 "Give and it will be given to you: good measure, pressed down, shaken together, running over, will be put into your lap".

Our first instance, from the extracanonical Joseph tradition, is from Artapanus, whom we quoted above in connection with Joseph's division and demarcation of the plots of arable soil. To this he adds that Joseph "also invented the measures (μέτρα) and that he was deeply loved by the Egyptians because of it" (ap. Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* IX 23). Flavius Josephus' version of the story contains the additional detail that Joseph "driving in a chariot through the whole country gathered the corn from the farmers *measuring out* (ἀπομετρῶν) to each of them the portion sufficient for sowing and sustenance" (*Ant. Jud.* II 90), and again when his brothers come to Egypt for the second time Joseph "orders his dispenser (ταμίας) to give them the (portion of) grain *measured out* (μεμετρημένον)" (*ibid.* II 124). We have seen that Firmicus Maternus explained that the Egyptians, who worshipped Joseph after his death and placed a modius on his head, did so in order to remind later generations of his righteous corn distribution, litt. "weighing out" (*dispensatio*), because he had apportioned (*diviserat*) the corn with it (*De errore prof. rel.* XIII 2). Likewise Rufinus says that some considered the Alexandrian Sarapis statue to have been in honour of Joseph because of the latter's measuring out of corn: "*ob dimensionem frumenti*" (*Hist. Eccl.* XI 23).

Rabbinical literature contains an instance as well, though it is not easily spotted unless Firmicus' remark about Joseph's *iusta dimensio* is kept in mind. The Midrash on Exodus which is known as the *Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael* comments on how Moses was able to find the bones of Joseph (Ex. XIII 19) which the Israelites had sworn to take to Canaan (Gen. L 25). After two versions have been given of Moses locating the coffin of Joseph there is in conclusion the moralistic aphorism "This is to teach you that with what measure a man metes it is measured unto him" (cf. Matt. VII 2 and parallels).[43] This is evidently meant very literally: because Joseph measured righteously he was accordingly recompensed in such a way that his hidden coffin was allowed to be found for a definite burial in the Promised Land.

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[43] J. Z. Lauterbach, *Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael*, Philadelphia 1933, vol. I, pp. 176-177.

Even the Koran mentions this detail. The Sura which occupies itself especially with Yusuf, the twelfth, states expressly: "59. And when he (Joseph) had furnished them with their provisions, he said: Bring me your brother, the son of your father. Do you not see that I give *full measure* and am the best of hosts? 60. But if you do not bring him to me there will be no corn *measured* to you from me ...".

Apparently it was this aspect of measuring or weighing that most readily came to mind if Joseph's activity had to be briefly characterized, for when the guild of money-changers in medieval Chartres had a stained glass window placed in the famous cathedral there, some time between A.D. 1210 and 1240, it depicts the history of Joseph their patron saint, while the donors themselves are represented to the left weighing their gold coins.

In conclusion we may say that the terminology used for Joseph's measuring: μέτρον – (ἀπο-)μετρεῖν – dimensio – dispensatio is much the same as that used in connection with Sarapis. It is difficult to say whether it was one of the causes or the result of the identification of the two, or merely a parallel development. It is in any case possible that the identification had other grounds than merely the part they both played in connection with grain. To investigate this possibility we shall have to look more closely at the two components of Sarapis, Osiris on the one hand, Apis on the other, and see whether either of them has separately been associated with Joseph.

Osiris and Joseph

We have already seen that both Osiris and Joseph were seen as the introducers of regular agriculture, but there is more. From Rabbinical literature, the Mekilta passage which we discussed above for its moralistic conclusion, has also been quoted in this connection.[44]

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[44] For instance, M. Güdemann, *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien*, Leipzig 1876, p. 26ff., and *Mythenmischung in der Hagada. Ein Beitrag zur jüdischen Sagengeschichte, wie zur Mythologie der Aegypter, Phöniker und Griechen. IV. Joseph-Osiris*, M.G.W.J. XXV, 1876, pp. 229ff., esp. 229-259; B. Heller, *Die Sage vom Sarge Josephs und der Bericht Benjamins von Tudela über Daniels schwebenden Sarg*, M.G.W.J. LXX, 1926, pp. 271-276.

It is a comment on Exodus XIII 19 "And Moses took the bones of Joseph with him". According to Genesis L 25-26 Joseph had made his compatriots promise that they would take his bones with them should they return to Canaan, then he died, was embalmed and laid in a coffin. As it is said that it was Moses who fulfilled that promise, understandably the question was raised how this was actually done by Moses. The Mekilta passage runs: "But how did Moses know where Joseph was buried? It is told that Seraḥ, the daughter of Asher, survived from that generation and she showed Moses the grave of Joseph. She said to him: The Egyptians put him into a metal coffin which they sunk [*sic*] in the Nile. So Moses went and stood by the Nile. He took a table of gold on which he engraved the Tetragrammaton, and throwing it into the Nile, he cried out and said: "Joseph, son of Jacob! The oath to redeem his children, which God swore to our father Abraham, has reached its fulfillment. If you come up, well and good. But if not, we shall be guiltless of your oath". Immediately Joseph's coffin came to the surface, and Moses took it. And you need not be surprised at this..." (Next a parallel is drawn with the story of the floating axe head in 2 Kings VI 5-6, after which the Mekilta continues with another version of the finding of Joseph's coffin:) "R. Nathan says: They had buried him in the Capitol of Egypt in the mausoleum of the kings, as it is said: "And they embalmed him and he was put in a coffin in Egypt". And how did Moses know which was Joseph's coffin? Moses went and stood among the coffins. He cried out and said "Joseph, Joseph. The oath etc. (see above)". Immediately Joseph's coffin began to move and Moses took it and went away. This is to teach you that with what measure a man metes it is measured unto him".

As the word אָרוֹן (Septuagint: σορός) is used only once in the Old Testament with the sense of "coffin" and that in connection with the death of Joseph, it is understandable that this detail has been associated with that other famous story about a coffin in Egypt, Plutarch's version of the Isis-Osiris-myth in which the god Typhon, his brother Osiris, and others play a game with a coffin. In turn they all try whether the coffin fits them. But as soon as Osiris is inside the coffin Typhon closes the lid and pushes it and the living Osiris into the Nile. The coffin was made of wood, the lid was fastened by Typhon with molten lead (*De Iside* 356e). This myth has influenced the further Jewish tradition about Joseph's coffin of which we have just seen a specimen. Firstly Joseph's coffin, the material of which is not mentioned in the Old Testament, is regarded as having been wholly of lead[45] (compare the molten lead in Plutarch's story) or at any rate of metal,[46] since it had to sink to the bottom of the water. Why it had to be hidden and by whom, are questions that have received different answers. One version is that the Israelites themselves sank the coffin in the Nile to prevent the Egyptians from worshipping him.[47] According to other sources it was the Egyptians who did it, either to keep Israel in Egypt because with the coffin hidden Israel could not leave without breaking its promise to Joseph (Gen. L 25),[48] or in order to bless the waters of the Nile[49] or sea,[50] or to make them abundant.[51] The last two positive aims are clearly connected with Osiris, who himself represents the rising of the Nile, while Isis is the fertile soil watered by the god. Plutarch also records a rite which was performed when the river was at its lowest level. A sacred chest inside which was a golden coffer containing drinking water was carried by the priests to the sea. The crowd assembled on the shore rejoiced when it was produced, crying: "Osiris has been found". Then a lump of earth was moistened with this water and moulded into a crescent shaped image which by the union of its constituents symbolized (the reunion of) Osiris/water and Isis/soil (*De Iside* 366f.).

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[45] Mekilta (Beshallah) 24a-b, quoted by L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, Philadelphia 1969 (repr.), II, p. 182; the many versions of this story are given in translation, partly by Ginzberg, partly by G. Kittel, *Die Probleme des palästinischen Spätjudentums und das Urchristentum*, Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament. Herausgegeben von Rudolf Kittel. Dritte Folge, Heft 1, Stuttgart 1926, pp. 169-179. The two collections supply one another.

[46] Lauterbach, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

[47] So Zohar III 46a (translated by H. Sperling - M. Simon - P. P. Levertoff, London 1949, p. 139).

[48] See note 45.

[49] Epstein, *op. cit.*, *Seder Nashim*, vol. III, Sotah 13a (translated by A. Cohen), pp. 67-68.

[50] According to the Midrash Haggadol on Genesis L 26 Joseph's coffin was put in the Nile, and this is explained as follows: "that they put him in the *sea* (happened) that its water would be blessed"; see Kittel, *op. cit.*, p. 177 no. 16.

[51] Mekilta de-Rabbi Shim on 24, quoted by Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 376 n. 438.

The *Mekilta* (*Beshallah*) just quoted[52] relates as an extra detail that immediately before the Exodus Moses had been searching for the coffin for three days and three nights until he at last met the daughter of Joseph's brother Asher, a detail reminiscent of Isis' desperate roaming and searching for Osiris (*De Iside* 356e). For Osiris' absence also lasted three days: his body was thrown into the Nile on the 17th of Athyr (*De Iside* 356c), the performance of the above mentioned rite was on the 19th (*De Iside 366f.*).[53] In one of the parallel versions, the *Midrash on Shir ha-Shirim*,[54] there may be another echo of Plutarch's story: Moses first made four silver leaves and drew on them the images respectively of a lion, a man, an eagle and a bull (cf. Ezek. I 10). When he threw the lion into the Nile the river grew wild and roared; when he threw in the picture of the man the scattered bones of Joseph were put together so as to become a body again; after the eagle had been cast into the river the coffin began to float so that Moses was able to recover it. The fourth silver leaf with the picture of the bull was not needed, but it became later the model from which the Golden Calf got its shape. The gathering together of Joseph's bones seems out of place in this story, the whole point of which is that his body was in the coffin awaiting removal to Canaan. It may be an echo of the vision of the prophet Ezekiel who saw a valley full of bones which were put together and brought back to life (XXXVII 7-10). But these bones are a multitude, as the prophecy is about the people of Israel: "Son of man, these bones are the whole House of Israel" (v. 11), which makes it less likely that our Midrash passage really has any allusion to this vision. What it does much more closely resemble is the gathering together by Isis of Osiris' scattered limbs dismembered by his brother Typhon and buried at fourteen different places in Egypt. Isis searches for them and fits them together again into a body which comes back to life (*De Iside* 364f.; 373a).

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[52] See note 45.

[53] Cf. Heller, *op. cit.*, p. 275, and H. Gressmann, *Tod und Auferstehung des Osiris*, Leipzig 1923, p. 4.

[54] 13a-b in the edition of L. Grünhut, Jerusalem 1897, quoted by Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 122 and vol. VI, p. 51 n. 266.

Thus it does appear that the several versions of the finding of Joseph's bones agree in a number of respects with the Osiris myth as told by Plutarch (A.D. 46-120) in his treatise *De Iside et Osiride* which he dedicated to Clea, a priestess of Osiris living at Delphi (364e). Osiris and Joseph are both put in coffins, their coffins are thrown into the Nile, are searched for and found, their scattered limbs or bones are reassembled, and moreover the fact that both are taken to the water, whether Sea or Nile, has the purpose of effecting somehowing the flooding of the river. With these correspondences, however, and that of the introduction of regular agriculture, the list of parallels is still not quite complete. In his *Apology against Apion* Fl. Josephus has attacked a number of critical remarks made by two Egyptian historian priests, Manetho (*c.* 275 B.C.) and Chaeremon (*c.* A.D. 50) concerning Moses and the Exodus.

Chaeremon, librarian of Alexandria and eventually one of the tutors to the young Nero, wrote a history of Egypt in which he also discussed the sojourn of the people of Israel in his own country. It is curious to read that he makes Joseph and Moses contemporaries of one another and describes them as joint leaders of an exodus of several hundred thousand diseased persons expelled by Ramesses to Syria. This propaganda story, of course, is an attempt to vindicate the reputation of Egypt, which does not come very well out of the Book of Exodus. Both Moses and Joseph are called by Chaeremon ἱερογραμματεῖς and their Egyptian names are given as *Tisithen* and *Peteséph* (*Contra Apionem* I 290). The latter name looks at first sight like a careless blend of *Petephrê* the name of Joseph's father-in-law (Sept. Gen. XLI 45), and Joseph's own name, but compound names of the type *Pete-* "the one given by..." with a god's name to follow, as in *Petisis* "the one given by Isis" (or "Isidorus"), were so common in Chaeremon's time that he as a native must have understood them as a matter of course, and cannot therefore have substituted *Pete-* for *Jô-* without a reason. Apparently it was only the first syllable of the Hebrew name that made no sense in Egyptian, whereas the second, *-sêph*, did and could therefore be retained. We can also perceive this in the Egyptian name *Osarsêph* which according to Manetho's version of the Exodus Moses had had as a priest at Heliopolis before he adopted his new name, and which as Manetho (or Pseudo-Manetho) expressly states was derived from the name of Osiris (*Contra Apionem* I 238; 250; 265; 286). We may note in passing how the city of Heliopolis has here, as it were, leaked from the Joseph story into the Moses cycle. As for the name Osarsêph, we may safely assume that it was good Egyptian as a whole, for Manetho, himself a priest at Heliopolis, or the source he used, or else his pseudepigraphic imitator could not have been more friendly to Israel than Chaeremon and given another Egyptian priest a hybrid name, half Egyptian (Osar-), half Hebrew (-sêph). Indeed the second syllable is as Egyptian as the first, for this compound name is also known from autochthonous Egyptian records as *Wśỉr-Spꜣ*. It is a combination of the names of Osiris and Sepa, a chthonian deity worshipped in the shape of a centipede in the neighbourhood of Heliopolis,[55] and comparable to such unifications as Amon-Re, Re-Harachte, Osir-Harachte, and the like. It could, however, also serve as the name of an ordinary person and is known as such from the Middle Kingdom. Ranke gave its meaning tentatively as "Osiris ist der spꜣ",[56] but according to Hoffmann there is a second possibility according to which the two components are simply added "Osiris-and-Sepa", on the analogy of *ỉnpw-Rꜥ*, "Anubis and Re", with some such phrase as "... protect me" understood.[57] Despite Gager's objections,[58] it is quite possible that Saalschütz may have been right[59] in his conjecture that Osarsêph was a simple substitution for Josêph, interpreted as a theophoric name Jəhôsêph (cf. Psalm LXXXI 6 M.). The name of the Hebrew god Jəhô or IAω was translated by Osar, the supreme god of Egypt, so that Josêph was not transformed into a new, hitherto non-existent Egyptian name, but replaced by an already existing name which was considered to be its equivalent. IAΩ is so often found on amulets, even together with Osiris, that Manetho must have known its significance.[60] IAΩ and Sarapis are also invoked in a prayer contained in a magical papyrus, a prayer which may be either Egyptian or Jewish. It is hard to say which, owing to its impenetrable syncretism.[61] Saalschütz 's conjecture of course supposes that Joseph and Moses were fused into one person. Since the two had already been made into colleagues by Chaeremon this is not to be ruled out in advance. It does gain some further support from the introduction of Heliopolis into the Moses cycle, though here again we must admit that this city, which in the Septuagint is mentioned only as the dwelling place of Joseph's father-in-law (Gen. XLI 45, 50; XLVI 20) also found its way into the life of Abraham as told by Eupolemus (2nd century B.C.). During his stay in Egypt (Genesis XII 10-20 mentions no cities) he says that Abraham would have lived in Heliopolis where he taught his Babylonian astrology to the priests (ap. Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* IX 23). Moreover it is known that other attempts have been made to combine or connect Joseph and Moses. Pompeius Trogus (*c.* 25 B.C.) in his lost world history made Moses the son of Joseph (ap. Justinus *Epitoma* XXXVI 2, 11) and Apollonius Molon, a rhetorician who counted Cicero and Julius Caesar among his pupils, wrote in his *Against the Jews* that Moses was "the third from Joseph" which may mean "the third son" or "the grandson" of Joseph (ap. Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* IX 19). It is also remarkable that Flavius Josephus makes no mention of any specific version or distortion of the Joseph story attributable to Manetho who must have yet had every reason to make denigratory remarks about it and to stamp the Jew Joseph, the foreigner who became viceroy of Egypt, as one of the hated Hyksos. Must we conclude that if there had been such a "Manetho version" Josephus would scarcely have refrained from criticising it in his turn? Or in other words, that Manetho or Pseudo-Manetho did *not* deal with Joseph separately but conflated him with Moses? Well, whether this was so or not, the possible substitution of Osarsêph for Josêph would certainly have constituted a further link between him and Osiris.

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[55] H. Kees, *Anubis "Herr von Sepa" und der 18. oberägyptische Gau*, Aeg. Zschr. LVIII 1923, pp. 79-101; H. Bonnet, *Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte*, Berlin 1952, coll. 698b-699a.

[56] H. Ranke, *Die ägyptischen Personennamen*, Glückstadt 1935, vol. I, p. 35 no. 3.

[57] Konrad Hoffmann, *Die theophoren Personennamen des älteren Aegyptens*, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Altertumskunde Aegyptens, vol. VII-1, Leipzig 1915, pp. 67, 71.

[58] J. G. Gager, *Moses in Greco-Roman Paganism*, Nashville-New York 1972, p. 115 n. 5: "This interpretation entails a complicated string of assumptions, e.g. that this Egyptianized name of Joseph was mistakenly applied to Moses which renders it unlikely and unnecessary".

[59] J. L. Saalschütz, *Zur Kritik Manethos und der Manethonischen Hyksos*, p. 91; I have not been able to consult this work: it is discussed by Güdemann, *Mythenmischung...* p. 260 n. 1.

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[60] Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols*..., vol. II, p. 269.

[61] K. Preisendanz, *Papyri graecae magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri*, Leipzig-Berlin 1928, vol. I, pp. 196-198; cf. Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols*..., vol. II, pp. 194-195.

Apis and Joseph

In the *Midrash on Shir ha-Shirim* quoted above some vague association may be discerned between Joseph and the Golden Calf. The silver leaf with the image of a bull, which Moses did not need to make Joseph's coffin float, later in the desert became the model from which the idol was made. Only in so far as it was really meant or interpreted as an imitation of Apis would it also imply some connection with Joseph. No such interpretation, however, is found according to Ginzberg in the old Rabbinical literature, although the Golden Calf is considered identical with Apis by the church father Lactantius in his *Divinae Institutiones* IV 10 (written between 304 and 313) and the author of the *Apostolic Constitutions* VI 20 (around A.D. 380).[62] It is probably also a later development of our story which the Persian al-Bîrûnî (973-1048) tells on the authority of the Jew Ja'qûb ben Mûsâ al-Niqrisî: Moses first tried in vain to make Joseph's coffin float with the image of a fish, but succeeded with the image of a calf.[63]

For the rest the Jewish bull symbolism connected with Joseph seems to have originated with Moses' blessing of the tribes in the Book of Deuteronomy ch. XXXIII, but it may very well also have contributed to the identification of Joseph and Sarapis. The blessing of the tribe of Joseph ends as follows: "His firstling bull has majesty, his horns are the horns of a wild ox, with them he shall push the peoples, all of them, to the ends of the earth, such are the ten thousands of Ephraim, and such are the thousands of Manasseh" (XXXIII 17). On the strength of this passage it is not surprising that in later times the bull was taken as a symbol or emblem of Joseph. In the apocalyptic *Testament of Naphtali* V 6-7 the patriarch tells his children on his death bed of two visions he has had. He has seen on the Mount of Olives a winged bull appear, which all the sons of Jacob tried to bridle. None could do so except Joseph who mounted the bull and flew about on it. In the second vision only Joseph could steer a ship through a fierce gale, while none of his brothers could. These dreams look like variants of Joseph's own dreams as told in Genesis XXXVII.[64] In the younger Hebrew version of this testament, however, Joseph and the Bull clearly represented the Northern kingdom of Israel and its subsequent decline.[65] Some of the versions of our "coffin story" have this bull symbolism, too. Moses threw a stone into the Nile on which he had written "Bull, come up" in order to make Joseph's coffin float; according to another version he shouted this instead of calling Joseph's name.[66] As the lion was the symbol of Judah, bull and lion together probably symbolized Israel as a whole: together they are pictured in the mosaique of the synagogue at Beth-Alpha, and painted above the door of a Jewish tomb at Khirbet Semmaka (Mt. Carmel).[67] The bull was also the emblem of the more important of the Joseph tribes, Ephraim. According to the *Midrash on Numbers* the banner of this tribe bore the picture of a bull. The anachronistic story that Jehoshua the successor of Moses, who belonged to this tribe, had special coins minted to celebrate his conquest of Canaan is interesting. The coins, it is said, had on the obverse a bull, and on the reverse a wild ox.[68]

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[62] See Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, vol. VI, p. 52 n. 271; S. Krauss, *Aegyptische und syrische Götternamen im Talmud*, in: G. A. Kohut (ed.), *Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut*, Berlin 1897, p. 341 concluded from the Babylonian Talmud passage that Joseph is there identified with Apis, because Sarapis is "sar Apis", "prince Apis", but that is not the etymology which the Talmud gives (see above).

[63] C. E. Sachau, *The Chronology of Ancient Nations. An English Version of the Arabic Text of the Athâr-ul-Bâkiya of Albîrûnî, or "Vestiges of the Past", Collected and Reduced to Writing by the Author in A.H. 390-1, A.D. 1000*, London 1879, p. 269; cf. Heller, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

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[64] Charles, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

[65] Charles, *op. cit.*, pp. 361-362.

[66] Tanchuma to Exodus XIII 19, Chronicle of Moses, *end*, and Midrash Sechel Tob on Exodus XIII 19; see Kittel, *op. cit.*, p. 173 no. 7, p. 176 nrs. 13 and 14; the type of magic practised here is discussed by A. Marmorstein, *I Sam 25, 29* in: Z.A.W. II (N.F.) 1925, p. 119ff.

[67] Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols*..., vol. I, pp. 243-244 and 87.

[68] Bemidbar Rabba II 7 and Bereshith Rabba XXXIX 11 (see H. Freedman-M. Simon (edd.), *Midrash Rabba*, London 1961 (3rd ed.): Numbers translated by J. J. Slotki, p. 30, and Genesis translated by H. Freedman, p. 320); cf. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 238; vol. VI, p. 83 n. 447, p. 180 n. 54.

Summary

To sum up the whole complex of the Interpretatio Judaica of Sarapis we observe that both in the god Sarapis himself and in his component deities Osiris and Apis there were features with which Joseph could be assimilated. The bull as the symbol of the Joseph tribes and more widely of the Northern kingdom could be a reminder of Apis, while the "coffin" of Joseph was the "bridge" to Osiris and also to Sarapis whose name was often explained as "coffin of Apis". It is logical to argue that the identification of Joseph and Sarapis first began from the idea that both, each in his own way, gave corn to Egypt. The heavier emphasis in later literature on the measuring of corn by Joseph, is most likely due to the Sarapis theology. A further elaboration but no longer connected with Sarapis or Osiris, is the interpretation of the pyramids as the granaries that Joseph had had built in order to store away the supplies for the seven years of famine (so Rufinus, Julius Honorius, Cosmas of Jerusalem).[69] This idea has even been perpetuated by medieval travellers in a Latin poem which they carved into the stone of the Great Pyramid.[70] That it was Jews who first propagated the identity of Joseph and Sarapis is clear. It was not they so much as the Egyptians who were likely to be disturbed by the worship of their Joseph as an Egyptian god. The Egyptians would not dream of identifying one of their own chief gods with a human foreigner, except possibly a bad god. Typhon, the treacherous adversary of the triad of Osiris, Isis and Horus, was according to some the ancestor of Judah and Jerusalem. And this of course may well have been a case of the reverse process, an "Interpretatio Aegyptiaca" of Jewish religion and history.

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[69] Rufinus, *Eccl. Hist* XI 18; Julius Honorius, *Cosmogr.* XLV (ed. Riese p. 51, 2-5); Cosmas Hierosol., *Comm. ad Carm. Greg. Naz.* LXXX 2 (Migne *P.G.* XXXVIII, p. 534).

[70] B. v. d. Walle, *A propos du graffite latin de la grande pyramide* (*CIL* III, 1, no. 21), Chronique d'Égypte XXXVIII, 1963, pp. 156-160.

ILLNESS AND SIN, FORGIVING AND HEALING

The Connection of Medical Treatment and Religious Beliefs in Ben Sira 38, 1-15

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The relation between religious experience and mental and physical health is a central issue in most religions. They promise health and happiness to their adherents and claim to have ways of promoting individual and social welfare. They all, therefore, are to explain away one way or another illness and unhappiness. Likewise they have to account for the creation of well-being outside their own community, because most religions present themselves as the one and only means to this end.

The field of study I have given this rough outline of, is quite extensive. The present article wants to draw the reader's attention to one tiny spot in the area, a section from a book of wisdom evidencing an endeavour to dissolve the tension between medical treatment and a religious attitude towards illness and healing; a tension apparently created by the growing impact of Hellenistic culture and sciences on traditional Jewish beliefs in second century Palestine.

The book of wisdom of Jesus Ben Sira most probably was written in Palestine somewhat before 175 B.C. About fifty years later a grandson of the original author, living in Alexandria, published a Greek version of the book. His text was to be part of the Greek Bible, in use by Hellenistic Jewry and henceforth in Christian churches. In this way the Greek version has been transmitted to modern time along a rather direct way, while the Hebrew original is known to us only fragmentarily and from a mainly late manuscript tradition. The textual problem is a rather complicated one: not only is the Greek version much more an adaptation than a translation of the original, it also appears to have been reworked and expanded during its transmission; also the evidence of the Hebrew text dates back to different stages in the history of the book's transmission, partly reflected in the Syriac version, which most probably rests on a secondary Hebrew text. The discovery of portions of the Hebrew text at Qumran, however, in more than one way corroborated the authenticity of the substance of the Hebrew fragments' text.[1]

Next to the problem of the text, defining the historical setting presents a second major difficulty to the interpreter of the book. Although in general it can be said that Ben Sira is a representative of Palestinian Jewry in the process of redefining its position face to face an increasing Hellenistic influence, it is not easy to judge where exactly he is to be situated. Contemporary evidence with which a direct comparison could be made is almost entirely lacking. Ben Sira's work has been labelled as 'conservative' while it appears to be less hellenized than a much later work like the Wisdom of (pseudo-) Solomon;[2] this, however, only reveals to which high degree such judgements are of a relative nature. It is not surprising, therefore, to see how widely divergent views on Ben Sira's attitude towards Hellenistic thought and culture have been taken. Some suppose him to have been quite hostile,[3] while others think that he showed an open mind for the new *Zeitgeist*.[4]

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[1] Cf. recent studies of the textual problem of Ben Sira by A. A. di Lella (*The Hebrew Text of Sirach*. A Text-Critical and Historical Study, The Hague 1966) and H. P. Rüger (*Text und Textform im hebräischen Sirach*. Untersuchungen zur Textgeschichte und Textkritik der hebräischen Sirach-fragmente aus der Kairoer Geniza, Berlin 1970). Several editions of the Hebrew fragments have been published round the beginning of this century (A. Cowley-A. Neubauer (1897), S. Schechter-C. Taylor (1899), I. Lévi (1898-1904), N. Peters (1902), R. Smend (1906)) Various fragments discovered since then have been included in a more recent edition by F. Vattioni (*Ecclesiastico*. Testo ebraico con apparato critico e versioni greca, latina e siriaca. Napoli 1968) J. Ziegler in 1965 published his edition of the Greek version in the Göttingen Septuagint project (*Septuaginta*, Vetus Testamentum Graece Auctoritate Societatis Litterarum Gottingensis editum, vol. XII, 2, Sapientia Iesu Filii Sirach, ed. J. Ziegler, Göttingen 1965). A modern edition of the Syriac version is still wanting.

[2] A. A. di Lella, "Conservative and Progressive Theology: Sirach and Wisdom", *CBQ* 28 (1966) 139-154.

[3] E.g. R. Smend, *Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach erklärt*, Berlin 1906, and V. Tcherikover, *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews*, Philadelphia 1959.

[4] E.g. I. Lévi, *L'Ecclésiastique ou la Sagesse de Jésus, Fils de Sira*, I.II, Paris 1898, 1901, V. Hamp, *Sirach*, Würzburg 1951 (Echter Bibel), R. Pautrel, "Ben Sira et le Stoïcisme", *RScR* 1963 (51) 535-549, and J. Marböck, *Weisheit im Wandel*. Untersuchungen zur Weisheitstheologie bei Ben Sira, Bonn 1971.

Given this state of things every study of a portion of the work of Ben Sira may contribute to solving the textual problem and to describing more accurately the historical position of the book.

The passage I have selected for discussion belongs to a context of mainly practical wisdom advice. Its direct setting contains warnings not to eat too much or without discrimination (37, 27-31) and directions about restriction and propriety in mourning (38, 16-23).[5] No doubt speaking about the unhealthy effects of gluttony brought to the author's mind to dwell upon the right attitude towards medical science. It is difficult to decide, however, whether it was in irony that after his rather lenghty recommendation of putting medical expertise to a good use he continued on the topic of restraining one's lamenting for the dead.[6] However that may be, it reintroduces the theme of moderation, thus marking the organization of this section in three parts, the central part of which functions as a digression within a continuing exposition on moderation.

This subject represents a recurring theme in Ben Sira. Chapter 31 calls for restraint within the framework of an exposition on proper behaviour at meals. Also there gluttony is connected with illness; in general it is said: 'whatever you do, be modest, and no mishap will touch you' (31, 22).[7]

A sober way of living prevents illness, so a wise man must restrain himself. Such is Ben Sira's basic advice in matters of health care.[8]

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[5] In the present article I follow the verse division of Ziegler's edition of the Greek version. Chapters 31-36 which are out of order in most Greek manuscripts, I indicate according to the original arrangement as documented by the Hebrew and Latin traditions.

[6] Such an ironical connexion would fit into a widespread usage. Speaking of doctors suggests thinking of death. Cf. F. J. Brecht's collection of Greek epigrams on the deadly effects of the physician ("Motiv- und Typengeschichte des griechischen Spottepigramms", *Philologus Suppl.* XXII, II, Leipzig 1930, 46*sqq.*). In the present context, however, not the doctor is the butt, but the obstinate sinner whom no doctor can help. See the explanation of 38, 15 given below.

[7] Here the Greek version (ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔργοις σου γίνου ἐντρεχής / καὶ πᾶν ἀρρώστημα οὐ μὴ σοι ἀπαντήσῃ) slightly changes the sense of the Hebrew (בכל מעשיך היה צנוע / וכל אסון לא יגע בך) without, however, altering its intention.

[8] In this respect Ben Sira's approach not only corresponds with most wisdom traditions and with philosophical treatises like Plutarch's *De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta* (Moralia 122B*sqq*), he appears to represent the general intention of Jewish medicine. Cf. H. Baruk's judgement in "La médecine hébraïque face à la médecine hippocratique", in: *La collection hippocratique et son rôle dans l'histoire de la médecine.* Colloque de

Its most typical expression can be found in 18, 19 ('before you are ill, care for your health') and 18, 21 ('before you fall ill, humble yourself / and in the time of sins, show repentance'). A healthful and a godfearing way of living are to be identified. Health is a most important factor in well-being, ranking above wealth (30, 15). It should be seen as a sign of divine blessing. Likewise illness gives evidence of God's wrath -although life has taught Ben Sira this is not an automatically operating detection system: 'Do not say "I sinned, yet nothing happened to me", for Yahweh is very patient' (5, 4).

The line of thought of 38, 1-15 is in substance clear and simple.[9]

Strasbourg, Leyde 1975 291-303: "La médecine hébraïque ... est avant tout tournée vers la prophylaxie des maladies et vers l'hygiène. Elle considère la maladie comme relevant très souvent d'erreurs soit d'hygiène physique, soit d'hygiène morale". (292). Cf. also M. A. Halevy, "Un aphorisme 'médical' de Ben-Sira et son importance médico-historique", *Revue d'Histoire de la Médecine Hébraïque* No. 63 (XVII.1) 1964 99-104.

[9] The Hebrew text of this passage has been preserved only in ms.B. For the reader's convenience I include at this point a translation of the whole passage according to this manuscript.

1 Honour the physician before he is needed
also him God has appointed
2 From God the physician gets his wisdom
and from the king he receives presents
3 The physician's knowledge lifts up his head
and before noble men he can stand
4 From the earth God produces medicines
and a sensible man should not reject them
5 Did not the water taste sweet because of a piece of wood
in order to make every man know his power
6 And he gave men understanding
to show his glory in his strength
7 By them the physician relieves pain
8 and thus the ointment-mixer produces ointments
so that there is no end to his work
nor to success by the sons of man
9 My son, in illness don't let it be
pray to God for he heals
10 Flee from injustice and partiality
and from all sins cleanse your heart
11 Offer incense and a memorial
and fat, prepare the best you can
12 And also give place to the physician
and he must not be removed, for also him you need
13 For there is a time when in his hand (are) successes

The reader is exhorted to honour the physician, for 'also him God has appointed' (1b).[10] His wisdom comes from God (2a),[11] the physician receives royal honours (2b), and 'the physician's knowledge lifts up his head / and before noble men he can stand' (3).[12] Thus his honourable position should be clear.

Next to his expertise, also the remedies a doctor applies come from God — a good reason not to reject them (4). An example from biblical history illustrates this (5a).[13] God's strength and mighty deeds are to be seen in medicines and medical knowledge alike (5b-6).[14]

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14 for also he supplicates god
that he may make his diagnosis successful
and his treatment in order to save your life
15 A man who sins before him who made him
will be strong before the physician

With few minor exceptions this translation rests on Lévi's edition of ms.B. In vv. 11a and 12a, where the manuscript is badly legible, I have followed his reconstruction. I have not always followed his interpretation. In my opinion the text of ms.B in this passage basically constitutes the original Hebrew text (not its many glosses, nor the Greek version which appears not to have captured the sense of the Hebrew in some instances, and elsewhere to have deliberately changed it). My reasons for this judgement are threefold: 1) the passage thus constitutes a coherent unit both stylistically and thematically; 2) it clearly fits into the line of Ben Sira's thought elsewhere in his book; 3) the glosses in the Hebrew ms and the different readings of the Greek version can be explained as reinterpretations or misreadings.

[10] In Greek καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔκτισεν κύριος, thus taking the Hebrew חלק in the specific sense of 'to create'. In view of its use in 7, 15 39, 21 and 40, 1 it no doubt should be rendered by 'to appoint, to assign'.

[11] *Vide*, in a very similar connexion, 1, 19 (ἐπιστήμην καὶ γνῶσιν συνέσεως ἐξώμβρησεν (*sc.* σοφία) / καὶ δόξαν κρατούντων αὐτῆς ἀνύψωσεν) and also 17, 7*sqq* and 39, 6. Cf. the attribution of all human knowledge to God in Sap. Salom. 7, 15*sqq*, where several fields of knowledge are explicitly mentioned.

[12] Ps 3, 4 110, 7 Ben Sira 8, 8 Prov. 22, 29 give illustrations of the same idiom.

[13] The reference is to Exod. 15, 25 where it is related that Moses at the instigation of God threw a log into bitter water so that it became sweet. Directly connected to this incident a statement follows which has been central to Israelite thought on illness and healing: 'If only you hear carefully to the voice of Yahweh your God and do what is right in his eyes and listen to his commands and keep all his statutes, I will not bring upon you any of the sufferings (Hebrew: כל־המחלה; LXX: πᾶσαν νόσον) which I have brought on the Egyptians; for I, Yahweh, am your healer (Hebrew: רפאך; LXX: ὁ ἰώμενός σε)' (Exod. 15, 26). Cf. Exod. 23, 25*sq* Deut. 7, 12*sqq*.

[14] It is not clear whether כחו refers to the power of the wood or to God's power. The parallel בגבורתו in 6b suggests the latter. The presence of the same notion in 17, 8*sqq* 42, 17 43, 27*sqq* supports this reading. The glosses כוחם and בגבורתם simplify these verses by introducing a constant reference to the תרופות of 4a. In my opinion it is not until 7a that we find this reference (בהם).

Physician and apothecary operate with god-given remedies and serve to accomplish God's work (7-8).[15]

The second part of the exposition (9-15) focustes on the relation of medical treatment and a religious appreciation of illness. In case of illness one should pray to God, abstain from doing injustice, purify one's heart from sins, and bring offerings the best one can (9-11).[16] This, however, is not the only thing to do. One should give a place to the doctor 'because also him you need' (12). In other words, next to prayer, repentance, purification and offerings, medical help should be called upon. At times recovery is in the doctor's hands — yet only so to speak, for he knows himself that he depends on God for the success of his treatment (13-14).[17] A sinner will not be cured. This is the sense of the final warning 'a man who sins against his maker will resist his doctor' (15).[18]

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[15] In Genesis Rabba, ch. X, we find an explicit quotation from Ben Sira: 'God caused drugs to spring forth from the earth; with them the physician heals the wound and the apothecary compounds his preparations'. The context suggests this is taken as a demonstration of the order and purposefulness of God's creation like it is the case in our passage.

The precise meaning of 8c is difficult to decide. The Hebrew reads ותושיה מבני אדם. The glossator suggests מפני ארצו which seems to agree with the Greek καὶ εἰρήνη παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ προσώπου τῆς γῆς. My translation ('so that there is no end to his work and to success by the sons of man') seeks to maintain the parallelism of God's works and human successes -a thought, which seems to be underlying the whole of 38, 1-8. The expression בני אדם is also used in 36, 28 and 40, 1. Probably the same Hebrew idiom also lies behind the Greek of 17, 30.

תושיה is a technical term in wisdom litterature; cf. *i.a.* Prov. 2, 7 3, 21 Job 6, 13 11, 6. It denotes 'sound wisdom' or the effect of it.

[16] In 11b the Greek reads ὡς μὴ ὑπάρχων apparently mistaking a Hebrew כאונך for כאינך. The absence of a Latin equivalent at this point demonstrates that the Greek makes no sense.

Vv. 9-11 reflect traditional Israelite beliefs. Yahweh is the exclusive source of life and death. Sin and misfortune are closely related, and so are forgiving of sins and restoring of well-being. Although this basic pattern here and there became subject of debate and sometimes was considerably modified (cf. the book of Job) it remained a characteristic expression of Israelite religion.

[17] Philo's refutation of those who use medicines and only turn to God once all medical expertise has failed (*De sacrif. A. et C.*, 70) and his view of healing with or without medical means as a divine gift (Διὰ τοῦτ' οἶμαι καὶ ὑγείαν μὲν τὴν ἁπλῆν, ἧς οὐ προηγεῖται νόσος ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ὁ θεὸς χαρίζεται δι' ἑαυτοῦ μόνου, τὴν δὲ γινομένην κατὰ νόσου φυγὴν καὶ διὰ τέχνης καὶ διὰ ἰατρικῆς, ἐπιγράφων καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τεχνίτῃ τὸ δοκεῖν ἰᾶσθαι, πρὸς ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸς καὶ διὰ τούτων καὶ ἄνευ τούτων ἰώμενος. *Leg.* III, 178) may serve as an illustration of what is meant here.

Vide also rabbinical opinion documented in b.Berak. 60a.

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[18] Here the author of the Greek version (ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἔναντι τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτὸν ἐμπέσοι εἰς χεῖρας ἰατροῦ) and the Hebrew glossator (על ידירופא יסתוגר) show not to have shared the unambiguously positive appreciation of the physician in this passage.

In various ways commentators have tried to explain away the difficulty which arises when this text would be the original one. J. Marböck (*o.c.* 159) writes: 'Der abschliessende V 15 klingt im Zusammenhang mit V 14 paradox und etwas spöttisch: "Wer vor seinem Schöpfer sündigt, wird dem Arzt überliefert". Ben Sira hat damit allem Anschein nach mit Sinn für Humor ein Sprichwort angefügt, das ausserdem mit den 37, 27-31 erwähnten Folgen der Unmässigkeit sehr gut zu vereinbaren ist und die alte Tradition des Zusammenhanges zwischen Sünde und Krankheit nochmals zum Ausdruck bringt'. I doubt very much, however, that such a negative qualification of the physician — be it in irony — can be seen to agree with the intention of the remainder of the passage.

Still less acceptable I find A. Stöger's explanation (Der Arzt nach Jesus Sirach (38, 1-15), *Arzt und Christ* XI (1965) 3-11): 'er weiss auch, dass die Begegnung des Kranken mit dem Arzt Schmerz, Pein, Plage bedeutet. Seine Behandlung ist unangenehm, der Erfolg stellt sich nicht immer ein', or the *New English Bible*'s translation: 'when a man has sinned against his Maker, let him put himseh in the doctor's hands'.

G. von Rad takes this verse to be characteristic for Ben Sira's divided loyalties: 'Merkwürdig zwiespältig ist das Kapitel über den Arzt bei Jesus Sirach (...) in dem nach Art solcher Spruchsammlungen sehr verschiedene Voten zu dem theologischen Problem des Arztes zusammengestellt sind. (...) Auf den letzten der Votanten — "wer vor seinem Schöpfer sündigt, fällt in die Hände des Arztes" (v. 15) — haben die vorausgegangenen positiven Argumente anscheinend keinen Eindruck gemacht. (...) Das Ganze ist das typische Dokument einer Aufklärung; die doch den altüberkommenen Glauben nicht preisgeben will. Aber sie (...) bemüht die Theologie nur noch, um dem Arzt (...) nachträglich die Legitimation zu geben'. (*Theologie des Alten Testaments.* I. Die Theologie der geschichtlichen Ueberlieferungen Israels, München 1962 (4) 288) Von Rad seems to have rightly sensed the negative tenor of v. 15, yet in my opinion it is precisely the negative purport of the statement which betrays its secondary nature; it does not fit in with the intention of the whole passage; it corresponds with other equally negative secondary notes about the physician in the Greek Bible (e.g. Ps 87, 11 Isa. 26, 14 Tobit 2, 10 Sinait. version); last but not least, its origin is easily explained by the relative obscurity of the original text which has been preserved in the Hebrew ms. B. On closer scrutiny יתגבר לפני רופא appears to be a clear statement, perfectly in line with its context (*contra* e.g. R. Smend, *ad loc.* and most commentators who without further explanation prefer the reading of the Greek version). The verse shows a simple, harmonious structure

יתגבר – אשר חוטא
לפני – לפני
רופא – עושהו

thereby expressing the parallellism in which God and the physician have been presented throughout the passage. Like חוטא לפני עושהו expresses 'sin against God', so יתגבר לפני רופא denotes 'resistance against the physician'. 'Sin against God' represents the

This passage appears to be a well-organized unit, subdivided into two parts, held together by formal repetition and thematic coherence.[19]

Vv. 2-8 elaborate the opening sentence 'honour the physician before he is needed / also him God has appointed'.[20] Medical expertise is made fully acceptable in general.

Vv. 9-15 envisage the role of the doctor in case of illness. Both the doctor and the patient should rely on God to grant recovery by a successful treatment. *Conditio sine qua non* are doing away with sins and praying to God. The closing sentence summarizes this intention in a parallellism clearly pointing back to v. 1. Like one should honour the physician while God has appointed him, so a sinner against God should not expect to be healed by the physician.

The second half of the passage specifies the place of medical expertise in case of illness. Throughout the section the physician is shown to be depending on divine ordination and support.

Ben Sira's exhortation to honour the physician may serve to illustrate two concepts that are central to his thought.

In his world-view everything is governed by a divine order. God has created everything with its own purpose, he has given all there is its proper place and he makes all things prove good at their proper

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opposite of what has been suggested in vv. 9-11. In that case medical treatment will yield no results.

[19] *Contra* J. Marböck; *o.c.*, 155, who divides the passage into three parts: 1-8; 9-11; 12-14, not knowing what to do with v. 15.

[20] Also in this case I take it that the text of the Hebrew ms. B reflects the original intention of the author. The Greek evidence is divided (τίμα ἰατρὸν πρὸς τὰς χρείας αὐτοῦ next to τίμα ἰατρον πρὸς τὰς χρείας (αὐτοῦ) τιμαῖς αὐτοῦ), while the Hebrew glossator suggests רעה רופא לפביצרכך More or less clearly the Greek texts refer to the doctor's salary — in itself a suitable theme, yet improbable in the present connexion with 1b. The Hebrew glossator seems to have been influenced by v. 12b: כי גם בו צורך.

Again, apparently the seemingly obscure Hebrew occasioned these reinterpreting corrections. The opposite movement is without motive. The occurrence of the same exhortation in rabbinical writings (*i.a.* Exodus Rabba XXI) cannot serve this purpose. *Vide* M. A. Halevy, *o.c.*

An argumentation similar to that of v. 1b, but to a quite different end, may be found in Test. Job 38. There Sofar suggests to call upon medical help (ἰδοὺ γὰρ πάρωμεν μεθ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς ἰατροὺς τῶν τριῶν βασιλειῶν ἡμῶν. καὶ βούλει θεραπευθῆναι ὑπ' αὐτῶν; ἴσως ἀναπαύσει.) Job, however, refuses: ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ εἶπον Ἡ ἐμὴ ἴασις καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ θεραπεία παρὰ Κυρίου ἐστίν, τοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς κτίσαντος (38, 8; ed. Brock).

time. A clear expression of these views may be found in 16, 17-17, 14 and 39, 12-35.[21]

The physician's divine assignment as well as god's creation of medicinal herbs reveal the purposefulness of the cosmos. At the same time they serve to demonstrate God's glory and the majesty of his creation.[22]

This way of thinking represents a classical theme of Israelite wisdom traditions.[23] As it is worked out by Ben Sira its rationalistic optimism has made students of his work think of Hellenistic influence, particularly on the part of popular Stoic philosophy. Although it might be saying too much to speak of this in terms of influence and dependance, it seems to be warranted to value Ben Sira's world-view as a cognate expression of prevailing ideas of the time.[24]

The second range of thought underlying the passage on the physician centers around piety and sin. True wisdom to Ben Sira is not to be reduced to a keen insight into the nature of man and his world. It should comprise sincere piety and doing away with sin.[25] God's works are good, yet human freedom of choice may produce evil. Illness and misfortunes are to be reduced to sin. Knowing its cause implies knowing the remedy: sin brings forth illness, so only forgiving may bring healing.[26]

Ben Sira presents a coherent and consistent answer to the questions medical practise posed to his religious beliefs. To conclude it remains to be asked what may have prompted his plea for the physician.

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[21] There we find the technical terminology to describe God's creation which is also used in 38, 1-15: חלק (38, 1 / 7, 15 15, 9 16, 26 39, 25 40, 1 44, 2), צורך (38, 12 — in 1a it is used in a different sense — / 39, 16.21.30) and עת (38, 13 / 10, 4 39, 16.28.34). Cf. J. Marböck, *o.c.*, 136-151.

[22] Cf. 17, 8*sqq* and the passage 42, 15-43, 33.

[23] *Vide* Job 28, 25*sq* 38, 5 Prov. 3, 19 8, 22*sqq* Ps. 104.

[24] A more detailed discussion of Ben Sira's relation to Stoic philosophy may be found in R. Pautrel's article on this theme (*vide* note 4), and with J. Marböck, *o.c.*, 30*sqq*.143*sqq*.170*sq* and Th. Middendorp, *Die Stellung Jesu Ben Siras zwischen Judentum und Hellenismus*, Leiden 1972 (diss. Leiden), 28-34.

[25] J. Haspecker, *Gottesfurcht bei Jesus Sirach*. Ihre religiöse Struktur und ihre literarische und doktrinäre Bedeutung, Romae 1967 deals with the theme of εὐσέβεια in Ben Sira. In ch. 15 (vv. 11-20!) 17, 24-18, 14 and 26, 28-27, 3 central thoughts on sin may be found; 10, 6*sqq* shows how closely it is connected with ὕβρις.

[26] Cf. note 16. Parallels to 38, 9-11 may be found in 17, 25*sqq* 18, 21 21, 1 and 39, 5.

Israelite medical expertise virtually restricted itself to the treatment of external injuries.[27] It is reasonable to suppose that a growing interest in medical science must be ascribed to innovations of foreign origin. Most probably Ben Sira's argument was occasioned by the expansion of medical practise following the increasing influence of Hellenistic culture and sciences in Palestine. Although traditionally physicians were looked upon with distrust — presumably because of their frequent association with magic and foreign religion —, his reaction is a positive one. I venture to suggest an explanation for it.

The Hippocratic treatise *De Morbo Sacro* fights a (pseudo-) religious explanation of epilepsy and a treatment by magical means. Its positive thesis represents an enlightened, rationalistic approach of this disease.[28] It might very well be that similar views enabled Ben Sira to a positive appreciation of medical science, especially when they would have been associated with equally positive tones on a truly pious attitude towards the gods in case of illness as we find them in *De Morbo Sacro* I, 41 *sqq.*[29]

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[27] Cf. J. Hempel, "Ich bin der Herr, dein Arzt", *ThLZ* 82 (1957) 809-826 (810).

[28] The main intention of this writing is the falsification of the theory that some diseases are of divine character and therefore require a special 'divine' treatment. This opinion is shown to be sheer opportunism of pseudo-healers trying to conceal their lack of sound medical expertise (cf. I, 10*sqq*.24*sqq*.32*sqq*). In fact every disease is of divine nature, while founded in the divine order of things; in other words, every disease is divine because it is natural. Cf. H. W. Miller, "The Concept of the Divine in De Morbo Sacro", *TAPhA* 84 (1953) 1-15, A. Thivel, "Le 'divin' dans la Collection Hippocratique", in: *La Collection Hippocratique et son rôle dans l'histoire de la médecine.* Colloque de Strasbourg, Leyde 1975, 57-76, and F. Kudlien, "Das göttliche und die Natur im hippokratischen Prognostikon", *Hermes* 105 (1977) 268-274.

[29] Against the 'religious' treatment of charlatans it is said οὓς ἐχρῆν τἀντία τούτοισι (*sc.* καθαρμοῖσί τε χρέωνται καὶ ἐπαοιδῇσι, καὶ ἀνοσιώτατόν τε καὶ ἀθεώτατον πρῆγμα ποιέουσιν ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, I. 39) ποιεῖν· θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι καὶ ἐς τὰ ἱρὰ φέροντας ἱκετεύειν τοὺς θεούς, I.41; cf. also I.30*sq* (*Die hippokratische Schrift "Ueber die heilige Krankheit"*, Herausg., übers. und erl. von Hermann Grensemann, Berlin 1968 (Ars. Medica, II, 1).

THE CULT OF THE IBIS IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN PERIOD*

With Special Attention to the Data from the Papyri

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For strangers visiting ancient Egypt, one of the most striking aspects of the native religion was the worship of sacred animals. Some believed that this cult contained a deep symbolism,[1] but most were inclined to mock. An example of this is the well-known passage in Juvenal's satires (Sat. 15). There is also an interesting text in Clement of Alexandria's *Paedagogus*, in which he compares women, who dress with great attention to their external appearance, but neglect their inner selves, and the Egyptian temples:[2]

> 'Their propylaea and outside courtyards, their sacred woods and meadows are adorned, and the inner courts are surrounded by very many pillars. The walls shine with stones from foreign parts, and in no way are they backward in the techniques of writing. The temples sparkle with gold, silver and mat gold and flash with coloured stones from India and Ethiopia. The sanctuaries are overshadowed by cloths studded with gold. If, however, you enter the interior of the enclosure, hastening towards the sight of the almighty, and look for the statue residing in the temple and if a *pastophoros* or another celebrant, after having solemnly looked round the sanctuary, singing a song in the language of the Egyptians, draws back the curtain a little to show the god, he will make us laugh

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[1] See, for example, Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, c. 71-76.

[2] Clemens Alexandrinus, *Paed.* III, II.4: 2-4; S.C. 158, pp. 18ff. Specific polemics against the cult of the ibis are also attested. The Septuagint contains a clear example of Jewish polemics against this cult in its inclusion of the ibis in the list of unclean birds; see Lev. 11.17 and Deut. 14.16. Some Graeco-Roman authors characterize the bird as very dirty for the same motive; see I. Becher, *Der heilige Ibisvogel der Aegypter in der Antike*, in *Act. Hung.* 15 (1967) pp. 377-385.

> aloud about the object of worship. For we shall not find the god for whom we have been looking inside, the god towards whom we have hastened, but a cat or a crocodile or a native snake or a similar animal, which should not be in a temple, but in a cleft or a den or on a dung heap. The god of the Egyptians appears on a purple couch as a wallowing animal'.

The Egyptians, however, were extremely serious in their cult of animals. This fact was discovered by a Roman who had been so unfortunate to kill a cat and had to pay for this with his own life.[3] According to Herodotus (2.65), anyone who killed, even unintentionally, an ibis or a falcon had to die.[4] In the later period especially, the Egyptians attached a great deal of importance to their worship of animals, possibly as a form of resistance to foreign rulers.[5] One of these animals was the ibis. Like the baboon, this bird was associated with the god Thoth.[6]

There are four possible ways of obtaining more precise information about the cult of the ibis in the Graeco-Roman period. The archaeological finds can be examined, the Egyptian and especially the Demotic texts can be analyzed, the data contained in Greek papyri or ostraca can be investigated or texts concerned with this cult in

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[3] See Diodorus Siculus, I.83.

[4] See, however, Diodorus Siculus, I.83.

[5] See A. Wiedeman, *Der Tierkult der alten Aegypter* (A.O. 14), Leipzig (1910), pp. 20ff. For the Egyptian cult of animals in general, see also T. Hopfner, *Der Tierkult der alten Aegypter*, Vienna (1913); for the cult of the ibis in particular, see H. Bonnet, *Reallexicon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte*, Berlin (1952), pp. 320ff.; G. Roeder, *Ibis*, in *RE* IX, c. 808-815 and A.-P. Zivie: *Ibis*, in *LÄ*, III, 1 (1977), pp. 115-121.

[6] It is not surprising, since the baboon had been extinct for a long time in Egypt at this late period and the temple animals had to be imported from Central Africa (see H. S. Smith, *A Visit to Ancient Egypt*, Warminster, 1974, p. 42), that the Greek papyri provide no data about the cult of the baboon, but do give information about the cult of the ibis, which was present in great numbers in Egypt during the same period. In a few Demotic papyri (such as P. Ryl. Dem. 11.1 and P. Lond. Dem. 10523-10528), on the other hand, two embalmers of baboons, a father and son, from Jemeh (near Thebes) are mentioned (beginning of the third century B.C.). Baboon necropolises have been found in Tûnah el-Gebel — see the surveys in *Chr. d'Égypte*, especially Vol. 14 (1939), pp. 93f. and 278f., and Vol. 20 (1945), pp. 91-98; see also S. Gabra in *ASAE* 39 (1939), pp. 490f. — and in Saqqarah — see Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 41ff., and below, note 55. Because the present article is above all concerned with data from the Greek papyri, however, I left the cult of the baboon out of account.

THE CULT OF THE IBIS IN EGYPT ACCORDING TO THE PAPYRI


MEMPHIS
PHILADELPHIA
KROKODILOPOLIS-ARSINOË
OXYRHYNCHUS
AKORIS
HERMOPOLIS MAGNA
APOLLINOPOLITES HEPTAKOMIAS
PANOPOLIS
THEBE
PATHYRIS
LATOPOLIS
OMBOS
SOKNOPAIOU NESOS
APIAS
EUHEMERIA
THEADELPHIA
PHILADELPHIA
KROKODILOPOLIS - ARSINOË
OXYRHYNCHA
KERKEOSIRIS
MAGDOLA
TEBTYNIS
MEA
SOBTHIS
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the classical authors can be studied. In this article, we shall above all be concerned with the Greek papyri.[7] A diachronistic treatment is, however, not possible because of the material itself, since, if there are perhaps differences between the ibis cult in the Ptolemaic period and the Roman, they cannot (as yet) be traced. What is, however, striking is that most of the papyri mentioning the ibis cult date from the second century B.C.[8]

The three main aspects of the worship of the ibis are the temple cult, the breeding and feeding of ibises and the mummifying and interment of the dead birds. This meant that three kinds of cultic places were necessary — sanctuaries, breeding and feeding places and spaces for mummification and interment. In the Greek papyri, various terms are used, probably corresponding to these three forms. They are ἰβιών for the ibis sanctuary, ἰβιών τροφή for the feeding place and ἰβιοταφεῖον for the mummification place.

It is, however, not entirely clear whether the term ἰβιών really points to a place of cult that is different from the ἰβιών τροφή or the ἰβιοταφεῖον. In addition, the term ἕρμαίον is also used as well as ἰβιών. In P. Tebt. 88 (a survey of landed property), for example,[9] there is reference to an ἰβηοταφίου καὶ Ἑρμαίου (line 53), an ἄλλου Ἑρμαίου (line 57) and another ἄλλου (line 60), which appear to have existed in 115-114 B.C. in the village of Kerkeosiris in the Fayyum. In P. Tebt. 62 (119-118 B.C.), there is reference, however, to an ἰβίω(ν) τροφῆς (line 19), an ἄλλου (line 21) and an ἄλλου ἰβίω(νος) (line 23) in the same village. A similar picture also emerges from other papyri from this village.[10]

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[7] We shall not consider the magic papyri in this article.

[8] See also A. Traversa, *Ibiotáphoi, ibioboskoí e un cartonage inedito della collezione Osloense*, in *Symbolae Osloenses* 36 (1960), p. 52. Note, however, that the first testimony of the cult of the ibis dates from the XIXth dynasty (see W. Spiegelberg, *Neue Urkunden zum ägyptischen Tierkultus*, in *SBAW* 1928, 3, pp. 14-17) and that servants and grounds of the cult of the ibis are mentioned in Egyptian texts from the Late Period (see A.-P. Zivie, *Hermopolis et le Nome de l'Ibis* I, Cairo, 1975, p. 92).

[9] For the abbreviations indicating the editions of the papyri, see E. G. Turner, *Greek Papyri: an Introduction*, Oxford (1968), pp. 157-171.

[10] See P. Tebt. 63.28ff. (116-115 B.C.); 64(a).9ff. (116-115 B.C.); 98.34, 36, 38 (± 112 B.C.).

It cannot be assumed that the terms used in these papyri do not refer to the same places of cult, since those who cultivated the estates that belonged to the sanctuaries always have the same names in these papyri. This implies that — if the καὶ in P. Tebt. 88.53 is regarded as explanatory — both ἑρμαῖον and ἰβιών could be used both for ἰβιών τροφή and for ἰβιοταφεῖον.[11] It is also remarkable that, in the Oxyrhynchus papyri, the ἄμφοδον Ἑρμαίου is regularly mentioned as the part of the city in which the temple of Hermes-Thoth was situated, but that there is one reference to the ἄμφοδον ἰβιοτ(αφείου).[12] It is obvious that this is another name for the same part of the town.[13]

In addition to being the term used for a place where the ibis was worshipped, ἰβιών can also be a name for a place or part of a name for a place. Calderini[14] provides a list of twenty-five villages bearing this name in the papyri (mostly of the second century A.D.). These places named in the papyri were scattered all over Egypt, but most of them were near Hermopolis (Magna) and Oxyrhynchus. The first should cause no surprise, since the city had since time immemorial been the centre of the cult of Thoth. In the case of the second, the reason that we know so many villages in the neighbourhood of Oxyrhynchus which were called ἰβιών, must be because so many papyri have been found in this district.[15] What is striking is that this place name is usually, in its complete form, ἰβιών of NN. The name must therefore have originated in a local sanctuary of the ibis cult, founded or financed by the person named.

The fact that the cult spread over the whole of Egypt is in accordance with other data. It is clear from the Greek papyri that the ibis was worshipped in Akoris, Apias, Apollinopolites Heptakomias, Euhemeria, Hermopolis (Magna), Kerkeosiris and the surrounding district, Krokodilopolis-Arsinoe, Latopolis, Magdola, Mea, Memphis and the surrounding district, Ombos, Oxyrhyncha, Oxyrhynchus, Panopolis(?), Pathyris, Philadelphia(?), Sobthis, Soknopaiou Nesos, Tebtynis, Theadelphia and the country around Thebes.[16] This list can also be expanded on the basis of Demotic texts.[17] Centres of the ibis cult have also been brought to light by archaeological investigations in Tûnah el-Gebel (near Hermopolis Magna), Thebes, Abydos, the oasis of Baḥrîya, Baqliya, and especially Saqqarah.[18]

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[11] I do not agree here with W. Croenert in *SPP* IV, p. 105 and W. Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Ägypten* I, Leipzig and Berlin (1905), p. 416. See also D. J. C. Crawford, *Kerkeosiris: An Egyptian Village in the Ptolemaic Period*, Cambridge (1971), p. 88.

[12] P. Princ. 46.14 (Oxyrhynchus, second century A.D.).

[13] Because it is not possible to assume, without further data, that every ἑρμαῖον was at the same time also a centre of the cult of the ibis, the information contained in the papyri about ἑρμαῖα will not be discussed in this article.

[14] A. Calderini, ΙΒΙΩΝ *nei nomi di luogo dell'Egitto greco-romano*, in *Mélanges Maspero* II (1935), pp. 345-355. An earlier list will be found in Croenert, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[15] Another explanation will be found in Calderini, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

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[16] Akoris: P. Rein. 40.4 (114 B.C.?) (see, however, below, note 32); Apias; P. Petr. III.58, e, II.23; Apollinopolites Heptakomias: P. Flor. 331.21 (second century A.D.); Euhemeria: P. Giss. Bibl. Inv. 226.2 (131 B.C.; provisionally published in *Archiv* 17, 1962, p. 119, note 4); P. Fay. 246 (± 100 A.D.); Hermopolis (Magna): P. Ryl. 254.11 (second century B.C.); Kerkeosiris: P. Tebt. 62.19, 21, 23 (119-118 B.C.), P. Tebt. 63.28, 29, 30 (116-115 B.C.), P. Tebt. 64(a).9, 10, 11 (116-115 B.C.), P. Tebt. 72.410f. (114-113 B.C.), P. Tebt. 88.53, 57, 60 (115-114 B.C.), P. Tebt. 98.34, 36, 38; the surrounding district: P. Tebt. 87.100 (late second century B.C.); Krokodilopolis-Arsinoe: P. Tebt. 113.11 (114-113 B.C.), at least according to W. J. R. Rübsam, *Götter und Kulte in Faijum während der griechisch-römisch-byzantinischen Zeit*, Bonn (1974), p. 40, but, according to W. Peremans and E. van 't Dack, *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* III, No. 7069, this papyrus deals with an ἰβιοβοσκός from Kerkeosiris; Latopolis: BGU 995, III.5 (110-109 B.C.); Magdola: P. Enteux. 50.1, verso (221 B.C.), P. Tebt. 82.38, 43 (115 B.C.); Mea: P. Cairo Zeno 59270.7 (251 B.C.); Memphis: UPZ 119.17 (156 B.C.); the surrounding district: BGU 1216 *passim* (110 B.C.); Ombos: O. Pr. Joachim *passim* (first century B.C.); Oxyrhyncha: P. Tebt. 1002, fr. 2, 9f. (second century B.C.); Oxyrhynchus: P. Fouad 16 *passim* (first century B.C.; for this dating, see H. Cadell, *Chr. d'Égypte* 42, 1967, p. 190 and L. Mooren, *Anc. Soc.* 1, 1970, p. 15f.), P. Princ. 46.14 (second century A.D.); Panopolis(?): SB 4636.31 (third century A.D.); Pathyris: P. Grenf. II.15, II.7 (139 B.C.), P. Lond. VII.2191.23, 32 (second century B.C.); Philadelphia(?): P. Mich. Zeno 31.8 (256-255 B.C.?); Sobthis: BGU 1753.6 (64-63 B.C.); Soknopaiou Nesos: BGU 387.II.22 (second century A.D.); Tebtynis: P. Tebt. 121.78 (94 or 61 B.C.; corrected according to F. Preisigke, *Berichtigungsliste*... I, Berlin and Leipzig, 1922 (*BL*), p. 425), P. Strassb. 91 (86 B.C.?); Theadelphia: P. Petr. III, 82.3 (third century B.C.?); in the country around Thebes: P. Lond. II, 219a, recto, 3 (second century B.C.), SB 10397.12 (second to first century B.C.). The various place names formed with ἰβιών are not included in this list. See also note 14 and the map.

[17] See, for example, Temenesi in the Sebennytic district (see J. D. Ray, *The Archive of Ḥor*, London, 1976, p. 136) and the Assiut region (see H. Thompson, *A Family Archive from Siut*, Oxford, 1934, pp. 9, 39, 58 = PBM 10591, recto, viii, 3; 10575. 6 and 10591 verso, vi.4). More places are listed by D. Meeks, *Le grand texte des donations au Temple d'Edfou*, Cairo (1972), p. 68f. and Zivie in *LÄ* III, 1 (1977), c. 121, note 56.

[18] See Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 136, note 3 for bibliographical references; an even more comprehensive list (with also bibliographical references) is given by Zivie in *LÄ* III, 1 (1977), c. 118.

We may therefore assume that there were centres of the ibis cult everywhere in Egypt.[19]

Apart from the worship of the sacred ibis in the form of a statue[20] or a living specimen,[21] the centres of the ibis cult had two special functions, which we have already mentioned above. These were the breeding and feeding of ibises and the mummification and interment of the birds. The first of these functions was carried out in an ἰβίων τροφή (Dem. *tꜣ ẖrt n nꜣ hbw*).[22] This term is ambiguous, since it can mean not only the breeding place itself, but also the arable land belonging to it, the crops grown on the land being used to feed the ibises.[23] This land was generally situated on the border of a much larger piece of arable land[24] and was leased out to sub-tenants, who had to cultivate the land and contribute part of their crop as food for the ibises.[25] The papyri provide us with some information about the size of the arable land — the three ibis sanctuaries in Kerkeosiris e.g. had four, five and five *arourai* of land respectively. (One *aroura* was 2756 square meters).[26]

The ibises themselves were probably kept in cages.[27] In Saqqara, there was also a building that was called *ʿẖyt n ms* or 'birth chapel'.[28] Ray has described this as 'a building, or group of buildings, intended for the incubation of eggs and the rearing of young birds',[29] because a number of eggs were found there in the cultic buildings, when excavations were carried out. It is very probable that taking care of the procreation of these birds formed an important part of the work in the ibis sanctuary.

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[19] See, for example, the detailed list of ibis sanctuaries in the vicinity of Memphis in BGU 1216.

[20] See P. Strassb. 91 (Tebtynis, 87 B.C.?), BGU 387, II.22 (Soknopaiou Nesos, second century A.D.) and below.

[21] There was even reputed to be an immortal ibis in the sanctuary at Hermopolis; see Aelianus, *Hist. ant.* X.29.

[22] See H. Thompson, *Note on t ẖyr(.t) in Boundaries of Ptolemaic Conveyances of Land*, in *JEA* 23 (1937), p. 258; E. A. E. Reymond, *Two Demotic Memoranda*, in *JEA* 58 (1972), pp. 254ff.; see, however, also Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 139 and M. El-Amir, *Note on "t ḫyr.t" in boundaries of Ptolemaic Houses at Thebes*, in *ASAE* 53 (1956), pp. 135-138.

[23] For this practice, see also Diodorus Siculus l. 83. In addition, γῆ τῶν ἰβιοβόσκων is also mentioned. (See, for example, BGU 995, III.5; P. Lond. VII.2191).

[24] See Reymond, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] See the survey in Crawford, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

[27] See F. Preisigke and W. Spiegelberg, *Die Prinz-Joachim-Ostraka*, Strassbourg (1914), p. 25; A. Traversa, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[28] See Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[29] *Ibid.*

Some information is also provided in the texts about the feeding of the ibises. It is clear, for example, from P. Tebt. 62 that corn, aracus (wild chickling) and lentils[30] were grown on the ibis farms at Kerkeosiris, probably as food for the birds. Clover is mentioned explicitly in a text in the Ḥor archive as a food for ibises.[31] In P. Rein. 40:4 (114 B.C.?), a *sitologos* called Hermias says that he has received twenty *artabai* of corn, possibly as food for ibises.[32] (One *artabe* was usually 39.29 litres). It is possible — the text is mutilated — that six ibises were fed on these twenty *artabai.* It is, moreover, striking that this corn should have been received by a *sitologos,* in view of the fact that the *sitologoi* were state officials with the task to collect revenue in kind.[33] In BGU 1753.6 (64-63 B.C.), the βασιλικός γραμματεύς instructs that thirteen *artabai* of corn should be given to the ibis sanctuary at Sobthis. This was probably a state contribution. It is also clear from the Ḥor archive that rations of food were supplied by the king to the ibis sanctuary.[34] We are bound to ask here who or what benefited from this food — the ibises or those who cared for them?[35] These attendants were known in Greek as the ἰβιοβοσκοί[36] and in demotic possibly *nꜣ sdmw-ʿš n nꜣ hbw.*[37]

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[30] See also Crawford, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

[31] Text 8 recto, 18 (Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 38); see also Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

[32] According to Preisigke, *BL* I, p. 385, however, it is not a question of food for ibises that is discussed in this text, but a place name ἰβιῶν φαγῆ(τος).

[33] See, for example, P. Vind. Worp, p. 39.

[34] Text 33.3-4 (Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 105); see also Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[35] For the food supplies from the ibis farms, see P. Fitzhugh D. 1 (ed. Reymond, *op. cit.*) and DOA 792 (*Or. Suec.* 14, 1965, pp. 35ff.). According to an ostracon at Leiden (SB 10397.12; Thebes region, second to first century B.C.), half an *artabe* was delivered to the ibis sanctuary, possibly by another sanctuary.

[36] See BGU 995, III.5 (Latopolis; 110-109 B.C.); O. Tait 124 (149 or 138 B.C.); P. Cairo Zeno 59270.7 (Mea; 251 B.C.); P. Enteux. 50.1, verso (Magdola; 221 B.C.); P. Fouad 16.2 (Oxyrhynchus; first century B.C.); P. Giss. Bibl. Inv. 226.2 (Euhemeria; 131 B.C.; provisionally published in *Archiv 17*, 1962, p. 119, note 4); P. Lond. II.219a, recto, 3 (Thebaid; second century B.C.; corrected in accordance with *BL* I, p. 242); P. Lond. VII, 2191.23, 32 (Pathyris; second century B.C.); P. Mich. Zeno 31.8 (Philadelphia?; 256-255 B.C.?); P. Petr. III.82.3 (Theadelphia; third century B.C.?);

In addition to keeping living specimens, there was also the task of ensuring that the ibises continued to exist after death. This was achieved by means of mummification. The men who were in charge of this were called in Greek ἰβιοτάφοι.[38] There are, however, very few papyri in which they are mentioned.[39] One text is very interesting: P. Strassb. 91.4ff. (86 B.C.?). This text refers to Ἁρμιύσος τοῦ Φ̣[α]τρείους καὶ τῶν μετόχω[ν] ἰβιοτάφ̣ω̣ν̣ καὶ [ἱ]ερ[α]κ̣οτάφων τοῦ̣ ἐν Τεβτύνει Ἑρμαίου, in other words, the embalmers of ibises and falcons in the sanctuary of Hermes-Thoth at Tebtynis, who, as is clear from the word μετόχω[ν], were in association with each other. We shall be speaking below about the occurrence of embalmers of falcons in a Hermaeum. In this connection, the following passage in this text is interesting: 'When, on the fifth of the leap-days in the year 31 (= probably 13 September 86 B.C.), one of us, Harmiysis, was washing the linen coverings of the statues (ἰδώλων) of ibises and falcons (present) in the sanctuary, the son of Phanesis and Sioueris, the son of Sioueris, and his son came up, who gave him several blows and took away the linen cloths of the gods and the garments that he was wearing, so that we were almost obliged to dispense with the new year procession and the other practices that had taken place since time immemorial (...)'.

It is clear from this that the ἰβιοτάφος had more to do than simply embalm ibises. He also had the task of washing the linen coverings of the statues of the gods for the new year procession which took place on the following day. There must therefore have been statues of ibises and falcons in the sanctuary, covered with linen cloths and carried round in procession during the feast of the new year. The

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P. Tebt. 61b.401 (Kerkeosiris; 118-117 B.C.; supplemented); P. Tebt. 72.410 (Kerkeosiris; 114-113 B.C.); P. Tebt. 113.11 (Krokodilopolis Arsinoe; 114-113 B.C.); UPZ 119.17 (Memphis; 156 B.C.); UPZ 153.5, 17 and 154.6 (255 B.C.). For those employed in the cult of the ibis, see Otto, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 109-112 and Traversa, *op. cit.*, p. 53ff.

[37] See Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 142; according to P. Strassb. 91, verso, this is, however, equivalent to ἰβιοτάφος. See also Herodotus II.65 for those who were in charge of sacred animals in general.

[38] For Demotic equivalents, see Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 143 and also above, note 37.

[39] P. Fouad 16.3 (Oxyrhynchus; first century B.C.); P. Grenf. II.15.II.7 (Pathyris; 139 B.C.); P. Strassb. 91.4 (Tebtynis; 86 B.C.?); P. Tebt. 963.2 (early second century B.C.); SB 9628.2 (second century B.C.). See also Traversa, *op. cit.*, p. 52f.

statues of ibises that have been found are, for the most part, of a fairly stereotyped kind, with bronze heads, tails and feet, and wooden bodies. The wood was often gilded or painted white.[40] In combining bronze and whitewashed wood the natural colours of the ibis were indicated, since an *ibis religiosa* is white except for the black head and tail.

According to a later passage in the same papyrus, the same men had raided the sanctuary during the previous year and had taken forty silver drachmae as booty. The embalmers were therefore threatening to leave the temple if the authorities did not take action. It is clear from SB 9628 that an other ἰβιοτάφος did in fact leave his place of work. Also according to P. Tebt. 963, which is a complaint made by an ἰβιοτάφος about difficulties in collecting payments due for the ibis cult, the staff employed in the ibis cult sometimes ran certain risks in carrying out their duties.

These ἰβιοτάφοι must have had a gigantic task indeed, in view of the practice, in the later period at least, of embalming all the dead ibises that were found.[41] We may assume on the basis of Diodorus Siculus' text (I. 83)[42] that one of the tasks of those employed in the ibis cult was in fact to collect the dead bodies of wild ibises. Sometimes only a few feathers were found, but these were also interred.[43] Great numbers of ibises were involved. Apart from the archaeological finds, which will be discussed below, our information comes from the Greek and Demotic ostraca from Kom Ombo (O. Pr. Joachim) and the Demotic archive of Ḥor from Saqqarah published in 1976 by J. D. Ray.

There was a cultic company or association in Ombos (θίασος or σύνοδος), which was responsible for the interment of the ibises. The number of ibises interred at the same time is indicated on some of the ostraca. The lowest number is 357[44] and the highest 4507.[45]

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[40] See, for example, J. Vandier, *Une statue d'Ibis* in *RdE* 7 (1950), pp. 33-35.

[41] According to Herodotus II.67, the dead ibises were taken away into sacred buildings in the city of Hermes (= Hermopolis). Maybe this was true for his time, but ibis necropolises have been found also outside of Hermopolis.

[42] See also O. Pr. Joachim 25.4 and Spiegelberg's commentary on this text.

[43] See T. E. Peet and L. S. Loat, *The Cemeteries of Abydos* III, London (1913), p. 40; Preisigke and Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, p. 30f.

[44] O. Pr. Joachim 1.8; 17 January 79 B.C.

[45] O. Pr. Joachim 13.11; 23 August 65 B.C.

It is probable that interment was an annual event (though not on a fixed day) in the presence of high-ranking state officials such as the *strategoi*, who were members of the cultic association mentioned above.[46]

Very few data about the mummification of the ibises themselves can be found in the archive of Ḥor. The mummification and the wrapping are mentioned in the texts,[47] but no details are given. One has the impression[48] that the mummified ibises must have been checked by three priests in 'the house of waiting' and that each mummy had to be put into a separate jar. They obviously remained there until the great annual interment took place described in the texts.[49] The population of the Serapaeum came together and the mummies of the ibises and falcons were taken in procession, accompanied by certain ceremonies,[50] to their places of eternal rest.[51]

Our information has been extended by archaeological finds. A very impressive number of ibis mummies have been discovered. According to Ray,[52] more than four million ibises must have been interred in the necropolis at north Saqqarah, which amounts to about ten thousand interments each year. In a dream text from the archive of Ḥor,[53] there is a reference to food for 60,000 ibises and this number may not be an exaggeration. Although ibis necropolises have been found elsewhere, the necropolis of Saqqarah was clearly much larger than all the others. It had already been known for a long time,[54] but excavations only began in 1964. The first archaeologist to work there was Emery and excavations were continued after his death in 1971 by H. S. Smith.[55] The ibis necropolis of Saqqarah begins with a fore-court. This must originally have been planted with trees. It measured 20 by 26 m. A dromos leads down to a staircase and this gives access to the necropolis proper.[56] In addition there is a chapel dating from the Ptolemaic period. It was there that the archive of Ḥor, which has already been mentioned several times in this article, was discovered. The staircase descends through a simple gateway. There may well have been other entrances, but these have not been discovered. Below there is a system of corridors, the average height of which is 4 m. and the average width 2.50 m. These corridors run across shafts and burial chambers belonging to ancient mastabas. These galleries were intended to serve as resting places for the ibis mummies.

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[46] See Preisigke and Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, p. 28ff.

[47] See Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[48] See, for example, text 19, verso, 6ff.; Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] See also S. Morenz, *Ein neues Dokument der Tierbestattung*, in *ZÄS* 88 (1962), pp. 42-47, for an interesting illustration of a ritual carried out in connection with an ibis mummy (date unknown).

[51] This place of eternal rest is called *pꜣ ʿwy ḥtp pꜣ hb* in Demotic; see G. R. Hughes, *The Cruel Father* in *Studies in honor of J. A. Wilson*, Chicago (1969), p. 48.

[52] Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[53] Text 8, recto, 18; Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 38; see also p. 138.

[54] Travellers such as Poccock, Denon, Mariette and Lepsius had already visited the necropolis. (See W. B. Emery's account in *JEA* 51, 1965, p. 6).

After they had been wrapped, often very beautifully in geometrical patterns,[57] or else provided with appliqué themes, these mummies were placed in jars. Ideally, as we have already seen above, one ibis mummy was placed in each jar.[58] These were then closed and piled up one on top of the other in the solemn interment that took place later, until the gallery was filled to the top with jars.[59] A total of 76 corridors have been found in this complex of galleries at Saqqarah[60] and a second complex has also been discovered.[61]

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[55] Provisional reports on the excavations of the ibis galleries at Saqqarah will be found in *JEA* 51 (1965); 52 (1966); 59 (1973); the baboon galleries: *JEA* 56 (1970); the hawk galleries: *JEA* 57 (1971); the temple terrace: *JEA* 55 (1969), 56 (1970) and 57 (1971). See also Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-63. Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 153, has provided a clear comprehensive map.

[56] A plan will be found in *JEA* 59 (1973), p. 15, fig. 4. See also the description of the ibis necropolis at Tûnah el-Gebel given by S. Gabra in *ASAE* 39 (1939) pp. 490ff.

[57] See Gaillard and Daressy, *La faune momifiée de l'antique Égypte*, Cairo (1905), Plate XLVI.

[58] Outside Saqqarah, coffins in the shape of an ibis or little wooden or stone chests were also used for this purpose.

[59] See a very clear photograph in *JEA* 52 (1966), Plate II, 4.

[60] A plan will be found in *JEA* 52 (1966), fig. 2.

[61] See the foreword to *JEA* 57 (1971) and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 27. The ibis feeding place at Saqqarah is thought to be near the Lake of Abusir; it has not, however, been discovered, at least not yet. See Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 25 and Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 138. It is also thought that the sanctuary near the entrance to the falcon galleries on the temple terrace may also have been used for the ibis cult; see Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

In addition to this interment in galleries, other, simpler forms of interment were also practised. In Abydos, for example, in addition to another burial place,[62] a place of interment has been found containing 250 unfired ibis jars sealed with bricks and set up without any obvious order in the open air during the Roman period.[63]

At Tûnah el-Gebel many galleries were found, but also the offices of those employed in the cult of the ibis and an embalming workshop.[64]

Private people sometimes had an ibis mummy in their tombs. This may have been a domestic ibis which accompanied its worshipper into death.[65] Others brought their dead domestic ibises to the ibis necropolis at Tûnah el-Gebel.[66] The ibis was kept as a domestic animal, not only because it was sacred, but also because it swallowed snakes and other vermin.[67] Some Egyptians wore a signet ring with a representation of an ibis.[68] In a papyrus also a ship is mentioned with an ibis as its figure-head.[69] An interesting limestone relief showing the holy ibis and inscribed with the name of Hermes (= Thoth), has been published by L. Kákosy;[70] in my opinion it must have served in a private cult.

As one would expect, research into the nature of ibis mummies has shown that most of the specimens were not mummified in the most expensive way. According to Herodotus (2.86ff.), the Egyptians had three different kinds of mummification for men, the first being the most expensive. Most ibises were mummified according to the second method,[71] with the result that many of them are now in poor condition. In any case, the cult of the ibis must have been a very costly affair for the temple and the state. There are indications, however, that private persons provided money.[72] It is certain that pilgrims made a contribution to defray these costs, when they visited an ibis sanctuary.[73] It is possible that P. Tebt. 1086 (early second century B.C.) contains written proof of this, since it has been regarded as an account of travelling expenses. In this text we are told that four copper drachmae were spent 'on behalf of the ibis'.

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[62] See E. A. Ayrton, and others, *Abydos III*, London (1904), p. 1.

[63] See Peet and Loat, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-47; T. Whittemore, *The Ibis Cemetery at Abydos (1914)*, in *JEA* 1 (1914), pp. 248ff.

[64] See S. Gabra in *ASAE* 39 (1939), p. 491.

[65] See Hopfner, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

[66] See S. Gabra in *ASAE* 39 (1939), p. 490.

[67] See Roeder, *op. cit.*, c. 809f.

[68] See SB 10500.32, 37.

[69] See P. Lond. II. 256a (p. 99).

[70] See L. Kákosy, *Problems of the Thoth-cult* in *Act. Hung.* 15 (1963), pp. 123-128.

[71] See Hopfner, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

What also emerges from an analysis of the ibis mummies themselves is that the ἰβιοτάφοι did not always do their work conscientiously. Some of the birds, for example, were placed in the jars without having been mummified or in a partly mummified state. In some cases, empty jars were interred.[74] When this happened, the embalmers must have earned their wages in a particularly easy way. This fraud has, however, not only been found out by archaeologists. It is clear from the archive of Ḥor that it was known also at the time. On the basis of several texts, Ray has reconstructed a situation in which, from 207-206 B.C. onwards, abuses occurred in the mummification and interment of the ibises, but no measures were taken against this abuse until 174 B.C., in October of that year. These measures were obviously not very successful, since an investigation was carried out in the year 172, on 31st of May. This resulted in the arrest of six priests. Further reforms were enacted on June 13 165 on the instigation of Ḥor, who supported his arguments by referring to oracles of Thoth.[75] After that, there were apparently no more abuses, at least during Ḥor's lifetime.[76]

Not only ἰβιοτάφοι, but also ἰβιοβοσκοί have not always been scrupulous in their work, as appears from a very interesting document: a petition written by a scribe 'doing the work of the ibis' and addressed to 'the Ibis, Thoth, Twice Great, Lord of Hermopolis, the great god'.[77] More of such letters to the gods of the necropolis are known,[78] also some others addressed to Thoth.[79] In this petition the writer Efôu introduces himself as a devout servant of the ibis already for nine years. His life, however, has become intolerable because of Psenteêhe, also a servant of the ibis, who is robbing the poor scribe for years now. In despair he resorts to Thoth. Interesting are his accusations: Psenteêhe is stealing the food destined for the ibis (line 4); he is not keeping guard over the ibis (line 4) and is misappropriating property belonging to the ibis (line 7f.). The editor of the text warns us that we should not want to deduce too much from these accusations,[80] but considering the aforementioned abuses, we have to conclude that being a servant of the ibis does not implicate a genuine devotion to this sacred bird. An analysis of other ibis mummies, however, has revealed great care taken in tending the birds, since in one particular case it is clear that an ibis' broken shoulder had been set.[81]

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[72] See Preisigke and Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, p. 1 and Spiegelberg in *SBAW* (see above note 8).

[73] Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 139; Herodotus II.65.

[74] See also Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 143f.

[76] See, however, Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[77] See G. R. Hughes, *A demotic Letter to Thoth*, in *JNES* 17 (1958), pp. 1-12; the petition is dated 502 B.C.; provenance unknown.

It is apparent that the payment of the people employed in the cult of the ibis was problematical. When measures were taken to reform the mummification and interment of the sacred birds at Saqqarah, the method of payment was also regulated.[82] Nonetheless, the function continued to be attractive. This is borne out by the fact that there are documents relating to the sale of an ἰβιοταφεῖον as well as the land belonging to it and the prophetship.[83] These three wooden tablets date back to 255 B.C.[84] The purchasers were two brothers, both of them ἰβιοβοσκοί — Teōs and Zminis. The previous owner was called by the Greek name of Dorion and held a fairly high position in the state (*toparches*). His property was handed over to the state because of his debts and sold at a public auction. The three wooden tablets are in fact three successive receipts and it is clear from them that a total of 210 drachmae was paid for the property.

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[78] *Ibid.*, p. 3f.

[79] See G. R. Hughes, *A Demotic Plea to Thoth in the Library of G. Michaelides* in *JEA* 54 (1968), pp. 176-182 and the article mentioned above in note 51.

[80] See the article in *JNES* (mentioned above in note 77), pp. 2f.

[81] See Hopfner, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

[82] See text 19 and 21; Ray, *op. cit.*, pp. 74 and 82, also p. 145f.

[83] UPZ 153-155. See also A. Pelletier, *Planchette gréco-égyptienne du Cabinet des Médailles*, in *Rev. Ét. Gr.* 58 (1945), pp. 184-195.

[84] Dating according to P. W. Pestman, *BL*, V, p. 152.

What is striking, however, is that the last instalment was not paid by the two brothers, but by two of Zminis' daughters, who obtained the land, the place of cult and the prophetship in this way. What is not clear, however, is whether the daughters then became actively involved in the ibis cult. What is particularly interesting for us is that, if Dorion was really a Greek, these tablets show that a Greek was concerned with an indigenous cult as early as 255 B.C.

It is also clear from the papyri that those employed in the cult of the ibis combined their work with other jobs. An ἰβιοβοσκός at Kerkeosiris was, according to P. Tebt. 72. 410f., also a κριοτάφος, in other words, one who mummified rams. In P. Cairo Zeno 59270.7 (251 B.C.), we read of ἰβιοβοσκοί offering wood for sale in Mea. P. Grenf. II, 15, II, 7 (139 B.C.) is a conveyance, in which one of the ἰβιοτάφοι from Pathyris, sixty years old and strongly built — he is described as such in the conveyance — buys a piece of land of five to six *arourai* for two talents and 3000 copper drachmae. This ἰβιοτάφος was obviously not without means and was therefore able to possess land of his own. A prophet of the god Orsenouphis, who was himself called Orsenouphis,[85] owned various plots of land in Magdola belonging to the so-called smaller sanctuaries; viz. to the sanctuary of the god Orsenouphis,[86] to that of the god Souchos,[87] and also an ἰβίων τροφή.[88] It can be inferred from this that it was possible to be actively engaged in various cults at the same time. It goes without saying, then, that those employed in the cult of Thoth were also involved in the cult of the ibis. An example of this was one Pnepherōs, who was a prophet of Hermes-Thoth,[89] but who also owned an ἰβιών in Tebtynis.[90]

In addition to the ἰβιοβοσκοί and the ἰβιοτάφοι, other names of personnel engaged in the ibis cult are mentioned in the (Greek) papyri. In P. Jand. 34.3 (190 B.C.), for instance, ἰβιοιερεῖς are mentioned. Unfortunately, this term does not occur again in the papyri and it is not possible to deduce from the context what the functions of these ibis priests were. In P. Fay. 246 (Euhemeria, ± 100 A.D.), there is a possible reference to an ἰβιοστολιστής and, in SB 4636.31 (Panapolis, third century A.D.), to ἰβίων φύλακες, but, since both of these readings are uncertain,[91] we cannot be sure of it. A στολιστής was a priest who was in charge of the στολιστήριον, the place where the garments of the gods and such were kept.[92] It is possible that the term ἰβίων φύλακες applied to those who supervised the ibises and the place where they were worshipped. According to the Ḥor archive, there was at Saqqarah a gate-keeper or *mn-nỉwt* (another uncertain reading) who had the task of guarding the ibises and their offspring.[93] This official may have had the same function as the ἰβίων φύλακες in Panopolis. It may be inferred from Demotic texts[94] that those priests who are designated as χοαχύται in the Greek papyri, in other words, the priests who poured water and had to offer sacrifices for the dead, were connected with the cult of the ibis.

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[85] This is clear from P. Tebt. 88.35.

[86] See P. Tebt. 63.27 and others.

[87] See P. Tebt. 82.18.

[88] See P. Tebt. 82.38.

[89] See P. Tebt. 88.60.

[90] See, for example, P. Tebt. 62.23f. See also, for the entire question, Traversa, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

The papyri provide a few data about the organization of the cult and these can be supplemented by information from the archive of Ḥor. What is particularly striking is that there was a clear inclination to combine the cult of the ibis with that of other sacred animals and especially with that of the falcon.[95] We have already mentioned that there were not only embalmers of ibises, but also men employed mummifying falcons in the sanctuary of Hermes-Thoth at Tebtynis (P. Strassb. 91.4ff.) and that the sanctuary contained statues of falcons as well as those of ibises (line 10f.). From the Kom Ombo ostraca too, it is clear that there was a combined burial place for both ibises and falcons.[96] This is moreover borne out by the finds made in some of the ibis necropolises. In Thebes, for example, a large burial place containing ibis and falcon mummies was discovered in 1898 and 1899.[97] Falcon mummies have also been found in the (second) ibis cemetery at Abydos mentioned above, but the most striking case of a combined burial place is at Saqqarah. In the necropolis containing falcon mummies, which was apparently in direct communication with the baboon necropolis,[98] there are many more graffiti dedicated to Thoth than to Horus.[99] Consecrations to 'Thoth, the great god, to Osiris the Ibis and to Horus the Falcon' are also found on the temple furnishings stored here.[100] This combination is also found in the archive of Ḥor.[101] Ray[102] has suggested that this is because the ibis was the sacred bird of the moon and the night, whereas the falcon was associated with the sun and the daylight. I think that a more prosaic explanation is more obvious and more likely. The ibis and the falcon were the most revered of the sacred birds, but there were numerically far more ibises. It must therefore have been easier and more economical to add the smaller cult of the falcon to the centres of the ibis cult than to set up a separate organization devoted exclusively to the cult of the falcon. We have already noted that those employed in the ibis cult were sometimes also involved in other cults. It should, however, be added that the ibis has also been connected with other gods, e.g. Isis, Osiris and Imhotep.[103] Ibises are represented on two frescoes from Herculaneum depicting a sanctuary of Isis; the birds are shown walking in the grounds of the sanctuary.[104] Two statues of ibises have also been found in Pompeii.[105]

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[91] According to P. Collart, *Les Papyrus grecs d'Achmîm*, Cairo (1930), p. 74f., there is no reference in this text to ἰβίων φύλακες; the text would deal with πρεσβύτεροι from a village ἰβιών. In P. Fay. 246, all that is mentioned is in fact ἰβιοστολ. For this, see, however, Otto, *op. cit.*, I, p. 109, note 7.

[92] See Otto, *op. cit.*, I, p. 84 and Rübsam, *op. cit.*, p. 86f.

[93] See Text 33.7; Ray, *op. cit.*, pp. 105 and 142.

[94] Dem. Pap., Berlin 3075, 3111, 3141. See also W. Spiegelberg, *Demotische Papyrus aus den königlichen Museen zu Berlin*, Leipzig and Berlin (1902), pp. 7, 9, Plate 7, 13-15. For other Demotic terms for those employed in the ibis cult, see Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[95] See also J. Quaegebeur, *Teëphibis, dieu oraculaire*? in *Enchoria* 5 (1975), pp. 19-24, especially p. 23, note 36.

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[96] See also the Demotic papyrus PB 3111 (= PB 3141) mentioned above note 94.

[97] See the Marquis of Northampton and others, *Reports on Some Excavations in the Theban Necropolis*, London (1908), p. 5.

[98] See Emery in *JEA* 57 (1971), p. 4.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[101] See Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

[102] *Ibid.*

[103] See also Zivie in *LÄ* III, 1, (1977) c. 118.

[104] See V. Tran tam Tinh, *Le culte des divinités orientales à Herculaneum* (*EPRO* 17), Leiden (1971), Cat. No. 58 and 59 (Fig. 40 and 41).

[105] See V. Tran tam Tinh, *Essai sur le culte d'Isis à Pompéi*, Paris (1964), Cat. No. 145 and 146.

The ibis cult at Memphis came within the organization of the Serapaeum, according to P. Par. 11 (= UPZ 119) (156 B.C.), in which it is stated that an ἰβιοβοσκός was one of the people employed in the Serapaeum. It can also be inferred from the Ḥor archive that the ibis cult was not independent, but was in principle subject to the authority of the βασιλικὸς γραμματεύς (*sẖ-Pr-ʿꜣ*) and that both the temple of Ptah at Memphis and the temple of Osiris-Apis (that is, the Serapaeum) had authority over those employed in the cult of the ibis.[106] In P. Fouad 16.2f. (Oxyrhynchus, first century B.C.) an ἰβιοβοσκός and an ἰβιοτάφος are mentioned as belonging to the members of the Serapaeum at Oxyrhynchus.

The archive of Ḥor provides more information about the hierarchy of those engaged in the cult of the ibis. At the head of this hierarchy was a lesonis (*mr-šn*).[107] There was also the controller of the temple, the *pꜣ nty šn ḥt-ntr* (ἐπιστάτης) who acted on behalf of the state and was also known as the *pꜣ rd n Pr-ʿꜣ*.[108] Below these men in the hierarchy were twenty-five priests (*nꜣ wʿbw n Ḏḥwty*) who formed a council (in Greek βουλευταὶ ἱερεῖς). There were also inspectors or *mštw*, who supervised the lower staff.[109] It is also clear from P. Fouad 16 that an ἰβιοβοσκός, at the same time ἰβιοτάφος, of the Oxyrhynchus Serapaeum had to supervise the centres of the ibis cult in the region and was therefore obliged to make a tour of these places of cult in the country districts. So there was obviously also a hierarchy within the structure of the lower staff engaged in the cult of the ibis.

We know from the papyri dealing with Kerkeosiris that the feeding places of the ibises were regarded as belonging to the second class of sanctuaries.[110] In Egypt, during the Ptolemaic period, sanctuaries were divided into three categories: the great sanctuaries, the smaller sanctuaries and those without landed property.

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[106] See Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[107] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

[108] *Ibid.* The ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ἱεροῦ is also mentioned twice in O. Pr. Joachim. See Preisigke and Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, p. 60ff.

[109] See Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 142. See also the inspectors mentioned in O. Pr. Joachim 25.4.

[110] See P. Tebt. 5.70 (a decree issued by Ptolemaeus Euergetes II; 118 B.C.); P. Tebt. 63.28 (Kerkeosiris; 116-115 B.C.) and P. Tebt. 87.100 (Kerkeosiris region; late second century B.C.).

Unfortunately, there are few data in our texts about the Egyptians' religious attitude towards the ibis. Deified ibises (ἀποθεουμέ̣ν̣ων ἰβέων̣) are mentioned in P. Fouad 16.9. According to the texts in the archive of Ḥor, the ibis was the soul (*by*) of Thoth.[111] Votive inscriptions from Thebes[112] present the patron of the ibis and the falcon to Osiris-Ibis, Osiris-Falcon and all the gods of the resting place, and one (inscription No. 1) to Thoth.[113] In a plea addressed to the Ibis, this bird is invoked as a deliverer for those in distress.[114] In themselves, however, the great sums of money and the great amount of work invested in the worship, care and mummification of the ibis are a clear indication of the importance attached by the Egyptians living under foreign rule to this particular form of honour paid to their god Thoth.

Addendum:

After having completed this article I got access to the book written by S. Gabra, *Chez les derniers adorateurs du Trismégiste* mentioned above. Unfortunately, the book is largely an autobiography and less a study of the excavations at Tûnah el-Gebel; some information on the ibis necropolis there is, however, to be found on pp. 159 till 192. But this information is not very conclusive.

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[111] See Ray, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

[112] See Marquis of Northampton and others, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-22.

[113] See also the so-called *Gedächtnisurkunden* in O. Pr. Joachim; Preisigke and Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 32ff. and the announcements made by S. Gabra in *ASAE* 39 (1939), pp. 490ff. and in *Chr. d'Égypte* 22 (1947), p. 264, in connection with texts found in Tûnah el-Gebel, but which have not to my knowledge been published. Gabra's book *Chez les derniers adorateurs du Trismégiste*, Cairo (1971), was unfortunately not available to me. Further details concerning the religious attitude towards the ibis will probably be supplied by the graffiti and inscriptions from Saqqarah, when these have been published.

[114] See the article by Hughes mentioned above note 51.

FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS AND THE MYSTERIES

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If ever a *captatio benevolentiae* were needed, then it is in the case of this lecture. It does not require too much imagination to grasp the first reaction of somebody reading the theme of this paper in the program for this study-conference: "what has that Jewish historian to contribute to research in this field of Hellenism?" Indeed, it may seem at first sight somewhat curious to choose Josephus for a subject, when we are discussing aspects of Hellenistic culture. I am fully aware of this difficulty — if difficulty it is; nevertheless, the choice was made deliberately and will find, I hope, its justification in what is presented. But let me first of all say something about that reaction.

Hellenism: in using that term we may repeat the famous line of Goethe: "du sprichst ein grosses Wort gelassen aus". That single and simple word covers an area from Rome to India, from Assuan to the Danube; it studies the varied history of a period between the momentous campaign of Alexander the Great to the new beginning under Constantine the Great (or even further?), some six and a half centuries. We all realize that it is a super-human task to map out that field in one single picture. It is one of the great achievements of classical scholarship in our twentieth century that this field that had been so long neglected has become one of major interest, mainly through discoveries great and small in many separate areas with regard to both geography (Asia Minor, Egypt etc.) and specific subjects (religion, philosophy, economics, art etc.). But every labourer in this field is confronted, almost every day anew, with the many gaps in his documentation. Of course the material is so abundant on the one hand and so dispersed that no single person could hope to have it all at his command, but on the other hand he stands with empty hands at specific points. We often rescue ourselves from that unpleasant situation by generalizations and we feel most fortunate if new data become available. And they come, almost daily. We are often so overwhelmed by this new material and the light it sheds on unknown details in the vast field, that we tend to overlook the contribution that may come from ancient authors that have been known and studied for more than five centuries like Josephus.[1]

Moreover Josephus is a Jew whose main concern was the history of his people in the land of Israel. Though it is true that the Jewish people at the time of his writing formed part of the Roman Empire and had been subjected to the politics of preceding reigns in the Hellenistic world for several centuries, yet it was a special nation that had been extremely succesful in maintaining its religious identy amidst a world which we characterize with the term "syncretism". Is that Judaism not so special an entity that we can hardly incorporate it in our study of Hellenism? Perhaps we may pay attention to that form of Judaism that existed in the Diaspora, in the world of Hellenism, but that is treated more as a variant of Judaism (Hellenistic Judaism) than as a particular aspect of Hellenism. And even if we take into account the fact that such a considerable part of the Jews lived in the Hellenistic world, we discover in reading Josephus' works that one of its greatest defects is the neglect of their history. No doubt, we catch glimpses of it, but not a continuous view; all attention is concentrated on the history of Palestine.

This defect may partly be caused by the themes of Josephus' main books "The Jewish War" and "the Antiquities of the Jewish people"; nevertheless it is there. And the question may be raised: why deal with this Jewish historian, while we are discussing Hellenism? This question is an objection that can be easily made, but it springs from a strange compartmentalization that can be traced in our studies, and is present there, often unnoticed.

In many departments of scientific study the same phenomenon can be observed: one does not look over the fence of his own discipline. In our *research* are we not frequently victims of divisions in labour made for reasons of *teaching*? To take an example in that research-field that brings us together: by tradition we have a division between "Religionsgeschichte" and "Religion of Israel" and so an author like Josephus belonging to the Jewish faith does not enter on the scene of Hellenistic religions, because that region is reserved, so it seems, for non-Jewish, non-Christian religions. Particularly when we are dealing with a subject of such a complexity as Hellenism, with a field in which so many streams mingle and where on the other hand so many gaps in our documentation are visible, we must be fully aware of that danger and guard ourselves against such onesideness. We must make use of all resources while dismissing *our* distinctions and giving head to those that were natural in *Antiquity*, e.g. in time, space, origin and influences. Time does not allow me to illustrate this thesis with examples, such as the study of Gnosticism to mention only this very notorious area. But if we return to our topic, Josephus,[2] it will become clear that he can also demonstrate the point at issue.

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[1] In this connection I should like to recommend the reading of the inaugural lecture by the former professor of Ancient History at the University of Utrecht J. H. Thiel, *De Oude Geschiedenis en de Archaeologie*, Amsterdam 1946 also to students in the field of the Hellenistic-Roman *Religionsgeschichte*.

Josephus is not an exception to that rule. The great historian Edward Schwarz once commented upon Diodorus Siculus, the author of a "General History" published in the times of Caesar and Augustus,[3] that his book had no independent value; the value lay only in its reproduction of reliable older sources, now lost.[4] This is a rather partial, one-sided view. All historians have a double function. They do not only relate the past, "wie es eigentlich gewesen", according to their conception, but also reflect their own time and person, precisely in that conception and in their presentation to the public they have in view. This statement has nothing to do with the notorious debate on historical objectivity or on value-free research. It formulates the rule that every historian, even in looking back to the past, is a child of his time, and as such Josephus is a typical example of a man living in Hellenistic culture, and he has the advantage over and above many of his contemporaries that we can know him rather well. He is not a shadowy figure as so many others, but in his works he has left us a self-portrait both in the passages where he tells about his life and between the lines of his narratives. Even if that self-portrait is idealised in many places, particularly in his "Autobiography" where it becomes a self-defence, it is sufficiently clear to show him as a typical representative of Hellenistic culture in certain aspects of its rich and colourful variety.

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[2] In my "Delitzch-Vorlesungen" on Josephus I dealt with this same subject from a somewhat different point of view: *Flavius Josephus als historischer Schriftsteller* (= Franz-Delitzch-Vorlesungen, N.F., 1971), Heidelberg 1978.

[3] Cf. the (unsigned) article *Diodorus*, in K. Ziegler-W. Santheimer (edd.), *Der Kleine Pauly, Lexikon der Antike*, Stuttgart 1967, Bd. ii, col. 41f.

[4] E. Schwartz, *Diodorus*, in *Griechische Geschichtsschreiber*, Leipzig 1957 (a reprint of his articles in Pauly-Wissowa's *Real-Encyclopädie*), p. 45; on p. 36 he calls Diodorus "ein besonders tief stehendes Exemplar dieser Bücherfabrikanten der werdenden Welthauptstadt". — In the article, referred to in note 3 it is said: "Die reiche Information ... ist in ihrer Zuverlässigkeit von der Qualität der jeweils benützten Vorlagen abhängig", and: ....dass D. als Geschichtsquelle nur so viel wert ist wie seine jeweilige Vorlage, soweit seine Angaben nicht... auf Autopsie beruhen". — This is only true in sofar we take "Geschichtsquelle" as a source for older times, but he is for us also a "Geschichtsquelle" for his own time, e.g. in the selection and reproduction of the material.

Josephus was by birth and profession a Jew, not an apostate, but proud of his priestly origin, even at the time when he lived far from his homeland.[5] He had a Jewish, Pharisaic upbringing, and fought for a time in the war against Rome, but realized at a certain moment that the prospects of this revolt were hopeless. So he changed sides and gradually became a member of the Flavian court. There is no need to recount here all the vicissitudes of his life. Let it be sufficient to remember for the moment that he travelled through many parts of the Mediterranean world and lived for many years in Rome. He wrote in Greek and even where he employed ghost-writers,[6] he must have had ample contact with Greek culture, as we see from the authors he quotes. He was well aware of the anti-Jewish feelings in many quarters, which he tried to change for the better by supplying good information. This fact shows that he did not live in a ghetto, but wanted to play his part in the outside world which was the Greco-Roman world. It would not be a fair estimate of his situation, if we formulated it in the biblical phrase: "the voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau" (Genesis 27:22). He was and wanted to be a Jew, but one who keenly felt his position in a world that was stamped by Hellenistic culture.

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[5] Josephus, *Vita* 1 "My family is no ignoble one, tracing its descent far back to priestly ancestors" ... 12 "Being now in my nineteenth year I began to govern my life by the rules of the Pharisees"; *c. Apionem* I 54 "being a priest and of priestly ancestry, I am well versed in the philosophy of those writings" (viz. the books of the Old Testament). — The English translations of the quotations from Josephus' writings in this paper are taken from the Loeb-edition by H. St. J. Thackeray, R. Marcus, L. H. Feldman.

[6] Josephus, *c. Apion.* I 50 "Then, in the leisure which Rome afforded me, with all my materials in readiness, and with the aid of some assistents for the sake of Greek (χρησάμενός τισι πρὸς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνὴν συνεργοῖς), at last I committed to writing my narrative of the events". — The famous problem of these συνεργοί cannot be discussed here, but in my view the influence of these helpers has often been exaggerated.

So Josephus is not only important as a source of factual information, but also as a mirror of the spiritual life of his age, the years of the Flavian dynasty. What we can learn from him is markedly different from what we see in historians like Tacitus or Suetonius, in satyrists like Juvenal and Martial, from what we hear of Dio Chrysostom and many others that could be named, but it helps us to get a clearer picture of that period of Hellenistic culture. And in that respect he is, I believe, often underestimated. One of this paper's aims is to remedy this defect in some not unimportant respect.[7]

Josephus did not describe that piece of contemporary history, the *Bellum Judaicum* to give countenance to his own people in that terrible crisis of Jerusalem's capture, but to explain to his Aramaic fellow-Jews and to foreigners what really did lead to this catastrophe and to ward off misunderstanding and slander. This Jewish nation was of considerable antiquity and for that reason could not be brushed aside as completely insignificant, so he demonstrated in his *Archaeology*. In this Hellenistic world he worked for his people as an apologist. With all ancient historians he shared the conviction that history-writing served a certain purpose, should be useful or give delight to the readers. His choice was readily made: to help his Hellenistic audience to discover what the Jews really were. The word "apologist" has a disparaging sound in our ears; it seems to denote somebody who tries to defend a certain cause with somewhat tricky arguments, who is full of party-spirit, who highlights some elements in his story, while he suppresses others.

It is always wise to keep that in mind in reading Josephus when one tries to discover what really happened. But on the other hand this character of his work is an asset, when we try to see him in relation to his environment, the Hellenistic world. For the apologist does not write under the guidance of his own inspiration, but he has to reckon with his opponents, he must parry their attacks, refute their arguments and be sensitive to their expectations. That was true in the case of Josephus. But whereas in his *Bellum* and *Antiquitates* these apologetic motives are under the surface — and that is precisely the attraction in studying these books —, Josephus comes quite frankly to the fore as a defender of his nation in his books *Contra Apionem*.

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[7] For other aspects I may refer to my "Delitzch-Vorlesungen", mentioned on p. 246, n. 2.

This work is a most interesting document for the religious history of the 1st century A.D., not only because of the quotations taken from authors whose books are unfortunately lost, but also for its own intrinsic value. It is directed against a libel by an Alexandrian rhetorician Apion who lived in the first half of the 1st century.[8] He was involved in the Alexandrian riots against the Jews in the days of Caligula and passed some years in Rome. Though in the time of Josephus' writing Apion was dead and buried for several decades, the venom of his writing did its work and in the famous fifth book of Tacitus' *Historiae* we see its effects.[9] Josephus has noticed it himself: "I observe that a considerable number of persons, influenced by the malicious calumnies of certain individuals, discredit the statements in my history concerning our antiquity", he tells us at the beginning of his first book.[10] In the preface of his second book he decries Apion as "a man of low character and a charletan" who repeats the allegations of others with some additions of his own; the result is "pure buffoonery" and a display of "gross ignorance" in Josephus' eyes, but yet, our apologist remarks, "most people are so foolish as to find greater attraction in such compositions than in works of a serious nature, to be charmed by abuse",[11] but he has to admit that this very Apion "has written an indictment of us formal enough for a court of law".

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[8] See the articles on Apion by H. Gästner, in *Der Kleine Pauly*, Bd. I, col. 432 and A. Schalit, in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Jerusalem 1972, vol. iii, col. 178.

[9] A. M. A. Hospers-Jansen, *Tacitus over de Joden, Hist. 5, 2-13*, Groningen 1949 (diss. Utrecht).

[10] Josephus, *c. Apion.* I 2 "Since, however, I observe that a considerable number of persons, influenced by the malicious columnies of certain individuals, discredit the statements in my history concerning our antiquity ...".

[11] Josephus, *c. Apion.* II 3-4.

Whatever may have been the real nature of Apion's attack which has perished, it was so vigorous that Josephus thought it worth while to refute it so many years later.

What is the importance of these books *Contra Apionem* for the study of Hellenistic religious history? Can much be gained from a refutation of anti-Jewish gossip? I think, yes, if we realize who the opponents were and in what surroundings this book must be placed. Apion was a spokesman who had won fame; he was nicknamed "cymbalum mundi" by the emperor Tiberius[12] and that shows that his voice was heard far and wide; several times he is quoted by the older Pliny.

Another much older reviler of the Jews, whose work Josephus opposes, was Apollonius Molon, a professor of rhetoric, who had lived in the last part of the 2nd and the first part of the 1st century B.C. As an advocate for the Rhodians in 81 B.C. he had made a deep impression in Rome and later became the teacher of influential Romans such as Cicero and Caesar.[13]

Books written by men like this Apollonius Molon and Apion could not but carry weight. Both were representatives of that class of teachers, which had such a tremendous influence in the ancient world, since they formed the minds of the educated and leading classes in society. They brought with them the enormous prestige of the East. Their words had been heard in Rome and found a permanent echo in their writings.

Their attacks on the Jews and Josephus' defence had nothing to do with obscure peculiarities of some Eastern religions, but clearly effected those circles in Rome to which Josephus had access or whose favour on behalf of his nation he wished to win. Since this priest, turned into historian, was not teaching *Halakah* to his fellow-Jews or prospective proselytes, but wanted to gain a hearing in educated circles, he had to reckon with his audience and to present Judaism within their framework of thought. Therefore this book gives an insight into current ideas about God, religion, ethics. Such ideas, e.g. that God cannot be seen as He is, but only be known through His works,[14] were not new or startling. That could not have been the case, given the origin of this treatise which aimed at making an appeal through what was generally accepted as "fashionable". But the fact that many parallels can be found, may not lead us to dispose of them off-hand as mere *topoi*, which often is no more than a learned way of saying that they are "worthless". For a student of religious history the matter has a different face. It is true that there existed definite generally accepted ideas, but that does not mean that they are fully described by our word "commonplace". We must carefully analyze from what school-tradition these ideas stem, in what kind of combination they had been incorporated, for what end they were used. A careful analysis can help us to get better acquainted with the spiritual life in educated circles of Rome during the reigns of Domitian and his successors.[15]

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[12] Apud Plinius, *Nat. Hist.*, praef. 25.

[13] See the articles of H. Gärtner, in *Der Kleine Pauly*, Bd. III, col. 1400, s.v. *Molon* 2. and A. Schalit in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. iii, col. 188, s.v.

The theme and plan of this book did not lead Josephus to a description of religious life in the Roman Empire as it manifested itself in so many ways. But reluctantly he offered a piece of "comparative religion". A very important statement of his may be quoted at full length: "Gladly would I have avoided an investigation of the institutions of other nations; for it is our traditional custom to observe our own laws and to refrain from criticism of those of aliens. Our legislator has expressly forbidden us to deride or blaspheme the gods recognized by others, out of respect for the very word 'God'".[16] But since our accusers expect to confute us by a comparison of the rival religions, it is impossible to remain silent ... the statement which I am about to make is no invention of my own for the occasion, but has been made by many writers of the highest reputation".[17] To whom did he refer here? To Greek philosophers like Plato? Josephus betrays his knowledge about the tripartite division of theology made by Varro:[18] that of the poets, that of the lawgivers or statesmen and that of the philosophers. He does, however, not put these three forms on a par, but chooses the last one: "Who, in fact, is there among the admired sages of Greece who has not censured their most famous poets and their most trusted legislators for sowing in the minds of the masses the first seeds of such (wrong) notions about the gods?".[19] For these lawgivers entered on their task with ignorance of the true nature of God; they failed "to formulate even such correct knowledge of it as they were able to attain and to make the rest of their constitution conform to it",[20] this in contrast, we may add, with the great lawgiver Moses, who had according to Josephus the true knowledge of God and whose legislation showed a conformity with it.[21] But once on the wrong course these lawgivers gave free rein to the poets with their indecent tales about the gods; in this connection Josephus passes a very severe verdict on those people who tried to safeguard these poets by allegorizing.[22] But in the last resort these highminded Greek philosophers like Plato derived their knowledge from Moses.[23] He is the oldest; his laws had stood the test of time.[24] This line of reasoning Josephus follows to turn the standards of his philosophical audience into a recommandation of the Jewish religion. His nation with its peculiar customs was held up for ridicule and despite, but the truth is different: it is the example and realization of the ideal state of the Greek philosophers who had accepted its principles.

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[14] Josephus, *c. Apion.* II 167 δυνάμει μὲν ἡμῖν γνώριμον, ὁποῖος δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἄγνωστον — 190 ἔργοις μὲν καὶ χάρισιν ἐναργὴς..., μορφὴν δὲ καὶ μέγεθος ἡμῖν ἄφατος. Cf. my remarks in *Het Godspredikaat "Het Begin en het Einde" bij Flavius Josephus en in de Openbaring van Johannes*, Amsterdam 1976 (in Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, deel 39, nr. 1), p. 33.

[15] It was probably written after 100 A.D., see H. St. J. Thackeray, *Josephus*, *The Life*, *Against Apion* (Loeb-edition, vol. i), p. xiif.

[16] Greek text: II 237 περί γε τοῦ μήτε χλευάζειν μήτε βλασφημεῖν τοὺς νομιζομένους θεοὺς παρ' ἑτέροις ἄντικρυς ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης ἀπείρηκεν, αὐτῆς ἕνεκα προσηγορίας τοῦ θεοῦ. This goes back, as Thackeray remarks, *l.c.*, p. 389, n. a, to Exod. xxii 27 LXX: θεοὺς οὐ κακολογήσεις. He refers also to Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* IV 207 and Philo, who expresses the same idea, *Vita Mosis* II 205 and *De Spec. Leg.* I 53. For the "technical term" θεοὶ νομιζόμενοι = "the acknowledged gods", see W. Fahr, ΘΕΟΥΣ ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ, *zum Problem der Anfänge des Atheismus bei den Griechen*, Hildesheim 1969.

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[17] Josephus, *c. Apion.*, II 237s.

[18] See J. Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie, les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes*, Paris 1958, pp. 277-307, ch. V "La 'théologie tripartite' de Varron; since also the name of Scaevola (and even Posidonius) is connected with this division, it is well to remember the remark of Pépin, *l.c.*, p. 283: "Si Varron est tributaire de Scaevola pour l'idée même de la théologie tripartite, il en donne du moins une présentation renouvelée, et surtout il en fait un usage tout différent".

[19] Josephus, *c. Apion.* II 239.

[20] Josephus, *c. Apion.* II 250.

[21] See also Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* I 18ff., the beginning of his exposition of the Jewish state as ordered by Moses.

[22] See the commentary of J. G. Müller, *Des Flavius Josephus Schrift gegen den Apion*, Basel 1877 (reprint: Hildesheim 1969), p. 345f. who was correct in pointing out that this passage is directed against people who try to save bad stories about the gods by allegory, and in referring to *Ant. Jud.* I 24 πάντα γὰρ τῇ τῶν ὅλων φύσει σύμφωνον ἔχει τὴν διάθεσιν, τὰ μὲν αἰνιττομένου τοῦ νομοθέτου δεξιῶς, τὰ δ' ἀλληγοροῦντος μετὰ σεμνότητος, ὅσα δ' ἐξ εὐθείας λεγέσθαι συνέφερε ταῦτα ῥητῶς ἐμφανίζοντος. One may also compare *Ant. Jud.* I 15 τῇ δυνάμει (sc. of God) πρεπούσας ἀεὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀνατέθεικε πάσης καθαρὸν τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ φυλάξας λόγον τῆς παρ' ἄλλοις ἀσχήμονος μυθολογίας. On the other hand Josephus gives in *Ant. Jud.* I 179ff. an interesting "symbolical" explanation of the Tabernacle and the vestments of the priests.

Now one may say that this is basically the same position as that of Philo or even with a grosser generalization that of Hellenistic Judaism. That is true to a certain extent, for we should not fool ourselves by forgetting that Hellenistic Judaism is for 95 procent known only through these two authors. But even so we should not overlook the different situations in which both authors lived, or let me put it this way: between Philo and Josephus lies the fatal year of 70 A.D.; Philo had to face troubles against the Jews on a local level whereas Josephus moved among the rüling classes of the Empire that had been defied by the Jews. In Philo's days Jerusalem's temple still stood in full glory as the visible centre of Judaism, whereas Josephus and his contemporaries knew of its destruction and did see ruins. It took courage on Josephus' part — and that is too often forgotten — to come on the scene as a staunch defender of his people, not pleading for compassion, but presenting it as an example. And in doing so the author of the *Bellum Judaicum* did not live in a dream-world. Moreover the line of defence is much more historical than philosophical, more concrete than abstract. That too is characteristic of the ambit of Josephus. We noticed too, that he uses the scheme of Varro's tripartite theology. That is also significant of his situation. He has not humanity in general in view, but the nation as a historical entity. For him nation, religion and ethics are closely tied together with an emphasis on the nation, as it was for the Roman public. Religion is not so much a matter of the individual believer, but of the state.

Against this background I want to discuss some passages where

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[23] Josephus, *c. Apion.* II 168, cf. Plato as lawgiver II 223s., 255ss.

[24] Josephus, *c. Apion.* II 279 ss.

Josephus deals with that phenomenon of Hellenistic religion that takes pride of place in the description of that period, namely the mysteries.

The first item that will come to mind in this connection, is of course the famous passage about Tiberius' measures against the Isis-cult in Rome (*Ant. Jud.* xviii 65-80). It tells the story of a Roman lady who belonged to one of the most distinguished families in the capital and was a devotee of Isis; how a lover of hers with the help of priests of the Aegyptian goddess had found an opportunity of having sexual intercourse with her under the guise of Anubis. This outrage came to light by the man's own flippancy; the priests were crucified, the temple destroyed, and the culprit himself came off with nothing more than with exile, because it was a "crime passionel", which was a rather unexpected end to the story.

In the plan of this paper a full discussion of all aspects in this curious story is superfluous. We may refer to the latest treatment by Mrs Kelly Heyob in her book on "the Cult of Isis among women in the Greco-Roman World",[25] where many other studies dealing with this remarkable passage are mentioned. For our purpose we can leave aside all issues about the historical reliability of Josephus' account[26] and may limit ourselves to the question of his report itself and its insertion.

In what connection did Josephus tell the story? First he has given an account of the havoc (called θορυβεῖν in § 58) made by the government of Pontius Pilate in Judaea because he had taken measures that were a transgression of the Jewish Law. Then Josephus continues: "About this same time[27] another outrage threw the Jews into an uproar" (ἕτερόν τι δεινὸν ἐθορύβει τοὺς Ἰουδαίους). The simple reader would expect this to have happened also in Judaea, but no, he is suddenly confronted with the situation in Rome, for it was there that it took place, in the same time as some scandalous deeds in the temple of Isis, so he informs us. And Josephus was well aware of his literary activity at this point, for he continues: "I shall first give an account of the daring deed of the followers of Isis (τοῦ τῶν Ἰσιακῶν τολμήματος μνήμην) and shall then come back to what happened among the Jews",[28] cf. the closing remark in § 80: "I shall now return to the story, which I promised to tell, of what happened at the same time to the Jews in Rome". Then he tells of a noble Roman lady, a proselyte, who had been swindled out of much money and costly goods by some scoundrels under the guidance of somebody posing as a rabbi. They escaped with their loot, but Tiberius who had been informed by the duped family, banished the whole Jewish community from Rome "because of the wickedness of four men" (as is explicitely stated at the end in § 84). The next story is concerned with the appearance of a messianic figure among the Samaritans, who started a certain movement that was also knocked down by Pilate, but led to his downfall. It is interesting to see how Josephus connects this account with the preceding one: "the Samaritan nation was not exempt from disturbance" (§ 85 οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο δὲ θορύβου καὶ τὸ Σαμαρέων ἔθνος, cf. in § 88 καταστάντος δὲ τοῦ θορύβου ......).[29]

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[25] S. Kelly Heyob, *The Cult of Isis among Women in the Graeco-Roman World*, Leiden 1975, pp. 115-119, with this conclusion: "Here the propaganda was levelled against the Isis cult as a defence of Judaism. Though it cannot be proved with certainty that the Paulina story is mere fabrication, it is evident that a great deal of caution is necessary in basing any allegations on it".

[26] E.g. the question whether Josephus used a well-known novellistic motif, as was maintained by Weinreich, *Der Trug des Nektanebos, Wandlungen eines Novellenstoffs*, Leipzig-Berlin 1911; here discussion of Josephus on p. 17ff.

[27] According to Josephus the event took place during the rule of Pontius Pilate in Palestine, whereas Tacitus, *Annales* II 85 dates the measures against the Isis cult and the Jews cf. Rome in 19 A.D., see the note of L. H. Feldman, *in loco*, *Josephus*, vol. IX p. 50f.

The composition is clear; two lines are combined: a) Pilate's brutal behaviour against the Jews and their laws, ending with his downfall — b) three stories under the "Stichwort" θόρυβος (58, 65, 85). With the second case the story of the Isis-cult is combined very loosely, but also quite deliberately, as we saw. The reason for this curious connection and the insertion of a story that has apparently nothing to do with the general plan is the fact that Tiberius had in the same year taken measures against the cults of Isis and of the Jews in Rome. That is known through Josephus' younger contemporaries Tacitus,

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[28] Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* XVIII 65 τὰ ἐν τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις γεγονότα — the translation "to the fate of the Jews", is somewhat overdramatic.

[29] Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* XVIII 84; for the various account of the penalty inflicted on the Jews, see L. H. Feldman, *in loco*, *Josephus* vol. IX, p. 60, n. 61 n. b.

Annales ii 85 and Suetonius, *Tiberius* 36; both cults are linked together in one sentence.[30] Hence that fact[31] was still remembered in Josephus' time, but in the accounts of the Roman historians reasons for these measures are not given, only the bare facts.[32] Given this situation we understand why Josephus made this strange insertion, for there was an urgent reason. He knew of the current reports by which the Isis-cult and the Jewish religion were thrown into one box and fell under the same stricture. He was not after the telling of a juicy story, as is often thought, but he wanted his readers to see the true reasons of what had happened and the differences between the two cases. Moehring has given a list of six points which show that according to Josephus' presentation of the events[33] the two cases were totally different. The most important point is in my opinion the fact that the regular priests of Isis themselves were ready to make their religion the instrument for dishonouring the lady, that they let Mundus play for the god Anubis, that such a god could be thought of as having sexual intercourse with human beings and that they accepted money for their quasi-revelation,[34] whereas on the other side the Jewish swindler was an impostor who had been banished from Israel because of transgressing certain laws, and his accomplices were of a piece with him.[35] So any impartial observer who was well informed about the ins and outs of both affairs and did not rely blindly on their being joined in a decree of the Senate,[36] could see that they had nothing to do with each other and were completely different. Moreover, Josephus did not leave his readers in uncertainty about his judgement on the Isis-business: in his introduction he speaks of "acts of a scandalous nature" (§ 65: πράξεις αἰσχυνῶν οὐκ ἀπηλλαγμέναι) and he rounds off his story by saying: "Such were the insolent acts of the priests in the temple of Isis" (§ 80: καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἴσιδος τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ὑβρισμένα τοιαῦτα). With this stress on the immorality of what had happened, Josephus lined up with others such as Juvenal, who had the same misgivings about the Isis-cult.[37]

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[30] Tacitus, *Annales* II 85 *Actum et de sacris Aegyptiis Iudaicisque pellendis factumque patrum consultum est ...*; Suetonius, *Tiberius* 36 *Externas caerimonias, Aegyptios Iudaicosque ritus compescuit coactis qui superstitione ea tenebantur religiosas vestes cum instrumento omni conburere. Iudaeorum iuventutem per speciem sacramenti in provincias gravioris caeli distribuit, reliquos gentis eiusdem vel similia sectantes urbe summovit ... Expulit et mathematicos ...* (these are not mentioned in the other reports); cf. Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* XVIII 65 συντυγχάνουσιν — "simultaneously (sc. with the outrage against the Jews) ... occurred" the matters in connexion with the Isis-temple.

[31] It is rather strange that the Isis-cult suffered under persecution during the reign of Tiberius, because in Egypt there are found indications for good relations of that emperor with the goddess, see R. E. Witt, *Isis in the Graeco-Roman World*, London 1971, p. 223. Or was that devotion to a local deity, while the situation in Rome was a different matter?

[32] Various explanations have been suggested, see H. R. Moehring, *The Persecution of the Jews and the Adherents of the Isis Cult at Rome A.D. 19*, in *Novum Testamentum* III (1959), p. 295. But that is nothing more than guess-work, because the texts state no reasons, not even in the form of rumours, except for ... Josephus!

[33] H. R. Moehring, *l.c.*, p. 301f.

[34] It is always a weighty charge against priests, prophets etc. that they were selling their graces, see J. Reiling, *Hermas and the Christian Prophet, a Study of the Eleventh Mandate*, Leiden 1973, p. 53f.

It is beyond dispute that Josephus inserted this story for apologetic reasons.[38] It falls outside the scope of this paper to probe its reliability. Just one remark: apologists are not *per se* romancers, let alone liars; in many cases to state the truth is the best defence.

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[35] Cf. in the list of H. R. Moehring, *l.c.* p. 301, point 2.

[36] According to the report of Tacitus; at any rate the measures against the Isis-cult and the Jewish community were remembered in combination. This is the only reason I can find for Josephus' introducing the two stories together. That fact is generally overlooked.

[37] See the well-known texts in S. Kelly Heyob, *l.c.*, p. 114 and her evaluation on the following pages, where she points to other texts which bring to light the chastity of Isis-devotees (as is also done in the story of Josephus!) and the cult in general. But let us observe, that Josephus does not accuse the Isis-cult as such, but the priests and speaks about the things that happened with the sanctuary of Isis (περί- round, concerning).

[38] This fact is stressed very much by Moehring, *l.c.*, and Mrs. Kelly Heyob, *l.c.*, but the question is, in what way did Josephus want to defend his own religion. I don't think it correct to say: "Here propaganda was levelled against the Isis cult as a defense of Judaism" (see p. 254 n. 25). Attacks on a rival religion do not use such a matter-of-fact language as Josephus employs here; that the things that had occurred at the Isis-temple were scandalous was the least he could say. The grounds for doubting the reliability of this story as given by Mrs. Kelly Heyob, *l.c.* p. 117f. are far from strong or convincing. Take e.g. the first argument: "The foolishness of both husband and wife is scarcely credible". One may ask; why not? Because of the invitation of the god? But then the fact is overlooked that such invitations were extended (see p. 258, n. 39) and the "religious atmosphere" undervalued (cf. the success of Alexander of Abunoteichos, to mention only one example; and was that limited to the Roman Empire?). But here I cannot discuss the whole matter.

However, what do we learn here of Josephus' attitude towards this particular form of religion? The story is not told to demonstrate the religious superiority of Judaism over the Aegyptian cult; that may be a consequence, but is not the real objective. Josephus wanted to safeguard his religion against a misunderstanding that might follow from a *senatus-consultum*. It is in this way that the Isis-cult was caught sight of, and not because of rivalry for the favours of the Roman élite.

Josephus knows of the spread of Isis-worship, of meals with the godhead, as we see them in some papyri for the Serapis-cult.[39] He gives a clear indication of *pia fraus*, just as Lucian does later in his work on *Alexander Pseudomantis*. Explanations about the name, origin etc. of this cult are not mentioned and were evidently superfluous. But even more interesting is to observe that the blame for this outrage is not attributed to the godhead, but to the priests. There is no attack on this idolatrous cult itself, nor any warning against it. That could have been easily done, as is done in the case of the licentious acts in Greek mythology.[40] This abstinence from explicitly decrying this Aegyptian cult is, I think, in line with the principle we mentioned before (p. 251), of not blaspheming foreign gods. But his rejection goes without saying.

In quite a different connection mystery-cults are mentioned in a passage of *c. Apion* ii 266f. In a refutation of the charge, made by Apollonius Molon against the Jews, because they refuse "admission to persons with other preconceived ideas about God", and decline "to associate with those who have chosen a different mode of life" (ii 258), Josephus points among other things to the attitude of the Athenians who inflicted an inexorable penalty on any who uttered a single word about the gods contrary to their laws" (ii 262).

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[39] H. Lietzmann - W. G. Kümmel, *An die Korinther* I/II^5, Tübingen 1969, pp. 49-51 excursus on "Kultmahle".

[40] Cf. Josephus, *c. Apion*. II 242-249; this criticism was not original, see P. Decharme, *La critique des traditions religieuses chez les Grecs des origines au temps de Plutarque*, Paris 1904, but it shows what Josephus could have done, had he had the intention to attack the Egyptian cult; in that direction too there were Greek examples, e.g. criticism of the theomorphic character of the Egyptian gods etc.; something of it in *c. Apion*. I 254.

Apollonius' seeming ignorance in this matter offers Josephus an opportunity to show his learning, for he produces a list of such cases, taken from the history of Athens in the 5th and 4th century. In this typical collection of examples[41] two items are concerned with mysteries. The first case is that of the so-called atheist Diagoras,[42] on whose head a price was set "because he was reported to have jeered at their mysteries" (of course the Eleusinian). It is curious that Josephus includes this case in his list of Athenian acts of *misanthropia*, because this punishment was not so much directed against the foreigner as against his *asebeia*.[43] The second case is that of a priestess Ninus who was put to death because she was accused "of initiating people into the mysteries of foreign Gods" (§ 267: ὅτι ξένους ἐμύει θεούς). These mysteries were those of the Phrygian Magna Mater.[44] Nothing is said about their contents; the fact is simply stated as a proof of Athenian inhospitability, even to foreign gods. The comment Josephus makes is remarkable, for he adds: "Those who had such a law (sc. by which the introduction was forbidden on penalty of death) evidently did not believe that the gods of other nations were gods", to which we may add as an unspoken thought: "as we Jews do not recognize them". In incorporating these items in his list Josephus did not express any judgment on the mysteries as such; he accepted, that they were there and he noted the reaction of the Athenians, from which he could score a point in his apology.

A factual statement of the same sort is made in Josephus' detailed account of the assassination of Caligula. He tells us that the emperor followed a deserted alley in the palace which was a short-cut to the baths: "he also wished to inspect the boys who had come from Asia. A troop of them had been dispatched as a choir to sing in the mysteries he was celebrating" (ἐπὶ ὕμνοις μυστηρίων ἃ ἐπετέλει);[45] in that way he met his fate. Josephus had already mentioned these mysteries on an earlier occasion, where he informs us that Caligula would figure as a woman "in the rites of certain mysteries which he had himself contrived. He would put on woman's robes and devise wigs or other means of counterfeiting a feminine appearance". He infuriated one of the officers of the guards by giving him in stead of the pass-word "women's words and such as had quite obscene connotations".[46] Here we have not a specimen of the regular mysteries, but an invention of the debauched emperor himself, who wanted to indulge in sexual excesses under the mask of religious rites. This detail that was instrumental in Caligula's ruin, forms part of many madman's acts committed by that emperor and described at length in the beginning of Book xix of the "Antiquities". These mock-mysteries are not specially singled out to be condemned; the bare catalogue of vices speaks for itself as damning evidence.

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[41] But was such a proof by that set of examples from long ago still up to date in the 1st cent. A.D., see e.g. the observation in Acts of the Apostles 17:21.

[42] Cf. A. B. Drachmann, *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity*, Copenhagen 1922, p. 31ff. and H. Dörrie, *Diagoras* 1., in *Der Kleine Pauly*, Bd. I, col. 1507.

[43] As Alcibiades, Andocides, see W. Nestle, *Asebieprozesse* in Th. Klauser (ed.), *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, Stuttgart 1950, Bd. I, Sp. 735-739. — Diodorus Siculus XIII 5, 7 says of Diogoras: διαβολῆς τυχὼν ἐπ' ἀσεβείᾳ.

[44] See Th. Reinach - L. Blum, *Flavius Josèphe Contre Apion*, Paris 1930, p. 106, n. 1 and already the old C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg 1829 (reprint Darmstadt 1961), Bd. I, p. 664ff.

Quite different from the texts we have discussed sofar is the passage in *c. Apion* ii 188ff. (See Appendix I). In glowing terms by means of a rhetorical question Josephus sings the praises of the Jewish constitution which is a "theocracy" (§ 165). We may quote from the final paragraphs which are so significant: "Could there be a more saintly government than that? Could God be more worthily honoured than by such a scheme, under which religion is the end and aim of the training of the entire community (πάντος μὲν τοῦ πλήθους), the priests are entrusted with the special charge of it, and the whole administration resembles some sacred ceremony (ὥσπερ δὲ τελετῆς τινος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας οἰκονομουμένης)? Practices which, under the name of mysteries and sacred ceremonies,[47] (μυστήρια καὶ τελετὰς ἐπονομάζοντες), other nations are unable to observe for but a few days, we maintain with delight and unflinching determination all our lives".

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[45] Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* XIX 104.

[46] Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* XIX 30; also known through Suetonius, *Caligula* 56 and Seneca, *De Const. Sap.* 18, 3 see the note of L. H. Feldman, *l.c.*, p. 229, n. c and p. 230.

[47] Thackeray, *l.c.*, p. 369 translates: "rite of initiation", but Reinach-Blum, *l.c.*, p. 91: "cérémonies" and that is preferable here, because the *tertium comparationis* is not initiation, but the cultic act. — It is not worthwhile to discuss other variant translations, see J. G. Müller, *l.c.*, p. 210f. — In the preceding sentence Josephus uses the word ἐπιμέλειαν; that may have a general meaning "charge", "care" of the priests, but it was a special word in the Eleusinian cult, see the references in G. E. Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries*, Princeton 1961, p. 331, index s.v. *epimeletai*.

It is remarkable that Josephus compares the Jewish constitution and way of life[48] with a τελετή and in the next sentence he introduces by way of quotation a fuller expression: μυστήρια καὶ τελετάς. The main category here is therefore: τελετή, a word with a wide range of meanings in Greek, as was shown in the dissertation of C. Zijderveld.[49] Its general notion is that of a "sacred action or ceremony"; it is often used together with μυστήρια, but is not restricted to that area. Therefore the translation: "rite of initiation" is not correct and consequently we cannot say with Cerfaux: "ils (sc. les Juifs) sont le peuple *initié*, célébrant perpétuellement le mystère du gouvernement divin".[50] Such a comparison may be found in Philo, but it is reading too much into Josephus' words to find it here. For the term τελετή the notion of secrecy is not essential;[51] but on the other hand it is not any action whatsoever; it is a sacred, ritual action. Hence it can be combined with μυστήρια, as in an inscription: τῆς τῶν μυστηρίων τελετῆς,[52] but also as two separate words, e.g. Artemidorus iv 2 in a list: μυστήρια καὶ τελετὰς καὶ πανηγύρεις καὶ ἀγῶνας.

In such cases the first word is the general notion: the secret religious mysteries and by the word τελετή the ceremonies of a religious nature are meant. In Josephus' days the combination must have been a standing expression as appears from an interesting passage of Varro, transmitted by Augustine: *de religionibus loquens*

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[48] The word πολιτεία comprizes both meanings, see H. G. Liddell - R. Scott - H. Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*⁹, Oxford 1940, p. 1434, s.v.

[49] C. Zijderveld, Τελετή, *bijdrage tot de kennis der religieuze terminologie in het Grieksch*, Purmerend 1934 (diss. Utrecht), a very full collection of the material.

[50] L. Cerfaux, *Influence des mystères sur le Judaïsme avant Philon*, in *Recueil Lucien Cerfaux*, Gembloux 1954, vol. I, p. 108 (italics are mine). He was correct, however, in stating that Josephus' vocabulary is "claquée sur celui d'Eleusis" (p. 109), as will appear from the following pages of this paper, but he did not give any proof from texts and his conclusion is incorrect.

[51] C. Zijderveld, *l.c.*, p. 44.

[52] C. Zijderveld, *l.c.*, p. 41. — Diodorus Siculus V 48, 4 παραδεῖξαι τὴν τῶν μυστηρίων τελετὴν ... δοκεῖ δ' οὗτος πρῶτος ξένους μυῆσαι καὶ τὴν τελετὴν διὰ τοῦτο ἔνδοξον ποιῆσαι.

multa esse vera, quae non modo vulgo scire non sit utile, sed etiam, tametsi falsa sunt, aliter existimare populum expediat, et ideo Graecos teletas ac mysteria taciturnitate parietibusque claussise.[53] The Roman Varro clearly considers these Greek "*teletas ac mysteria*" as the best form of religion by which the ordinary people can be governed and kept in order by the state-authorities. Presently we shall return to this point.

Josephus in this passage draws a comparison with the mysteries, which were clearly considered by his audience as the highest form of religion. It is characteristic of the religious situation that he does not refer to the cults of the gods of the Greek or Roman pantheon. Why? The text does not give any reason, but I would suggest, that he could not make his *tertium comparationis*, viz. ethical life there. But he could find it in the mysteries and their sacred ceremonies. It is most probable that he is thinking here as Zijderveld suggested,[54] of the Eleusinian mysteries which enjoyed a great popularity and prestige in the imperial period[55] and were the typical state-mysteries, because of their close links with Attica and Athens (see the quotation of Varro, already given). The point of comparison is not found in the Jewish festivals like Passover, but in the ethical impact of religion. There the Jewish cult, he explains, by far surpasses the mysteries ("few days" *versus* διὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος).[56] The festival of the Eleusinian mysteries lasted for nine days (Boedromion 15-24)[57] and it may be well to recall here some sentences from Mylonas' critical study on Eleusis: "It may be well at this point to note that with the end of the celebration at Eleusis the special obligations of the initiates to the Sanctuary and to the Goddess came to an end. ... They were not formed into 'thiasoi' or bands or clubs dedicated to the service of the Goddess and of humanity".[58] But for the Jews, so Josephus declares, the holy bond with God and men is permanent throughout his whole life. It may be asked in this connection whether the words μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ γνώμης ἀμεταθέτου have also a special meaning, because they give a strong emphasis to the sentence. Are they used to suggest a contrast? Since Foucart the experience of the Eleusinian *mystès* has often been seen reflected in a famous fragment of Plutarch, *De Anima*: "then came all the terrors before the final initiation, shuddering, trembling, sweating, amazement".[59]

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[53] Varro, ap. Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei* IV 31 = B. Cardauns, *M. Terentius Varro Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum*, Wiesbaden 1976. Teil I *Die Fragmente* p. 23, fr. 21 (in the older edition of Agadh, fr. 10b).

[54] C. Zijderveld, *l.c.*, p. 87.

[55] See the references in M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, München 1950, Bd. II, p. 88f. (Hellenistic times), p. 329ff. (Roman times).

[56] H. G. Liddell-R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones, *l.c.*, p. 45, s.v. II.

[57] G. E. Mylonas, *l.c.*, pp. 247-289.

Mylonas, however, has combatted this view not without good grounds.[60] But if such words expressed the feelings of the iniate, did Josephus have them in view to mark a contrast? Or was he rather drawing a parallel between the temporary joy of the mystery and the permanent gladness of the law-abiding Jews? It is hard to decide, though I am inclined to choose in favour of the former alternative, because of the words γνώμης ἀμεταθέτου ("unflinching determination" is a mental attitude which would contrast very well against others like "trembling" etc.).

The suggestion that Josephus has particularly the Eleusinian mysteries in mind here, becomes a certainty, when we read his next sentence: τίνες οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προρρήσεις καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεις; There is not the slightest reason to indicate a break between § 189 and 190, as Thackeray did by placing a white line there. On the contrary οὖν as a consecutive co-ordinating conjuction[61] points in the opposite direction, to bring the two sentences close together. But what is the correct translation of the noun προρρήσεις? It seems obvious to take it in contrast with the following word "prohibitions" and to translate it by "prescriptions" (Reinach) and "precepts" (Thackeray).[62] This is, however, a mistaken, *ad-hoc* translation, for the Greek dictionaries give different renderings of this word, but nothing like "(legal) prescript" (synonym for "commandment"). It is rather strange that the first of these "precepts and prohibitions" should be a piece of ... theological creed (§ 190). But what other possibility is there? The most usual meaning is that of "prediction, prophecy", and that was also known to Josephus,[63] but does not fit here either. Now the Eleusinian mysteries come to our rescue. Clement of Alexandria who had a fair knowledge of the subject, informs us that the *teletai* "are not exhibited incontinently to all and sundry, but only after certain purifications and previous instructions" (προρρήσεων).[64] The fact that this was specific for Eleusis, but was taken over by others appears from Lucian, who tells us that Alexander, the false prophet, instituted mysteries (τελετή) beside his oracle; on the first day there was a πρόρρησις "as in Athens", by which atheists, Christians, Epicureans coming to spy upon the rites are banished.[65] A scholion on Aristophanes contains the information: παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἱεροφάντου καὶ δᾳδούχου πρόρρησιν τὴν ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ.[66]

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[58] G. E. Mylonas, *l.c.*, p. 280; but the reference he gives there to Diodorus Siculus V 48 (should be: 49, 6): γίνεσθαι δέ φασιν καὶ εὐσεβεστέρους καὶ δικαιοτέρους καὶ κατὰ πᾶν βελτίονας ἑαυτῶν τοὺς τῶν μυστηρίων κοινωνήσαντας, does not speak of the Eleusinian, but of the Samothracian mysteries in fact. It may be of course that it does also apply to the former, but that is not sure. — Cf. also Epictetus, *Dissert*. III 21, 15 οὕτως ὠφέλιμα γίνεται τὰ μυστήρια, οὕτως εἰς φαντασίαν ἐρχόμεθα, ὅτι ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ ἐπανορθώσει τοῦ βίου κατεστάθη πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν.

[59] Plutarchus, *De anima*, fragm. ap. Stobaeus, Floril. IV 107, speaking about the experience of dying: τότε δὲ πάσχει πάθος οἷον οἱ τελεταῖς μεγάλαις κατοργιαζόμενοι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τῷ ῥήματι καὶ τὸ ἔργον τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ τελευτᾶν καὶ τελεῖσθαι προσέοικε. πλάναι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ περιδρομαὶ κοπώδεις καὶ διὰ σκότους τινὲς ὕποπτοι πορεῖαι καὶ ἀτέλεστοι, εἶτα πρὸ τοῦ τέλους αὐτοῦ τὰ δεινὰ πάντα, φρίκη καὶ τρόμος καὶ ἱδρὼς καὶ θάμβος. ἐκ δὲ τούτου φῶς τι θαυμάσιον ἀπήντησε καὶ τόποι καθαροὶ καὶ λειμῶνες ἐδέξαντο κτλ., cf. P. Foucart, *Les mystères d'Éleusis*, Paris 1915, p. 390ff.

[60] G. E. Mylonas, *l.c.*, p. 264ff.

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[61] F. Blass - A. Debrunner - R. W. Funk, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and other early Christian Literature*, Cambridge 1961, par. 451 (1).

[62] Cf. J. G. Müller, *l.c.*, p. 311: "Gewöhnlich heisst πρόῤῥησις Vorhersagung; hier aber, *wie schon aus dem Gegensatz erhellt*, Befehl, positives Gebot" (italics are mine). He refers to Josephus, *c. Apion.* I 258, but there it has the meaning of "prophecy" (see following note).

[63] Josephus, *c. Apion.* I 258 about a seer in Egypt: φησὶ (sc. Manetho) δὲ τὸν μὲν μάντιν αὑτὸν ἀνελεῖν τὴν ὀργὴν τῶν θεῶν προορώμενον καὶ τὰ συμβησόμενα περὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον, τῷ δὲ βασιλεῖ (sc. Amenophis, who had consulted the seer) γεγραμμένην τὴν πρόρρησιν καταλιπεῖν. Some other references chosen at random may be found in *Ant. Jud.* IV 105, 403, VI 43, 334 (on Saul μηδὲ προρρήσεως τυγχάνοντα μήτε διὰ προφητῶν μήτε δι᾽ ὀνειράτων), XVII 45. In Greek literature this meaning is very common, see H. G. Liddell - R. Scott - H. Stuart Jones, *l.c.*, p. 1496, s.v. 1); the number of examples could easily be expanded, also from Christian authors.

[64] Clemens Alex., *Stromateis* V, iii 20,1 αἱ τελεταὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἀνέδην οὐ δείκνυνται, ἀλλὰ μετά τινων καθαρμῶν καὶ προρρήσεων.

[65] Lucianus, *Alexander* 38 τελετήν τε γάρ τινα συνίσταται καὶ δᾳδουχίας καὶ ἱεροφαντίας (see below in the text) (during three successive days); on the first day πρόρρησις ἦν ὥσπερ ᾿Αθήνησι (n.b.!) τοιαύτη· "Εἴ τις ἄθεος ἢ Χριστιανὸς ἢ

It took place on the 15th Boedromion, the first day. "Then it was" says Mylonas, "that the people were officially invited to take part in the celebration of the Mysteries and to be initiated into them. Exactly what was stated in the proclamation we cannot know".[67] At any rate, certain conditions for admission were laid down. In the time of the Roman Empire these conditions seem to have had a moral character, as in the form transmitted by Celsus: "Whosoever has pure hands and a wise tongue. And again others say: Whosoever is pure from all defilement, and whose soul knows nothing of evil, and who has lived well and righteously".[68] In the light of these data

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Ἐπικούρειος ἥκει κατάσκοπος τῶν ὀργίων, φευγέτω· οἱ δὲ πιστεύοντες τῷ θεῷ τελείσθωσαν τύχῃ τῇ ἀγαθῇ." εἶτ' εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐξέλασις ἐγίνετο· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἡγεῖτο λέγων "Ἔξω Χριστιανούς", τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἅπαν ἐπεφθέγγετο κτλ. — This description of opening actions to the mysteries gives a good impression of the Eleusinian πρόρρησις, because Alexander imitated, as is expressly said, what happened in Athens. — See also Lucianus, *Demonax* 34 ἐτόλμησε δέ ποτε καὶ Ἀθηναίους (again in Athens!) ἐρωτῆσαι δημοσίᾳ τῆς προρρήσεως ἀκούσας, διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀποκλείουσι τοὺς βαρβάρους, whereas the founder of the mysteries Eumolpus himself was a barbarian and Thracian; *De Sacrificiis* 12 is more general θέμενοι δὲ βωμοὺς καὶ προρρήσεις καὶ περιραντήρια προσάγουσι τὰς θυσίας.

[66] Text in N. Turchi, *Fontes historiae mysteriorum aevi hellenistici*, Roma 1923, p. 58 (a renewed and up to date edition of this useful collection is an urgent desideratum!). — An allusion in Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 47 (ed. Dindorf, II p. 418) οὐδέ τις ἡμᾶς ἀπελαύνει πρόσρησις εἰ καὶ μυστηρίων.

[67] G. E. Mylonas, *l.c.*, p. 247; but if one takes into account, what Lucianus tells us about the institution of Alexander (before p. 264, n. 65), one gets a clearer view (Mylonas did not refer to this parallel).

[68] Origenes, *c. Celsum* III 59 quotes the following words of Celsus: οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τελετὰς καλοῦντες προκηρύττουσι τάδε· ὅστις χεῖρας καθαρὸς καὶ φωνὴν συνετός, καὶ αὖθις ἕτεροι· ὅστις ἁγνὸς ἀπὸ παντὸς μύσους, καὶ ὅτῳ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν σύνοιδε κακόν, καὶ ὅτῳ εὖ καὶ δικαίως βεβίωται. Καὶ ταῦτα προκηρύττουσιν οἱ καθάρσια ἁμαρτημάτων ὑπισχνούμενοι. — Other texts in G. E. Mylonas, *l.c.*, p. 247, n. 16. F. Cumont, *Lux Perpetua*, Paris 1949, p. 240f., says: "A l'origine aucune condition de moralité n'était requise ... c'est tardivement que s'est introduite dans la religion éleusienne, sans jamais y prédominer, l'exigence d'une pureté à la fois rituelle et spirituelle" (p. 241, referring to that text of Celsus). — But in the time of Josephus we may assume that this was the situation. — Cf. also Suetonius, *Nero* 34, 4 after the matricide by Nero: *peregrinatione quidem Graeciae et Eleusiniis sacris, quorum initiatione impii et scelerati voce praeconis summoventur, interesse non ausus est.* Interesting in this connexion is also the story of Apollonius of Tyana, who was refused by the hierophant; in Philostratus, *Vita Apoll. Tyan.* IV 18 ὁ δὲ ἱεροφάντης οὐκ ἐβούλετο

the expression of Josephus becomes clear. He puts the question that may be asked by somebody who has heard the Jewish religion called a mystery: what then is the proclamation of the God in whose name this ceremony is celebrated and what are the obstacles on the way of admission?[69]

His answer is concise: "they are simple and familiar" (ἁπλαῖ τε καὶ γνώριμοι). The former adjective is often used in religious contexts to denote that the word is in plain language, without ambiguity, easy to grasp.[70] In Antiquity religious truth was, as anyone knows, frequently given in veiled forms; in the eyes of many people that was a sign of its divine character. That was certainly true for the mysteries: their outward appearance, their dark expressions — only the initiates understand them.[71] These Jewish *prorrhèseis* are absolutely clear and well-known. The background of this latter adjective is to be seen in sharp contrast with the secret character of the mysteries

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παρέχειν τὰ ἱερά, μὴ γὰρ ἄν ποτε μυῆσαι γόητα, μηδὲ τὴν 'Ελευσῖνα ἀνοῖξαι ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ καθαρῷ τὰ δαιμόνια. Apollonius says that the hierophant has not yet mentioned the chief offence, viz. that Apollonius is wiser than the hierophant and is so humble as to ask for initiation, as if the hierophant surpassed him in wisdom. At the instance of the public the priest changes his mind, but then Apollonius forgoes his request for that time (I cannot discuss at the moment this witness to such a peculiar clash, but thought it too remarkable as to leave it out, because I did not find it referred to elsewhere in connection with the admittance to the Eleusinian mysteries).

[69] In my study "*Het Godspredikaat*", p. 32 I gave the translation "wijdingsspreuk", but perhaps "proclamation" is better, if only the relation with the mysteries is preserved. (H. G. Liddell - R. Scott - H. St. Jones, *l.c.*, p. 1496, s.v. 2. give the translation: proclamation, public notices, but do not call attention to the technical sense in connection with the mysteries, though that was already found in F. Pape, *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache*, *neue Bearbeitung* von V. C. F. Rost, F. Palm c.s. 5, Leipzig 1852 (reprint Darmstadt 1970), Bd. II 1, pp. 1154f. s.v., but there it is incorrectly defined: "Das Verbot der Theilnahme an den Eleusinien"; on the contrary, it announced the beginning. The word ἀπαγορεύσεις must be seen in connection with the preceding one; it is not "prohibitions" in general, but those which forbid entrance to the mysteries, the condition of which was spoken in the text on p. 264 and n. 65.

[70] For the present I wish to refer to my remarks in *The Interpretation of Romans* 12:8, in M. Black - W. A. Smalley (ed.), *On Language*, *Culture and Religion*, in *In Honor of Eugene A. Nida*, The Hague - Paris 1974, pp. 178ff. (in due course I hope to publish a fuller treatment of the subject).

[71] The well-known words of Apuleius, *Metam.* XI 23 after the "description" of the initiation: *Ecce, tibi rettuli quae quamvis audita ignores tamen necesse est.*

which had built impregnable walls between the sacred and the profane: the truth was only revealed to the happy few of the initiated. The first part is the confession of God in the terms of popular (middle Platonic) philosophy.[72] It is said: "Him we must worship by the practice of virtues" (§ 192) and that is explained by referring to certain parts of the Mosaic law. It would take us too far if we were to discuss the special points Josephus has selected and on which he lays stress. Of special interest is the attitude towards strangers: "the best of all measures at once to secure our own customs from corruption, and to throw them open ungrudgingly to any who elect to share them" (§ 209). It is remarkable that in § 211 he incorporates some principles not found in the Jewish law, but known to the Greek world as the Bouzygian commandments.[73] For those who diligently observe that Law of God, even unto death, the prize is waiting, not the glories for which the Greeks strove,[74] but "God has granted a renewed existence and in the revolution of the ages the gift of a better life" (§ 219). In these Greek terms the Pharisee Josephus expressed his belief in the resurrection of the dead and life eternal. Was this also formulated with an eye on the mysteries? Their promises are here fulfilled.[75]

For our theme this is a most important piece of evidence.

Josephus accepts the existence of the mysteries; he did not pour out the vials of his indignation or scorn on them, as was done later, e.g. by Clement of Alexandria and other Christian apologists.[76]

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[72] See my study *Het Godspredikaat*, pp. 28ff.

[73] See the important discussion of this paragraph by H. Bolkestein, *Een geval van sociaal-ethisch syncretisme*, Amsterdam 1931 (in Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, deel 72, serie B, No. 1), pp. 44ff. in connection with the fragment of Philo, *Hypothetica*, preserved by Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* VIII 7, 6-8.

[74] Josephus, *c. Apion.* II 217s. "For those, on the other hand, who live in accordance with our laws, the prize is not silver or gold, no crown of wild olive or of parsley with any such mark of distinction". The prizes mentioned here are, as Thackeray indicated (*l.c.*, p. 380, n. e; 318, n. f.) those of the Olympic games, of the Isthmian and Nemean games; but Josephus refrains here from making a direct allusion to the mysteries and their hopes; is that accidental?

[75] That is often maintained, but it was opposed by F. Cumont, *l.c.*, p. 241.

[76] Clemens Alexandrinus, *Protreptikos* 2 and the discussion by G. E. Mylonas, *l.c.*, p. 288ff.

He accepts the fact that in the eyes of his readers these *teletai* are the highest form of religion. Well, he takes up the challenge and compares them with the religion of the Jewish state. The latter, he sets forth, is far superior in the stamp it gives to human conduct, for the despised Jews have the loftiest conception of God, have in His Law no hidden riddles, but real revelation and form a sublime nation in harmony, remain true to it till death. Of course Josephus knew only the outward facts about the mysteries and was merely interested in them because of the prestige they enjoyed in the circles to which he addressed his apology.

The doctrine of God is the basis of the Jewish commonwealth. That is the cornerstone of Josephus' presentation. Amidst many different forms of government that exist Judaism is exceptional because it "may be termed a 'theocracy'" (§ 165). In that connection he portrays God in a way very much parallel to the first part of the *prorrhèsis*, mentioned before (see p. 264).[77]

It will be wise to draw that passage into our discussion, for the sequence is relevant for our purpose (see Appendix II).

We said — in agreement with scholarly opinion — that Josephus expressed the doctrine of God in terms of religious philosophy, current in his age. He however held a totally different view: the philosophers derived their conceptions "from principles with which Moses supplied them" (§ 168). In the present context there is no need to deal extensively with this well-known idea of what is sometimes called "the Greek theft".[78] But for the moment it is of great importance to see what conclusion Josephus has drawn here. These are his words: "Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, the Stoics who succeeded him, and indeed nearly all the philosophers appear to have held similar views concerning the nature of God. These, however, addressed their philosophy to the few, and did not venture to divulge their true beliefs to the masses who had their own preconceived opinions" (ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὀλίγους φιλοσοφοῦντες εἰς πλήθη δόξαις προκατειλημμένα τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν § 169). The attitude of the Jewish lawgiver was just the opposite, for he implanted his belief concerning God in his contemporaries and future generations; "he did not make religion a department of virtue", but the cardinal virtues of Platonic philosophy[79] departments of religion, so that "religion governs all our actions and occupations and speech" (§ 169ff.).

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[77] I dealt with that passage in my study *Het Godspredikaat*, p. 32ff.

[78] Cf. e.g. Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromateis* I 17, 87, 2; V 1, 10, 1; V 5, 29, 2.

Neither the word "mystery" nor *teletè* is mentioned in this passage and they cannot be expected here as in the other text where the words have their "technical" meaning. Nevertheless the tendency of Josephus is quite clear: the philosophers kept the "truth" about God hidden from the masses of ordinary people who lived in their "opinions",[80] and therefore there is a parallelism here with the mysteries. He uses here the verb ἐξενεγκεῖν, which is also found in § 224: "Plato himself admits that it is hazardous to divulge the truth about God to the ignorant mob" (αὐτὸς δὲ Πλάτων ὡμολόγηκεν ὅτι τὴν ἀληθῆ περὶ θεοῦ δόξαν εἰς τὴν τῶν ὄχλων ἄγνοιαν οὐκ ἦν ἀσφαλὲς ἐξενεγκεῖν). This is a reference to a well-known text of the *Timaeus* 28 c: τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν. This pronouncement was translated in Cicero, *Timaeus* 6 by: *indicare in vulgus nefas* (sic!); in Apuleius, *De Platone* I 5 by: *in multos eam enuntiari non posse*,[81] but he has also the Greek text: εὑρόντα τε εἰς πολλοὺς ἐκφέρειν ἀδύνατον. The same quotation from Plato is also found in Albinus, *Eisagoge* 27 in this form: οὔτε εὑρεῖν ᾤετο εἶναι ῥᾴδιον οὔτε εὑρόντας ἀσφαλὲς εἰς πάντας ἐκφέρειν. If we compare these textforms we see some interesting differences, the most important being the change from the simple λέγειν into ἐκφέρειν.[82] Because the two last witnesses are derived from Middle Platonic schoolbooks, it is almost certain that Josephus here is also depending on such a "compendium Platonicum".[83] This verb is often used in a context of secrets; an interesting example from the secular sphere is Dionysius Hal., *Ant. Rom.* III 23, 6 where a king says: πράγματα μέλλω εἰς ὑμᾶς μεγάλα καὶ ἀπροσδόκητα ἐκφέρειν, ἃ τέως ἔκρυπτον, ἱκετεύω δ' ὑμᾶς ἀπόρρητα ποιήσασθαι. In another place the same author speaks of early historians who published local traditions for a wider public: εἰς τὴν κοινὴν ἁπάντων γνῶσιν ἐξενεγκεῖν.[84] In Josephus we may compare *Bell. Jud.* I 470 μηδὲν ἐκφέρεσθαι τῶν ἀπόρρητων and particularly *Ant. Jud.* xii 112: of somebody who became mad, because he had busied himself too much with divine things and was willung ταῦτ' ἐκφέρειν εἰς κοινοὺς ἀνθρώπους. In that sense it was regularly applied to revelation of the mysteries; a clear instance of it is found in Diogenes Laertius ii 101 where a question is put to a hierophant: τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ἀσεβοῦντες περὶ τὰ μυστήρια; he answers: οἱ τοῖς ἀμυήτοις αὐτὰ ἐκφέροντες.[85] So the associations this word carries with it are quite clear; it amounts to "betraying the secrets of the mysteries".[86] It is typical that later Platonic schooltradition has substituted this word for the simple "to speak" of the original text; it is a significant interpretation and is illustrative of the fact that philosophy was considered more or less as a mystery-cult. The way in which Plato spoke of οἱ πολλοί pointed in the same direction.

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[79] Josephus mentions: δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, καρτερία, συμφωνία τῶν πολιτῶν. Thackeray, *l.c.* p. 361, n. a: "The four cardinal virtues of the Platonic School, except that Harmony (συμφωνία) here replaces the usual Wisdom (φρόνησις)", but this change is easily understood, because Josephus is dealing with the state, not with the individual, and then συμφωνία was usually better.

[80] The contrast between ἀλήθεια and δόξα is very frequent in Greek philosophy, see G. Delling, in G. Kittel (ed.) *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, Stuttgart 1935, Bd. II, p. 237.

[81] Other latin translations in A. S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceroni De Natura Deorum*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1955 (reprint Darmstadt 1968), vol. i, p. 232.

[82] Other differences: ἀδύνατον (Plato, Apuleius) contra ἀσφαλές (Albinus, Josephus) — πάντας (Plato, Albinus, Tertullianus) contra πολλούς (Apuleius) and ὄχλων (Josephus; Minucius Felix: *in publicum*).

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[83] See my study *Het Godspredikaat*, p. 34f.

[84] So Dionysius Hal., *De Thucydide* 5 and cf. ch. 6 and 7; but particularly interesting is his comparison in *De Compos. Verb. 25* μυστηρίοις μὲν οὖν ἔοικεν ἤδη ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ εἰς πολλοὺς οἷά τέ ἐστιν ἐκφέρεσθαι. ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴην φορτικός, εἰ παρακαλοίην, οἷς θέμις ἐστίν, ἥκειν ἐπὶ τὰς τελετὰς τοῦ λόγου, θύρας δ' ἐπιθέσθαι λέγοιμι ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τοὺς βεβήλους, where the vocabulary of the mysteries is so clearly reflected. See the note of W. Rhys Davids, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The three Literary Letters*, Cambridge 1901: "Dionysius proclaims himself, in a curious and characteristic way, the hierophant of mysteries no less sacred and hidden than those of Eleusis". The question whether these terms were Eleusinian or Orphic (cf. O. Kern, *Orphicorum fragmenta*^{2}, Berlin 1963, p. 257ss. and Plato, *Symp.* 218b), does not concern us here.

[85] For other texts see O. Casel, *De Philosophorum Graecorum silentio mystico*, Giessen 1919, p. 5, 9, 56, 64, 114, 147, 157 and C. A. Lobeck, *l.c.*, I p. 55, n. p.; a.o. Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. V 7, 41, 1 Ὅθεν καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι οὐ τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσι τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀνετίθεντο μυστήρια οὐδὲ μὴν βεβήλοις τὴν τῶν θείων εἴδησιν ἐξέφερον. See also the very important note of A. S. Pease, *l.c.*, I pp. 351f.

[86] For synonyms see the list with references in Casel, *l.c.*, p. 5.

There is no need to speak extensively about the Pythagoreans who were well-known for their distinction between esoteric and exoteric teaching.[87] For the Stoics we may quote these lines of Cleanthes which are very appropriate: μὴ πρὸς δόξαν ὅρα, ἐθέλων σοφὸς αἶψα γενέσθαι/μηδὲ φοβοῦ πολλῶν ἄκριτον καὶ ἀναιδέα δόξαν/οὐ γὰρ πλῆθος ἔχει συνετὴν κρίσιν οὔτε δικαίαν/οὔτε καλήν, ὀλίγοις δὲ παρ᾽ ἀνδράσι τοῦτό κεν εὕροις.[88] As far as their conception of God is concerned it is sufficient to remind ourselves of the difficulty of grasping their exact notion of the god or gods.

Josephus expresses here the view that in Greek philosophy the truth about God was known, but that the teachers did not "dare" to reveal it. In a previous study I put the question what the reason for this reticence could have been: was it fear of death, as is suggested later by Christian authors, or their awe for the divine mystery that would be vulgarized and ridiculed by the masses?[89] Josephus does not give a clear answer, but since he does not refer to *asebeia*-trials in this connection and the underlying idea of this passage is: revelation of God is the basis of a good state, I think we have to choose for the second side of the alternative. But it may be that he had not completely forgotten the former, for the penalties for those who had betrayed the secrets of the mysteries were well-known. But this lack of courage would have been one more indication for our author that they followed the wrong course. — However that may be, Josephus criticizes here a line of thought that was very widespread in the Hellenistic world and also defended by e.g. Varro: Philosophy in any form possesses the truth about god as a well-guarded secret mystery, that can be revealed only to a small circle. It is interesting to see the difference here between Josephus and later the Christian Clement of Alexandria, for whom these philosophical mysteries are the porch to the higher mysteries of the Christian faith. No, Josephus rejects this kind of division between the happy few and the masses. Again: it is a distinctive mark of superiority that the Jewish nation is not kept together by such a difference between esoteria and exoteria, but is built on revelation of that true God whom the philosophers secretly confessed. Therefore it is the fulfilment of their ideas.[90]

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[87] Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. V 9, 59, 1 ἡ Πυθαγόρου συνουσία καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλητὰς διττὴ κοινωνία. ἀκουσματικοὺς τοὺς πολλούς καί τινας μαθηματικοὺς ἑτέρους καλοῦσα, τοὺς γνησίως ἀνθαπτομένους τῆς φιλοσοφίας, and Porphyrius, *Vita Pyth*. 37. In his survey of Greek philosophy Aristocles, *Peri Philosophias*, ap. Eusebius, *Praep. Evang*. XI 3, 1 even goes so far as to say, that the followers of Pythagoras ἐπεκρύψαντο πάντα.

[88] Cleanthes, fr. 559, in I. ab Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*², Stuttgart 1964, vol. I, p. 128 s. — cf. also Zeno, fr. 43 ap. I ab Arnim, *l.c.*, I p. 15: ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι Ζήνωνι τῷ πρώτῳ γεγράφθαι τινά, ἃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἐπιτρέπουσι τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἀναγιγνώσκειν μὴ οὐχὶ πεῖραν δεδωκόσι πρότερον, εἰ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῖεν. See also on the Stoics Casel, *l.c.*, p. 44, 47 s. — For this whole paragraph of Josephus this book of Casel is extremely important, see on the Pythagoraeans, p. 30 ss., 52 ss.; on Plato, p. 35 ss.

[89] See my study *Het Godspredikaat*, p. 16 and p. 32, n. 96. — For the latter part of the alternative, see also the whole context in which Josephus brings the quotation from the Timaeus in *c. Apion*. II 223 s.

There are some more texts which are relevant for our theme. The first is found in a description of the temple in Jerusalem, "the one temple for the one God" (§ 193).[91] In order to refute the slander, that the Jews were fattening a Greek prisoner there every year to be sacrificed and eaten (§ 95), and to show that such a thing is absolutely impossible, Josephus describes the real situation of the Temple when it was still functioning.[92] It is all fixed in the Law (§ 106), and, according to the unspoken suggestion, therefore open to all. Within that context he declares: "no unmentionable mysteries take place, no banquet is served within the building. The foregoing statements are attested by the whole community, and conclusively proved by the order of procedure" (§ 107 of which only the Latin translation exists: *neque mysteriorum aliquorum ineffabilium*[93] *agitur, neque intus ulla epulatio ministratur. Haec enim quae praedicta sunt*

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[90] See A. S. Pease, *l.c.*, pp. 351 f.

[91] Interesting is the explanation with the famous Greek rule "for like ever loves like", *cf.* Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* IX 3, 3 and Sirach XIII.15.

[92] Josephus does not say a word about the downfall of the Temple nor that it all was past time. He has taken the situation such as it was at the time the slander was uttered.

[93] The word *ineffabilium* has, I think, a double meaning here: a) the mysteries which may not be spoken of, and b) the crime which allegedly took place was beyond words.

habent totius populi testimonium manifestationemque gestorum). This is a most important pronouncement, because Josephus does not simply say: we Jews celebrate no mysteries, but points to their temple-service itself. There in the heart of Judaism, where the existence of the one God is reflected, there are no hidden mysteries; everything can be seen and controlled. It could not have been said more clearly: the Jewish religion does not know mystery-cults.

The second text we have mentioned already in passing, but it is necessary to return to it and call attention to its vocabulary. On p. 252 we saw how Josephus highlights the care the Lawgiver has bestowed on strangers. He expresses this thought in these words: μήτε φθονήσωμεν τοῖς μετέχειν τῶν ἡμετέρων προαιρουμένοις (§ 209, in Thackeray's translation: "to throw them — i.e. our customs — open ungrudgingly to any who elect to share them"). Josephus has in mind the attitude towards prospective proselytes who are not turned away, for "to all who desire to come and live under the same laws with us, he gives a gracious welcome, holding that it is not family ties alone which constitute relationship, but agreement in principles of conduct" (§ 210).[94] The wording here: μήτε φθονήσωμεν, is characteristic and full of meaning for readers in Antiquity. Some years ago I published a study under the title ΑΦΘΟΝΩΣ ΜΕΤΑΔΙΔΩΜΙ, in which it was shown that μὴ φθονεῖν or ἀφθόνως are typical words in the Hellenistic world with its many mystery-cults and teachers of secret lore.[95] These mysteries and teachers possessed a hidden knowledge of the divine world that could be either harmful or advantageous to those who lacked that knowledge. Its contents were ἀπόρρητα = ineffable, could not, might not be spoken of in public. There was this reticence and there were the doors, of which Varro spoke (p. 261 f.),[96] which formed the demarcation-line between the few enlightened and the *profanum vulgus*. Only on certain conditions, e.g. initiation or payment, was it possible to acquire that secret knowledge. To this particular context belongs the *aphthonia*; it denotes that he who possesses that knowledge places it at anybody's disposal without any reserve.

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[94] Josephus, *c. Apion.* II 209-210 προνοησάμενος ὅπως μήτε τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθείρωμεν μήτε φθονήσωμεν τοῖς μετέχειν τῶν ἡμετέρων προαιρουμένοις. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἐθέλουσιν ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν νόμους ζῆν ὑπελθόντες δέχεται φιλοφρόνως, οὐ τῷ γένει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τοῦ βίου νομίζων εἶναι τὴν οἰκειότητα.

[95] W. C. van Unnik, ΑΦΘΟΝΩΣ ΜΕΤΑΔΙΔΩΜΙ, Brussels 1971 (in *Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België*, Klasse der Letteren, jaargang XXXIII, nr. 4), where the texts on which this statement is based, are discussed. — By an oversight this text of Josephus was left out there; this mistake is corrected here.

[96] For many parallels see O. Casel, *l.c.*, passim.

So Josephus indicates here again a fundamental difference between the religion of the Lawgiver Moses and the wide-spread mysteries. Moses did not institute a secret society with special customs, but took care that it would be open without restriction to *all* who decided to accept that revelation and its way of life.

In that perspective Josephus also saw and spoke of the translation of the Hebrew sacred books into Greek. We are so acquainted with the existence of the Septuagint, that we hardly realize what an astonishing fact this translation actually was, not only in its later effects, but also in its origin: the Jewish people made its Holy Law and its constitution, written in mysterious characters, accessible to all the civilized world at the bidding of king Ptolemy II. Josephus relates this fact in the following words: "Eleazar, who yielded in virtue to none of our high priests, did not scruple to grant the monarch the enjoyment of a benefit, which he would certainly have refused had it not been our traditional custom to make nothing of what is good into a secret".[97] The terminology used here is highly significant in the context of Hellenistic religious vocabulary.

That Law given by the sage Moses is the storehouse of true wisdom: "first to study the nature of God, and then having contemplated his works[98] with the eye of reason to imitate so far as possible that best of all models... (it could only be of avail with the readers, if) before all else they were taught that God, as the universal Father and Lord who beholds all things, grants to such as follow Him a life of bliss, but involves in dire calamities those who step outside the path of virtue" (from the same Prooemium I 19-20).[99] Here again the unshakeable connection between the conception of God and virtue is apparent. But then again we understand why Josephus reacts so strongly in the passage we discussed before.

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[97] Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* I 11 Ἐλεάζαρος τῷ προειρημένῳ βασιλεῖ ταύτης ἀπολαῦσαι τῆς ὠφελείας οὐκ ἐφθόνησε, πάντως ἀντειπὼν ἄν, εἰ μὴ πάτριον ἦν ἡμῖν τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν τῶν καλῶν ἀπόρρητον, discussed in my study *Aphthonos*, p. 32.

[98] See my study *Het Godspredikaat*, p. 33.

[99] Cf. Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* I 19-20 θεοῦ πρῶτον φύσιν κατανοῆσαι καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἐκείνου θεατὴν τῷ νῷ γενόμενον οὕτως παράδειγμα τὸ πάντων ἄριστον μιμεῖσθαι

A further implicit reaction to the mysteries will be found in Josephus' rendering of the regulation in Deuteronomy xxxi 10ff. Every seventh year at the Feast of Tabernacles, when the multitude (πλῆθος n.b.) is assembled, the high priest "standing upon a raised platform"[100] shall "recite the laws to all; and let neither woman nor child be excluded from this audience, nay nor yet the slaves.[101] For it is good that these laws should be graven on their hearts".[102] Thereby they will be saved from ignorance (ἄγνοια) which would lead to sin and penalty. In this way again Josephus shows why the law of God must

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καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι κατακολουθεῖν ... ὅτι πάντων πατήρ τε καὶ δεσπότης ὁ θεὸς ὢν καὶ πάντα ἐπιβλέπων τοῖς μὲν ἑπομένοις αὐτῷ δίδωσιν εὐδαίμονα βίον, τοὺς ἔξω δὲ βαίνοντας ἀρετῆς μεγάλαις περιβάλλει συμφοραῖς. The conception of the "imitation of God" that is so emphasized here was, as is well-known, very widespread in the world of Josephus, a.o. in Stoic circles, but not only there. This vast subject needs separate treatment.

[100] This information is not contained in the text of Deuteronomy, but see 1 Ezra 9:42 LXX ἔστη 'Εσδρας... ἐπὶ τοῦ ξυλίνου βήματος. Josephus has not taken that over in his report of that event (*Ant. Jud.* XI 154ss.), but renders it by ὁ δὲ μέσος τοῦ πλήθους σταθείς.

[101] Cf. the echo in Josephus *c. Apion.* II 181 "With us all act alike, all profess the same doctrine about God, one which is in harmony with our Law... Even our women folk and dependants would tell you that piety must be the motion of all our occupations in life".

[102] Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* IV 209-211 συνελθόντος δὲ τοῦ πλήθους... ἀναγινωσκέτω (sc. the high-priest) τοὺς νόμους ἅπασι, καὶ μήτε γυνὴ μήτε παίδες εἰργέσθωσαν τοῦ ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ οἱ δοῦλοι. καλὸν γὰρ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγραφέντας καὶ τῇ μνήμῃ φυλαχθῆναι μηδέποτε ἐξαλειφθῆναι δυναμένους. οὕτως γὰρ οὐδὲ ἁμαρτήσονται μὴ δυνάμενοι λέγειν ἄγνοιαν τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις διωρισμένων ... ὡς προλεγόντων (sc. the laws) αὐτοῖς ἃ πείσονται καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγραψάντων διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἃ κελευοῦσιν. N.B. this double ἐγγράφω. — Cf. also the parallel in *c. Apion.* II 176-178 with the interesting distinction between the Jews and others: "Indeed, most men, as far from living in accordance with their own laws, hardly know what they are. Only when they have done wrong do they learn from others that they have transgressed the laws. Even those of them who hold the highest and most important offices admit their ignorance (ὁμολογοῦσι τὴν ἄγνοιαν); for they employ professional legal experts... But should anyone of our nation be questioned about the laws, he would repeat them all more readily than his own name. The result then, of our thorough grounding in the laws from the first dawn of intelligence is that we have them, as it were, engraven on our souls" (ἔχομεν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὥσπερ ἐγκεχαραγμένους). — See also *Ant. Jud.* III 89s. the story of the revelation at Mount Sinai to the people in its totality.

be known by *all* human beings whithout exception and cannot remain a secret.

Now at this point we can give a satisfactory answer to a question which has been left open so far. On p. 266 we heard Josephus saying that the *prorrheseis* and *apagoreuseis* of the Jewish "mystery" were ἁπλαῖ τε καὶ γνώριμοι.[103] For the first word "simple" we gave an explanation, but the meaning of the latter, "familiar", was left open. The word γνώριμος is stronger than γνωστός; Plato, *Leg.* 798a has it in a remarkable series of synonyms: φίλα τε καὶ συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα. When used of persons it means either "kinsmen" or "distinguished, notable people".[104] What is γνώριμον is not only intellectually known, but there is a personal tie, one might almost say: it is known by the heart. After having heard that passage about reading the Law to all the people without distinction, so that it is engraved in their souls, we fully understand what Josephus' meaning is: the commandments of the Law in the Jewish *teletè* were not something completely strange and unintelligible; no, that Law was clear and really familiar, had become part of themselves. So this simple statement reveals the deep cleavage which Josephus saw between the "mysteries" and his own religion:[105] these words of the Law are not inscrutable, not accessible only to the happy few, but open to all and familiar to all. Josephus made use of the vocabulary current for the mysteries, but the meaning he gave to the words pointed in the opposite direction within the context of the Jewish Law.

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[103] See the combination of the two words as adverbs in Demosthenes, *Or.* XXIV 68 the first characteristic of a good law, that is of benefit to the people (τῷ πλήθει) is its being ἁπλῶς καὶ πᾶσι γνωρίμως γεγράφθαι, so that one cannot have diverging opinions about it.

[104] Cf. H. G. Liddell-R. Scott-H. St. Jones, *l.c.*, p. 355; for the use by Josephus: K. H. Rengstorf (ed.), *A complete Concordance to Flavius Josephus*, Leiden 1973, vol. I, pp. 389f. s.v. — Very significant is *c. Apion.* II 167 about God δυνάμει μὲν ἡμῖν γνώριμον, ὁποῖος δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶν ἄγνωστον.

[105] For the attitude of Philo, which is different from that of Josephus see the important notes of A. Méasson, *De Sacrificiis*, Paris 1966, pp. 202-204, and E. E. Starobinski-Safran, *De Fuga*, Paris 1970, pp. 276f. (in R. Arnaldez-J. Pouilloux-C. Mondésert. *Les Œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, resp. vol. 4 and 17). — For E. R. Goodenough, see his *By Light, Light*, New Haven 1935 and above all his enormous, great work *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, New York 1953ff., 12 volumes, with all the discussion his theses evoked.

In this study of "Josephus and the Mysteries" we have passed in review those texts, where the Jewish apologist made clear references to that special form of religious life that was so *en vogue* in the Hellenistic-Roman world. It might be possible to detect some more minor traces in his exposition of the commandments found in the Law. But that would require a very detailed comparison in the field of contemporary ethics for which the time is now lacking.

It should be remarked that Josephus broaches the essential discussion of that subject at very special places, viz. where he speaks of the heart of religion, the nature of God. This fact gives us an indication that this comparison of Jewish faith with the mysteries is not made by chance. He does not compare Israel's god with Zeus or any other figure of the Greek or Roman Pantheon, but he speaks of the mysteries and the loftiest forms of philosophy. This shows what was living and really essential for his audience. And he did so within the wide compass of political life.

Was the highest form of religion and philosophy that which was attainable by a small select company while the common folks are left outside, in darkness? Was ethics a matter of a small band of wise men while the rest of mankind could live on in their folly, going along in their error? Was it to the benefit of the individual and the state that truth and falsehood about God were hidden behind closed doors and passed in silent awe?

Here Josephus as a spokesman of Judaism gave an unequivocal answer: No! He had encountered in different forms that longing for mystery, secret truth; he accepted the fact that there were such mystery cults and esoteric philosophical groups where the mass of the people were excluded and despised. But he saw it as his task to show that the religion of that small conquered nation, trodden down in the course of events and scorned, was far superior to anything philosophy and mystery had to offer. Here we become aware of the great rift between Judaism and the surrounding religious world. That revelation in Moses' law had no hidden truth and was open to all; it was real revelation of God and gave a code of conduct in accordance with His will.

It would be interesting at this point to compare Josephus with Philo or to discuss the ideas about Jewish mysteries, as expounded by Erwin Goodenough (n. 105). That must be left for further research. For the moment it will be sufficient to break off at this point, after having listened to the voice of Josephus. It may have made us aware that it is impossible to speak of "Hellenistic Judaism" as a uniform entity, although it was based on one foundation. In different contexts and with different men it took a different shape.

In studying the complicated and richly variegated world of Hellenistic religion where "secret knowledge" was so highly priced we see that Judaism was preached by its representative Josephus who knew his world and its language, as a religion that went its own way, that was a living contrast with any sort of hidden mysteries. This is, I think, an important insight also with regard to the early spread and so-called Hellenization of Christianity.

Let me close with a final remark of a more general character. I hope that this paper has shown how rewarding a careful interpretation of texts, known and read for ages, can be. Progress in our field of study is not only made by "new" material, but also by a very attentive reading of "old" texts. We have discovered that Josephus had far more to tell us for our theme than that direct witness about the Isis-cult. By learning the "language" of the ancient authors and the weight their words carried for them and their public we gain deeper insight and a clearer view of their situation and the basic issues of their lives. If this paper has demonstrated this method in a specific case and will stimulate further research along these lines, my intention has been realized.

APPENDIX

Josephus, *contra Apionem* II 188-192

188 Τίς ἂν οὖν ἀρχὴ γένοιτο ταύτης ὁσιωτέρα; τίς δὲ τιμὴ θεῷ
μᾶλλον ἁρμόζουσα, παντὸς μὲν τοῦ πλήθους κατεσκευασμένου
πρὸς τὴν εὐσέβειαν, ἐξαίρετον δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἱερέων
πεπιστευμένων, ὥσπερ δὲ τελετῆς τινος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας
189 οἰκονομουμένης; ἃ γὰρ ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄλλοι
φυλάττειν οὐ δύνανται, μυστήρια καὶ τελετὰς ἐπονομάζοντες,
ταῦτα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ γνώμης ἀμεταθέτου φυλάττομεν ἡμεῖς διὰ
τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος.

190 Τίνες οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προρρήσεις καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεις; ἁπλαῖ τε καὶ
γνώριμοι. Πρώτη δ' ἡγεῖται ἡ περὶ θεοῦ λέγουσα, ὅτι θεὸς ἔχει
τὰ σύμπαντα παντελὴς καὶ μακάριος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ καὶ πᾶσιν αὐτάρκης,
ἀρχὴ καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος οὗτος τῶν πάντων, ἔργοις μὲν
καὶ χάρισιν ἐναργὴς καὶ παντὸς οὑτινοσοῦν φανερώτερος, μορφὴν
191 δὲ καὶ μέγεθος ἡμῖν ἄφατος. πᾶσα μὲν γὰρ ὕλη πρὸς εἰκόνα
τὴν τούτου, κἂν ᾖ πολυτελής, ἄτιμος, πᾶσα δὲ τέχνη πρὸς
μιμήσεως ἐπίνοιαν ἄτεχνος· οὐδὲν ὅμοιον οὔτ' εἴδομεν οὔτ' ἐπινοοῦμεν
οὔτ' εἰκάζειν ἐστιν ὅσιον.
192 Ἔργα βλέπομεν αὐτοῦ, φῶς, οὐρανόν, γῆν, ἥλιον, ὕδατα, ζῴων
γενέσεις, καρπῶν ἀναδόσεις. Ταῦτα θεὸς ἐποίησεν οὐ χερσίν, οὐ
πόνοις οὐδέ τινων συνεργασομένων ἐπιδεηθείς, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ
θελήσαντος, καλῶς ἦν εὐθὺς γεγονότα. Τοῦτον θεραπευτέον
ἀσκοῦντας ἀρετήν· τρόπος γὰρ θεοῦ θεραπείας οὗτος ὁσιώτατος.

Josephus, *contra Apionem* II 168-170

168 Ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι παρ' Ἕλλησιν ὅτι μὲν
ἐδιδάχθησαν ἐκείνου τὰς ἀρχὰς παρασχόντος, ἐῶ νῦν λέγειν,
ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ πρέποντα τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσει καὶ μεγαλειότητι,
σφόδρα μεμαρτυρήκασι· καὶ γὰρ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας
καὶ Πλάτων οἵ τε μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι
καὶ μικροῦ δεῖν ἅπαντες οὕτως φαίνονται περὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ
169 φύσεως πεφρονηκότες. Ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὀλίγους φιλοσοφοῦντες
εἰς πλήθη δόξαις προκατειλημμένα τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος
ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν, ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης, ἅτε δὴ τὰ
ἔργα παρέχων σύμφωνα τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ μόνον τοὺς καθ' αὐτὸν
ἔπεισεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀεὶ γενησομένοις τὴν περὶ
170 θεοῦ πίστιν ἐνέφυσεν ἀμετακίνητον. Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ
τῆς νομοθεσίας πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον πάντων [ἀεὶ] πολὺ διήνεγκεν·
οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἐποίησεν τὴν εὐσέβειαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτης
μέρη τἆλλα, λέγω δὲ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, τὴν σωφροσύνην, τὴν
καρτερίαν, τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐν ἅπασι συμφωνίαν.

SOME REMARKS ON THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF MONICA, MOTHER OF SAINT AUGUSTINE

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In the Acta Sanctorum of the Fathers Bollandists occurs a remarkable passage, which refers to Monica's religious life.

The text of this passage is as follows:

> In die Cypriani, dum haec Christi ancilla mereretur accipere sacramenta, dum esset in domo, fere a terra per cubitum elevata fuit, clamando, qua quietissima esse consueverat, dicens: "Volemus ad coelum, volemus ad coelum, fideles". Quam cum post interrogaremus quid sibi acciderat, non respondebat; sed tanto gaudio replebatur quod omnes ad festum perducebat, cantantes cum propheta: "Cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum". (Boll. die 4 maii).

According to M. L. Abbé Bougaud,[1] referring to this passage the Bollandist author refers to a religious experience, which Monica had on the day of Saint Cyprianus, the 16th of September, in the year 387 after she had left Milan and possibly before she had arrived at Ostia, where she and Augustine had the wellknown vision of Ostia.[2] Except for Monica's Christian piety the above quoted passage of the Bollandists seems us to be interesting for some other reasons.

First of all it is explicitly said, that Monica was levitating at her devotion, which is a good reason for further comment on the passage. In the second place the words "volemus ad coelum" demand a more detailed explanation than has been given hitherto.

To start with levitation this phenomenon occurs in many religions besides the Christian.

In his book "*The Greeks and the Irrational*" Dodds[3] calls levitation a traditional mark of magicians and holy men.

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[1] *Histoire de Sainte Monique*, 2, ed. Paris 1866, p. 421.

[2] Cf. *Confessions* IX, X, 23-25. See also P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions*, 2, Paris, 1968.

[3] E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, University of California Press, 1968,

He notes that it was "attributed to Simon Magus (ps. Clem., *Hom.* 2, 3, 2); to Indian mystics (Philost., *Vit. Apoll.* 3, 15) to several Christian saints and Jewish rabbis; and to the medium Home.[4] Also a magician in a romance lists it in his repertoire (P.G.M. 34, 8), and Lucian satirizes such claims (*Philops.*, 13; *Asin.* 4)" while "Iamblichus' slaves bragged of their master's being levitating at his devotions (Eunapius, *Vita soph.* 458)".

Also Teresa of Avila is said to have been levitating[5] and the same holds for Veronica Laparelli, a sixteenth century nun.[6]

In the German *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*,[7] a levitation is defined as follows:

> "Levitation ist ein freies Schweben und sich Hochheben des menschlichen Körpers über dem Erdboden. Es ist eine Begleiterscheinung der Mystik und der Ekstase. Sowohl im Heidentum wie im Christentum begegnet dieses Phänomen".

From this quotation it is clear that occasionally, when the soul is in a state of ecstasy, the human body is lifted from the earth in a manner contrary to all normal physical laws. As we have seen, the phenomenon is not limited to Christian mysticism, but appears already widespread among adherents of other religions long before Christianity came into existence.[8]

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p. 310, n. 124. See also F. Heiler, *Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion*, Stuttgart 1961, p. 292 and 556. On p. 556 Heiler says: "eine (andere) Folge der mystischen Ekstase ist die Levitation, das Gefühl der "Überwindung der Körperschwere und des Schwebens über dem Boden". According to Heiler (p. 555) the mystical ecstasy is "ein ausserordentliches religiöses Erlebnis, dass sich nicht auf die eigene Seele beschränkt, sondern auch die Mitmenschen und sogar die Natur in seinen Bann zieht.

[4] Home, who was aware of his own levitations, was seen to levitate by many witnesses, as for instance by Lord Lindsay, Lord Adare, and Captain Charles Wynne, according to Lord Lindsay's statements before the Dialectical Society of London. See *Quarterly Journal of Science*, January, 1874.

[5] See *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* 2. Freiburg 1961 under "Levitation".

[6] See *Journ. Soc. Psych. Research*, 1951.

[7] See note 5.

[8] Long before the Christian religion came into existence levitation was a traditional mark of Indian and Chinese monks. See O. Leroy, *La Lévitation, contribution historique et critique à l'étude du merveilleux*, Seine-et-Oise, 1928, p. 19 who points to the fact that levitation is as old as Buddhism itself. See also R. Hardy, *A Manual of Buddhism in its Modern Development*, 1853; and R. Burnouf, *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, 1844. In my view it is not improbable that levitation was also

However, the soul's state of ecstasy seems to be a necessary condition for levitation to occur. So Tenhaeff's explanation[9] that whenever levitation occurs, it is caused by psychokinetic forces which temporarily overrule the law of gravitation, does not seem unacceptable.

Taking Tenhaeff's explanation for granted we have to notice the fact, that not in all cases of ecstasy this mental state is accompanied by levitation of the body. For instance we might refer to the ecstasies of Plotinus[10] and Porphyry and even to that of Augustine.[11]

It is beyond any doubt that their mind reached the state of ecstasy, whereas it is out of the question that their body was lifted up from the earth at those occasions. The unification with God of their minds as a result of rather hard and difficult intellectual efforts, was an ecstasy without any corporeal phenomenon such as levitation of their bodies. On the other hand we must say, that levitation does not seem to be dependent on the fact, whether the mind's ecstasy is spontaneous or the result of some mental effort. For we know, that Indian or rather Thibetan monks[12] and even laymen trained themselves in breathing and gymnastic exercises in order to reach that mental state of ecstasy, which is accompanied by levitation of their bodies. As a matter of fact levitation is one of the aims of their efforts. There is also evidence, that levitation occurs spontaneously, when a person reaches the mental state of ecstasy in a sudden and obviously unexpected way. So Teresa of Avila is told to have been seen in a sudden state of ecstasy, accompanied by the levitation of her body by her mother superior, when the latter adressed her and she started to listen to the message, putting off her glasses and looking at her superior.[13] Levitation as a more accidental phenomenon of devotion seems to be the case, when Iamblichus was seen levitated,

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one of the noteworthy manifestations attributable to Pythagoras, regardless of whether the episode in Iamblichus' *Vita Pyth*, ch. 28 par. 136 is to be explained as levitation (Leroy, *op. cit.*, p. 17 n. 2) or bilocation (Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 141).

[9] W. H. C. Tenhaeff in *Parapsychologie*, 2, 1964. *A case of levitation in Nepal* by E. A. Smithies, C.I.E.

[10] Cf. Porphyry, *Vita Plotini*; Plotinus, *Enn.* I, 6, 9, 1. 125ff. ed. Bréhier.

[11] Cf. *Conf.* IX, 4, ch. 10; *Enn. in Ps.* 134 (P.L. t. 37, col. 1742).

[12] See Alexandra David Neel, *Mystiques et magiciens du Thibet*, Paris 1929.

[13] See *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 2, Freiburg 1961, under Teresa von Avila.

when trying to reach the ecstasy of mind. For in *De Mysteriis* III, ch. 5-6 Iamblichus himself mentions levitation as one of the purely accidental phenomena of theurgy, whose aim is the ecstasy of the human mind by the presence of the divine.[14]

This mental state, which according to Iamblichus is characterized by the fact, that by the choice of his own free will a man takes the lead of the god, who is present, and cooperates with this god after this god has entered him,[15] or that also by the choice of his own free will a man becomes totally possessed[16] by the god, of whose presence he tried to assure himself by means of the art of theurgy, appears to be accompanied by corporeal phenomena. Iamblichus stresses the point that the mental state of ecstasy means the contact of the human soul with the higher and spiritual life of the gods. This contact[17] may be a participation, a communion or a unification, at any rate its aim is spiritual. We may conclude that all bodily manifestations of an ecstasy are in Iamblichus' opinion of secondary importance to the person concerned and that they are not part of his or her aim — certainly never aimed at. Such an opinion accords well with the general Neoplatonic view of bodily and material things. They were not bad, but of much less value than spiritual things. Moreover the fact that the occasional bodily manifestations of an ecstasy are not aimed at on their own account is good evidence that the author is telling the truth about their occurence. Thus it would not make sense to suppose that Iamblichus invented those strange bodily happenings he described as accompagning an ecstasy, since he would then have been contradicting his own Neoplatonic doctrine. So among the possible bodily manifestations of an ecstasy, we must accept levitation, as experienced by Iamblichus himself according to Eunapius.[18] If the bodily manifestations, whatever they are, astonish an unwitting observer, it is all the more credible, that they actually occurred.

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[14] It is a remarkable fact, that according to Iamblichus in the same passage this ecstasy, which is achieved by theurgy, can also be accompanied by the counterpart of levitation, for as a matter of fact all the corporeal phenomena, which accompany the mental state of ecstasy, can be represented by their counterparts as well.

[15] Cf. *De Myst.* III, 5, l. 9-12 (éd. Bréhier).

[16] In the case of total possession Iamblichus speaks of *enthousiasmos*. This kind of "ecstasy" can also be caused by the gods against a man's own will.

[17] Cf. *De Myst.* III, 5, l. 13-16 (éd. Bréhier).

[18] See p. 280, esp. n. 3. N.B. The fact that his own slaves mocked him for it,

For any part I see no reason to disbelieve Iamblichus' or Eunapius' reports of levitation, whatever the real cause of the phenomenon. But even though the historical fact of levitation of their reports on the evidence is accepted, it does not mean that all other reports of levitation are equally truthworthy. It does, however, warn us against an excess of scientific doubt about it. Thus I do not see any reason to doubt the levitations of Apollonius, mentioned by Philostratus.[19] In this case of course it must be born in mind that the author was writing a new gospel for the wife of Septimus Severus, and would be anxious to do all he could emphasizing how great a shaman Apollonius was. But it is not likely he made up the story of his levitation in order to increase his resemblance to Jesus Christ.[20] If this had been so, he would certainly not have told us that Apollonius himself saw many Indian monks levitating. For this would have been to diminish the shamanistic greatness and fame of Apollonius. In my view it is more probable that Philostratus told the truth about Apollonius' levitation than that he made it up. If he had invented the story he would certainly have left out the addition that Apollonius himself saw the phenomenon among Indian monks. As told by Philostratus the stories of levitation by Apollonius and by the Indian monks seem more likely to be true than untrue. It becomes all the more acceptable against the background of other cases of levitation, some of which I have already mentioned above, and which cannot reasonably be doubted.[21]

The case of levitation by Teresa of Avila[22] also seems truthworthy. The author refers explicitly to the astonishment and utter stupefaction of the Mother Superior who observed it, and was taken completely unaware. This seems to rule out both self-deception and deception. In *De Mysteriis* III Iamblichus talks about levitation, dealing with

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makes it easy to believe that Iamblichus, too, was sometimes seen levitating above the earth.

[19] See p. 280.

[20] Cf. e.g. Mk. VI, 49.

[21] See p. 283, n. 15 and 16.

[22] See p. 281.

a lot of other strange phenomena of persons in a special state of mind, which he calls "enthousiasmos". A special characteristic of "enthousiasmos", or possession is that the possessed can get in touch with fire without burning or feeling pain. Another characteristic of possesion according to Iamblichus, is anesthesy for speerwounds; another walking on water. Iamblichus also tells us that all the above mentioned phenomena, which appear to accompany the so called ecstasies of the human mind, are sometimes replaced by their opposites.[23] He emphasizes also that *enthousiasmos*, or possesion, must be absolutely distinguished[24] from the state of mind caused by mental illness, although the latter may have its own bodily manifestations and these may show a certain resemblance to those occurring in cases of possession. Iamblichus says explicitly, that the causes of the "divine madness" must be sought elsewhere than in the body or mind of the human being concerned. Reasoning as a good Neoplatonist, he cannot allow that the "lower" could have any positive influence on the higher. The causes of possession, according to Iamblichus,[25] are the illumination coming from the gods, the inspiration given by them to the possessed, the presence of their total power, which completely takes us over, ousting our own consciousness and movement, pronouncing words unthought by the speaker, words of the possessed, words wholly at the disposal of the possessing god, and allowing us no activity of our own.

Whatever the real causes of ecstasy and possession may be, the fact that Iamblichus explicitly distinguishes them from apparently similar states of mind resulting from mental illness and often originating in bodily disturbances of the nervous-system is an indication that what Iamblichus called possession was really different from such states. He could hardly have mentioned them if there were no differences at all.

Here we must ask how Iamblichus, being aware of the similarity between the symptons of divine possession and those of certain physical disturbances, could also distinguish their underlying causes. How else indeed, except if there really was an observable differrence between those who could become, as Iamblichus called it, "possessed by the gods" and those who were suffering from mental illness due to some bodily defect. On the other hand, as I already remarked, those states of mind, which must be considered extraordinary but obviously have nothing to do with mental illness and which are attributed by Iamblichus to the power of the gods, are an indication that human life has a larger scope than the bounds of our every-day physical world allow us to suspect. I consider that Iamblichus' statements about ecstasy and possession seem trustworthy evidence from the ancient world for certain data of modern parapsychology. As far as levitation is concerned, the testimony of Iamblichus and others is good evidence for the occurrence of this phenomenon in antiquity.

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[23] See *De Myst.* III, ch. 4-7.

[24] See *De Myst.* III, 8.

[25] See *De Myst.* III, 8 (117).

The fact that such a phenomenon did really occur on certain recorded occasions does not prove that it also took place on others, but it does rule out a too sceptical attitude to the historical records of this phenomenon altogether. In his famous book on levitation, in which many cases are cited, Leroy[26] observes that those who deny the fact of levitation must reject a great deal of historical evidence, and that they do so without giving sufficient reason. Leroy argues, — rightly in my opinion — that the least those denying the fact of levitation must do is to prove the untrustworthiness of one of its most remarkable records, such as the levitation of Joseph di Copertino. This had not been done upto the time when Leroy wrote, nor has it been done to this day. It would indeed be a falsification of history to deny the historical records of levitation on grounds other than those normally accepted as part of historical method. So far as the cases mentioned above are concerned I can only repeat that I can see no reason to doubt the reliability of their sources. Nor can the facts they relate be dismissed as due to the author's credulity or autosuggestion by witnesses. This may be possible in other cases,[27] but it must be clear from the foregoing it is not so in the cases of levitation discussed. Historically speaking it must be said the the phenomenon of levitation is attested by sources, the reliability of which is not in doubt. It may be objected, that the writer of history whose sole purpose is to report historical facts is often dependent of the statements of eyewitnesses, who may be mistaken about their own psychological condition. I do not deny that this may be true in some cases where an honest historian may misinterpret the testimony of eyewitnesses of levitation by not taking their physical condition into account. But, even if there are such cases, where after investigation the historian appears to have misinterpreted the testimony it must be acknowledged that there are other cases of levitation which cannot be rejected as due to an author's unreliability or to his misinterpretation of accounts by eye-witnesses disturbed by a mental illness and seeing only hallucinations.[28] Thus I am certain that the cases of levitation already discussed can stand up to critical inquiry both author and sources being reliable. The remark by Eunapius (on page 280) that the slaves of Iamblichus used to make fun of their master's levitations at his devotions does not suggest that these eye-witnesses were mentally disturbed. So it must be with the cases of levitation, mentioned by Iamblichus himself. For it is very improbable that the man who knew the difference (see p. 283) between mental illness and a state of ecstasy despite the similarity of some of their symptoms would be mistaken about his own mental condition. I think we must accept the fact that Iamblichus himself really observed the phenomenon of levitation in people, who were not mentally disturbed. There is no reason to doubt that Iamblichus really saw normal people levitating. So also there is no reason to doubt Philostratus' statements concerning the levitations of Apollonius of Tyana. I have already said that this author's honesty is not in doubt and would only add here that he seems equally free from credulity.

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[26] See O. Leroy, *La Lèvitation, contribution historique et critique à l'étude du merveilleux*, 1, Seine et Oise, 1928.

[27] Joseph di Copertino, a seventeenth-century Roman Catholic monk, who was seen by many different people to levitate, for instance by the Lutheran prince Johann Friedrich von Brunswick. See Leroy, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

Whatever objections may be made against Philostratus as a historian who did not thoroughly investigate his sources, for the reasons given above we must accept that he did not deliberately invent te story of the levitation of Apollonius of Tyana and his previous observation of this phenomenon among Indian mystics. Philostratus at any rate must himself have believed his sources. From Dio Cassius[29] we know that Apollonius possessed what we should call paranormal gifts.[30] And he is called a magician by the sceptical minded Lucian[31] and by Apuleius.[32] Of course this fact on its own does not prove Philostratus' report of the levitation of Apollonius, but against the background of other reports of levitation, it allows us to say that the onus is on those who would deny the story to disprove it.

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[28] Of course it cannot be denied, that there are psychologically disturbed persons with hallucinations of flying in the air or of seeing other people do so.

Whatever the causes or conditions for the occurrence of levitation may be, it is a matter of fact that in certain undoubted cases it does occur. The evidence from antiquity at least is convincing. It is this evidence especially which makes it seem more scientific to accept the fact of the phenomenon than to deny it. It must be admitted, too, that the other cases discussed favour the acceptance of the phenomenon. Obviously it has nothing to do with mental illness, either in the levitating subject or in the witnesses. Nor can error due to selfdeception of the eyewitnesses be admitted in the cases discussed.

In most of the cases of which history informs us, levitation seems to occur spontaneous and not as something achieved by special techniques. The case of the Thibetan monks however, suggests that there are exceptions.

Leroy, in his book on levitation concludes that there is no reason to assume that levitation is reserved only for the religious. Logically speaking he is no doubt right. Even, if in all the cases discussed by him the subjects had been members of some religious society, it would have been right not to exclude the possibility that in theory others too could share the experience. But Leroy's conclusion does seem to be influenced by the rigid distinction he makes implicitly between religion and any other form of spiritualism.

Considering the numerous cases of levitation summarized by Leroy and the cases discussed above of which some were not dealt with by him, I venture to assert that levitation seems to be a special mark of people who believe in some kind of methaphysical world. This may be the world beyond this one of the Roman Catholic religion, or of any other religion, but it can also be the metaphysical world of a Neoplatonist like Iamblichus, or the world of a spiritualist.[33]

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[29] See Dio Cass, LXVIII, 18 (Philostratos, *Vita Apoll.* VIII, 26).

[30] For instance that of precognition. Thus he prophesied the murder of Domitian.

[31] *Alex.* 5.

[32] *De Magia* 90.

In every case the levitating subject is found to have some kind of belief in a supernatural world. The belief in question could even extend to being in league with the devil,[34] although the reliability of the case I have in mind, cannot be fully proved.

In my opinion it does not seem to be altogether unacceptable, that the belief in a world beyond this world, which is ruled by the laws of physics, in advance raises any kind of concious or unconcious blockade against the influence of other forces than those, known in this physical world. At any rate such a conception does not seem to be excluded by our knowledge of the facts, although it can not by fully proved either.

On page 280 we quoted a passage from the Acta Sanctorum, referring to Monica's religious life. We have already mentioned the fact, that it is explicitly said, that Monica was seen being levitated by other Christian believers on the 16th of September in the year 387.

It is remarkable, that Leroy does not mention this case at all, although the words "fere a terra per cubitum levata" leave no room for doubt.

From the passage it is clear, that those who were eyewitnesses of Monica's levitation had not expected anything of the kind and were taken quite by surprise. Thus it can not be explained as a hallucination of the bystanders. Indeed they were astonished that such a quiet person as Monica was respected to be, should have become so ecstatic, speaking with a loud voice and being "raised up from the earth". When the bystanders ask her, Monica herself can give no explanation of what has happened, but is only so full of joy, that it has a certain influence on the bystanders, who join her in going to Holy Communion. Here I wish to stress the point that the eyewitnesses of

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[33] Thus Home was a "spiritualist" before his conversion to Catholicism.

[34] So in the case of the Roman Catholic nun Marie Madeleine de Courdoue, who believed her paranormal gifts including levitation resulted from her pact with the devil. See *Acta Sanctorum* A. VII d'Octobre, p. 569B; Leroy, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

Monica's levitation asked her about this experience before they came under the influence of her ecstatic mood.[35] So any idea that they may have imagined, under the influence of ecstasy themselves, what they claimed to have seen, must be rejected. We must accept the fact that Monica was levitating and that when it happened, she had nothing else in mind but to prepare herself for Holy Communion. In my view her case has some resemblance to that of Teresa of Avila, which I discussed on page 283.

Monica was preparing herself to receive Holy Communion, but this does not imply, that while still in the house and before she reached the church she could have made a deliberate effort to achieve ecstasy. We must conclude that she reached that special state of mind spontaneously, a state described in the *Acta* as contrary to her normal disposition and accompanied by the phenomenon of levitation. From the words she called out when levitating in ecstasy it is clear, that she was still aware of the world around her and the presence of other people. She addressed them with the words, "*volemus ad coelum, fideles*". It follows that she was fully aware of being still on earth and surrounded by others. And here is another point of resemblance with the levitation of Teresa of Avila. Of Teresa, too, it may be assumed that she was in a religious mood at the time having been occupied with her studies, which were no doubt religious.[36]

The same holds for Monica, who was preparing herself to go to church. We do not know whether Teresa got into trance during her levitation. So there may still have been a difference between the two cases. For levitation, it seems, may occur when the subject is not in ecstasy but merely in a mood which is closely connected with his or her spiritual life. So all in all, there is no reason to doubt Monica's levitation. We have seen that levitation is a phenomenon of spiritualist tendencies in general and that it is therefore not specific of the Christian religion.

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[35] Cf. the words, "non respondebat; sed tanto gaudio replebatur quod omnes ad festum perducebat".

[36] See also Leroy, *op. cit.*, pp. 89ff. Leroy mentions similar conditions in the case of the levitation of François Xavier, who was sometimes levitating when celebrating Mass or just after it.

In the case of Monica it seems fair to assume that her levitation was a manifestation of her spiritual life as a fourthcentury Christian. We must add, however, her spiritual life was itself affected by an emotional attachment to certain remnants of the old pagan cults.[37] In his *Confessions* VI, 2, 2 Augustine tells us that in the year 385 in Milan according to the general custom of the ancient African church, his mother went to the graves of the Saints with the usual gifts for the dead, and that this was later forbidden her by Ambrosius.[38]

Its is exceptionally difficult to assess what precise influence Monica's attachment to the old gentile religious customs may have had on her Christian belief. But from the fact that she kept up the old observance of the *refrigerium*, it is clear that, sincere Christian as she was, she was still steeped in the ancient religion, which in the fourth century after Christ was by no means dead. We may infer, that she would at least have had a predisposition to accept the irrational aspects of spiritual life, not only as a matter of church doctrine but also as a survival from the ancient religion. So she can not have had any objections in principle to miraculous phenomena in religious practice.[39]

A variant form of levitation, walking on water was well-known in the Christian religion.[40] In about the same time in which the New Testament was written Dio Chrysostom refers to walking on water and flying as miracles.[41]

In the fourth century things were no different. In developing a more elaborate system of dogma the Christian Church had detained the supernatural phenomena of religion, whereas in the pagan world we note even a survival of magical practices,[42] closely bound up with ancient religious belief in the power of the supernatural and the divine. Whatever the differences in the fourth century between an ordinary Christian believer and a religious heathen, they certainly had nothing to do with the denial of supernatural phenomena.[43] In late antiquity[44] and right into the fourth century A.D. the idea of ecstasy as a means for the human soul to reach heaven while still in the body was widespread in the Hellenistic world. It was commonly believed that the soul would go to heaven after the death of the body.

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[37] See P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin*, 2, Paris 1968, pp. 86-91.

[38] See J. Quasten, *Vetus Superstitio et nova religio, the Problem of the refrigerium in the Ancient Church of North Africa* in *Harvard Theological Review*, t. XXX III, 1950, pp. 252-266.

[39] See Iamblichus, *De Myst.* III, and Lucian, *De Luctu.*

[40] See Mk. VI, 49; Jn. VI, 19.

[41] See G. Mussies, *Dio Chrysostom and the New Testament*, Leiden 1972, p. 65.

[42] See A. A. Barb in *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity*, ed. A. Momigliano, Warburg-Oxford 1970 rightly emphasized that no clear line can be drawn between magic and religion.

The Christian religion of the early centuries, too, was acquainted with both possibilities of the soul's journey to heaven.[45] The idea seems to have been familiair both in early Christianity and in later Judaism[46] and in the pagan world, too.[47] From Plato's *Phaedrus* onwards it became a general notion in the Hellenistic world and was still thoroughly alive in the fourth century A.D. both in and outside the Christian church. There is an illuminating passage in Arnobius, *Adversus Gentes* II, 62: "Neque illud obrepat aut spe vobis aeria blandiatur, quod a sciolis nonnullis, et plurimum sibi arrogantibus dicitur; Deo esse se gnatos, nec fati obnoxios legibus; si vitam restrictius egerint, aulam sibi ejus patere, ac post hominis functionem prohibente se nullo tamquam in sedem referri patritam; neque quod Magi spondent, commendatitias habere se preces, quibus emollitae nescio quae potestates vias faciles praebeant ad coelum contendentibus subvolare ...". The translation by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson[48] is: "And be not deceived or deluded with vain hopes by that which is said by some ignorant and most presumptuous pretenders, that they are born of God and are not subject to the decrees of fate; that this palace lies open to them if they lead a life of temperance, and that after death as men, they are restored without hindrance, as if to their father's abode; nor by that which the Magi assert, that they have intercessory prayers, won over by which some powers make the way easy to those who are striving to mount to heaven ...".

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[43] Barb, *op. cit.*, p. 104, remarks that Jesus himself was alleged to have been executed as a sorcerer according to *Bab. Talmud, Sanhedrin* VI, 1 (fol. 43a). He also refers to *Koran*, V.110. In certain circles the Christian religion was considered as a kind of magical cult.

[44] According to W. Bousset, *Die Himmelsreise der Seele*, 2, Darmstadt 1962, it was Plato's *Phaedrus* 248C which introduced the journey of the soul to heaven into Greek thought. See further Philo of Alexandria, *De insomniis* I.22, who connects this passage of the Phaedrus with Genesis 28.

[45] Cf. Justin Mart., *Apol.* I, 59 s.q. (*Just. Mart.* wrongly thinks Plato in Phaedrus 248 C was influenced by Gen. 28). Clemens Alex., *Strom* V, ed. H. Potter 692. *Origen, contra Celsum* VI, ch. 3. Arnobius, *Adv. Gentes* II, 62.

[46] See H. Bietenhard, *Die himmlische Welt im Urchristentum und Spätjudentum*, Tübingen 1951.

[47] See Flavius Josephus, *Antiq.*, XVIII, 18.

[48] *The seven books of Arnobius Adversus Gentes*, vol. XIX in Anti-Nicene Christian Library, 1871.

We see that Arnobius passes from an attack on the views of certain philosophers[49] concerning the soul's origin and destination to a condemnation of the Magi for pretending that they had power to facilitate the soul's journey to heaven after death. One conclusion we may draw is that the Magi were still making offers of help to those who wanted to reach heaven. And we know from this very context that even Arnobius himself believed in magical practices[50] but thought they ought to be confined to any powers except human souls. Another striking point about the passage quoted is the figurative language of the words "subvolare ad coelum". Obviously this is connected with the ancient conception of the winged soul which we find everywhere in the Hellenistic world.

The soul was winged long before the notion of its journey to heaven entered the Greek world.[51] Flying souls are found in paintings on Attic oil-flasks[52] dating from the days when it was still thought that the dead went as shades into the darkness of Hades.[53] According to early Greek religious thought the dead were believed to visit their own graves and sometimes the houses in which they lived during their lives. In Plato's *Phaedrus* and later in the writings of Hellenistic writers we find both the notion of a journey of the soul to heaven and that of the winged soul.[54] So A. d'Alès[55] remarks that Christian writers, who were all acquainted with the notion of the soul's going to heaven after death, drew on Plato's *Phaedrus* for the metaphor of the winged soul. The winged soul is found on many graves in the Hellenistic world.[56] It is also a metaphor of Plotinus (*Enn.* I, 6, 5) who influenced Ambrosius in *De Isaac* VIII, 78 (C.S.E.L. 32, 1 S 696, 22).[57] Of course in the writings of Neoplatonic writers and Christian writers influenced by Neoplatonism the wings of the soul and its journey to heaven have acquired a metaphysical meaning which is clearly due to their elaborate idea of God and the soul as spiritual beings.[58] In other cases the soul's journey to heaven seems to be connected with the writer's conception of the universe.[59] So heaven, which has to be understood as the dwelling place of God and the powers surrounding or subordinated to Him, is closely associated with the sky.[60] So it is easily understood that the human soul in ecstasy or after death must ascend to reach heaven, to which the blessed have access.[61]

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[49] For instance all Neoplatonists believed the soul to be of divine origin. As for the reading "*sciolis*" from the emendation of Gelenius instead of "*scholis*" according to the mss. I must observe that the meaning of the passage is the same whether we read sciolis or scholis. For the main point is Arnobius' attack on believers in the soul's divine origin.

[50] So did Origen, *Contra Celsum* i.69.

[51] See note 41, where I referred to W. Bousset, *Die Himmelsreise der Seele*, Darmstadt, 1962. Bousset rightly remarks that it was Phaedrus 248c which introduced the soul's ascent to heaven into Greek thought. In contradiction to Bousset I observe that in Greek thought the concept of reincarnation was of earlier date than the Phaedrus-passage.

[52] See E. Rohde, *Psyche*, Tübingen 1925, 1, 244; II, 122; II, 161. The Attic oil-flasks are certainly older than the 5th century B.C.

[53] The remains of this old concept even survived the new one of the soul's ascent to heaven. This may be seen in the fact that the cult of souls at the tomb, which is closely linked with the old Hades beliefs, held its ground in the Hellenistic world until the fourth century A.D. See also note 35.

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[54] In Egyptian religion too we find the concept of a flying soul. The Ba-soul which takes care of the body of a dead person, is represented as a bird with the head of a human being. In H. Bonnet, *Reallexikon der Ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte*, Berlin 1952, p. 76 we read: "... In den Gräbern des Neuen Reiches sehen wir oft die Seele dargestellt, wie sie den Grabschacht zur Mummie hinabfliegt, den Lufthauch des Lebens an ihre Nase hält und sich sorgend auf dem Leichenbett niederlässt ...".

[55] A. d'Alèse, *Les ailes de l'âme*, *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, t. X, 1933, p. 63ff. Alès mentions Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VI, 43-44; Gregorius of Nyssa, *De Anima et resurrectione*, P.G., 46, c. 112C-113A; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* I, 1, 4, 3; Methodius, *Conv. Virg.*, VIII, 2.

[56] See P. Courcelle, *Quelques Symboles funéraires du Néoplatonisme latin* in *Revue des Études anciennes*, t. XXII, 1945, pp. 155-174.

[57] See P. Courcelle, *Die Entdeckung des Christlichen Neuplatonismus* in *Zum Augustin-Gespräch der Gegenwart*, Darmstadt 1962, pp. 145ff.

[58] See for instance Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, 4 Ch. 5, where heaven is described as the realm of the nous (= Ideas) and as the to the former subordinated realm of the soul. Plotinus did not know *De Chaldeicis Oraculis* — see Kroll in his commentary on this work. So his conceptions of heaven and the soul can not have been influenced by it.

[59] See for instance Paul, *Eph.* IV, 9, where heaven is located above the earth. See Bietenhard, *op. cit.*, p. 237. Further *Eph.* 6, 12, where there is reference to the spirits of the air. See also Iambl., *De Myst.* I, 20.

In the above quoted passage of Arnobius the words "subvolare ad coelum" must be read against the background of Arnobius' own conceptions of a metaphysical world[62] and a soul which he did not believe was incorporeal. Arnobius believed that heaven was above the earth. In the centre was God himself and on his right Jesus Christ, called Angel of the Church by the so called Fathers of the Church. Next in order came the Thrones, the Archangels, Cherubim, and Seraphim, and most furthest from God's throne the Chorus of Angels, the tutelar geniuses of man.[63] In Arnobius' view it was by the grace of God that after death the soul, which was not immortal in itself could become *longaeva* and go to heaven. When Arnobius attacks the magicians, his attack is directed against their practices, which in his view offered no real help to those trying to fly to heaven. To some extent he also criticizes these last, but merely because they have vain hopes and look for help from magicians. He does not offer objections to the fact of trying to fly to heaven, only to the methods used. People should trust in the grace of God, he thinks, and not look to the theurgy of the magicians. This very passage of Arnobius makes it clear that in the fourth century A.D. magical practices were still usual in certain circles in order to achieve the journey to heaven for the soul. Secondly the words "subvolare ad coelum", used of the soul's "flight" refer back to a very ancient concept, that of the winged soul, later combined with another concept not quite ancient, that of the soul's journey to heaven. The fact that these concepts were in keeping with those of third century and earlier Christianity concerning the soul and its destiny does not mean that their origin could not be much older. Thus returning to the words spoken by St. Monica on the occasion referred to on page 282, I find it remarkable, that she expressed herself in words similar to those used by Arnobius of people who looked to the magicians for help in making the journey to heaven when they died. As a fourth century Christian Monica certainly believed in the possibility in going to heaven after death, regarding it as man's real destiny and of more worth than life on earth. The words "volemus ad coelum" undoubtedly testify to her sincere Christian belief, according to which heaven was a better dwelling place for the soul than earth. Her mode of expression, could just as well have been used by pagans, to express the mental state of ecstasy during their lives on earth or the blessings of heaven for their souls after death. The reason that Monica could use the same words as a pagan seems to be that there was a certain similarity of belief between Christians and pagans with regard to heaven and the soul, as I have made clear above. Monica, who might have heard Ambrosius' preach *De Isaac* in Milan,[64] was certainly familiar preaching with the pagan concept of the soul's flight to heaven. It cannot be fully proved, but nor can it be denied, that Monica was influenced by them. When we remember her attitude to the cult of the dead at their graves it seems not unlikely, that she was similarly influenced by pagan notions of the soul's journey to heaven. She might then have found the same notions in Christianity with only a few changes concerning the means to be used. At least as far as the flight to heaven is concerned there can have been no contradiction between Christianity and paganism in Monica's case. Nor were the *fideles* around her surprised at the words she used, but merely at the fact of her levitation. In the eyes of those *fideles* Monica was saying nothing strange. We can only conclude that her words "volemus ad coelum" corresponded to a very common notion, alive among pagans and Christians alike.

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[60] Even Plutarch's idea (*De orbe et facie lunae*) that on the moon unpurified souls find a place where they can be purified, fits in with the notion of close links between the metaphysical world and cosmology.

[61] Cf. Arn., *Adv. Gentes* I, 42.

[62] Cf. Arn., *Adv. Gentes* I.

[63] According to Orelli in his edition of Arnobius this conception of heaven was of Chaldean origin and generally accepted by the socalled fathers of the Old Church, who found it also in certain biblical writers.

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[64] Probably *De Isaac* is to be dated between April and June 386. See P. Courcelle, *Die Entdeckung des christlichen Neuplatonismus* in *Zum Augustin-Gespräch der Gegenwart*, Darmstadt 1962, p. 180.